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The All Needs Approach to Emergency Response
Donald A. Donahue, Stephen O. Cunnion, Carey D. Balaban, Ken Sochats
ABSTRACT
For decades,  emergency planners  have 
operated either under an approach termed 
“all hazards,” focusing on the commonalities 
of catastrophes,  or under scenario-specific 
planning rubrics  that aligned actions  with 
the particular cause of the disaster. While 
each method has  i ts  strengths  and 
advocates,  both have demonstrated 
shortcomings in execution and generated 
pervasive  dissatisfaction among served 
communities.  The authors  contend this 
discontent derives  from a failure to  address 
the perceived needs within the impacted 
populations.  Drawing upon classic theories 
of rationality and motivation, a new 
paradigm of “all needs” planning is 
proposed.  This  approach offers  an effective 
planning matrix that is  both flexible and 
robust in assessing the myriad needs  of a 
disaster-stricken populace.
INTRODUCTION
This article presents a  model  for  an  All Needs 
Approach  to catastrophic  event  preparedness 
and response.  It advances the premise that 
the focus on  threat  elements needlessly 
truncates and Balkanizes the full role of 
government  in  a  disaster, which  is to provide 
immediate relief and to facilitate full  recovery 
of the physical and social  community 
infrastructures. By  basing  planning on  the 
needs of the impacted population  – the “all 
needs”  approach – planners can better 
prioritize  the full  range of requirements and 
fully  integrate both  the government  and non-
government contributions.
This model  is based on  well-accepted 
scienti f ic research  and is a imed at 
understanding  and integrating needs of all 
types of individuals in  an emergency 
situation, including the need to care for 
others (e.g.,  family, pets, or  patients).  The 
article starts by  outlining some basic 
principles of motivation  and relates these to 
the human  decision-making processes and 
behaviors in  emergencies.  We then  show  how 
special needs fit  into this framework. Next we 
present  a  model  for  an  All Needs Approach 
and demonstrate how  it  might be used to 
define emergency care.
The national  approach  to emergency 
response vacillates between  two philosophies. 
The first  parallels the mode of thought  of the 
early  days of emergency  management, 
wherein  each  type of emergency  is considered 
an  independent entity  with  scenario-specific 
issues of planning,  response, and recovery.  In 
1991,  the fall of the Soviet  Union  eliminated 
central  control  of its considerable  arsenal of 
weapons of mass destruction  and generated 
concern  over  potential  terrorist  use within 
the United States.  Planning  shifted from  a 
focus on  a  single,  technologically  advanced 
adversary  to a mix  of threats by  non-state 
actors,  disease outbreaks, and natural 
disasters.  By  the middle of the decade, a 
b r o a d e r d e f i n i t i o n  o f e m e r g e n c y 
preparedness began to emerge. Hurricane 
Andrew  in  1992  and the bombings of the 
World Trade Center in  1993  and Alfred P. 
Murrah  Federal Building in  1995  provided 
deadly  affirmation  of the need for a shift in 
planning for emergency response.
“In  1996, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 
program  established the first homeland 
security  training  programs to prepare U.S. 
cities to respond to terrorist attacks.” 1 
Created by  the Defense Against  Weapons of 
M a s s D e s t r u c t i o n  A c t o f 1 9 9 6  ( a n 
a m e n d m e n t t o N a t i o n a l  D e f e n s e 
Authorization  Act  for  Fiscal Year  1997),  the 
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program  provided 
training  and equipment to the nation’s 
largest  120 cities. The authorizing  legislation 
designated the Department  of Defense (DoD) 
as lead agency  and assigned participating 
agencies, including  the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency  (FEMA),  the Federal 
B u r e a u  o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n  ( F B I ) , t h e 
Department of Health and Human  Services’ 
Public  Health  Service, the Department  of 
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Energy,  and the Environmental  Protection 
Agency.2  
The 1996  publication  of the Guide for All-
Hazard Emergency Operations  Planning by 
FEMA  signaled a  paradigm  shift from  a 
concrete ,  scenario-based emergency 
management  perspective to a  more abstract 
focus on the common  response elements 
across emergency  events.  This focus on 
hazard commonalties represented disaster 
response issues as a  family  of general 
problems with  common  threat  elements to be 
mitigated.  This approach  was designed to 
h e l p e m e r g e n c y  m a n a g e r s l e v e r a g e 
efficiencies in  planning  for  and responding  to 
emergencies and detect  gaps in  plans and 
responses.
The events of September  11,  2001  and the 
ensuing  postal anthrax  attacks resulted in  the 
creation of the Department  of Homeland 
Security  and the incorporation  of FEMA  into 
the department. The need to respond to acts 
of terrorism  broadened the planning  focus 
within  the FEMA  agenda. The 2005  National 
Planning Scenarios  outlined fifteen  likely 
natural and man-made disasters that were 
intended “for  use in  national,  federal, state, 
and local homeland security  preparedness 
activities.” 3  These scenarios,  in  essence, 
represented hybridization  of the two 
approaches, emphasizing  an all hazards 
perspective but  with  the added dimension of 
specific threat  scenarios as a preparedness 
framework. In  theory,  this set  of scenarios 
should be sufficient  to identify  the all-
hazards-based competencies required for 
capabilities-based planning. However,  the 
focus on  the immediate response to the 
specific, prescribed circumstances may  come 
at  the expense of neglecting  a  broader 
perspective that  facilitates immediate relief 
while laying  the foundation  for  long-term 
recovery.
The all hazards approach  attempts to 
“optimize”  (in  a  loose sense) institutional 
plans and actions across disaster  scenarios by 
trading  off specificity  for  a general reduction 
in  hazard or  risk.  Following traditions of 
operations research, there has been a  natural 
bias to use objective measures (e.g.,  economic 
loss,  lives saved, and speed of evacuation) as 
benchmarks to guide optimization. However, 
these outcome measures are  clearly  too 
narrow. The effectiveness of response cannot 
be measured exclusively  in  terms of logistical 
indicators,  but rather  by  the recovery  and 
resiliency  of the region. Much  as body  counts 
do not  determine a  military  victory, 
traditional objective measures do not  fully 
assess the effectiveness of the disaster 
response in  restoring  the perceived quality  of 
life after an extreme event.
The events surrounding  more recent 
disasters,  particularly  Hurricanes Katrina 
and Ike, demonstrated these traditional 
measures and response strategies lead to 
suboptimal  results because they  are not 
completely  congruent  with  the public’s 
perception  of needs and its ongoing concerns. 
Disaster  response has long  been  viewed as 
providing  maximum  assistance to the 
greatest  number  of people,  with  the reluctant 
– if rarely  voiced – acknowledgement that 
there will  be those beyond immediate help. 
By  that  metric,  the  responses to these two 
hurricanes were adequate and, therefore, 
successful,  albeit  outwardly  chaotic.4  That 
100,000  to 300,000 mostly  poor  could not 
be evacuated from  New  Orleans immediately 
following  Katrina  (which  has come to 
symbolize failed emergency  planning) has 
b e e n  a t t r i b u t e d t o f a u l t y  p l a n n i n g 
assumptions on the part  of local officials.5 
Still, more than  60,000 people were 
subsequently  evacuated by  federal  assets 
responding to the disaster,  an  indicator  that 
the system  seems to work  if we make the 
appropriate assumptions.
The fact  that the name Katrina remains 
synonymous with  failed response some six 
years on  demonstrates the enduring  damage 
that  can  be inflicted by  failure to address the 
hierarchy  of needs within  the impacted 
population.  There has been  a  widespread 
perception that addressing a  broader 
spectrum  of needs is beyond the current 
responsibilities of government.  Hence, 
emergency  managers have focused on the 
concept  of “citizen  preparedness,” 6 which is 
based on  the premise that  citizens should be 
in  the best  position  to determine and satisfy 
their  own needs. It  should not be a  surprise 
to find that evacuees prefer  to relocate to a 
relative's or  friend’s home or an  alternate 
place of employment.  Indeed,  the data  from 
Hurricane Katrina  suggest  this, identifying 
evacuee relocation to virtually  every  state. 7 
Soc ia l sys tems at  these evacuat ion 
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destinations would typically  have the 
capability  of and interest  in  providing for  the 
evacuee's normal and special needs.  Although 
emergency  managers do not  typically  plan 
evacuation  destinations chosen voluntarily  by 
citizens,  the data  necessary  to plan for  them 
can  be generated easily  from  population  data 
or  direct citizen  surveys. Rather,  an 
insensitivity  to higher  level citizen  needs and 
the perceived benefits of managed evacuation 
centers drive the decision making process.
While  immediate physiological needs are 
generally  met,  it  is the perceived absence of 
attention  to psychosocial  welfare that 
generates long-term  dissatisfaction, loss of 
confidence in  institutions,  and subsequent 
political  and policy  ramifications.  When 
reinforced by  emotionally  wrenching  images 
– wheelchair-bound victims,  lost  family  pets, 
and the disproportionate impact on  society’s 
less fortunate – the expectations of the 
impacted population can  drive future policy 
and operations. Special  needs, including 
evacuation  provisions for  pets, are now 
included prominently  in  planning because 
they  address the perceived needs and, hence, 
the credibility  and trusted status of the 
responders for the affected populations.  
This article outlines principles for an  “all-
needs”  approach  to improve responses from 
the perspective of the physical and 
psychological needs of the  survivors,  who 
include victims and persons displaced (or 
simply  inconvenienced) by  the event.  This 
construct  builds upon  the authors’ experience 
in  healthcare and work integrating physical, 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l , s p i r i t u a l ,  f i n a n c i a l , 
environmental, and other  factors into a 
robust delivery model.
One begins by  accepting that  benchmarks 
for  the outcome of emergency  care can  be 
defined as satisfaction of the relevant 
subjective needs of the survivors of a  disaster. 
By  analogy,  a  person who falls overboard is 
saved by  the provision  of a  life ring  or 
preserver.  That  rescue falls short,  however, if 
the individual is not  brought aboard,  offered 
warmth, drink,  and food as necessary, and 
returned to shore.  An ideal  outcome can 
likely  never be achieved, but it  should not 
preclude improvement as a  goal  for 
integrated planning.  In times of economic 
austerity,  the pragmatic suggestion that one 
sets priorities before assessing  needs reverses 
the effective planning  process and needlessly 
omits capabilities outside government that 
help meet  the perceived needs of the affected 
population.  Some of the most robust 
response derives from  outside government 
but  cannot be projected and requires 
facilitative official planning  to occur. 
Following Katrina, the Southern  Baptist 
Convention  of the North  American  Mission 
Board supplied thirty  mobile kitchens, 
contributing  to the more than  8  million  meals 
served by  the American Red Cross.8  The 
massive response from  the Walmart 
Corporation  was a spontaneous response to 
perceived needs. 9  This l ies beyond 
government’s mandate, but  cannot  be absent 
from government’s planning.
The unprecedented evacuation of greater 
New  Orleans met  many  objective measures of 
success.  The global perception  of a  death  toll 
increased to 1,836  by  failure to address socio-
economic  and special needs and of an  inept 
response that did little to foster the 
beginnings of recovery  represented 
consummate failures in  meeting  the needs of 
victims.  The lasting  image is not  of 
Louisianans whisked to safety, but  of people 
abandoned and neighborhoods forsaken. In 
essence,  emergency  care is simply  needs 
satisfaction  and successful emergency 
response depends on  the satisfactory 
identification and servicing of relevant needs.
Understanding  the system  of human  needs 
is critical  to defining  emergency  strategies 
because subjective needs determine both 
individual behavior in  emergencies and 
effective response levels. Public perception  of 
needs satisfaction  is critical because it  drives 
public  opinion, trust, and confidence in 
response capabilities.   It  can  impact multiple 
individual factors that  influence the Threat/
Ef f i cacy  Prof i le  o f indiv idua ls and 
communities, such  as trust  in government, 
civic engagement,  and perceived societal 
norms,10  to reduce barriers to preparedness 
b e h a v i o r s a n d c o m p l i a n c e w i t h 
recommendations.  Therefore, common sense 
suggests that a  subjective, outcome-based 
overlay  of the all hazards approach,  an “all 
needs”  approach, can take an  enlightened 
look  at  the mult i tude of temporal , 
community,  and special needs – what we 
term  “focused needs”  −  and develop 
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strategies that address those needs in  an 
effective and efficient manner.  
NEEDS 
Developing a  taxonomy  of needs is the  first 
step toward developing  an  All  Needs 
Approach. As a  starting point, one can begin 
with  the classical hierarchy  of needs schema 
of human  motivation that  was developed by 
the noted psychologist,  Abraham  Maslow 
(Table 1). This schema is based upon  the 
premise that  there are five sets of general 
goals,  or  basic needs that  motivate human 
behavior. 11  Although  the arrangement  of 
these needs in  an  order  or  hierarchy  reflects 
philosophical  and psychological traditions 
(e.g., Aristotle’s hierarchy  of levels of 
anima), 12 the order is neither  linear  nor  fixed. 
Reflective of the human behavior  it  is meant 
to model, the hierarchy  is comprised of 
myriad supportive and supplemental needs 
that,  in  aggregate, determine the relevant 
stratus.
In  fact, core tenets of the Maslow 
hierarchy  – often  overlooked by  its critics – 
are “(a) there are multiple and independent 
fundamental motivational  systems and (b) 
these motives form  a  hierarchy  in  which 
some motives have priority  over  others.” 13 
T h e s e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  f u n c t i o n i n g 
dimensions can  be represented by  the 
modification of the classic  Maslow  pyramid 
(Figure 1) to depict overlapping  goal systems 
(Figure  2). Rather  than  a unified linear 
progress ion,  the hierarchy  of fers a 
multilayered model where an  individual  can 
occupy  several  levels depending  on myriad 
factors, including the external environment. 
Maslow  discounted ecological  impact. “It 
remains to caution  the theorizer  against too 
great  a  preoccupation  with  the exterior,  with 
the culture,  the environment, or  the situation. 
Our  central object  of study  here is, after  all, 
the organism  or the character  structure.” 14 A 
sudden  shift  in  the degree of safety  and 
security, though,  is likely  to produce a  change 
in hierarchical focus.  
If you  are having  lunch  with  your boss, 
and you  discover  a  scorpion crawling  up 
your leg, self-protection goals are likely  to 
trump whatever food- or status-related 
goals were salient a  moment earlier. But if 
it is merely an ant on your  leg, and your 
boss has just asked you  to consider a 
promotion, the self-protection  goal  is  not 
likely to be foremost in mind.15
The schema is predicated on  the concepts 
that  each  goal is satisfied to a  variable degree 
in  every  individual and that  the perception  of 
current needs arises in  terms of the relevance 
of unfulfilled goals.  The significant  change in 
needs and priorities wrought  by  a  disaster  is 
likely  to realign multiple  dimensions of the 
needs hierarchy.
An example that  follows the hierarchical 
order  is the starving person  who will  risk 
safety  and debase self-esteem  to acquire  food, 
even  by  begging  or  eating  decaying garbage. 
Conversely, a  martyr can  be motivated by 
self-actualization  and devalue physiological 
needs and safety.  In  other  individuals,  the 
need for  esteem  can override social needs. 
These examples illustrate the point  that the 
taxonomy  of needs simply  defines a 
multidimensional space for  understanding 
the interplay  of motivations and supporting 
and supplemental needs in personal decision 
making.
Figure 1. Maslow’s classic hierarchy of needs
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Figure 2. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs modified to illuminate supportive and supplemental needs.
The feasibility  of implementing an  All 
Needs Approach will  depend upon  the ability 
to identify  a  focused list of policies for  needs 
satisfaction  that will be perceived as adequate 
by  a  large segment  of the public.   An All 
Needs Approach  must  necessarily  focus 
policy  on  consensus needs and goals − 
individualized needs obviously  cannot  be 
accommodated.  In addition,  one in  five 
Americans presents some degree of 
functional  or  performance limitation,  an 
array  of circumstances loosely  classified as 
“special  needs.” 16 Sensitivity  to social needs 
and needs for  self-esteem  require some 
degree o f group ident i f i ca t ion  and 
personalization. Do we use a  least  common 
denominator  approach,  a  population  average, 
or  a  greatest common  denominator  approach 
in  selecting  levels of needs satisfaction? The 
guiding principles for  selection  of these levels 
of needs satisfaction  are not  simple. Neither 
are attempts to quantify  aspects of 
motivation  and the results thereof. Another 
critique of Maslow  relies almost  solely  on  the 
fact  that  his level descriptors do not 
correspond to mathematically  independent 
factors in  questionnaire studies. 17 This fails to 
consider  the myriad and constantly  shifting 
dimensions of human  motivation. Moreover, 
we would suggest  some issues defy  standard 
quantification. Statistically,  and based on 
objective criteria,  the United States prevailed 
in  the war  in Viet  Nam. This would come as 
an  amusing revelation  to government leaders 
in Hanoi.
For  our  purposes,  then, the hierarchy  can 
be regarded as a “place holder”  for  a 
generalized or average relevancy  rating that 
can guide public policy.
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Table 1.  Summary of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Need.18
Goal (Basic Need) Definition Example
Self Actualization To become everything that one is 
capable of becoming
External recognition, self fulfillment
Esteem Needs Image Respect, self-worth, status
Social Needs Relationships Communication, privacy, 
companionship, mental health, 
belongingness, role
Safety needs Freedom from harm Life, injury, threats
Physiological needs Basic survival needs Breathing, homeostasis, water, sleep, 
food, sex, clothing, shelter, mobility
The first step for an All Needs Approach  to 
disaster  management,  then, is identifying  the 
motivating  goals and their  relative values. It 
is assumed generally  that actions of 
individuals in  an emergency  are  typically 
consistent  with  the hierarchy  of goals in 
Maslow’s motivation  theory.  For  example,  we 
assume that  at  the lowest  level,  people make 
decisions with  respect  to sheltering  in  place 
or  evacuating  based on their  perceptions of 
consequences in  terms of both  their 
physiological needs versus their  safety  needs. 
They  will tend to shelter  in  place if they 
believe they  have adequate resources for  their 
projected basic  survival  needs or  for  the 
perceived consequences of the threat. In  fact, 
a  strong  sense of preparedness for  basic 
n e e d s c a n  c r e a t e a  b i a s t o w a r d 
underestimation of threat  consequences and 
a  reluctance to evacuate.  Similarly,  if the 
homeowner  views the intrinsic value of the 
property  as essential to long term  survival, 
i.e.  worth  protecting  even while placing self 
in  danger, the risk perception/acceptance 
threshold shifts dramatically  away  from  the 
evacuation option.
There are other  considerations that  may 
consistently  alter  the order  of needs in  the 
hierarchy. For  example, a  person  with  the 
responsibility  for  caring  for  others may  place 
paramount value on  acting  for  his or  her 
charges. A  parent  will  risk his or  her  own 
safety  for  a  child or other dependent  for  care. 
In  a  similar  vein, the relevance of a  social 
need can  explain  seeming  irrationality  of 
emergency  behavior  with  respect  to pets.  The 
pet  can  be considered as a  family  member, to 
the extent  that  the goal of caring  for  the pet 
becomes so important that  threats to survival 
become susceptible to devaluation,  denial, or 
even  a  “martyrdom” mentality.  In  the latter 
case,  caring for the pet  can become a higher 
purpose for  self-actualization. Combined with 
a  sense of a  modicum  of preparedness for 
basic  needs,  the presence of a  pet appears to 
strongly  tip  the balance toward a decision  not 
to evacuate.
Needs may  be activated by  short- or  long-
term  considerations.  For  example, a person 
may  stay  where her job is because she uses 
the job  (pay) to satisfy  physiological  needs, or 
a  resident may  have an  emotional  affinity  to 
his “hometown,”  as was widely  witnessed in 
New  Orleans. Need can  also be  triggered by 
circumstantial and temporal  considerations. 
A  woman  late  in  her ninth  month  of 
pregnancy  is not by  definition disabled, but 
would require targeted consideration  of 
conditional needs.
It is not  the responsibility  of emergency 
response to address all needs at all  levels. We 
would suggest that  self actualization  is well 
beyond the practicality  for  emergency 
response. Self esteem  needs probably  do not 
need to be addressed except  that  any 
emergency  response must  be respectful of the 
individual.  However,  these levels can  be 
affected indirectly  by  response and 
m e s s a g i n g  s t r a t e g i e s t h a t e n h a n c e 
psychological resilience in  the face of 
traumatic experiences. Psychotraumatology 
uses the term  ”growth  through  adversity” to 
descr ibe the emergence of posi t ive 
adaptations and adjustments as we live 
through  traumatic, catastrophic,  and 
threatening  situations. 19  The recognition  of 
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and ability  to operate under  conditions of 
uncertainty,  the development  of a sense of 
connected detachment  (“integration of affect 
and cognition”), and the recognition  and 
acceptance of human  limitations appear  to be 
critical psychological  factors in  overcoming 
personal,  and by  extension  communal, 
adversi ty .20  Proact ive educat ion of 
individuals and community  leaders, 
combined with  appropriate messaging 
strategies,  may  be one way  to nurture and 
engage these bases of psychological  resilience 
in response planning.
If we provide rescued survivors with only 
safety  and merely  satisfy  their  physiological 
needs, their  motivational  basis will stem  from 
their  social  needs. Success in  satisfying needs 
will not  eliminate need.  The public (and 
media) focus will simply  shift to other 
unsatisfied needs that had lower  initial 
salience in  the hierarchy.  Thus, to better 
manage survivors we will  need to address 
some of their  immediate and pressing  social 
needs. Interestingly  enough,  this is another 
place where companionship concerns (e.g., 
provisions for pets) re-enter the picture.
BOUNDED RATIONALITY
The standard hierarchy  of needs theory 
presumes that  people behave as rational 
agents when  making decisions to meet  their 
perceived needs.  This view  mirrors the 
prevailing  notion  in  economics that  humans 
behave as rational agents when making 
decisions to optimize needs fulfillment. 
However,  the recognition  that  humans act  as 
agents with  bounded rationality  has emerged 
from  Herbert  A. Simon’s proposal to “replace 
the global rationality  of economic man  with  a 
kind of rational behavior  that  is compatible 
with  the access to information  and the 
computational  capacities that  are actually 
possessed by  organisms,  including  man,  in 
the kinds of environments in  which such 
organisms exist.” 21 From  this viewpoint,  both 
human cognitive limitations and the 
limitations imposed by  the structure of the 
environment  and perceived solution  space 
are conditions that  constrain  the selection  of 
courses of action. 22  In  fact,  the criterion for 
satisfaction  with  a  decision  (or  course of 
action) is often  that it  meets a  threshold of 
being “good enough,”  or  satisfactory, which  is 
consistent  with  Maslow’s original  concept 
that  it  is only  necessary  to achieve a  level  of 
relative satisfaction  for  any  basic  need.23 One 
of the authors’ experience as an  emergency 
department administrator  for  an  inner  city 
hospital during  a  time of severe overcrowding 
noted that minimal  needs patients were 
willing  to wait  inordinate periods – in 
essence while their  medical needs were not 
being met  – provided that  the length  and 
cause of the extreme delay  was explained. 
Their  need for  medical attention  was 
subjugated by  satisfying  the need for  self-
determination,  a  higher  level within  the 
Maslow construct.
The more general incorporation  of 
bounded rationality  in  an  all needs 
framework is now  simple.  If we align  our 
resources and services to meet  the perceived 
needs and decision  space of the population 
(e.g.,  the response being “good enough”  vis-à-
vis each  basic need), we will  achieve a 
rational and robust  model to drive an  All 
Needs Approach. 
CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF 
BASIC NEEDS
Our  discussion to this point  implies that  the 
lynchpin  of an  All Needs Approach  is the 
accurate estimation  of the perceived 
hierarchies of needs in  diverse groups of 
people. Response strategies and policies can 
then  be designed to satisfy  the broadest 
possible spectrum  of perceived needs.  The 
approaches can  also include interventions to 
modify  expectations of satisfaction  of 
perceived needs that  may  be either 
impossible or impractical  as outcomes, which 
could even  be measures to modify  the 
perceptions themselves.
BASIC SURVIVAL NEEDS 
In an  emergency  context, one naturally 
thinks first  of survival needs as the 
physiological needs that  are necessary  to 
sustain life, such  as food,  water, and shelter 
(which  includes clothing).  However, as 
discussed by  Maslow’s original 1943  paper,  it 
is too restrictive to consider  only  those very 
rare situations when  one is faced with  a clear-
cut life-or-death  situation.  Perceived basic 
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survival needs are  likely  to be fluid and 
difficult to define because they  can  include 
amenities related to items that  are not 
essential for  basic survival.  Further,  they  will 
depend upon  the degree of preparedness and 
perceived preparedness among the affected 
populations.
SPECIAL NEEDS
Special  needs are not  really  new  basic needs 
but conditions that  alter  the resources and 
services that  are necessary  to meet the basic 
needs of affected classes of people. Many  of 
the current  efforts focus on  identifying and 
classifying  populations that require specific 
accommodations for  meeting  their  basic 
needs during  emergency  management.  The 
table below  shows one attempt  to catalog this 
population in  a  study  by  the Oak  Ridge 
National Laboratories. 24  





Mobility impaired Culturally isolated
Medically dependent Migrants




Nursing homes Socially isolated
Halfway houses Children
Assisted care facilities Low-income
Day-care centers Homeless
Prisons, jails Can't leave home
Homeless shelters Non-English speaking
Spouse-abuse shelters
Current Federal Emergency  Management 
Agency  (FEMA) terminology  eschews the 
term  special needs in  favor  of “Children and 
Adults with  Disabilities and Others with 
Access and Functional Needs,” 25 defined as: 
Children and adults  with access  and 
functional  needs may  have physical, 
sensory, mental  health, cognitive and/or 
intellectual  disabilities affecting  their 
ability  to function independently  without 
assistance. Others who may  have access 
and functional  needs include women  in 
late stages of  pregnancy, elders and those 
needing bariatric equipment. Populations 
whose members may have additional 
needs before, during and after  an  incident 
in  functional  areas, including  but not 
limited to:  maintaining independence, 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , 
supervision and medical care.26
The tendency  to focus on  special  needs 
p o p u l a t i o n s c r e a t e s s o m e a r t i f i c i a l 
partitioning. The definitions of groups are 
fuzzy. An  individual might  belong to one or 
more of these groups. More importantly, does 
the individual  associate him  or herself with 
these groups? A  special needs college student 
thinks about  him  or  herself as a  college 
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student  who happens to have special needs 
rather  that  an  individual with  special needs 
who attends college. Lists such  as the one 
shown above tend to marginalize the myriad 
organizations that  provide special  services 
every  day. Colleges and universities,  for 
example,  have food, medical,  transportation, 
and countless other  services to accommodate 
the needs of students.  Getting the individual’s 
affi l iation group right  is critical  to 
communicating  with  him  or  her  and 
effectively providing emergency services.
As in  the earlier  example of an  expectant 
mother,  extraordinary  need may  not  be 
recognized until the disaster  occurs.  A  person 
with  auditory  processing  disorder  may  be 
fully  functional  in  a  normal environment  but 
b e u n a b l e t o c o m p r e h e n d c o m p l e x 
instructions given  within  the confusion of a 
disaster  scene.  Neither  of these individuals 
could be expected to self-identify  the 
situational  need prior  to a  disaster. 
C o n ve r s e l y ,  w h a t  m a y  a p p e a r  a s a 
shortcoming  to a  disaster  planner  might be 
an  asset  in situ: blindness would not hamper 
evacuation  from  a  darkened subway  tunnel 
for  example,  and could even  foster  better 
navigation skills than those of sighted 
individuals in the same environment.
These lists are also vague and tend to 
focus on  the lowest  level of needs. What  are 
the actual needs of each  of these populations? 
Questions such  as “how  are the needs of 
populations such  as transients, migrants, 
tourists,  and the homeless the same or 
different?” are key.  Another  central  element 
is that  the needs,  their  criticality,  and their 
provision might  be different  if the emergency 
response strategy  is to evacuate or  shelter  in 
place.
DOES LACK OF PUBLIC PREPAREDNESS 
CREATE ANOTHER SPECIFIC NEED?
It is logical to consider  citizen  preparedness 
in  emergency  planning. Procedures such as 
self-evacuation  or  sheltering in  place rely 
heavily  on the individuals’ ability  to conduct 
those actions and willingness to accept  such 
official direction. The 2007  and 2009  Citizen 
Corps survey  data  suggest  that  there is a 
pervasive mismatch  between  the perception 
of personal preparedness and actual  degree 
of preparedness.27  It  seems reasonable to 
consider  the possibility  that  the public is 
differentiated into three populations: 
Prepared, Chronically  Preparing,  and 
Refractory  to Preparing, each  characterized 
by  a  different  level of anticipated needs in  a 
disaster scenario. The Prepared group 
includes the third of the population  who 
assert they  have either  recently  finished 
preparing  or  have been  prepared for  at  least 
six  months (see Figure 5  of the 2009  survey). 
The Citizen  Corps Personal  Behavior  Change 
Model  characterizes the Prepared group as 
individuals who believe that  preparedness is 
efficacious in  the face of an  understood set  of 
threats.28  The Chronically  Preparing group 
includes the roughly  40 percent of the 
population who are either  preparing  or 
intend to prepare within  the next  month to 
six  months.  These Chronically  Preparing 
citizens would correspond to the individuals 
who perceive significant  barriers to 
p r e p a r e d n e s s a c t i v i t y , d e s p i t e a n 
understanding  of susceptibility  to a 
potentially  severe threat.  Finally,  the 
Refractory  to Preparing  group is the 
remaining one-fourth  of the population  that 
is “not  planning  to do anything about 
preparing.”  The Personal Behavior  Change 
Model  characterizes this Refractory  group as 
individuals who are unrecept ive to 
preparedness messages because they  dismiss 
or  ignore their  susceptibility  to a potentially 
urgent and/or severe threat. 
The very  modest  measures that  seem  to 
justify  a  self-reported perception of personal 
preparedness are an  extremely  disconcerting 
finding of these surveys.  For example,  among 
the select  56  percent  of the population  who 
report  disaster  supplies at  home,  the greatest 
level of evidence of preparation  is that 77 
percent  (i.e.  43  percent  of the total 
population) report  that  preparations include 
a  home supply  of packaged food and 71 
percent (40  percent  of total population) 
include a  home supply  of bottled water. 
Inclusion  of such  rudimentary  items as a 
flashlight (43  percent  of those reporting 
supplies at  home; 24  percent  of the total), 
first  aid kit  (39  percent; 22  percent of total), 
or  a portable,  battery-powered radio (20 
percent; 11  percent  of total population)  is 
even  less prevalent.  Important personal  items 
for  evacuation  such  as medications, cash, and 
personal documents are included by 
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considerably  less that 10  percent of the total 
population. Despite some improvement 
between  the 2003  and 2007  surveys, these 
statistics remained stable in  the 2009  survey. 
One point seems obvious: only  a  fraction  of 
individuals in  the self-reporting Prepared 
group may  be prepared beyond the 
requirements for  a  short-term  shelter-in-
place strategy  at home.  The consequences of 
this misperception of projected needs in  a 
disaster  scenario may  be significant when 
they  prove to be inadequate during  a  real 
disaster.  
Thus, what  are routine functions during 
normal times become an  added disruption 
and dynamic planning  factor  during  a 
disaster. The acute alterations in  the 
perceived hierarchy  of needs may, in  fact, 
create an  expanded special needs population 
demanding psychosocial and material 
resources, both  in  person  and through  real-
time media  coverage. The unprecedented 
coverage of personal suffering – both  real 
and imagined – during  Hurricane Katrina 
marked the establishment of this expectation 
and clearly  demonstrated the existing 
infrastructure’s inability  to identify,  much 
less meet, this need.
ALL NEEDS APPROACH
Both  the situation-specific  and the all  hazards 
approach needlessly  focus preparatory 
actions on  discipline-specific communities: 
firefighters,  law  enforcement, public  health, 
and others all attend to their  responsibilities 
with  limited coordination  across functional 
boundaries.  The considerable effort  at all 
levels toward more integrated planning  has 
opened many  doors to integrated response. 
An examination  of planning,  exercises,  and 
actual responses to catastrophic  disasters will 
show  that  while the individual participant 
constituencies are improving  in  their  ability 
to work outside their  respective roles, that 
improvement has not  completely  broken 
down parochial barriers.  It  has been said that 
rather  than working  in  silos,  we now  have 
“cylinders of excellence.”
S u c h  a n a l y s i s w i l l  a l s o r e v e a l 
commonalities that  can  and should drive 
planning  and execution.  In  the absence of 
electric power,  ice and water  become priority 
needs. This addresses the immediate hazard 
(heat, spoilage,  and dehydration), but not 
necessarily  the overarching  need. Proximate 
need rapidly  gives way  to the desire for a 
return to a  reliable critical infrastructure. 
This progression replicates across multiple 
domains and functions of civil society. 
Gratitude for  emergency  shelter  succumbs to 
want of a  viable community  and a  return  to 
normalcy  – not as defined by  the responders 
but based on the prevailing perspective of the 
locals.  Our  distinct history  of local autonomy, 
local  mutual  aid compacts,  and supportive 
federalism  not  only  allows this, it  is codified 
by  the Constitution  and the very  structure of 
most government  programs executed at  the 
local  level.  Viewing response planning 
through  the eyes of those being served will 
facilitate better  integration  of resources and 
quicker  assimilation of the rescue effort  into 
the fabric of the community.  An  all needs 
framework provides a  strategy  to integrate, 
compare, and resolve all of the issues with 
respect to populations,  needs, emergency 
strategies, communications and providers.  
The first phase of an  all  needs framework 
maps resources onto needs. It generates a 
cross-classification  of populations with needs 
within  different  emergency  response 
strategies.  Populations can be defined that 
represent  any  relevant group whether  those 
cohorts are special needs, geographic,  ethnic, 
or affinity  based. Because the current 
operating  procedures of the full  spectrum  of 
responders implements these strategies, one 
can  assess the capabilities of current  resource 
allocation procedures during an emergency 
with  respect to needs satisfaction. For 
example,  service providers can  be mapped 
onto this framework  according to the needs 
they  satisfy.  Meals-on-Wheels would 
e n c o m p a s s s o m e p h y s i o l o g i c a l a n d 
psychosocial needs across response strategies 
(rows in  the matrix).  Other  providers (ethnic- 
and faith-based NGOs,  for  example)  address 
needs specific  to a  given population (columns 
in  the matrix).   Some providers will  address 
needs across levels and populations.
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POPULATIONS
Needs a b c d ... a b c d ...
Psycho-Social √ √ √ √ √ √
Safety √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Physiological √ √ √ √
Strategies Evacuation Permanent
Figure 3. All Needs Matrix
Note: Check marks are for illustration purposes only.
This matrix framework  serves several 
purposes. Firstly,  it  provides a  taxonomic 
structure for  populations in  terms of 
resources to meet  common  needs across 
populations.  The fact  that  we use the term 
“special  needs”  does not  necessarily  require 
each  group’s need to be handled a  special 
case by  customized “cylinders of excellence.” 
Rather, the inclusion of each  population  in 
the needs framework guarantees that 
appropriate accommodations are included in 
a  coordinated delivery  effort.  For  example, 
for  public preparedness, we can  tailor 
messages and media to specific  targeted 
populations making  our  communication 
system  more efficient and effective.  A  major 
failing  of the evacuation  of the Lower  Ninth 
Ward in  New  Orleans was the inability  to 
convey  the message to the remaining 
population.29 
Secondly,  this framework  serves as a 
template – a  decision  tree format – for 
various functions within  disaster  response. 
Consider  the need to move or  relocate a 
population.  Such  movement  may  be for  a 
specified time period, an  indeterminate time 
period pending  some outcome, or  a 
p e r m a n e n t  r e l o c a t i o n . G i v e n  t h e s e 
parameters, the overarching  matrix can be 
modified as shown in Figure 4.
POPULATIONS
Needs a b c a b c a b c
Psycho-Social √ √ √ √ √
Safety √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Physiological √ √ √ √ √ √
Strategies Temporary Indeterminate Permanent
Figure 4. Relocation Needs Template
Note: Check marks are for illustration purposes only.
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This classification  of needs supports 
delineation  of requirements to serve 
designated populations, both  in terms of 
fundamental issues within the Maslow 
hierarchy  and in meeting the expectations of 
subgroups,  which  may  rise to higher  levels 
approaching actualization. The broad 
categories – in this example Psychosocial, 
Safety,  and Physiological – would be 
expanded to include specific  classifications of 
needs, indicators that could be used to group 
response requirements into functional 
cohorts to better  meet  the expectations of the 
impacted population.
P s y c h o s o c i a l n e e d s m a y  i n c l u d e 
a d d r e s s i n g  p o s t - t r a u m a t i c s t r e s s , 
reunification of families, and sharing  of 
relevant information  and instructions. 
Meeting  safety  needs can range from 
providing  a  haven  from  the disaster  to 
limiting  the spread of communicable disease 
to assuring  the  solvency  of savings in 
impacted f inancial institutions.  The 
reconstitution  of pharmaceutical records and 
the subsequent  provision  of medicine to 
people dislocated by  Katrina was an ad hoc 
reaction mounted by  volunteer  organizations, 
not a  concerted government effort.30 Finally, 
physiological needs may  include shelter, 
food, sanitation,  mobility  assistance,  and 
accommodations for  required medical 
procedures such as dialysis.
It is important to note the matrix  format 
offers a construct  within  which  to plan 
response, but it should not be viewed as a 
mechanism  of compartmentalization. Indeed, 
perceived individual,  family, and community 
needs can  cut  across classifications that  are, 
by  definition, arbitrary.  Effective response to 
a  communicable disease,  whether  naturally 
occurring  or an act of bioterrorism,  will 
equally  address the psychosocial  need for 
confidence in  public  health  officials and 
mechanisms,  provide for  the safety  of the 
population,  and preserve the physiological 
integrity  of the populace via  prevention  and 
efficacious treatment.
The All Hazards Approach  has proven 
useful for  defining  emergency  planning,  but  it 
has also produced significant  shortfalls. The 
All  Needs Approach  helps prioritize response 
capabilities within  an  all  hazards context.  The 
All  Needs Approach  is applicable to all phases 
of emergency  management − planning, 
response, and recovery.  It promotes holistic 
problem  identification, appropriate response 
definition  and economy  of response. The 
focus on  satisfying individual needs 
addresses the most immediate concerns of 
the affected public.   
CONCLUSION
The goal  of this article is to stimulate 
innovative thinking  about  the satisfaction  of 
population  needs during emergencies. 
Current analyses and classification of needs 
focus on  objective factors: metrics that 
measure quantifiable indices of response. 
However,  these analyses have resulted in  lists 
of needs disassociated from  the nexus of 
needs of the needy.  Furthermore,  the systems 
developed to satisfy  those needs are largely 
ad hoc,  single- and basic-need oriented; e.g., 
meals,  housing,  medical,  social,  and 
immediate, limited psychological services. 
Shelters, soup kitchens,  emergency  clinics, 
and other  needs-satisfaction  facilities sprout 
up at event time.
In everyday  society,  needs are satisfied by 
institutions.  Institutions are designed to meet 
the broad spectrum  of needs of the 
population  they  serve.  Hospitals, for 
example,  meet  the predominant need – 
medical care – and also housing,  food, 
entertainment,  and other  requirements. No 
emergency  manager  would argue that  we 
should not evacuate a hospital patient  to 
another medical facility,  if available,  versus 
some other venue.
Identifying  the specific nuances of need 
cohorts can  point  to viable solutions. Colleges 
and universities provide food, shelter, 
m e d i c a l , e n t e r t a i n m e n t , l a n g u a g e , 
handicapped and other services (in  addition 
to educational services) as part of their 
normal operations.  The predominant  need of 
a  college student  is to get  an  education. 
Evacuating  students to another  college or 
university  will meet this primary  need,  as 
well  as all associated needs of the student 
population. Indeed some colleges and 
universities have existing  programs where 
students are regularly  exchanged.  This goal 
requires a  targeted approach to evacuation  of 
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identifiable population sets, versus mass 
movement.
The evacuation model  makes use of the 
existing infrastructure to satisfy  evacuee 
needs and can  be extended to all  sorts of 
other organizations (nursing  homes, 
retirement communities,  prisons, etc.). The 
model is attractive to the host  organizations. 
They  could make use of excess capacity. 
Emergency  funds can  be used to compensate 
the organizations.  From  an  emergency 
management  standpoint,  we would be using 
existing resources rather  than stockpiling 
emergency  supplies. The needs of the 
evacuees would be more effectively  satisfied 
by  organizations similar  to the ones that they 
were evacuated from. More effective 
emergency  management  can be facilitated 
because organizations and their  constituents 
can  be identified during preparation  and 
their  information used to plan routes, 
d o c u m e n t t h e m , a n d m a k e o t h e r 
preparations. More of the emergency 
manager’s time can  be freed up to serve those 
who really need help.
Most  members of the population  satisfy 
their  needs through jobs.  They  exchange their 
services for  wages that  they  use to satisfy 
their  specific  needs in  a  way  that  they 
determine.  The workplace often  serves as a 
social milieu.  In  addition, job or  profession  is 
often  an  integral  anchor  of their  personal 
identity.  Hence, evacuating  them  away  from 
their  jobs can  be a  devastating  blow  to needs 
satisfaction.
Perhaps we should think about how  to 
evacuate jobs.  Certainly,  a  continuity  of 
operation  plan  (COOP) accomplishes job 
relocation for  organizations,  albeit  for  a  small 
portion  of the employees. Organizations can 
be incentivized through  tax  breaks to include 
a  larger  number  of employees in  their  COOP. 
We might  also create job clearinghouses. 
Most  organizations have “wish  lists”  of 
projects that they  have not done because they 
do not  have the appropriate funds. Incentives 
and direct emergency  funding  can  be used to 
“employ”  evacuees in  temporary  jobs that 
match  their  existing  skills.  For  example, 
another municipality  can  use a  municipal 
government  employee with street paving 
skills.
Finally,  the All Needs Approach provides a 
set  of principles and goals for  projecting both 
immediate and long-term  requirements. 
More deliberate mechanisms,  such  as the 
Planning,  Programming, and Budgeting 
System,  delineate all  requirements then 
allocate resources according  to prioritization 
and availability. Disaster  response is,  by 
definition,  spontaneous and dynamic.  A 
requirements-based planning tool affords 
projections of immediate needs and provides 
a  map against which  to identify  and prioritize 
subsequent  assets to speed restoration  and 
recovery. From  an  operational planning 
perspective, it is nothing more than  including 
the needs of the population  as an important 
consideration  in  implementing  response 
logistics. 
The preceding  ideas lead us to several 
potential operating  principles that are related 
to needs satisfaction. The dif ferent 
populations in  society  determine natural 
groupings of needs that  are essential to 
consider  in  planning  emergency  responses. 
Satisfaction  with  our  responses will be 
proportional to the degree that our  responses 
recognize and fulfill the status quo ante for 
those needs. The opportunities for  personal 
choice in  the process also result  in  improved 
satisfaction.   The implication  is simple: we 
can  improve satisfaction  by  considering 
continuity  of needs satisfaction as integral  to 
the emergency response.
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The Next Meltdown?
Responding to a Nuclear Accident in theDeveloping World 
James Higgins
ABSTRACT
As  the twenty-first century  begins,  an 
increasing number of developing nations are 
aggressively pursuing the use of nuclear 
power as  a source of electricity. Much 
attention within the  international security 
community has  been placed on the  growth of 
reactors  within the context of nuclear 
w eap o n s d ev e l o p m en t an d n u c l ear 
terrorism.  A major accident involving a 
nuclear reactor or stored nuclear waste may 
be a more likely possibility,  albeit one that 
has received considerably less  attention in 
terms  of disaster planning and response.  In 
t h e a f t e r m a t h  o f s u c h a d i s a s t e r , 
intervention by the  United States,  and other 
Western nations, may be warranted. In the 
context of homeland security operations  in 
such a scenario,  major challenges  will 
revolve around efforts to  detect and deter the 
importation of goods contaminated with 
radionuclides, and screening and processing 
of refugees  and immigrants from nations 
and territories affected by the nuclear 
accident.
INTRODUCTION
The expansion  of nuclear power  into 
developing nations raises the likelihood of a 
disaster  similar  to that of Fukushima, Japan, 
taking  place in  a state  that is profoundly  ill 
equipped to deal with  the consequences of 
fallout  on  a  large section  of its habitable 
territory.  In  such  a scenario,  the possibility 
that  appreciable,  even  hazardous, amounts of 
radioactive  contamination would be present 
on  travelers and goods arriving  in  the United 
States is not far-fetched. Depending  (of 
course) on  the severity  and extent  of such 
exposure,  Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)  operations may  be of considerable 
importance in  promoting  the public  health  of 
travelers and the economic stability  of 
importers and other  individuals/companies 
involved with international trade.  
While  securing nuclear  materials in  an 
effort  to stymie clandestine efforts to 
fabricate explosives is a  worthy  goal, too little 
attention  has been  placed on the potentially 
disastrous consequences that would ensue 
from  an accident  resulting from  a  legitimate 
use of nuclear  power. What  would happen  if 
tomorrow  an  accident  of the magnitude of 
Fukushima or  Chernobyl were to occur  in 
Jordan? Or  Bangladesh? Or  Vietnam? Would 
the affected country  be capable of addressing 
the accident? What  DHS operations would 
need to be expanded or  enhanced in  order  to 
deal  with  the consequences of a  major 
nuclear  disaster  in  a  developing  nation? As 
the Fukushima  accident  has indicated,  these 
questions are in need of consideration.
THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR CRISIS
As this is written,  in  January  2012, the most 
worrisome aspects of the crisis created by  the 
earthquake and tsunami- related damage to 
the six  reactors at  the Fukushima  Daiichi I 
nuclear  power  plant in  Fukushima,  Japan, 
appear to have been successfully managed.
The crisis,  which  began  on  March  11,  2011, 
was the worst  associated with  a nuclear 
power  operation  since the Chernobyl  disaster 
of April 1986.  The sequence of events,  as is 
best understood,  started with  the earthquake, 
which  resulted in  the automatic shutdown  of 
the three reactors,  Nos.  1,  2,  and 3  (Nos. 4, 5, 
and 6  were shut down  for  maintenance),  in 
operation  at  the Daiichi complex.  The 
earthquake disrupted electrical power  to the 
plant; as was designed in the event  of such  an 
emergency, the backup electrical system 
provided power  to run  the water-based 
cooling  systems for  the reactors.  However, 
the forty-five-foot  tsunami wave reaching 
shore forty  minutes after  the earthquake 
brought  all  emergency  generators offline. 
With  no way  to circulate water  through  the 
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reactor  pressure vessels (RPV)  housing  the 
reactor  cores,  the temperatures of the cores 
increased, leading  to “meltdowns”  of the fuel 
assemblies in Reactors 1, 2 and 3.1 
The high  temperatures converted the 
water  in the Reactor 1  RPV, and associated 
piping, to hydrogen gas.  It  is thought that  the 
escape/venting  of hydrogen  gasses into the 
primary  containment  vessel  (PCV),  the 
structure surrounding  the RPV, led to an 
explosion  on  March  12  that  destroyed a  large 
portion  of the Reactor 1  building. It is also 
thought that hydrogen  gas generated in 
Reactor  3  not  only  caused a smaller  explosion 
within  its RPV, but also leaked to the 
adjacent building  housing Reactor  No.  4. This 
resulted in an  explosion  on  March  15  that 
removed a  portion  of the roof of the Reactor  4 
building, and collaterally  damaged the 
Reactor 3 building. 2
Figure 1. Reactor No. 4 (foreground) and Reactor 
No. 3 (background) at the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power installation, March 16, 2011 
(photograph courtesy of Kyodo News/AP)
There was considerable  fear  early  on  in  the 
disaster  regarding  the cooling  ponds, which 
contain  up to 1,400 tons of water  to a  depth 
of thirty-nine feet  and are  located atop each 
of the six  reactor  buildings.  These ponds are 
used to store anywhere from  fifty  to 151  tons 
of spent  fuel rods containing  uranium  pellets 
within  a  zirconium-alloy  cladding.  The March 
15  explosion  at  the Reactor  4  building 
resulted in the creation of a  leak, and a  loss of 
water, from  the cooling  pond located atop the 
building. This raised the possibility  that the 
heat from  the pool’s spent  fuel rods would 
eventually  “boil off”  all  remaining water  from 
the pool,  leaving the rods exposed to the air. 
This would increase their  temperature, 
leading  to their  catching  fire, followed by  the 
strong likelihood of an explosion  involving 
most (if not all)  the fuel rods in  the pool. This 
catastrophe was averted through  improvised 
measures, including  dumps of water  from  a 
helicopter, spraying  water  into the pond 
using  fire truck  water  cannons, and,  starting 
on  March  18, the  use of concrete pumping 
vehicles flown  into Japan  from  the United 
States. Ultimately, the continuous deposition 
of nearly  1,100 square feet of seawater/fresh 
water  into the pool on a  daily  basis prevented 
overheating  of the fuel rods,  and permitted 
the implementation of more permanent 
cooling systems in May. 3
By  June,  3,700 workers were laboring  on 
cleanup and restoration  efforts,  which 
included pumping 500 metric  tons of sweater 
into the facility  daily,  in  order  to maintain  the 
cooling  capacities for the three reactors and 
four  spent fuel pools.  Gradually,  new  systems 
were installed,  or  existing  systems repaired, 
to recirculate coolant  among the reactors and 
spent fuel pools.4   
In  October  a  covering  structure 177  feet 
high  was erected over  the Reactor  1  building 
to contain  further  discharges of radioactive 
materials;  it  is intended to remain  in  place for 
at  least  two years.  Similar  coverings are 
planned for  placement  over  Reactor  2  and 
Reactor  3  in  2012.  On  December  16,  2011, 
Prime Minister  Yoshihiko Noda  announced 
that the Fukushima plant was in  “cold 
shutdown”; in  other  words,  the temperatures 
in  the damaged reactors had been reduced to 
below  the boiling point  of water.  The long-
term  plans for  remediation  of the Fukushima 
Daiichi  plant call for  identification  and repair 
of leaks or  cracks in the primary  containment 
vessels and reactor  buildings, followed by  the 
removal,  and interment,  of fuel  from  the 
damaged reactors. As well, the 90,000  tons of 
contaminated seawater and freshwater  used 
to cool the reactors in the aftermath  of the 
disaster  will  need to be  stored on  site until 
they  can  be decontaminated and released into 
the environment.  The overall  repair  and 
remediation  efforts at  the Daiichi plant  are 
estimated to take twenty-five years to 
complete.5 
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While  the exact  quantities never  will  be 
known, the Nuclear  and Industrial Safety 
Agency  of Japan  (NISA) has estimated that 
130 petabecquerels (PBq)  of radioactive 
iodine (131I) and 6.1  PBq of radioactive cesium 
(137Cs) 	  were released into the atmosphere due 
to the explosions.6 This is approximately  5  to 
6  percent of the amounts released by  the 
Chernobyl disaster.7 
Approximately  100,000 people,  in 
evacuation  zones extending  up to forty 
kilometers (equivalent  to twenty-five miles) 
from  the reactor  site,  were evacuated or 
otherwise “displaced”; when, and if, they  can 
return  to their homes is unclear.  The 
Japanese government has delineated a 
“contamination  zone”  of 930 square miles 
that will be targeted for  comprehensive 
cleanup; such  an  operation  will not  be trivial. 
Based on measurements of 137Cs in soil 
samples, one study  has estimated that  the 
region  northwest  of the plant  has been 
contaminated with  1,000  kilobecquerels 
(KBq) per square meter. By  way  of 
comparison,  in  the aftermath  of the 
Chernobyl accident,  Soviet  authorities 
p e r m a n e n t l y  e v a c u a t e d a r e a s w i t h 
approximately  1,500  kBq per square meter. 
Because the half-life of 137Cs is thirty  years, 
s o i l c o n t a m i n a t i o n  a n d a s s o c i a t e d 
remediation  efforts (such  as the removal  of 
topsoil from  affected cropland) will  have 
long-term  impacts on the future of 
agriculture and food production  in  many 
areas of Japan.8 
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES 
HOMELAND SECURITY
If mainstream  media  coverage was any 
indicator,  DHS operations in  response to the 
Fukushima  accident initially  focused on 
screening  airplane passengers (and cargo) 
arriving  in  the United States from  Japan  for 
the presence of radionuclides.  Screening  of 
passengers apparently  began on  March  17, 
2011, with  Secretary  Janet  Napolitano 
announcing  the screening being performed 
“in  an  exercise  of caution.” 9  One passenger 
arriving  at  Los Angeles International  Airport 
described uniformed personnel (i.e., US 
Customs and Border  Protection  officials, 
CBP) “[as] holding some sort of device and 
sweeping it over people as they walked by.” 10
With  regard to cargo,  in  the port of 
Oakland, the CBP was screening  incoming 
containers from  Japan  for  the  presence of 
radioactive contamination using  truck-
mounted devices as well as hand-held 
devices.  The devices (radiation  portal 
monitors, or  RPM),  installed as part of a 
collaborative effort  by  the DHS Domestic 
Nuclear  Detection  Office and CBP, are 
capable of detecting  gamma and neutron 
emissions.11 Not only  were containers being 
scanned,  but  trucks exiting  the shipyard with 
cargo also were required to pass through  a 
scanning  portal.  Encouragingly,  as of early 
April 2011,  no incoming  containers tested 
positive. 12
With  the discovery  later  in  the Spring  of 
2011  that  spinach  and milk  from  producers 
located more than  thirty  miles from  the 
Fukushima installation  contained higher  than 
normal amounts of 131I,  the Food and Drug 
Administration  (FDA) banned imports of 
foods produced in  the Fukushima  region  into 
the United States.  In  collaboration  with  the 
CBP, the FDA  was investigating the use of the 
Automated Targeting  System  to identify  and 
track  non-food items, such  as drugs and 
biologics,  which  also are imported from 
Japan and are under FDA regulation. 13 
The DHS also sponsored environmental 
and food monitoring  studies related to the 
Fukushima accident; for  example,  a  team  of 
scientists from  the University  of California, 
Berkeley,  collected rainwater  in  the San 
Francisco area  during  the interval  of March 
16-26  and detected radioisotopes of iodine 
and cesium  originating  from  the accident  site, 
albeit at  levels considered too small  to have 
effects on  human  health.  Expansion of the 
testing to weeds, vegetables,  and milk  from 
the San  Francisco area  also detected fission 
products,  again  at levels not considered to be 
harmful.14
T h e d i s a s t e r  a t  F u k u s h i m a  w a s 
unexpected in  the sense that  it  was caused by 
a  combination  of natural events thought 
highly  unlikely  by  engineers and nuclear 
safety  advisors: an  earthquake, which  the 
installation  putatively  was designed to 
withstand, followed by  a  tsunami, which 
prevented the restoration  of electrical  power. 
Within the span  of twenty-four-hours one of 
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the most  technologically  advanced nations on 
the planet was confronted with  a  nuclear 
disaster  occurring  amidst widespread 
destruction to the national infrastructure 
caused by the tsunami. 
The resolution  of the problems at the 
Fukushima plant remains uncertain, but  the 
disaster  is one that raises important  issues, 
issues with  relevance to the operations at 
DHS.
The question  could be asked,  why  does 
DHS necessarily  need to be involved in 
screening  incoming passengers and cargo for 
radionuclides associated with  a  nuclear 
accident  overseas? In  the aftermath  of the 
Fukushima disaster,  there has been  a  dearth 
of information  on  the amounts of such 
contaminants present  on the clothing  and 
skin  of travelers,  as well as the exterior  and 
interior  areas of aircraft.  A  CDC staffer 
indicated that  there was no evidence that 
travelers returning  to the United States from 
Japan  were “contaminated with  material at  a 
leve l o f concern.” 15  I f amounts o f 
contaminants on exposed individuals are 
considered to be negl igible ,  should 
widespread screening  even  need to be 
implemented? The response to this question 
is,  of course,  that  the psychological impact  of 
the disaster  exerts considerable  influence on 
how  federal agencies manage their  response. 
While an  extended discussion of the 
psychology  of disaster  responses and threat 
assessments/analyses is beyond the scope of 
this article,  it  is worth  noting that  despite 
assurances from  subject  matter experts that 
the amounts of fallout  from  the Fukushima 
disaster  that  reached the mainland United 
States were minute,  there was a  surge in 
purchases of potassium  iodide on  the part of 
the American public. 16 Accordingly,  Secretary 
Napolitano’s statement  regarding  “an 
exercise of caution”  served to notify  and 
reassure the public that  their  government 
was considering their welfare.
ISSUES SURROUNDING SAFE 
OPERATION OF NUCLEAR 
ENERGY FACILITIES
Obviously,  a  variety  of federal  agencies, 
academic  institutions, private contractors, 
and national  laboratories have been 
conducting  analyses of weapons of mass 
destruction  (WMD)  incidents, with  a  focus on 
treatment options for  casualties in  urban 
areas.  In  my  experience, there is an extensive 
body  of open-source literature (including 
white  papers and peer-reviewed journal 
articles) that  covers such  scenarios.  However, 
the open-source literature concerned with  the 
public health  and environmental quality 
consequences of a  nuclear  accident  is 
comparatively  scant,  and tends to consist  of 
reports by  investigative journalists, as well  as 
policy  and analysis articles by  environmental 
advocacy  organizations. This is particularly 
true of open-source information  dealing  with 
nuclear  power  in  non-Western  nations. 
Consequently, I have out of necessity  used 
this material to reference my  analysis of the 
expansion  of nuclear power in  developing 
countries.
As of January  2012,  the United States 
leads the world with  the largest number  of 
nuclear  power  plants in  operation  (104), 
followed by  France (58), Japan  (51),  and 
Russia  (33). But  the economic growth  and 
attendant  requirements for  increased 
electrical  power  experienced by  developing 
nations has made nuclear  power  an  attractive 
alternative to energy  generated from  coal,  oil, 
and natural gas.  In  contrast  to the 
a m b i v a l e n c e a b o u t n u c l e a r  p o w e r 
experienced by  “first  world” nations in  the 
aftermath  of the Fukushima  disaster,  China 
currently  operates fifteen reactors for  power 
generation, has twenty-six  reactors under 
construction, and has plans or  proposals for 
another 120 to be  constructed over the next 
several decades.  India currently  operates 
twenty  reactors,  is constructing  six, and has 
plans to build another  forty. Neither  Thailand 
nor Indonesia  possesses nuclear  reactors at 
present, but  each  country  hopes to build as 
many as six in the near future. 17 
As opposed to the situation  forty  or  fifty 
years ago,  when  contractors in  the United 
States, USSR,  Canada,  and Western Europe 
were the only  entities capable of erecting 
nuclear power  plants, China  has now 
emerged as a  competitive provider of power 
plant construction. This means that 
developing countries are no longer required 
to placate Western  governments in  order to 
gain access to nuclear  facilities; for  example, 
in  the spring  of 2010, an agreement was 
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made between China  and the Pakistan 
government to build two 650-megawatt 
(MW) reactors at the Chashma  nuclear 
complex. 18 
Prior  to the Fukushima  disaster,  the 
nuclear  power  industry  was adamant  that, 
whether emplaced in  first-world or  third-
world nations, nuclear  power  remained a  safe 
and ecologically  acceptable form  of energy 
production.  The World Nuclear  Association 
(formerly  the Uranium  Institute),  an 
advocacy  group formed by  nuclear power 
plant companies, states:
Today, nuclear power  plants  have a 
superb safety  record – both  for  plant 
workers and the public. In  the transport 
of nuclear  material, highly engineered 
containers – capable of withstanding 
enormous impact – are the industrial 
norm. More than  20,000 containers of 
spent fuel  and high-level  waste have been 
shipped safely  over a total  distance 
exceeding  30 million kilometres. During 
the transport of  these and other 
radioactive substances – whether  for 
research, medicine or  nuclear  – there had 
never been a harmful radioactive release.
The radiation produced within the core of 
nuclear reactors is similar to natural 
radiation  but more intense. At nuclear 
power plants, protective shielding isolates 
this radiation, allowing millions of  people 
to live in  safety  nearby. Typically, the 
radiation  people receive comes 90% from 
nature and 10% from medical  exposures. 
Radiation  exposure from  nuclear power is 
negligible.19
N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , p u b l i c c i t i z e n , 
environmental,  and clean energy  activist 
groups in  developing and developed nations 
disagree with  this viewpoint,  and argue that  a 
long  list  of accidents and acts of criminal 
negligence at  nuclear  power  plants are cause 
for concern, if not outright trepidation.
An in-depth  recitation  of such accidents is 
beyond the scope of this article, but  in  the 
aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, 
developments in  Japan  are worth  mentioning 
in this context.
Prior  to the Fukushima event, Japan  relied 
on  fifty-four  nuclear  power  plants to provide 
30 percent  of its electricity  and planned to 
construct  another  twelve reactors in the near 
future. 20 However,  serious problems with  the 
safe and conscientious operation  of these 
nuclear  faci l i t ies were documented. 
According to the World Nuclear Association:
In  2002 a  scandal erupted over the 
documentation of  equipment inspections 
at Tepco's reactors, and extended to other 
plants. While the issues were not safety-
related, the industry's reputation was 
sullied. Inspection of the shrouds and 
p u m p s a r o u n d t h e c o r e i s t h e 
responsibility of  the company, which  in 
this case had contracted it  out. In May 
2002, questions emerged about data 
falsification  and the significance of cracks 
in  reactor  shrouds (used to direct  water 
flow in  BWRs) and whether faults were 
reported to senior  management. By May 
2003 Tepco had shut down all  its 17 
reactors for inspections, and by the end of 
2003 only seven  had been  restarted. 
Replacement power cost on  average over 
50% more than the 5.9 yen/kWh (5.5 
cents US) nuclear generation  cost. Tepco 
now has  all  its reactors back on line, with 
the whole fiasco costing  it about JPY  200 
billion (US$ 1.9 billion).21 
Problems stemmed not  only  from 
negligent maintenance and inspection, but 
also from  geologic disturbances that  occur  in 
Japan.  For example, in  July  16, 2007,  an 
earthquake measuring  6.8  on  the Richter 
scale damaged the Kashiwasaki-Kariwa 
nuclear  power  station  facility  near  Niigata. 
Despite the plant’s location on bedrock 
(excavated in  some places to a  depth  of forty-
five meters, or  more than  147  feet)  – a 
construction  feature implemented to mitigate 
any  damage from  earthquakes – the tremors 
were of sufficient  intensity  to sever  piping 
and electrical assemblies within  the plant. 22 A 
transformer associated with  the external 
power  supply  to the plant caught fire, and 
two hours elapsed before the fire  was 
extinguished. There was leakage of water into 
the confines of the plant, and an  estimated 
90,000 Bq (2.4  µCi)  of radioactive water  were 
discharged into the Sea  of Japan. Radioactive 
gasses containing  isotopes of iodine,  cobalt, 
and chromium  were released from  exhaust 
stack No. 7  in  the aftermath  of the quake, and 
while the amount  estimated to have been 
discharged – 400  million  Bq (10,810 µCi) – 
was not  considered to be a  risk to public 
health, there were concerns that  i t 
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represented damage to the fuel assemblies 
within the reactor. 23 
The damage to the Kashiwasaki-Kariwa 
plant, which resulted in  the suspension of its 
operation  until August  2009, raised 
questions as to whether  even  very  expensive, 
dedicated approaches to “earthquake-
proofing”  a nuclear  reactor  facility  were valid 
when  severe quakes occur. Obviously,  the 
entire concept  of Japanese nuclear  plant 
safety  in  the context of a  natural disaster  was 
severely  tested by  the earthquake and 
tsunami of March  11,  2011  and their  effects 
on  the three operating reactors on  the 
grounds of the Fukushima installation.
The circumstances of the Fukushima 
disaster, which  took  place despite preventive 
measures (such as the presence of backup 
electrical  generators) put  in  place by  Tepco, 
have important  implications for  the 
conscientious operation  of reactors, or 
responses to accidents,  in  developing 
countries. These aspects of plant  operations 
and management  are complicated by  the 
unavoidable corollary  to the generation  of 
nuclear  power: the generation  of radioactive 
waste. 
The Internat ional  Atomic  Energy 
Association  (IAEA),  a nuclear  power 
advocacy  organization,  estimates that  each 
year  approximately  15,500  metric tons of 
highly  radioactive metal waste  are generated 
by  the industry  worldwide.24  The prime 
constituent of this high-level waste is the 
spent  fuel rods removed from  the reactor 
core; these are “hot”  in  both  a  radioactive and 
thermal sense,  and must be stored under 
water to avoid combusting. 
[As indicated earlier  in  this article, the loss 
of water  from  the cooling  pond atop the 
Fukushima Daiichi Reactor  4  building  in the 
aftermath  of the explosion  of March  15 
caused major  consternation  among  Tepco 
personnel]25 
Over  a  lengthy  interval (i.e.,  ten to twenty 
years)  of so-called “interim  storage” the rods 
in  the spent  fuel pools lose enough  heat and 
radioactivity  to be removed from  the water 
pool and placed in  large,  shielded containers 
for “dry” storage.26 
Along  with  the metal  waste, large amounts 
of less hazardous liquid and solid waste are 
produced by  nuclear  reactors.  Needless to 
say,  the storage and processing  of high- and 
low-level  waste is an expensive and politically 
charged feature of nuclear plant operation. 
To provide an  example of the substantial 
economic  and infrastructure resources that 
must be devoted to the “conscientious” 
storage and disposal of wastes associated 
with  reactor  operation,  it  is illuminating  to 
look at some examples of what is done in  first 
world nations. 
In  South  Korea, according  to the World 
Nuclear  Association, currently  all  high-level 
radioactive  waste (approximately  9,000  tons 
of spent  fuel)  is stored at  individual reactor 
sites,  as is intermediate and low  level wastes 
(approximately  60,000 200-liter  drums).  In 
order  to provide a  centralized locale for 
storage and disposal of these wastes,  the 
South  Korean  government has commissioned 
development of an  enormous facility  near  the 
southeastern c i ty  of Gyeongju.  The 
anticipated capacity  of the facility  is 800,000 
drums of intermediate- and low-level 
radioactive  waste.  During  the spring  of 2010, 
the facility  began receiving  200-liter 
containers of radioactive waste for  storage in 
outdoor  areas; in  2012,  this waste is expected 
to be moved to a  series of silos located eighty 
meters (262  feet) underground, for 
permanent storage. 27
For  long-term  storage of its nuclear  waste, 
the Finnish  government has chosen to 
construct  a  network of tunnels out  of the 
bedrock at  the Onkalo facility  on  Olkiluoto 
Island (located northwest  of Helsinki). The 
planning  for  the repository  began in  1970, 
construction  is taking  place from  2004-2010, 
waste will be received starting  in  2020,  and 
the facility  will  not be decommissioned until 
the 2100s. The dimensions of this facility  are 
impressive.  The main  access tunnel will be 
5.5  km  (over  three miles)  long and the lowest 
level in  the facility  will  be located 520  m 
(1,706  feet) underground (for  comparison, 
the former  North  Tower  of the World Trade 
Center  in  New  York  City  was 110 stories, or 
1,368 feet tall) (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Schematic  diagram of the Onkalo facility on Olkiluoto Island, Finland, for long-term storage of 
nuclear waste (from Onkalo: Underground Rock Characterisation Facility at Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, Finland).
The storage design  calls for  waste fuel  rods 
to be packed into large steel and copper 
canisters (the largest  canisters are  over five 
meters, or  seventeen feet,  in  length), which 
will  be placed into cylindrical shafts 
excavated in  the storage areas of the 
underground tunnels; these shafts would be 
filled with  layers of bentonite clay  to cushion 
the emplaced canisters. 28
The Onkalo facility,  which  will  cost an 
estimated 3  billion Euros, is designed to 
safely  store the waste for  as long as 100,000 
years;  it  is unclear  if information  about the 
site can  be maintained in  the racial 
consciousness of Homo sapiens  (or  other 
sentient creatures that  may  evolve during 
such  an epoch) for  such  an  extended period 
of time. Doing  so,  however,  is important, 
because another  Ice Age may  well occur  in 
that  interval  and result  in  the formation of ice 
layers two to three km  thick  over  the burial 
site. The structure of the bedrock of the burial 
site would be affected by  the pressures 
exerted by  such  masses of ice,  but  European 
authorities are confident  that  the copper  and 
steel canisters holding  the waste fuel  rods will 
withstand such compression.29
For  economic  and political  reasons, some 
governments choose to export their 
radioactive  waste. For  example, in 2009  a 
documentary  film-maker  named Eric  Guéret 
released a film  (English  title Waste: The 
Nuclear Nightmare) showing  that the 
Électricité de France company  was obliged to 
ship,  by  rail,  some 108  tons of uranium  waste 
from  its nuclear  plants at La  Hague to a 
restricted storage facility  in  Seversk, a  town 
in  Siberia.  Since the French  government 
permits the uranium  to be classified as a 
“recycled”  product,  rather  than a  hazardous 
waste,  its yearly  transport  is not subjected to 
regulations imposed on  waste shipments per 
se.  Such  transport is a  source of some degree 
of consternation  to communities lying 
alongside the rail route. But the French  are 
not alone in  seeking to export  their  nuclear 
wastes out-of-country; from  1996  to 2001, 
German  plants exported some 1,500 tons of 
waste every  year  to the Seversk facility. 
Expansions of this movement  of radioactive 
waste that  would ensue from  patronage by 
developing countries would arguably  increase 
the risk  of an  accidental  release of material 
during the transport process.30 
It is unclear  if less-developed countries 
have given  adequate thought  to the 
disposition of high-level waste that  is, and 
will be,  generated by  their  own  nuclear  plant 
operations.  It  is likely  that countries like 
Pakistan,  Jordan,  and Armenia  will store 
spent  fuel  generated at newly  constructed 
reactors on-site,  until  it  achieves temperature 
and radiation  levels amenable to removal to 
off-site storage.  It may  be that developing 
nations will  arrange to have their  waste 
transported by  rail  overland to the Seversk 
site, much  as France and Germany  have 
done. 
Alternatively,  less developed countries 
may  contract  to have their  waste interred in 
sites like Onkalo. But  is seems unlikely  – at 
least  in  light  of present-day  economics – that 
developing countries would have the financial 
resources to construct their  own  equivalent of 
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the Onkalo or  Gyeongju  repository. In  view  of 
the difficulties encountered with  the loss of 
coolant  to the spent  fuel pools at  the 
Fukushima reactors,  measures to deal with 
disruptions to on-site storage of nuclear 
waste will be another  costly,  but  critical, 
component of disaster  response planning  for 
nuclear  plants operating  in  developing 
nations. 
CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENT IN A DEVELOPING 
NATION
Are we to expect that developing  nations are 
fully  capable of operating  their  own 
burgeoning  supply  of nuclear  power  plants 
with  an attention  to safety  that  approaches 
that  of first  world nations? This is a  troubling 
question, yet a  question  that,  in  the aftermath 
of the Fukushima  accident, deserves more 
attention from  scholars in  the field of 
international relations and analysts in 
academe and government,  who have tended 
to focus on  issues relating  to nuclear 
proliferation, rogue states,  and terrorism,  as 
opposed to the expansion of nuclear power.
I would argue that  social and cultural 
attitudes that  promote malfeasance and 
corruption  in developing nations render 
these nations more likely  to experience a 
disaster  due to negligent  operation of a 
nuclear  power  facility.  For  example,  while 
Denmark  has a  Corruption Perception  Index 
(CPI) score of 9.3,  ranking  first in  the world 
for  honest and forthright  commercial 
exchange, China  has a  CPI score of 3.6, 
ranking  it seventy-second in  the world; India 
has a CPI score of 3.4,  ranking  it eighty-fifth 
in  the world; Pakistan has a  2.5  (134th), and 
Bangladesh a 2.1 (147th).31
Such rankings do not,  in  my  opinion, bode 
well  for  the absence of major  nuclear 
accidents in developing  nations. In  this 
regard,  it  is illuminating to examine the 
current situation  of India’s nuclear  facilities 
with  regard to safe and conscientious 
operation.
OVERSIGHT AND SAFETY: THE CASE OF 
INDIA
Open  source information on  nuclear  safety, 
nuclear  accidents, and preventive measures 
in  India  is not plentiful.  According to an 
October  2009  article in  the Asia Times 
online,  “data  on  the [nuclear  energy] sector 
are c losely  guarded by  the nuclear 
establishment, which  functions under the 
purview  of the Department of Atomic Energy 
(DAE).” 32
However,  some material on the topic is 
available from  the South  Asian news media. 
One of the more high  profile accidents in  an 
Indian  nuclear  facility  took place in 
November 2009,  when fifty-five employees at 
the Kaiga plant ingested small  amounts of 
radiation  by  drinking  water  from  a  cooler 
that had been (perhaps deliberately) 
contaminated with  tritium.  The ingestion  of 
the isotope was discovered through  routine 
monitoring of the urine of employees. 33 
Another  accident  that received media 
coverage took  place in  December  2009  at  the 
Bhabha  Atomic Research  Centre (BARC), 
India’s main  site for  nuclear  weapons 
development, when  a  fire in a  photochemistry 
laboratory  killed two students.34  It  could be 
a r g u e d t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t , h o w e v e r 
unfortunate,  was not  caused by  acts of 
negligence on  the part of the operation of the 
nuclear  reactors at  BARC.  However, there is a 
history  of incidents associated with  the 
facility  that  suggest safety  has not  received 
adequate attention.  For  example,  soon after 
the Dhruva  reactor  at BARC came online in 
1985, it  experienced a  malfunction  involving 
excessive vibration  due to water  flow  through 
the fuel assemblies: four  metric tons of heavy 
water  overflowed from  the reactor core. 
Operation  was suspended until January  1987, 
and the reactor did not  generate its full power 
until January 1988. 35
After  the resumption  of the reactor, safety 
issues continued to occur. In  1989  a 
technician  was accidentally  locked into a 
shielded room  in  the reactor building; he was 
only  rescued after  he repeatedly  shut  off the 
coolant  pump to the reactor, which  in  turn 
shut down  the reactor  and drew  the attention 
of the staff.  In  1991  the reactor operated for 
nearly  a  month with  a malfunctioning 
emergency  coolant  system. And, according  to 
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investigative journalist  A.  Gopalakrishnan, 
underground pipes used to transport 
radioactive  fluid waste around the BARC 
campus have burst,  contaminating  large 
tracts of the subsoil. Tanks containing  large 
volumes of liquid waste (in  a manner 
reminiscent  of the storage setup that led to 
the Kyshtym  disaster) have been  leaking,  and 
n o t  s u b j e c t e d t o t i m e l y  r e p a i r  o r 
replacement.36
It is unclear  if nuclear  power  plants in 
India have fully  cooperated with  the citizenry 
in  outlining what  is to be done in the event  of 
accident  of major  magnitude.  One grass-roots 
organization, the People’s Movement Against 
Nuclear  Energy, has accused the operators of 
the Koodankulam  nuclear  power  plant in 
Tamil Nadu  state of neglecting  to conduct 
safety  drills,  or  to share evacuation plans, 
with residents in the surrounding areas. 37 
There are indications that  the Fukushima 
event  has introduced a  cautionary  note to the 
expansion  of nuclear  power  in  India; in 
Madban, plans to construct  the world’s 
largest  nuclear power  facility  (the Jaitapur 
Nuclear  Power  Plant, consisting  of six 
reactors) have provoked calls for  a 
moratorium  on  its construction by  Indian 
sc ient is ts and act iv is ts .38  Whether 
construction  will  proceed despite such 
opposition,  and whether  it  will  be conducted 
with  increased attention  to safety  issues, 
remains to be seen.
If,  as I am  positing,  a  major  nuclear 
accident  takes place in  a  developing  nation 
within  the next several decades,  what  is the 
potential severity  of such an  accident, and 
what  type of response will be required of 
homeland security  operations in  the United 
States?
In this context  it  is sobering to note the 
findings of an  interim  report  on the 
Fukushima disaster  released in  December 
2011  by  Tepco.  Among other  findings,  the 
report  discloses that  Tepco officials had 
designed the plant  to withstand a  tsunami 
wave of twenty  feet  in  height; however,  the 
wave that  struck the plant  on  March  11  was 
more than  forty  feet in  height.  In  the 
immediate aftermath  of the earthquake and 
tsunami the workers made the erroneous 
assumption that  the emergency  cooling 
system  for  Reactor  No.  1  was operating, when 
in fact  it was defunct.  The absence of 
adequate cooling  was responsible in part for 
the explosion within the reactor  building the 
next day.  Arrangements to deal with a  loss of 
electrical  power  were inadequate; in  one 
instance,  workers were forced to use car 
batteries to operate valve assemblies 
associated with  the cooling systems. Tepco 
had placed an  emergency  operations center 
about  three miles from  the plant,  but  the 
operations center  was not  adequately 
shielded against  the radiation  exposure that 
would have been  created by  a  nuclear 
disaster; consequently, it  was of questionable 
utility  during the Fukushima crisis.  Data  on 
the dispersal of radionuclides resulting  from 
the reactor  explosion  were not  forwarded to 
the government  in  a  timely  manner. As a 
result,  on  March  12,  8,000 evacuees from  the 
town  of Namie, near  the Daiichi complex, 
traveled to the village of Tsushima  with  the 
expectation  that it was safer  than  Namie. In 
fact,  the extent of radionuclide contamination 
at Tsushima exceeded that of Namie. 
More revelations will undoubtedly  be 
brought  to light in  the next  six  months,  but it 
is apparent that  despite their  considerable 
experience in  the design,  construction, and 
operation  of nuclear  power facilities, both 
Tepco and the Japanese government  had so 
discounted the likelihood of an  accident  at 
t h e F u k u s h i m a  c o m p l e x t h e y  w e r e 
unprepared to cope with  the totality  of events 
triggered by the March 11 earthquake.39
As of December 2011,  the cost  for  dealing 
with  the disaster  at  the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear  power  plant is estimated to be $257 
billion  and to require several  decades to 
complete, by  every  measure a  sizable cost  to 
one of the world’s most  affluent nations.40 It 
is doubtful that  equivalent financial resources 
could be brought  to bear  by  the governments 
of developing  nations on  a  disaster  within 
their borders.
PROXIMITY TO POPULATION CENTERS: THE 
CASE OF BANGLADESH 
Most  of the developing  nations using,  or 
contemplating  using, nuclear  power  plants 
share a  problem  confronting  Japan  and its 
handling  of the Fukushima  disaster: close 
proximity  of the reactor site  to population 
centers. For  example,  Bangladesh  has 
contracted with  a  Russian firm  to construct 
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two reactors at  the Rooppur site in  Pabna 
District. 41 The Rooppur site is only  about 180 
km  (112  miles) from  Dhaka; a  reactor 
explosion that  distributes radionuclides 
(Table 2)  over  an  area equivalent to only  half 
that  of the Kyshtym  disaster  of 1957  (for 
example) would hypothetically  contaminate 
the largest  population  center  in  Bangladesh.42 
It is unclear  if the Bangladesh  government 
would be able to execute  an  evacuation  of 
large numbers of people from  a  heavily 
populated area, such  as that surrounding  the 
Rooppur site, should an  accident take place. 
The alternative to evacuation,  having  people 
remain within  contaminated zones,  may  be 
the only  recourse available to the Bangladesh 
government. 
Such  a  scenario would constitute a 
humanitarian  challenge of unprecedented 
scope, since it is doubtful the government 
would be able to supply  the affected 
multitudes with  necessary  quantities of 
uncontaminated drinking  water  and food for 
what  may  be months (if not years) of post-
accident  habitation.  Indeed, it is likely  that 
millions of Bangladeshis would unwillingly 
be forced to inhale radionuclides in  their  air, 
as well as ingesting  them  from  contaminated 
fresh water, crops,  and food animals. 
Providing  adequate medical care to such  a 
large number  of exposed persons would be an 
extremely  difficult  endeavor  for  the 
Bangladesh  government, thus,  morbidity  and 
mortality  due to exposure to beta- and 
gamma-radiation  emissions presumably 
would be very high. 
Particularly  worrisome with  regard to 
potential  casualties is the prevalence of 
m a l n u t r i t i o n  a m o n g  B a n g l a d e s h i s , 
particularly  women and children; in  a 
1984-2005  survey  of admissions to a  hospital 
in Dhaka, 47  percent of children were 
underweight, 30  percent  were stunted,  and 
22  percent were “wasting” (i.e.,  losing 
weight).43  Such  individuals,  with  their 
immune systems already  handicapped by 
m a l n u t r i t i o n ,  w i l l  f a c e a d d i t i o n a l 
immunosuppression  from  the effects of 
ionizing radiation.  This will exacerbate their 
vulnerability  to infectious diseases, which 
may  be a  major threat to public health if large 
numbers of exposed persons are gathered 
i n t o r e f u g e e c a m p s . T h e h i s t o r i c a l 
experiences of Bangladesh  in  regard to 
cyclone-associated mortality  are of import  in 
this regard; for  the 1970  and 1991  cyclones, 
the estimated mortality  figures were 300,000 
and 138,000  deaths, respectively. A 
considerable proportion of this mortality  was 
assumed to be derived from  causes not 
directly  associated with  drowning,  or severe 
physical  injuries,  associated with the cyclone 
per se,  but  rather  from  disease spreading  in 
the storm’s aftermath.44  In  the event  of a 
catastrophic  nuclear  accident in Bangladesh, 
mortality  statistics of this magnitude are 
depressingly likely.
Even  if casualties due to exposure to 
radionuclides would be small,  the economic 
consequences of a nuclear  disaster  in  a 
developing nation  such  as Bangladesh  would 
be significant. The lesson  from  the Chernobyl 
accident  is sobering: milk throughout much 
of northern Europe and the British  isles was 
discarded due to contamination  with  131I and, 
to a  lesser  extent, 90Sr. When  testing 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t m a n y  l i v e s t o c k h a d 
accumulated significant  quantities of 
radionuclides in  their  tissues,  restrictions 
were placed on  the slaughter  of animals for 
use in  the human  food chain.  With  regard to 
international trade, many  nations imposed 
bans and restrictions on  a  variety  of 
agricultural  products; for  example, Germany 
banned the importation  of Italian  vegetables, 
while Italy  in  turn  banned imports from 
Austria,  the  Eastern  Bloc, Scandinavia  and 
Switzerland.  Outside the European Economic 
Community,  Sri Lanka  destroyed imports 
from  Europe, and Jordan refused imports of 
goods from  some countries for  up to three 
months following the accident.45 
Early  on  in  the Fukushima  disaster  many 
countries restricted food imports from  Japan, 
particularly  seafood. 46  In  July  2011,  the 
disclosure that nearly  1,500  beef cattle  had 
consumed rice straw  from  the Fukushima 
area; that beef from  these animals harbored 
concentrations of radioactive cesium  well  in 
excess of government thresholds; and that 
some citizens had unwittingly  consumed this 
beef, has had a  deleterious impact on  the 
Japanese beef industry.47 
For  developing  nations, particularly  those 
that  rely  on  agricultural  exports as a  major 
source of revenue,  loss of such  income for an 
indefinite period of time may  provoke a 
collapse of the national  economy.  Such 
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economic travails may  exacerbate the 
increased movement of refugees or  migrants 
from the affected country.
SCOPE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF A 
NUCLEAR DISASTER OVERSEAS
The Fukushima disaster  has demonstrated 
the nature of DHS operations in  the event of 
a  nuclear  disaster  overseas (albeit  one taking 
p l a c e i n a  f i r s t - w o r l d n a t i o n  w i t h 
considerable economic and technologic 
resources available to combat the disaster). 
What  radioactive contaminants are 
associated with  the Fukushima  disaster  and 
being monitored by  CBP? As is shown  in 
Table 2,  among  the list of possible 
radionuclides ejected from  a reactor 
explosion  are a  number  with  comparatively 
short  half-lives, such  as 131I,  133Xe and 140Ba. 
Other  radionuclides possess lengthy  (i.e., 
hundreds of years) half-lives,  including 90Sr, 
137Cs,  and isotopes of plutonium. Some 
radionuclides are beta-emitters,  such  as 90Sr, 
while others are gamma-emitters, such  as 
137Cs.  In  the initial aftermath  of the disaster, 
attention  was focused on the dispersal  of 
gamma  emitters such  as 131I and isotopes of 
cesium, although  soil sampling from  March 
2011  revealed,  in  addition  to these species, 
the presence of (short-lived)  isotopes of 















plutonium-239 (α) 9 x 106
curium-242 (α) 163
Table 2.Selected radionuclides that may be 
ejected from a reactor core in the event of an 
explosion or fire.49
The main  agency  within  DHS playing  a 
role in  the response to the Fukushima 
disaster  is Customs and Border Patrol  (CBP). 
Indications are that  in  the aftermath  of the 
Fukushima incident, DHS technologies such 
as radiation  portal monitors (RPM)  and 
Hand-Held Radioisotope Identification 
Devices (HHRIID) are proving  useful  in  a 
new  role in  screening  incoming  cargo for 
radionuclides associated with  the Fukushima 
incident. 50 As mentioned at  the start of this 
article,  CBP was conducting  screening of 
incoming  cargo and persons from  the affected 
area  for  the presence of radioactive 
contamination; judging  by  open-source 
information,  CBP management  of this 
process led to some delays in  the transport  of 
goods received at  shipping  ports,  but  overall, 
there did not  appear to be a  deleterious effect 
on  cargo movement.51 This is despite the fact 
that some CBP operations were being 
conducted at  some distance from  port 
facilities; according  to a  March  25, 2011 
article in  The Journal of Commerce, the 
Coast Guard and CBP were tracking vessels 
transiting  the fifty-mile fallout  zone around 
the Fukushima site en  route to the United 
States,  with radiation  screening of ship 
contents being  conducted at  sea  i f 
warranted.52
CBP was also assisting  the FDA  with  the 
logistics of screening incoming food and 
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pharmaceutical products from  Japan. As of 
January  12,  2012,  the FDA  had tested 1,923 
food samples, only  one of which  had 
detectable levels of 137Cs / 134Cs.53 All testing 
evidently  has been performed at  the 
Winchester  Engineering and Analytical 
Center  (WEAC) in  Winchester, MA, with the 
six  laboratories participating  in the Food 
Emergency  Response Network  (FERN) 
capable of buttressing  this capacity  if 
needed.54 
To summarize,  as best can  be inferred in 
January  2012,  DHS operations (both 
individually  and in  conjunction  with  other 
federal  agencies) to screen  incoming cargo 
and persons from  Japan  for  radionuclides 
worked success fu l ly .  DHS deserves 
commendation  for  rapidly  responding to a 
scenario that deviated significantly  from 
those its operations were originally  devised to 
address (i.e., nuclear terrorism).  
One aspect of the Fukushima  incident  has 
not necessarily  been  very  informative for 
planning  for  DHS responses to a nuclear 
disaster  in  a  developing country: namely, the 
advent of large numbers of refugees and 
emigrants seeking  admission  to the United 
States. While the days immediately  after  the 
disaster  saw  a  sudden  exodus of foreigners 
from  Japan,  comparatively  few  of these 
individuals had received significant  exposure 
to radionuclides.55  It seems reasonable to 
propose that,  in  the event of a  nuclear 
disaster  in  a  nation  adjoining  the continental 
United States (e.g., Mexico or  Canada),  large 
numbers of individuals will  be exposed to 
fallout  and a  larger  proportion  of these 
individuals may  seek to enter  the United 
States. Not  all of these individuals will 
represent  foreign  nationals or refugees; some 
may  be US citizens and dependents. While it 
appears that  the screening  of persons 
entering  the United States in  the aftermath of 
the Fukushima  disaster  was carried out  with 
reasonable efficiency,  whether  such  screening 
procedures would be practicable  in  the event 
of a  catastrophe in  a  nation  neighboring  the 
United States, and a  concomitant influx  of 
larger  numbers of affected individuals,  is 
unclear.  This may  be one of the more 
challenging duties that will await  CBP in the 
event  of a  nuclear  disaster  in a  country 
adjacent to the United States.
For  an  example with  relevance to such  a 
scenario, a modeling  study  by  Canadian 
investigators looked at  high-throughput 
screening  of as many  as 20,000 exposed 
individuals,  who walked past a  portal-based 
gamma  detector.  The extent of contamination 
was hypothesized to range from  forty  to 900 
MBq for  137Cs.  For  comparative purposes,  the 
screening  of 300  people involved in the 
Goiania (Brazil) contamination event 
recorded a  maximum  137Cs contamination 
level of forty-two MBq.56  When  screened in 
groups of five,  individuals contaminated with 
seven  MBq of 137Cs could be detected,  while 
an  exposure corresponding  to 1.2  MBq of 
137Cs was undetectable. The investigators 
noted that  the speed of the screening  process 
was obviously  dependent  on  factors such  as 
the cooperation of the exposed persons,  as 
well as the physical mobility  of the 
individuals, their  familiarity  with  the 
language used by  the screening staff,  and the 
efficiency  with  which  groups of people could 
be organized in  a  large area  as part  of the pre-
screening  procedure. The model predicted 
that  screening  of 20,000 people under  a 
sixteen-hour-per-day  regimen required 
twelve to forty-three days,  depending  on  the 
size of the screening  groups.  If multiple 
monitors were deployed, the screening  time 














Table 3. Estimated time required to screen 20,000 
persons exposed to the equivalent of 7 MBq 137Cs 
using different screening group sizes.58
These types of modeling  studies can  be 
useful in  estimating  the radiation  monitoring 
capacity  that may  be required of DHS in 
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order  to screen incoming  persons in  the 
aftermath  of a nuclear  accident  resulting  in  a 
greater exposed population than  the 
Fukushima incident. As well,  dealing  with  a 
population of incoming  persons that  may  not 
be fluent  in English, and may  be suffering 
from  a  variety  of physical and emotional 
ailments,  will present  special challenges to 
the staff of such  screening  operations.  In  this 
context,  some experts advocate for  additional 
research  and development of methodologies 
for  effectively  communicating  monitoring 
procedures and results to screened 
individuals.59 
While the knowledge gained from 
operations associated with  the Fukushima 
incident  will  be useful,  more information 
regarding  the logistical  challenges associated 
with  setting  up and operating  high-
throughput  screening  operations at  major 
airports or  other  facilities will  be needed to 
enhance CBP capabilities in this area. 
How  long will DHS need to plan to provide 
screening  for  imported goods, refugees, and 
detainees? The question  is difficult to answer 
and depends on  a  number  of factors, chief of 
which  is the ability  of the affected nation  to 
implement measures to restrict  the export of 
potential ly  contaminated goods and 
materials,  as well as to provide medical  care 
to exposed persons.  If the Chernobyl  disaster 
is any  guide,  there is a disturbing  likelihood 
that  as time goes on,  materials containing 
radionuclides will  be transported from  the 
accident  zone into other  areas, as clandestine 
movement  of materials from  contaminated 
sites will  be hard to police by  a  government 
strained with  the task  of addressing the 
massive social and economic problems 
ensuing  from  the event.60  Accordingly,  DHS 
may  need to implement  screening  measures 
for  several years in  the aftermath  of a nuclear 
accident  in  a  developing country, as economic 
and political problems stemming from  an 
inability  to deal  with  the disaster  may 
continuously  generate a  stream  of refugees 
seeking admission to the United States. 
CONCLUSION
In  contrast to historical nuclear disasters 
such  as the Kyshtym  explosion and the 
Windscale fire, both  of which took place in 
1957, the Fukushima  nuclear  disaster  was not 
caused by  human error  per se; rather, it was 
triggered by  two successive geologic 
disturbances for  which  the facility  was 
unprepared: an  earthquake and a tsunami.61 
It could be argued that  this was a  rare 
coincidence and unlikely  to be the cause of 
failure at other  nuclear  facilities.  However, in 
this article I have posited that  in  the case of 
nuclear  power  plants operating, or  planned to 
operate,  in developing  nations, a  number  of 
factors other  than  unprecedented geologic 
disturbances may  contribute to increased risk 
for a catastrophic incident. 
In  the case of Iran,  for  example, the use of 
outdated equipment  may  be the issue; in 
February  2011, reports surfaced in  the news 
media  that  the forthcoming  startup of Iran’s 
nuclear  reactor at  Bushehr  had been 
indefinitely  delayed. Rosatom, the Russian 
firm  supervising the reactor’s construction, 
announced that one of the four  cooling 
pumps had been  damaged and needed to be 
replaced; this meant  that  the fuel had to be 
removed from  the reactor  core,  a  lengthy  and 
expensive process. The pumps date from  the 
1970s, when a  West  German firm  had 
contracted to build the reactor, but withdrew 
fo l lowing  the 1979  revolut ion. The 
incorporation of these obsolete pumps into 
the Bushehr  facility  is not  only  difficult  from 
an  engineering  point  of view, but raises 
questions as to their  effectiveness once the 
reactor becomes operational. 62 
The DHS,  and CBP in particular, has 
demonstrated the ability  to respond in  an 
effective manner  to the Fukushima  disaster. 
This bodes well for  DHS operations in  the 
event of a  nuclear  catastrophe in  Iran, 
Bangladesh, or  another  developing  nation 
that  (unlike Japan) will  lack  the economic 
and political  structures to deal with  such  an 
event. It  is reasonable to expect  that in  such a 
scenario DHS will  need to expand its 
capabilities to screen incoming  persons and 
goods for  contamination. As this article  has 
pointed out, further  investigations and 
analyses are needed in these areas to ensure 
that  the agency  is well  positioned to deal  with 
the unusual nature of such a crisis.
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Dispensing Mass Prophylaxis – The Search for the Perfect 
Solution
Sinan Khan and Anke Richter
ABSTRACT
Biological agents  can be  highly contagious 
and fatal,  requiring a timely response to 
avoid economic loss, loss  of life and large-
scale panic.  Local mass  prophylaxis  plans 
are based on the concept of Points  of 
Dispensing (POD).  However,  there  are 
various challenges  that the local health 
department (LHD) in large metropolitan 
areas  may encounter.  We examine the 
benefits and challenges of POD and 
proposed alternate  modes of dispensing. 
Considering that resources will always be 
under pressure,  LHD will need to conduct 
analyses to  determine what are the best 
alternate modes  of dispensing for their 
jurisdiction.  As  a starting point, each LHD 
should consider what aspects of their POD 
plan are most in need of supplementation – 
sites, security,  staffing, throughput, 
locations, etc.  – so that the relative 
importance of addressing the different 
criteria becomes clearer.  Tools  from  the  field 
of decision analysis  can facilitate  the 
analysis  and subsequent discussion 
necessary to make a well-informed choice.
INTRODUCTION
In  this paper  we examine Points of 
Dispensing  (POD) and proposed alternate 
modes of dispensing  for  oral prophylaxis 
from  the perspective of a  local heath 
department (LHD) in a  large metropolitan 
area.  We include this geographic  focus as the 
challenges LHD will encounter  in  rural  or 
sparsely  populated areas will most likely  be 
different from  those seen  in large urban areas 
with  a densely  concentrated population.  After 
presenting each mode of dispensing  and its 
potential benefits and challenges, we 
summarize the choice facing  the LHD and 
provide recommendations for  enhanced 
planning. It  is important  for  homeland 
security  planning  to consider  the realistic 
limitations of each  of the potential  modes of 
dispensing  and to explore options to 
supplement  this system.   To choose among 
the options,  it is necessary  to evaluate the 
benefits that  each  has to offer  in  alleviating 
the need for  resources that are scarce within 
the community. 
Start ing  with  President Cl inton’s 
Executive Order  12938 in 1994,  the funding 
for  bioterrorism  initiatives has increased 
significantly.1  Ten  years later, in  2004, 
President  George W.  Bush  signed Homeland 
Security  Presidential Directive 10 to 
strengthen  the nation’s preparedness and 
defense against  the use of biological  and 
chemical weapons.2  Effective on  March  1, 
2003,  the National Pharmaceutical  Stockpile 
became the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS) and serves as a  national  repository  of 
antibiotics, chemical  antidotes, antitoxins, 
vaccines,  medical equipment, and supplies to 
combat "Category  A" Threat  Agents as 
defined by  the Centers for  Disease Control 
and Prevention  (CDC). 3  The mission  of the 
SNS is to help state and local jurisdictions 
prepare a  strategic  and uniform  response to a 
large-scale natural disaster  or  an act  of 
terrorism.4  It  is the responsibility  of local 
health  departments to dispense SNS assets 
within  their  jurisdiction  – the SNS does not 
provide dispensing team  personnel, facilities, 
or  transportation  support  beyond the delivery 
of the supplies to a  state-identified receiving 
site.5 
Local mass prophylaxis plans are based on 
the concept  of Points of Dispensing (POD)  as 
a  mechanism  for  dispensing medicine and 
medical supplies to the general population 
d u r i n g  a  l a r g e - s c a l e p u b l i c  h e a l t h 
emergency. 6 Although the POD-based model 
has shortcomings, the CDC and the 
Department of Health and Human  Services 
(DHHS) still view  POD as the cornerstone of 
dispensing  during  a  bioterrorism  event 
requiring  oral prophylaxis. 7  The CDC 
Division  of the Strategic  National Stockpile 
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(DSNS) requires project  areas to complete 
three of seven  DSNS drills; of these, four  are 
directly  related to POD activation,  set-up, 
and throughput  and complete one functional 
or  full scale exercise  for  each Cities Readiness 
Initiative Metropolitan  Statistical Area  (MSA) 
that tests key  components of mass 
prophylaxis plans.8  These tests must be 
completed within  each Public  Health 
Emergency  Preparedness Grant  year 
(typically  August 10,  20XX – August  9,  20XX 
+ 1).   Failure to meet  these benchmarks could 
result  in  withholding  of funds or  future 
funding under the Pandemic  and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA). 9 
The Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI),  a 
part of the SNS,  was established to enhance 
preparedness in  the nation’s largest  cities. 
Through  CRI,  state and cities are  required to 
develop plans in  order  to provide antibiotics 
to the entire population  within  their 
jurisdiction  within  forty-eight  hours.10  This 
timeframe provides the optimum  benefit  of 
post-exposure prophylaxis among  those 
people who have inhaled anthrax spores. 11 
While there have been  no incidents 
requiring  mass prophylaxis using  the medical 
emergency  model, the recent  set of 
vaccination  efforts in response to the H1N1 
influenza outbreaks indicated that there are 
serious gaps in  public  health  personnel, 
personnel available to administer  vaccines, 
locations for  the administration  of the 
intervention, and necessary  medical supplies. 
A  public health  emergency  requiring 
activation  of POD for  immediate  life-saving 
interventions will operate under  different 
rules and regulations but  will probably 
encounter the same resourcing issues.
POINTS OF DISPENSING
The CDC recommends that POD be sites the 
community  is familiar with  such  as sports 
arenas,  convention  centers,  community 
centers, and,  in  some cases, schools. These 
facilities are usually  located in areas with 
high  population  density  and easy  access, 
ample parking,  and close to public 
transportation  facilities.12 Such  facilities also 
provide secondary  advantages such as a large 
space (with  available  floor  plans that denote 
all  rooms,  entrances,  and exits); familiarity  of 
local law  enforcement  with  securing  the 
facility; and climate control  (especially 
important in  areas with  extreme weather 
conditions). POD are typically  non-clinical 
sites to ensure that  treatment centers would 
be able to continue treating  their  existing 
pat ients as we l l as anyone who i s 
symptomatic or  injured during  the course of 
t h e e m e r g e n c y . M a s s p r o p h y l a x i s 
coordination  requires advance planning  and 
integration of staffing,  security,  traffic, and 
control  plans to successfully  respond to an 
incident. 13
Response p lanning  based on  the 
traditional POD has many  advantages. It is 
easily  scalable so the number  of POD opened 
can  be commensurate with the actual 
incident.  It  is open to the entire population 
(i.e.,  there are no restrictions on  who may 
obtain  prophylaxis from  a POD). Several 
exercises in the United States have tested 
POD models and many  jurisdictions use 
exercise data  to justify  their  POD efficiency, 
as required under  the Pandemic and All 
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA).14 Of all 
the alternate modes of dispensing,  the 
traditional POD has undergone the most 
frequent  and rigorous testing,  even  though 
criticisms have been leveled at  the testing for 
failing  to: include set-up times; include 
elements of uncertainty; include the 
interaction  with  security  or  law  enforcement; 
use fu l l  secur i ty  s ta f f ing; and test 
coordination  between  POD, the Receipt, 
Store,  and Stage (RSS)  Warehouse and the 
Command Center. 15
One disadvantage of the POD approach  is 
that  special  needs populations may  not be 
able to wait  in long  lines for  hours to receive 
their  medications, a frequent  feature of 
POD.16  No acceptable standard approach  – 
such  as an  extra  line for  those with  special 
needs or immediate priority  service for 
special-needs individuals – has been  found to 
resolve these issues. These alternative 
solutions will  require extra  staff (either 
additional staff or  staff borrowed from 
current POD operations), as well as extra  set-
up for  expedited processing, monitoring, 
security, and controls at  the POD sites – all  of 
which  affect  POD efficiency.  In  addition, 
there are the ethical  considerations for  both 
population  groups (general and special 
KHAN AND RICHTER, DISPENSING MASS PROPHYLAXIS  2
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 3 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
needs) in  terms of waiting  times,  priority, and 
access.17 
The Bioterrorism  and Epidemic Outbreak 
Response Model (BERM) estimates that in  an 
anthrax scenario, assuming  twelve-hour work 
shifts (with  a  downtime of 15  percent)  and a 
throughput  of 1,200  people per  minute, 348 
POD would be required to process a 
population  of 10 million  in  order  to 
prophylax  everyone in  forty-eight  hours. 18 
Due to local variations of POD design  and 
patient  flow  plans, staff requirements differ 
between  jurisdictional POD models. Using 
the staffing  determined by  the BERM model, 
if all  348 POD are activated, Los Angeles 
County  Department of Public Health  would 
require 8,352  clinical staff and 41,760  non-
clinical staff.  
In  a  large scale incident  where the full 
population needs prophylactic  services,  site 
and staffing  requirements reveal the 
disadvantages of the POD system. A  first 
issue is whether or  not there are sufficient 
adequate sites within  the geographic 
boundaries of an  LHD to serve as POD that 
have not  been  designated to serve other 
emergency  needs such  as a  shelter  or 
alternate medical care site. In  addition  to the 
sheer  physical  number  of POD sites, 
memoranda of understanding need to be 
developed and signed with  each  site owner 
that  address the site owner’s concerns about 
liability,  damage to the site,  and potential 
future ramifications to the facility  associated 
with  its use during the bioterrorism  event. 
Given  the complex structures of government 
organizations and their  relationships with  the 
private sector, this will take time and a 
considerable amount of effort. 
A  second set  of issues surrounds the 
staffing  requirements needed for  a large 
metropolitan  area  (e.g.,  the  need for  over 
8,000 clinical staff and almost  42,000 non-
clinical  staff in  Los Angeles County).   These 
staffing  requirements are not  unique to Los 
Angeles.  The CDC guidance for  dispensing 
site operations suggests that  metropolitan 
public health  agencies may  have to train 
thousands of people to meet  the key 
dispensing  site personnel needs,19  and that 
identifying  and training  these personnel  in 
adequate numbers poses a problem. 20
Staffing to these levels will  be dependent 
on  volunteers. 21 This implies that the LHD or 
some other  public  agency  must  have a 
volunteer  procurement  arm  dedicated to 
recruiting  volunteers and setting  up 
registries,  prior  to an  emergency,  that can 
pre-register, pre-credential clinical  staff,  and 
ideally  pre-train  non-clinical POD staff – a 
time-consuming  and expensive process. This 
represents a  serious additional workload at a 
time when  most  LHD are understaffed to run 
their  daily  functions and public  agencies face 
serious budget  cuts.22  Contacting,  training, 
and transporting this number of volunteers to 
the POD sites is practically  infeasible, 
especially  as the CDC strongly  recommends 
that  al l dispensing  sites be opened 
simultaneously  to avoid panic or the 
perception  of preferential  treatment. 23  The 
sheer  number  of volunteers poses difficulties 
in  obtaining  and maintaining  up-to-date lists 
with  current, accurate contact information. 
Beyond obtaining the volunteers, they  must 
be dispatched to the various functioning  POD 
sites.  
Several exercises in  Los Angles County 
found that  volunteers arriving  spontaneously 
at  POD sites without  prior  coordination 
would negatively  influence POD operations 
as personnel  are pulled from  their  primary 
tasks to handle the unexpected volunteers. In 
addition,  if there is no pre-planned staging 
area  for  staff to gather,  “flocking” at 
undesirable locations – such  as POD, 
hospitals and other  healthcare facilities – can 
occur,24  resulting  in  compromised care, 
uncoordinated staffing efforts,  and over- or 
under-staffing.  The exercises concluded that 
coordination  of volunteer personnel and a 
pre-designated staging  area  are essential and 
will need to be staffed by  LHD personnel.25 
Given  the need for large numbers of non-
clinical  staff,  training  will be done on a  just-
in-time basis.  Numerous tools for  this 
purpose have been  made publicly  available 
through  the National association  of Country 
and City  Health  Officials. 26  Training  is vital. 
Volunteers need to be familiarized with the 
POD setup and operations; without  a  clear 
understanding  of the POD flow  and layout, 
POD efficiency  will  be negatively  affected. 27 
Administering this training  will  require time 
and manpower, a  task that will  likely  also fall 
to the LHD. This implies that  during  an 
emergency,  in  addition  to setting  up the POD 
at  their  locations,  LHD staff will  need to 
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contact  volunteers, provide just-in-time 
t r a i n i n g ,  a n d c o o r d i n a t e v o l u n t e e r 
distribution among POD. 
Training has been  found to be an  essential 
step for  all individuals associated with  POD 
functioning. Breakdowns in  communication 
and logistics,  such  as an  inability  to order 
supplies or  report  problems,  can  result in 
diminished POD efficiency.28  The slower  a 
POD works,  the more POD will be needed to 
meet the prophylaxis mandates,  increasing 
the need for  sites and personnel.  Additional 
training on the need and necessity  of 
complying  with  personal  protect ive 
equipment  (PPE) guidelines will be required. 
Without training and fit-testing  volunteers, 
POD staff is not  likely  to adhere to the 
guidelines. 29 
Clinical  staff pose additional challenges 
since many  medical volunteers who would 
normally  be willing  and able to volunteer, 
such  as hospital doctors and nurses, fire 
d e p a r t m e n t p e r s o n n e l ,  E M T , a n d 
paramedics, may  have other  duties at  their 
primary  places of employment  that  take 
priority  during a  medical emergency.  Many  of 
these medical volunteers also participate in 
other  community  organizations such  as 
Community  Emergency  Response Teams 
(CERT), Disaster  Medical Assistance Teams 
(DMAT),  California  Medical Assistance 
Teams (CalMAT),  etc.   Another, almost 
opposite issue, has been documented as well. 
Several studies have found public health  and 
medical professionals reluctant to participate 
in  the response to a  biological attack or  a 
pandemic influenza  outbreak.30  The actual 
number  of medical volunteers responding  to 
an incident may be far less than planned.
Finally,  the number  of volunteers needed 
to maintain  round-the-clock  dispensing 
operations may  be higher  than estimated. 
The original estimates supplied by  the BERM 
model are based on  the assumption  that 
workers would be willing  to stay  for  twelve-
hour  shifts.  As discussed in  Trust for 
America’s Health, 31  there are many  reasons 
why  twelve-hour  shifts may  be unattainable – 
in  which case the number  of volunteers 
needed increases.
A  third set of issues surround the ability  to 
provide security  for  the POD – both  the 
security  at  the site as well  as traffic  control 
issues. POD are large facilities that  will 
attract a  large number  of people; as such, 
they  provide terrorists with  an “optimal” 
combination  of mass casualty  and mass 
media  exposure.  They  should therefore be 
considered a  high-value,  high-payoff target.32 
Security  is also needed for  the transport  of 
prophylactic  materials and to direct  and 
manage the flow  of traffic at  each  of the 
sites. 33  Additional issues may  arise when 
there are multiple law  enforcement 
jurisdictions within  a  large metropolitan 
area.  It is necessary  to identify  one central 
coordinator  for  all  of the jurisdictions,  who 
each  of the agencies will  accept  – a  task that 
has proven  difficult.34  While security  is not 
within  the purview  of the LHD, the ability  of 
a  city  or  county  to supply  the requisite 
security  personnel is frequently  limited. 
Security  personnel must  be used to preserve 
the functioning  of civil  society  during  the 
emergency.  Unfortunately,  police forces have 
been cut  in  these times of budgetary 
difficulties and many  jurisdictions are 
starting  to rely  on  volunteers.35  The LHD 
must  take into account  the security 
implications of its mass prophylaxis 
programs to ensure they  will be feasible 
within the security constraints of its area.
Most  large LHD concede they  will  not be 
able to set  up and operate all POD at  once 
and that POD would be opened based on 
availability  of staffing  and security  resources. 
This implies that more POD would eventually 
need to open  to be able to “make-up”  the lost 
time and still  be able to prophylax the entire 
population  within the forty-eight-hour 
window.
ALTERNATE MODES OF 
DISPENSING 
Alternate methods of dispensing are meant  to 
complement  POD as they  reduce the number 
of people who need to be moved through 
POD. 36  The CDC recommends several 
alternate modes of dispensing  shown  to be 
best  practices (there are several other 
alternate modes of dispensing  that are 
regularly  discussed on  the SNS listserv 
hosted by  the CDC). Some are based on  the 
“open”  model  (anyone may  rece ive 
prophylaxis) and others on  the “closed” 
model (prophylaxis is only  available to a 
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specific subpopulation).  The CDC states that 
in  order  to create robust  alternate modes of 
dispensing, the LHD needs to first  identify 
the population  that it  would serve, research 
the availability  of resources, and create a 
strong partnership with  stakeholders such  as 
local  law  enforcement,  medical reserves 
corps, CERT networks, the Red Cross, and 
those organizations that  would be partners in 
the alternate mode of dispensing  (businesses, 
schools/universities,  retail  pharmacies, 
health  maintenance organizations,  other 
government  agencies,  etc.).37  Not  all of the 
alternatives will  be feasible in  every 
jurisdiction. Therefore, early  assessment and 
analysis is critical to designing  a  plan  to 
supplement the traditional POD system.
PRE-POSITIONING MEDICATIONS
Prepositioning  can be used for  first 
responders and/or  for hospital  and medical 
staff and/or  for  all  government employees 
and their  families.  The CDC guidance is that 
these preferences (early  treatment  for  first 
responders) need to have been discussed 
openly  within  the community.38 Prophylactic 
drugs can  be purchased using  funding from 
the Urban  Area  Security  Initiative (UASI)  or 
Metropolitan Medical Response System 
(MMRS) to stockpile medications for  first 
responders; funds from  CDC can  be used to 
purchase drugs for public  health  emergency 
response personnel;  and funds from  the 
Health  Resource and Services Administration 
(HRSA) can  be used for  hospitals. The most 
important step in  setting  up a  pre-positioning 
operation  is to coordinate plans between 
LHD and other  local  government  agencies 
and hospitals. The LHD would be responsible 
for  writing  and managing grants and 
ensuring  that the drugs are rotated before 
they  expire.  In  the case of an  emergency, the 
partner  agency  would be responsible for 
picking  up and dispensing  the drugs. If the 
drugs were to be pre-deployed to the agencies 
t h e m s e l v e s , t h e n  i t  w o u l d b e t h e 
responsibility  of the agency  accepting  the 
drugs to maintain  their  cache under  strict 
supervision  of the LHD. No agency  would be 
allowed to distribute drugs without the 
consent  of the Public Health Officer  of the 
L H D .  A  s i g n e d m e m o r a n d u m  o f 
understanding  (MOU) would be required 
between  agencies detailing  the maintenance 
of the cache and the requirements and 
responsibilities of both agencies.  The LHD 
w o u l d b e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r  e n s u r i n g 
compliance with  the policies of the program 
and would therefore need to create a  registry 
for  all  personnel working  for  each partner 
agency.  The registry  would include all 
locations of the drugs,  the quantity  of drugs, 
and contact  information  for  the personnel 
responsible  for  dispensing at  the partner 
agency.
An important  advantage of prepositioning 
is that personnel required for  mass 
prophylaxis and medical  response would 
receive the required prophylaxis ahead of 
time, before the SNS arrives,  which  would 
ensure that  once the SNS becomes available 
personnel are at  work and ready  to distribute 
it  to the public. Additionally, the security 
requirements for pre-positioning  are 
generally  deemed as low; all  that  is needed 
is a  locked,  secure area  with  oversight  by 
licensed personnel and a  means to limit 
access to authorized personnel only.  Another 
advantage is that these individuals and their 
immediate family  members will not need to 
go to the POD.39  If the drugs are  stored at 
each  agency,  then  during  an  emergency  no 
LHD staff is required. If the drugs are stored 
at  a  central warehouse,  then  only  warehouse 
s ta f f ing i s required for  d ispens ing 
prophylaxis.  
The main  disadvantage to pre-positioning 
is that  the initial set-up can  be time 
consuming,  as it requires buy-in  from  the 
p a r t n e r  a g e n c i e s ( h o s p i t a l s , o t h e r 
g o v e r n m e n t a l  d e p a r t m e n t s , o t h e r 
government agencies).40  The rights, 
responsibilities,  and liabilities of these 
partners must be agreed upon  – issues which 
become more complicated if the partners are 
p r o v i d e d w i t h  t h e i r  o w n  c a c h e o f 
medications. In addition,  antibiotics have an 
expiration date and would have to be rotated, 
committing the various entities to a 
continuous maintenance program  and 
requiring  reapplication for  grants to fund 
such operations.
DISPENSING AT BUSINESSES 
Local health  departments have forwarded the 
idea  of dispensing  at  businesses,  which  has 
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the potential of benefitting  both  the business 
and the LHD.  If large employers prophylax 
their  own  employees and employee families 
during  a  large health  emergency  that  would 
require activation  of POD,  employees will  be 
encouraged to come to work – a  clear  benefit 
to the private sector.  In  addition  to protecting 
their  own workforce,  private industry  has 
proven  to be extremely  helpful in disaster 
recovery  efforts,  not  only  because businesses 
are citizens of their  own  communities, but 
a l so because wi thout  cont inui ty  o f 
community  no business can  be done.41  The 
much  quoted statement from  Stanley  Weiss, 
one of the founders of Business Executives 
for  National Security  (BENS), is that  “Being 
dead is bad for  business.” 42 From  the LHD 
perspective, the option   of dispensing at 
businesses becomes attractive if it can  reduce 
the number of individuals who will need to 
use the POD system.43  Target  businesses 
include large companies (the Orange County 
Health  Care Agency  defines “large”  as 
businesses that  have 100 employees or  more) 
a n d t h o s e t h a t  d e a l w i t h c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure such  as power,  water,  and 
communications. 
The LHD in  Orange County,  Florida,  has 
had great  success working  with  local 
businesses and obtaining  agreements with 
them  to prophylax their own  employees (in 
effect  serving  as a  closed business POD) with 
their  business POD. The challenge is to 
prophylax  1.6  million  people in Orlando (the 
largest  city  within  Orange County) within 
forty-eight hours.  After establishing 
memoranda of agreement (MOA)  with  large 
employers and medical facilities to prophylax 
their  own  employees and their  families,  the 
department  estimates that  they  can 
prophylax  40  percent  of their  population 
without  recourse to their  traditional POD 
system. 44
A  business POD would require an MOU 
between  the LHD and the private sector 
partner  that  specifies the roles and 
responsibilities of both  agencies.  It  would be 
the responsibility  of the LHD to notify 
business partners about  the activation  of the 
dispensing  plan,  separate and repackage 
medication that  will  be allotted to each 
business,  and create and send forms,  as well 
as notify  a  responsible party  regarding  the 
location  (the distribution  site) and pick-up 
time for the prophylactic  medications.  The 
health  department would also be responsible 
for  training  key  personnel to provide just-in-
time training  to the business POD staff. 
Businesses would be responsible for  picking 
up and dispensing  drugs to their  employees 
with  proper  medical  oversight,  distributing 
forms and information  sheets to their 
employees, setting  up and staffing  a  business 
POD, and returning  all  unused items (along 
with  completed patient forms) to the 
department of health.45
After  an  MOU is signed,  the LHD would 
issue an  authorization letter  to the 
businesses,  and the person  responsible for 
picking  up the medications would have to 
bring this letter  and photo identification  in 
order  to gain  access to the distribution  site. 
Since the location(s) of the pick-up sites for 
businesses would not be publicly  known  nor 
publicized,  the assumption  is that this covert 
approach  would negate the security  threat. 
Large businesses typically  have occupational 
health  nurses on  staff to oversee issues such 
as workers’ compensation  and therefore 
provide medical  oversight; they  may  in  some 
cases choose to contract their  employee 
health  services from  an outside agency  such 
as an  industrial health  clinic or  a  medical 
consultant firm  to come in  during  an 
emergency  and provide for  medical  oversight 
of dispensing.  Nevertheless, businesses may 
be unable to locate medical staff to provide 
proper  dispensing oversight. In  such  cases, 
businesses would ask  employees if they  have 
any  relative who has a  medical license – such 
as a nurse, doctor,  pharmacist  or  dentist – 
and would be willing to take responsibility  for 
medical oversight  during dispensing.  While 
this may  seem  like an  odd approach,  it is one 
way  of locating additional  personnel who 
have medical licenses and are not already 
committed to serve in  another  capacity  in  a 
crisis. The goal is to locate all potential 
personnel who have,  can  maintain,  or  can 
reapply  for the ability  to handle medications. 
The MOU would not be signed unless this 
resource could be located. In  the worst-case 
scenario,  the LHD would provide medical 
staff for  medical  oversight.  However, the goal 
of this alternate mode of dispensing  is for  the 
LHD not to deploy any medical personnel.
Advantages of this dispensing alternative 
include the ability  to prophylax a  large 
KHAN AND RICHTER, DISPENSING MASS PROPHYLAXIS  6
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 3 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
number  of individuals without  using  POD 
and the ability  to preserve scare clinical 
personnel resources. The disadvantages are 
the need to develop MOU, sorting through 
legal  ramifications, training  business staff, 
ensuring  that the proper  standards are met 
for  dispensing  prophylaxis,  and staffing  a 
warehouse distribution  center.  There is also 
the worry  that  businesses will  need clinical 
staff volunteers if they  are not  able  to locate 
their  own resources in  times of emergency. 
Most  states have very  strict  laws limiting  the 
dispensing  of medications to clinical staff and 
pharmacists so non-clinical  individual 
citizens are usually  prohibited from 
dispensing  medications,  even  under 
emergency  situations.46 If clinical staff (a  very 
limited resource)  needs to be provided by  the 
LHD, then  the advantages to using  the 
private sector are greatly diminished.
DISPENSING TO SHELTERED-IN 
POPULATIONS 
Sheltered-in  Populations (SIP) are defined as 
those populations that cannot  make it  to a 
POD. As seen  during  Katrina, the sheltered-
in  population  residing  in  nursing  homes, 
group homes,  and assisted living facilities can 
easily  be victimized when  staff abandons 
their  facilities to care for  themselves and their 
families.47  
The Oklahoma  City/County  Health 
Department developed a  SIP plan  that 
targeted jails,  nursing  homes, group homes, 
residential care, hospice, and home health 
care facilities. This plan  required minimum 
staffing  and security  and could still serve a 
significant portion  of this population. The 
program  also developed relationships with 
meals-on-wheels programs to distribute 
prophylaxis.   In  2006, there were 150 
facilities in  the registry  providing  prophylaxis 
to 250,000 people in  Oklahoma  County. 
During  an  exercise,  50,000 doses were given 
out in three hours using only  nine dispensing 
staff members and minimal security.48 
An advantage of leveraging  SIP facilities to 
serve as a mode of dispensing  is that  most  of 
these facilities are required by  law  to have 
medically  licensed staff on  hand.  Where this 
was not  the case in Oklahoma  City, the  health 
department looked to family  members of the 
resident  or  a  family  friend who had a  medical 
license and was willing  to take responsibility 
for  the given  facility.  While  this may  seem 
like an  odd approach,  it  was highly  successful 
in  Oklahoma  where they  were able  to find 
relatives of persons living in  the sheltered-in 
facilities who were willing  and able to take on 
the responsibilities of dispensing  in  each  of 
these venues. It  would be the responsibility  of 
this representative to dispense the drugs to 
the resident population  at  their  facility  and in 
every  case they  found a  representative.49 
Turning  to relatives of SIP residents met one 
of the goals of the planning  process: to locate 
local  medical  staff not committed to other 
response functions who can  be used in  a 
crisis situation.  
The biggest challenge Oklahoma  City 
encountered in  setting  up its SIP dispensing 
plan  was the creation  of a  registry, because 
finding their  target  agencies was very 
challenging.  The Oklahoma City/County 
Health  Department  worked closely  with  state 
agencies involved in licensing,  other  agencies 
that  deal with  the target  populations,  and 
even  resorted to using the phone book. The 
registry  included all locations of the target 
populations,  the number  of people living at 
each location,  and the number of staff 
working  there along  with  the members of 
their  immediate households. The registry  also 
identified a  single primary  and two secondary 
points of contact  during  an  emergency  to be 
notified of the location  of the SIP site.  These 
contacts were required to be licensed medical 
professionals.50 The registry  created another 
difficulty  because it requires constant 
updating  due to the high  turnover rate at  the 
targeted facilities. 51  Another  challenge was 
the development  of the MOU.  The higher-
level personnel at  each  agency  had to be 
actively  involved in  the mass prophylaxis 
discussion and many  of them  were reluctant 
because they  were under  the impression  that 
their  in-house physician  could provide the 
drugs needed during an emergency.52
DISPENSING AT COLLEGES/UNIVERSITIES 
College and university  health  centers in the 
United States provide low-cost  primary 
health  care to many  students nationwide. 
Nurse practitioners, registered nurses,  or 
physicians’ assistants usually  staff these 
health  centers and many  campuses are 
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affiliated with  medical schools.53 Colleges and 
universities have the infrastructure (large 
open  spaces for  dispensing such  as 
auditoriums or  basketball courts), medical 
staff, and non-clinical staff in  the form  of 
teachers as well as the student body  required 
to run  a  university-only  POD serving 
students,  faculty,  and staff (and their 
families).  It  would be the responsibility  of the 
university  to set  up,  staff, and operate a  POD 
with guidance available from the LHD.
An appropriate MOU must be developed 
between  the LHD and the university, 
verifying location and set-up of the university 
POD, staffing  for  the POD, and security  for 
the POD (which  may  be provided by  campus 
security  forces if available),  as well as 
delineating  the roles and responsibilities of 
each  organization. Universities with  an 
extremely  large student  body  may  require 
additional clinical staff from  the LHD to 
prophylax within  the forty-eight-hour 
timeframe.  Since some colleges and 
universities are state-run, LHD must consult 
their  state board of education  as well  as the 
university  management during  early  stages of 
planning.
One advantage of this system  is that, for 
certain colleges and universities,  it  would be 
possible  to prophylax  the entire campus 
population without recourse to any  additional 
resources (other  than  the prophylactic 
medications) from  either  the LHD or local 
security  forces.  Additionally, since colleges 
and universities represent  large social sub-
populations that  will need prophylaxis in  an 
e m e r g e n c y , p e r m i t t i n g o n - c a m p u s 
prophylaxis means a  large subpopulation  will 
be served that  no longer  needs to access 
transportation  services of any  kind. 
Disadvantages are that  the effort  of 
developing the MOU,  especially  if the state 
board of education  needs to become involved, 
may  be too substantial  given  the number  of 
individuals who would be prophylaxed.
DISPENSING AT MAJOR HOTEL CHAINS 
Most  major  metropolitan areas such  as Los 
Angeles,  Las Vegas,  and New  York not  only 
have large local populations but  must also 
deal with  a  fluctuating population  of tourist 
and business travelers.  Local health 
departments must be able to prophylax  this 
additional population to meet  the federal 
mandate. The Southern Nevada Health 
District  (SNHD),  which  includes Las Vegas, 
has over  300,000 tourists on  peak  days and 
adopted a  unique solution to deal with  its 
fluctuating  population.54  The SNHD 
partnered with  hotel and resort chains to set 
up closed POD to prophylax  employees and 
their  families as well  as all guests. This 
partnership was successful and both  parties 
were pleased with  its design. The partnership 
decreases the potential for  economic loss for 
the hotels and resorts by  safeguarding  their 
guests and staff, provides an  incentive for 
staff to return to work (by  providing  them 
with  prophylaxis),  and ensures continuity  of 
operations.  At  the same time,  the partnership 
allows the LHD to prophylax  the fluctuating 
and local population.55 
To make such  a  plan operational an  MOU 
between  the LHD and the hotel and resort 
chains would be required.  It  would be the 
responsibility  of the LHD to provide the hotel 
chains with proper  forms,  medications, and 
training of key  personnel involved in  the 
d i s p e n s i n g  p r o c e s s . I t w o u l d t h e 
responsibility  of the hotel  and resort chains 
to set  up and run  the POD and provide all 
medical and non-medical  staff required for 
dispensing; they  would also have to 
demonstrate the availability  of space and 
staff before the MOU could be signed. Hotel 
and resort  chains often  have an  occupational 
nurse on  staff for issues such as workers 
comp or  may  choose to contract with  an 
industrial health  clinic, local nursing  float 
pool, or a  medical consultant firm.  The non-
medical staff would be taken  from  the 
existing hotel staff.
The advantage of this mode of dispensing 
is that it  reaches a  population  that may 
otherwise have difficulties finding  and 
traveling to a  regular  POD. In addition,  no 
additional clinical or  non-clinical  staff would 
need to be provided by  the LHD in  an 
emergency.  The primary  disadvantage would 
be the amount of effort  required to develop 
MOU with  large hotel  chains and settle 
liability  issues within  the MOU.  While MOU 
are required in  all  dispensing  options, some 
are more difficult and time-consuming  to 
establish than others.
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DISPENSING THROUGH LARGE HEALTH 
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS 
Health  maintenance organizations (HMO) 
are a  type of a  managed care organization 
that  provides both  health  insurance and 
health  services. In  the Denver  Metro Area  a 
unique relationship has developed between 
the LHD and Kaiser  Permanente, the largest 
health  care provider  in  the area. Kaiser 
Permanente typically  conducts a  drive-thru 
flu  clinic in  the area and therefore has 
experience in  mass prophylaxis. Kaiser 
Permanente also has the clinical and non-
clinical  staff to support  mass prophylaxis as 
well  as the location  and partnerships to set up 
a  drive-thru  POD.  The MOU between  the 
LHD and Kaiser  Permanente  states that  the 
LHD is responsible  for  providing Kaiser 
Permanente with  prophylactic  medications 
and forms. It  would be the responsibility  of 
Kaiser Permanente to dispense medications 
to their  members and employees (and 
families of employees) only. 
Advantages of this mode of dispensing  are 
that  it requires no clinical  or  non-clinical staff 
from  the LHD,  there is a  potential that the 
HMO could also provide their  own  trucks and 
drivers for  medication  retrieval from  the 
warehouse, and people are familiar  with  and 
trust their  HMO for  medical assistance.  Also, 
health  maintenance organizations are often 
sizable employers in  addition to having  large 
numbers of members, which  can  significantly 
lessen the number of individuals seeking care 
from  the POD. The only  disadvantage is the 
amount  of effort  required to set up an  MOU 
that  clearly  delineates the responsibilities of 
each entity. 
DOOR-TO-DOOR DISPENSING 
The 2004  MOU between DHHS and the 
United States Postal  Service (USPS),  known 
as the postal  plan, states that the USPS  would 
suspend mail  delivery  during  an  emergency 
and bring medicine directly  to homes.56  This 
option would only  be available to areas 
designated as Cities Readiness Initiative 
(CRI)  areas based on  population  and 
geographic location.57  As of 2006  there are 
seventy-two CRI areas in  the United States.58 
The postal plan  is subject  to availability  of 
resources and funding  and is entirely 
voluntary on part of the USPS. 59 
In  this mode of dispensing,  postal 
employees would deliver  a single bottle of 
doxycycline to each  household, to provide 
individuals with  the first  dose and prevent 
initial  surge at  POD and giving  LHD the time 
to gather  resources.  On  November  11, 2006, 
postal employees delivered empty  cardboard 
boxes and information  flyers to residents in 
certain Seattle neighborhoods.  During  the 
nine-hour  exercise,  forty-one postal 
employees accompanied by  armed police 
officers delivered medications to 38,000 
households. Based on  the average household 
size in  Seattle,  (2.05  people),  the LHD could 
have initially  kept 77,900 people (15  percent 
of the population) away from POD. 60 
In  non-CRI cities, other  resources might 
be utilized.  In  Chesapeake, Virginia,  the LHD 
partnered with  school  districts to accomplish 
the task of prophylaxing  its population  of 
218,000.  Using school buses, bus drivers, 
escort  vehicles,  and eight medical personnel, 
the LHD dispensed medication  to 1,100 
individuals in  less than two hours driving 
door  to door.  The receipt  was confirmed by  a 
phone call into an automated system  that 
kept track  of the delivery  via  geographic 
information  system  (GIS). The Chesapeake 
Health  Department now  plans to prophylax 
their  entire population using  200 school 
buses and with  help from  local  Community 
Emergency  Response Teams (CERT) and the 
Medical  Reserve Corps (MRC).61  Similarly, 
LHD could choose to contract with  UPS, 
FedEx or  DHL to provide door-to-door 
delivery.  All major  delivery  service providers 
have a  logistic  infrastructure that  includes 
personnel, GIS tracking,  and route planning 
software.
The main  disadvantage to this mode of 
dispensing  is the security  requirements. 
However,  the Presidential Executive Order 
s i g n e d b y  B a r a k O b a m a  c a l l s f o r 
supplementing  local law  enforcement 
personnel with  local  federal  law  enforcement 
officers as well as other  appropriate 
personnel to escort  postal workers delivering 
prophylactic drugs. 62 
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DRIVE-THRU POD 
Drive-thru  POD originally  gained popularity 
as a  mechanism  to deliver  influenza 
prophylaxis to the elderly. A  review  of the 
program  in  the post-9/11  era  determined that 
the program  could be used to provide 
personal protec t ive equipment  and 
prophylaxis to the population  while 
maintaining  some form  of isolation.  The 
drive-thru  POD have a  simple set  up: patients 
drive  to the site and,  while in their  car, 
receive informed consent,  have a  brief history 
taken  (to prevent  contraindications),  and 
then  receive immunization  without leaving 
the vehicle. 63
Drive-thru  POD should be located close to 
major roads, highways,  or  freeways in  order 
to prevent traffic  jams.  It  is strongly 
recommended that the ingress and egress 
points be large enough  to allow  multiple 
lanes of traffic.  Similarly, the location should 
be large enough  to accommodate multiple 
lanes for dispensing.64
The Orlando Health  Department plan  calls 
for  ten  lanes of dispensing  to ensure a  high 
throughput  and to prevent overflow  of traffic 
onto neighboring  streets.65  They  predict  a 
reduction in  the number  of staff needed 
(compared to the traditional POD) and 
anticipate prophylaxing 60  percent  of their 
population using this method.66 
The main  advantage of drive-thru  POD is 
that  they  are regularly  used as flu  vaccination 
clinics each  year. Space requirements are 
much  more dynamic  and are not  bound by 
the strict  constraints of traditional POD.  In 
terms of security, law  enforcement agencies 
have stated that they  find it  much  easier to 
control  traffic at  a  drive-thru  POD than  at  a 
traditional POD. 67  Another  advantage to 
using  drive-thru  POD is that  the environment 
within  the car  can  be climate controlled, 
hence protecting  the population  from 
extreme heat or cold. 
There are some disadvantages to using  a 
drive-thru  POD.  The POD staff is exposed to 
the weather  conditions and the LHD is still 
responsible for  providing all POD staff. 
Drive-thru  POD would be limited to daytime 
operations and the LHD must plan  to remove 
cars that  break down or  run  out of gas.  There 
is also an  increased risk  of careless or 
panicked drivers, road rage, and carbon 
monoxide/dioxide exposure.
DISPENSING THROUGH RETAIL 
PHARMACIES 
Private sector  pharmacies,  located at  retail 
stores, wholesale markets, and stand-alone 
buildings, could also be a potential  partner 
for  health  departments during  a  public  health 
emergency  requiring mass prophylaxis. There 
is a  retail pharmacy  within five miles of 95 
percent  of the US population. 68 Every  year, 
large retail  stores with  pharmacies and 
private pharmacy  chains conduct influenza 
vaccination  clinics at  their  facilities. Some of 
these conduct their  vaccination  campaigns 
internally, whereas others contract  with 
private community-based health  service 
providers to organize  their  campaign and 
provide the vaccination service.69 Twenty-five 
to thirty  million  doses, accounting for  one-
third of the nation’s flu  vaccine,  were 
administered by  retail store/wholesale store 
pharmacies and private chain pharmacies.70
Many  private retail companies would be 
willing to work  closely  with  the LHD during 
m a s s p r o p h y l a x i s . D r .  O n o r a  L i e n 
interviewed executives from  various grocery 
store retail  pharmacies and pharmacies 
located within  chain  wholesale clubs and they 
were almost undivided in  their  endorsement 
and interest in  planning for  and responding 
t o a p u b l i c h e a l t h  e m e r g e n c y .71 
Representatives from  these businesses noted 
that although  they  were a “for-profit” 
business there was a  “strong connection 
between  assisting  during  an  emergency  and 
maintaining  or  improving their  reputation 
within the community.” 72
Advantages of this mode of dispensing  are 
that  no staff would be required from  the LHD 
and many  pharmacies have ample outdoor 
parking  as well as the indoor  space to 
accommodate a  large number  of people and 
maintain  their normal operations. In 
addition, pharmacies have electronic 
inventory  systems to receive and manage SNS 
inventory,  a  secure location  to store drugs, 
medical staff to meet  federal and state 
dispensing  requirements, and non-medical 
staff who can  serve essential functions during 
the dispensing process. 73
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An MOU needs to be established with  the 
pharmacy  chain  and potentially  with  each 
individual pharmacy.  Due to a  large number 
of pharmacies in any  area,  it  is necessary  to 
consider  geospatial analysis and find optimal 
locations such  as areas without  POD,  areas 
with  low  security  concerns, and areas with  a 
moderate population density. 
CHOOSING AMONG THE 
ALTERNATIVE MODES OF 
DISPENSING
There are several  alternate modes of 
dispensing  available for  local health 
departments.  However, each  alternative 
requires a  substantial amount of effort to be 
able to implement  it.  This represents a 
serious additional workload at  a  time when 
most LHD are understaffed to run their  daily 
functions. 74  Most  LHD will not be able to 
pursue all  of these options.  Therefore,  it 
becomes necessary  to choose among  them. 
Table 1  summarizes the advantages and 
disadvantages of each  alternate mode of 
dispensing. 
The optimal choice  for  a  LHD will be 
determined by  a  number  of different 
variables depending on  the relative 
importance of speed of dispensing, 
population reached, security,  and staffing 
requirements. Additionally, the LHD must 
take into account  the costs and political 
ramifications associated with  the alternate 
modes of dispensing  as well as the specific 
legal quandaries raised by  the alternate 













Closed No No Low Low Ensures staff for POD and hospitals 
is ready prior to mass prophylaxis
Dispensing at 
businesses




Closed No No Medium Low Without special assistance this 
population may not otherwise be 
able to receive prophylaxis.
Dispensing at 
c o l l e g e s /
universities
Closed Maybe No Medium Medium Implementation becomes easier if 
there is a campus environment
Dispensing at 
hotels
Closed Maybe No Low Medium Effectively deals with the non-local 
population (business and tourist)
Dispensing at 
HMO
Closed No No Low High Only provide prophylaxis to those 
having a particular health insurance
Door- to -door 
dispensing
Open No No High High Voluntary program that currently 
requires a large security component
D r i v e - t h r u 
dispensing
Open Yes Yes Medium Medium Savings in terms of staffing are 
small, speed of dispensing is slower
Dispensing at 
pharmacies
Open No No Medium Medium Convenient locations and strong 
bond with community
Open – anyone may receive prophylaxis
Closed – prophylaxis is only available to a specific subpopulation
Table 1. Comparison of Alternate Modes of Dispensing
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Costs associated with  alternate modes of 
dispensing  break down  into two major 
subcategories: preplanning  costs and 
implementation costs.  Preplanning costs are 
those associated with  setting up an  option, 
whereas implementation costs those incurred 
when  the option  is implemented during an 
emergency.  Both  costs can  be difficult  to 
define, estimate,  or  measure and may  include 
work-hours lost to the project,  employee 
salary  and benefits, contractor  fees,  and 
travel.  Although  cost  of implementation may 
be overlooked during  an emergency,  it  is very 
unlikely  that  public  and private partners 
would ignore the need to estimate both  types 
of costs during the preplanning phase. 
By  partnering with  other  agencies, LHD 
make the problem  of mass prophylaxis a 
community-oriented problem  and private 
partners may  fill gaps that LHD cannot. 
However,  especially  when using  closed 
models of dispensing, LHD may  be accused 
of favoritism  for exercising  one option  and 
not the other. 
There are several legal issues, liability  (tort 
and workers compensation)  in  particular, 
that  may  hinder  the implementation  of any 
mass prophylaxis plan. Chester  Lee Smith, 
from  the Georgia  Division of Public Health, 
hosted several  meetings with  BENS members 
and their  legal representatives between 
October 2003  and January  2007. During 
these meetings it  emerged that  the liability 
issue was of great  concern  to all  potential 
partners in  the private sector.75  Private 
partners must  also consider  that insurance 
companies may  refuse to cover  claims 
resulting  from  injuries, as dispensing 
medications is not  a  part  of their  normal 
operations. 76 
The government  has made significant 
strides in  alleviating  some of these concerns 
by  passing the Public Readiness and 
Emergency  Preparedness (PREP) Act in 
2005, which,  when issued by  the secretary  of 
the Department  of Health  and Human 
Services,  provides immunity  from  tort 
liability  (except  for  willful misconduct) for 
both  the administration  and use of 
countermeasures. 77 The federal  government 
as also instituted the Volunteer  Protection 
Act of 1997, 78 but  many  feel that  this act has 
too many  loopholes to be effective and states 
have the  ability  to opt  out  of the act  entirely. 
This raises the issue that  states do not  have a 
uniform  approach to the issues of liability. 
Most states have a  range of legislation 
surrounding  “Good Samaritan”  laws,  but  the 
strength  and coverage of these laws varies 
from  state to state and is very  confusing. 79 
The BENS members at  these meetings 
recommended new  legislation  or  changes in 
current legislation  such  as the states’ “Good 
Samaritan”  laws that  would protect  them 
from  legal liability  and litigation  occurring 
from  incidental injuries but  not from  willful 
negligence. 80 
CONCLUSION
Many  LHD may  find it  extremely  difficult  to 
prophylax  their  entire population  within 
forty-eight  hours using  only  their  POD 
because of staffing,  security, and site 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  c o n c e r n s . L o c a l  h e a l t h 
departments could open  more POD, but this 
would not resolve the issue because the 
number  of POD is directly  correlated to the 
requisite number  of resources.  The Trust  for 
America’s Health  determined that  “ensuring 
the public can  quickly  and safely  receive 
medicat ions dur ing  a  major  heal th 
emergency  is one of the most  serious 
challenges facing  public  health  officials”  and 
that  many  states still  do not  have viable 
means of addressing  volunteer  staffing 
issues.81  Considering  that  resources will 
always be under  pressure it  becomes 
necessary  for  public  health  officials to 
consider  alternate modes of dispensing. 82 
This implies that  LHD will need to conduct 
analyses to determine the best alternate 
modes of dispensing for  their  jurisdictions. 
This is a  difficult  task  since each  mode of 
dispensing  has a  unique set  of advantages 
and disadvantages.
As a  starting  point, each  LHD needs to 
make a  realistic  assessment  of how  many 
traditional POD it  will  be able to make 
operational  in  a  few  hours time. This will 
allow  the LHD to determine the amount of 
unmet  need. Workshops or  tabletop exercises 
designed specifically  to evaluate total  system 
response capacity  and capacity  resource 
requirements would be a  good starting  point 
to make this assessment. Traditional 
exercises such  as those listed in  the HSEEP 
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guidance are operationally  focused either  as 
functional exercises – such  as running one or 
a  couple of dispensing  options for  a short 
period of time – or  simulating  actual 
responses to a  mock incident  or  conducting 
discussions (workshops, games, tabletops) 
with a similar focus.
 While helpful,  these exercises do not 
focus on  the total  response effort  required, 
typically  assuming  perfect  scalability. While 
the HSEEP evaluation  methodology  could 
still  be used as a  means of evaluating the 
workshops/tabletop exercises,  the exercises 
themselves would need to be refocused to 
assess the total response effort  required. Only 
by  doing  a complete systems analysis of all  of 
the planned response elements within  the 
health  department’s jurisdiction will a solid 
assessment  of the degree to which  the 
public’s needs are met by  the response plan 
become apparent.  This analysis must also 
include the total  response requirements for 
each  entity  involved in  the plan  (health 
department,  security/law  enforcement, 
government, transportation,  community 
partners). For these efforts,  it  is critical to 
b r i n g t o g e t h e r  L H D s t a f f ,  h e a l t h 
professionals,  government officials,  police 
and other  law  enforcement  personnel,  their 
response plans,  and the assumptions that 
each agency  makes about  the actions, 
capability,  and availability  of the other 
agencies. The discussions will need to center 
around these assumptions and their  realism 
as well  as the total  response effort needed to 
meet the federal mandates.  
After  such  a  workshop/tabletop exercise, a 
realistic  picture  of the constraints within the 
community  should become apparent. 
Important  questions include estimates of the 
number  of sites required and the staffing 
needed to support  all  of these sites; the 
quantity  of medical professionals that have 
been  double counted; estimates on the 
number  of law  enforcement  personnel who 
will  be committed to tasks ensuring an 
orderly  society  (and not  available to a 
dispensing  operations); logistics of deploying 
large numbers of non-medical volunteers; 
logistics of on-the-spot credentialing  of 
medical personnel  who spontaneously 
volunteer; availability  (and timeliness) of 
using assets from  the National Guard, 
military  bases, police academies,  etc; and the 
suitability  and logistics of the POD sites that 
are not  within  the top ranked choices.   Given 
this information, the LHD can consider what 
aspects of their  POD plan are most  in  need of 
supplementation  – sites,  security,  staffing, 
throughput, locations, etc.  – so that  the 
relative importance of addressing the 
different criteria becomes clearer. 
Once the gap analyses have been 
completed,  and resource needs and their 
relative importance/priority  determined, the 
next question  is how  to best remedy  these 
needs.  The decision  makers for  each 
jurisdiction, potentially  the local health 
department or  other emergency  response 
agencies or  a  consortia  of response agencies, 
need to choose, in  concert with  their 
community  partners,  what  combination of 
POD and alternate modes of dispensing  best 
meet the needs of the population  within their 
jurisdiction. Table 1, adapted and expanded 
to reflect the specific  details of the 
jurisdiction is a  good starting  point for 
building  an  augmented system.  If too many 
options are available in  a  given jurisdiction, 
or  if the preferences and priorities vary 
widely  between community  partners,  tools 
from  the field of decision analysis,  such  as 
multi-criteria  decision-making,  can  facilitate 
the analysis and subsequent discussion 
necessary  to make well-informed choices. 
The Los Angeles County  Department  of 
Public  Health  conducted such  an  analysis for 
two types of dispensing situations.83   This 
research  provides a  template for  the analysis 
but  the results will necessarily  vary  by 
jurisdiction  and the specific  needs and gaps 
identified in each case.
Areas of future research should include 
full  systems analyses of a  jurisdiction’s 
response capability  showing  how  an 
integrated approach  could provide potential 
solutions to existing  capability  and staffing 
limitations.  Ideally  this would include 
analyses for  jurisdictions of different sizes 
and geographical locations to see if there are 
any  global best practices or  combinations 
that  appear  to work  best  with  certain  types of 
localities or geographical features or 
population demographics.  
There are many  options for expanding 
mass prophylaxis dispensing, each  with  its 
own  particular  set  of benefits and drawbacks. 
It is of utmost importance to have a realistic 
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sense of potential areas with  resource 
constraints if the jurisdiction  relies solely  on 
the traditional POD system. The key  is to 
evaluate the overall  system  from  all response 
partners’ perspectives to ensure that plans 
can  be translated into reality  in  a  full 
response situation.  Only  this type of holistic 
analysis will  reveal limitations within  the 
current policy.  It  is important for government 
agencies at  various levels to realize that  a 
“one size fits all”  approach  is likely  to fall 
short  given the incredible diversity  in  our 
cities and states. It  is equally  important  for 
individual jurisdictions to thoughtfully  assess 
their  individual  situations and decide, once 
the constraints in  a  particular jurisdiction are 
identified,  which  alternate modes of 
d ispensing can  be pursued to best 
supplement  the system. Only  once this is 
done can  the local  health  departments be 
assured they  are providing the best  service 
possible to the public that relies on them.
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Over this  past decade, Congress has 
responded to the growing threat of 
bioterrorism and risks  to  US national 
security with increased funding for 
biosecurity and public  health preparedness. 
This has included investment in domestic 
vaccine  manufacturing capacity by the 
United States government.  As  a result, a 
policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency 
has emerged that should cause policy 
makers  to  pause and ask: “what is  the next 
step?” In the near future, this  policy may 
create a surge of efficient vaccine production 
that current emergency distribution models 
are ill equipped to  manage. This article 
presents  the results of a research project 
aimed at developing a model that could 
serve as  a  strategy for pandemic vaccine 
distribution. It argues that as  the nation 
readied for its first pandemic in forty years, 
i t b e n e f i t e d f r o m i n v e s t m e n t s  i n 
preparedness but s t i l l found i tse l f 
unprepared for the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
vaccination campaign.
INTRODUCTION
The nation’s response to the 2009  H1N1 
Pandemic has been  met  with  scrutiny, 
candor,  and a  collaborative effort among 
federal  and state agencies, local public health 
authorities,  associations,  and experienced 
practitioners. The Institutes of Medicine and 
Center  for  Biosecurity  have held conferences 
that  have paved the way  toward improving 
pandemic response. 1  The workshop format 
used at these conferences resulted in  the 
identification and exploration of issues 
relating  to vaccine supply,  administration, 
and distribution  by  both  attendees and 
panelists. However,  after-action vaccine 
distribution discussions failed to result in  an 
overarching implementation  strategy  that 
could be linked to many  elements of a 
coherent  vaccine distribution strategy. This 
article presents a  model  that  could serve as a 
conceptual framework  for  designing  a 
pandemic vaccine distribution policy.
BACKGROUND
Congressional  action has responded to the 
growing threat of bioterrorism  and the 
associated risks to US national  security  by 
increasing  funding for  biosecurity  and public 
health  preparedness.  Among these actions 
has been the investment in  domestic vaccine 
manufacturing  capacity  by  the United States 
government.  As a  result,  a policy  of vaccine 
production self-sufficiency  has emerged that 
should lead policymakers toward the next 
steps in  developing a  vaccine distribution 
strategy. 2 In  the near  future,  this production 
strategy  will create a  surge of vaccine 
production efficiency  that  current emergency 
distribution models are ill equipped to 
manage. This gap between  production and 
distribution capabilities was witnessed in  the 
2009  H1N1  Pandemic  when the limitations of 
the public  health  mass vaccination model 
were recognized and a  distr ibut ion 
infrastructure was assembled to support  a 
vaccination  campaign.3  As a  result, public 
health  planners were encouraged to pursue 
agreements with private sector  providers to 
support  pandemic vaccine distribution. This 
guidance came after  the confirmation  of the 
H1N1  virus on  the North  American  continent 
in April of 2009. 4  
THE PROBLEM
T h e H H S P a n d e m i c p l a n f o r  m a s s 
vaccination  is non-executable,  inadequately 
resourced,5  and lacks a  staffing  strategy  to 
fulfill the goal of vaccinating  300  million 
Americans in  six  months. 6  The US General 
Accountability  Office  (GAO) has reported to 
Congress that  the Health  and Human 
Services (HHS) Pandemic Plan  lacks clarity 
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regarding  the roles and responsibilities of 
states versus the federal  government in 
regards to vaccine distribution. 7   As the 
nation  prepared for  H1N1,  its first  mass 
vaccination  campaign  in  nearly  forty  years, 
the GAO reported to Congress that  GAO 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s h a d n o t  b e e n 
implemented. 8 This report  came in  the midst 
of a  declared public health emergency.  The 
Association  of State and Territorial Health 
Officers (ASTHO) reported,  in  the aftermath 
of H1N1  Pandemic, that states experienced 
difficulties with  vaccine distribution. 9  Why 
does the nation  not have a  proven vaccine 
distribution system  after  spending  billions on 
pandemic preparedness?
The HHS mass vaccination  plan  is based 
on  the public  health  model,  established in the 
1950s and 1960s,  which  was successful in 
eliminating  infectious diseases while 
controlling numerous other  childhood 
diseases.  The plan  assumed state and local 
public health  personnel  would fulfill the 
distribution function, as they  did in  the 1957 
and 1968  pandemics.  However,  over  the past 
twenty  years, the public  health  vaccinator 
corps has declined,10 and in  the past  decade 
has continued to lose workforce capacity  due 
to state  and local  budget cuts. 11 Thus,  as the 
nation  readied for the H1N1  vaccination 
campaign, public health  no longer  had the 
workforce to sustain  an ambitious,  prolonged 
vaccination  campaign.  In  seeking to mitigate 
the effects of a  gap in  the public  health 
workforce,  Congress passed the Public Health 
Emergency  Response grant  to purchase the 
H1N1  vaccine and support  state and local 
response efforts to hire a  temporary 
vaccinator  workforce. When  attempting  to 
use the grant  funds to support a  range of 
vaccine distribution strategies,  states 
reported several policy  barriers, 12  such  as 
bureaucratic state procurement and hiring 
practices that  lacked a  “fast  track” 
mechanism  to expedite the filling  of 
vacancies during emergency  operations. 
Additional  challenges resulted from  the 
introduction  of web-based applications, 
databases,  and vaccine ordering applications 
that were new  to providers and lacked 
interoperability  with  seasonal  influenza 
vaccine administration systems. 
In  contrast  to the 80 million doses of 
H1N1  Pandemic vaccine dispensed in 2009,13 
the private sector  routinely  distributes 135  to 
140  million  doses of influenza  vaccine each 
flu  season. 14  Given  the limitations of the 
public  health  model  and government’s 
greater  reliance on  the private sector  to 
accomplish  a  “rapid response”  H1N1 
pandemic vaccine distribution, the time has 
come for a  strategic study  of strengths and 
weaknesses of all vaccine distribution 
logistics. This research  project  sought  to 
answer  the question “How  could a  new  model 
be designed to support pandemic vaccine 
distribution for  a  public health  emergency  of 
national significance?” 
If the  current public health  model 
experiences difficulties managing  vaccine 
distribution when  dose volumes are less than 
100 million, then  how  can the nation expect 
its public  health  system  to meet the goal of 
the HHS to distribute 300 million  doses? 
This article proposes a hybrid public/private 
policy  that  could serve as the basis for 
p a n d e m i c  v a c c i n e d i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d 
compliment  the current policy  of vaccine 
production self-sufficiency. 
METHODOLOGY
Policy  analysis was used to evaluate two 
existing  vaccine distribution  models and, 
from  that  analysis,  suggest a  new  hybrid 
model  for  pandemic vaccine distribution 
(PVD).  The analysis examined weakness in 
the current public  and private sector  models, 
identified strengths of those models, and 
developed a new  model that  could better 
achieve the policy  goal of vaccinating  300 
million people in  six  months. Three steps 
were used to evaluate existing private and 
public sector  distribution  models and develop 
a new hybrid model. 
1. The first  step was to identify,  shape, and 
validate model evaluation  criteria  using 
the Delphi method.  Subject  matter 
experts (SME) were interviewed in  two 
rounds: the initial  round was used to 
identify  criteria  and a  second round was 
used to validate the criteria  identified 
from  the first  round. In the second round, 
SME were asked to rate the  relative 
importance of each  criterion, rank order 
all  criteria, and discuss their  rationale for 
the ranked order of each criterion. 
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2. The second step was to evaluate the two 
distribution  models using  the model 
evaluation criteria,  which  were identified 
in the Delphi study.
3. The final step was to develop a new 
distribution model  for  pandemic  vaccine 
distribution.  The new  model  incorporates 
desirable attributes from  the two existing 
models; a  comparative analysis of the 
literature provided context in  which  to 
frame the new model.  
SAMPLE
The Delphi panel  consisted of eleven 
individuals with  professional vaccine 
distribution experience. Individuals selected 
served as subject  matter  experts and 
represented stakeholders who were involved 
in  either  non-emergency  (seasonal)  or 
emergency  (pandemic) vaccine distribution. 
These SME were drawn  from  policy, 
administration,  academic (medical),  state-
level program  operations,  federal  operations, 
and national policy  levels. They  represented 
local,  state, and federal levels of government, 
non-government  organizations and the 
private sector, and the disciplines of medicine 
(as physicians, nurses, or  pharmacists), 
emergency  preparedness, and business.  All 
had extensive experience with  the vaccine 
supply  chain,  including  production, 
distribution,  ordering, and administration.  As 
a  group, their  perspectives represented policy 
and operations,  and the public  and private 
sectors. It  is worth  noting  that  several SME 
had extensive experience in  one sector  but 
worked in  another  sector  at  the time of this 
study,  thus offering  insight  from  both  sectors 
as it  relates to vaccine supply, administration, 
and distribution.
DATA COLLECTION
The survey  instrument  consisted of a  series of 
sixteen  questions.  Questions were grouped 
into one of four  segments and each  interview 
consisted of the  four  segments: (1) SME 
background information; (2) private sector 
model and SME involvement  with  seasonal 
influenza vaccination; (3) pandemic  influenza 
vaccination  and the public  health  model; and 
(4) the ethics of vaccine distribution  during 
public  emergencies.  The first  segment 
established the SME’s experience and 
familiarity  with  vaccination  policy, both 
seasonal and pandemic. It  also offered an 
opportunity  to understand the SME’s 
expertise, with  in-depth  follow-up provided 
in  the subsequent sections of the interview. 
The second segment  focused the discussion 
on  knowledge of and familiarity  and 
experience with  the private sector  model and 
its outcomes. The third segment  focused on 
the public  health  model and provided an 
opportunity  to contrast  strengths and 
weaknesses of this model  with  the private 
sector  model. The fourth  segment  solicited 
discussion of the ethics surrounding vaccine 
distribution.
ANALYSIS
Survey  data  were analyzed to determine those 
themes that  emerged from  the interviews and 
resulted in the identification of enablers (the 
how) and criteria  (the what).  An  enabler  was 
defined as a  process that  supported a 
particular  outcome or  criteria.  Enablers were 
sorted based on  the interview  discussions 
that  related to a major theme.  Criteria  and 
enablers are depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Criteria & Enablers that Influence PVD15
The epidemiological model “web of 
causation”  was used to model and illustrate 
the inter-relationships among  the enablers 
and criteria  (see Figure 1).  First  introduced in 
the 1960s by  MacMahon, Pugh  and Ipsen, the 
web of causation  model  showed relationships 
among  causal  factors of disease. 16 The survey 
conducted for  this study  revealed that several 
factors contributed to the understanding  of 
the dynamics of vaccine distribution.  The 
application  of the epidemiological model 
helped to conceptualize how  the criteria 
relate to each  other  and associated enablers 
for  vaccine distribution.  The next step was to 
use these model  evaluation  criteria  to 
evaluate two current models of vaccine 
distribution: the public  health  model and the 
private sector model. 
TWO MODELS OF VACCINE 
DISTRIBUTION
THE PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL
The public  health  model (PHM) is the 
current,  documented strategy  for mass 
vaccination  when  a  public  health  emergency 
is declared. This guidance, which  dictates 
federal  policy  for  mass vaccination,  dates to 
the 1950s and 1960s when  mass vaccination 
clinics were used to defeat  childhood 
infectious diseases such  as polio,  smallpox, 
etc. In  the first  decade of the twenty-first 
century, the guidance was revised and 
updated,  and then  pushed to state and local 
jurisdictions.  This public health  model  is 
described in  numerous public  health  mass 
prophylaxis planning guidance documents. 
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Figure 2  depicts the public health  model, 
in  which  the federal government is the 
purchaser  and distributor  of pandemic 
vaccine and has the sole responsibility  for 
procurement and distribution  to the states. 
This model is labor  intensive and dependent 
upon  state, local, and tribal departments for 
distribution.  It requires logistics functions, 
such  as warehousing, that are no longer  in 
place for  day-to-day  functions in  most states. 
I n  2 0 0 9 t h i s m o d e l  w a s m o d i f i e d 
dramatically  for  H1N1  pandemic  distribution 
plans,  which  had an  impact on routine 
functions.17  For  example,  centralized 
distribution was incorporated for vaccine 
distribution  and the private sector  was 







Figure 2. Public Health Model18
The evaluation  of the PHM revealed that, 
while the Delphi panelists rated the planning 
guidance high  (see Figure 1),  most  model 
evaluation criteria  were  rated low, including 
the extent to which the guidance was 
executable, scalable,  and provider-centered. 
The criteria  of client-centered and integration 
were assessed as medium.19 During the rating 
of these criteria,  comments were offered by 
SME that provided insights to their 
assessments based on experience. Generally, 
they  believed the public health  model is dated 
and no longer reflects the realities of the 
twenty-first  century.  This view  was stated in 
the context  of the attrition  of the public 
health  workforce, low  dependence on  and 
integration  of untested technologies for 
logistics support,  and a consumer-oriented 
retail service sector. 
Consider  the attrition  of the public  health 
workforce and its capacity  to manage a 
sustained mass vaccination  campaign. 
Enumeration  methodologies used by 
departments of health  to assess the public 
health  nurse workforce across the nation  lack 
consistency, but states with  centralized public 
health  systems have reported declines in  that 
workforce. For  example, in  2009  South 
Carolina  reported that  its workforce over  the 
past  decade decreased from  an  estimated 
1,200  nurses to 461  nurses,  a  decrease of 
nearly  two-thirds. 20 Similar  reductions in  the 
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workforce have further  impacted vaccination 
support  requirements and the capacity  to 
sustain a campaign. 
The public health  model  is built  around 
few  technologies; however, subject matter 
experts cited examples of technologies 
introduced during  the H1N1  pandemic and 
described how  technologies used in  the 
private sector  would aid in  vaccine 
distribution.  For  example, two SME pointed 
out that the distribution  logistics to support 
H1N1  should have been managed by  a  Supply 
Chain  Inventory  Management  system. 
Another  SME described the Centers for 
Disease Control’s (CDC) use of technology  as 
“untested,”  while  another  reported her  state 
had been  using pen,  paper,  and fax  machine 
to manage vaccine distribution  prior  to the 
H1N1  pandemic.  The pandemic  caused the 
state to develop and roll out  a  new  web-based 
technology  ordering  system  for  physician 
practices willing  to administer  the H1N1 
vaccine. This was one state’s experience, but 
there was no one system  used by  all states for 
vaccine ordering  and distribution.  There also 
was no system  in  place for  use by  CDC’s 
contractor,  McKesson  Medical Specialties, 
which  was responsible  for  distributing 
pandemic vaccine to the 90,000 registered 
providers.21 
F ina l ly ,  the publ ic  hea l th  model 
incorporated limited strategies when 
compared to those of a  twenty-first  century 
consumer-oriented retail service  sector.  The 
mass vaccination clinic, according  to 
planning  guidance,  delivers service at  large 
centers. Clients who seek  vaccination  must 
travel  to this site for  a  single service (which  is 
not to say  that many  departments of health 
have not instituted alternative delivery 
methods such  as drive-thru  clinics, rural 
clinics located in  solo-owned pharmacies and 
mall clinics, but  this is not necessarily  a 
component of the traditional public  health 
model). 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR MODEL
A  vaccine is manufactured for  profit  and sold 
to wholesalers and distributors who sell  to 
frontline providers. Over  the past decade, this 
provider  network has expanded to include 
not  only  physician  practices,  but  retail 
pharmacies (chain-owned), grocery  stores, 
and big  box retail outlets as well. It  is 
estimated that a  third of all  annual  flu  vaccine 
is administered through  the retail  sector.22 
The balance is administered through 
physician  practices and community  clinics. 
While  the ability  of this model to distribute 
vaccine is powerful,  its ability  to respond to 
public health  emergencies is limited.  For 
example,  during  periods of vaccine shortage, 
the system  lacks the responsiveness to 
retrieve vaccine and distribute to high-risk 
population groups. Distribution  of the first 
doses of vaccine goes to high-profit  margin, 
bulk buyers.  Under  normal distribution, 
vaccine administration  is offered through 
retail outlets before the healthcare sector 
begins to offer  vaccine to its client  base, 
which  includes both  physicians and public 
sector providers. 
Figure 3  shows the private sector  model 
(PSM) and illustrates the complexity  and 
redundancy  of production,  distribution, and 
wholesaler  and provider  relationships. The 
government  – federal,  state, and local – 
accounts for  less than  10  percent  of the 
activity  in this model.23  Physicians,  at the 
provider  level,  purchase a  vaccine directly 
from  either  a  manufacturer  or  from  a 
wholesaler. That  purchase can  include 
auxiliary  supplies such  as syringes, alcohol 
swabs, and cotton balls. 
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Figure 3. Private Sector Model24 
In  evaluating  the PSM, Delphi panelists 
rated it high  for  three criteria  (see Figure 1): 
it  is executable, scalable, and client-centered. 
With  regards to two criteria  – provider-
centered and integration – the PSM was 
rated as medium, while the federal  planning 
guidance was rated as low. 25 
The limitations of this model to serve as 
public policy  are twofold: it  fails to reach 
p o p u l a t i o n  t a r g e t s t h a t a r e e i t h e r 
geographically  remote and/or high-risk. The 
model offers limited reach into remote rural 
areas not  served by  large corporations with 
franchise networks. For  example,  while 
corporate retail  pharmacies (such  as CVS, 
Walgreens and Rite Aid)  are members of the 
network, locally  owned pharmacies in  remote 
areas are not  served by  the pharmaceutical 
corporate structure.  Therefore,  these 
communities, in  all likelihood, are not  served 
by  this service delivery  model and would also 
be underserved in  emergency  distribution. 
The second limitation  of the model  is that it 
does not incorporate a  community  outreach 
component that  serves high-risk population 
groups,  such  as the homebound or 
uninsured.  Vaccination  rates among the 
uninsured,  underinsured,  and geographically 
remote population  groups are underachieved 
by this model due to limited accessibility.
RESULTS OF THE DELPHI PANEL
Three major  findings were drawn  from  this 
analysis of the public health  model  and the 
private sector  model: (1) the PHM is not 
executable; (2) there are statutory, regulatory 
and licensure barrier  to using  alternative 
healthcare professionals as vaccinators; and 
(3) the United States lacks a  comprehensive 
policy for pandemic vaccine distribution.
1.  THE HHS PANDEMIC VACCINATION PLAN 
IS NOT EXECUTABLE
The evaluation  of the public health  model 
illustrated the limitations of pandemic 
vaccine distribution (PVD) due primarily  to 
insufficient public  health  workforce capacity. 
The weaknesses of the  current  federal 
pandemic plan  for  distribution  were revealed 
when  the nation responded to the 2009  H1N1 
pandemic.  Public health  did not  have the 
expected infrastructure to support  mass 
vaccination  as called for  in the federal 
guidance to meet the HHS goal.  It is the 
public health  nurse workforce that has served 
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as the  key  personnel  in  past  mass vaccination 
efforts. As a  result,  Public  Health  Emergency 
Response (PHER) grants were used to 
supplement  the staffing  limitations of state 
and local departments of health  (DoH) and 
the private healthcare sector was recruited to 
assist with vaccination.
2.  THERE EXIST STATUTORY, REGULATORY, 
AND LICENSURE BARRIERS TO USING 
ALTERNATIVE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 
AS VACCINATORS
An alternative workforce capacity  must  be 
identified and readied for  emergency  mass 
vaccination  to supplement  the decline in  the 
public health  nurse workforce.  But regulatory 
complexities (such  as limited scope of 
practice)  restrict  recruitment of alternative 
health  professionals as vaccinators, especially 
during an  emergency. The pharmacy 
profession has been  readying  pharmacists for 
the role of vaccinator over  the past  sixteen 
years,  and this has been coupled with  the 
expansion  of retail  pharmacy  flu  clinics. 
While  public  health  was slow  to adopt the 
pharmacist  vaccinator  as a  partner  for 
emergency  mass vaccination during  the H1N1 
campaign, other  factors also limited the 
adoption  of pharmacists as vaccinators. 
These issues – scope of practice and medical 
control  – limit the ability  of other  allied 
health  professions (dentists, paramedics,  or 
veterinarians) to serve as vaccinators as well. 
States have authority  over  issues of medical 
control  and could resolve such  barriers.  But 
each  state must  identify  and address barriers 
that  surround the statutory  regulatory  issues 
that  limit  the use of allied healthcare 
professionals as vaccinators. 
3.  THE NATION LACKS A COMPREHENSIVE 
POLICY FOR PANDEMIC VACCINE 
DISTRIBUTION
While  the United States is progressing  toward 
vaccine production  self-sufficiency, little 
progress has been  made on  the distribution 
side. The CDC has distribution  projects 
underway, such  as the Vaccine Management 
Business Improvement Project  (VMBIP),26 
begun in  2003.  Elements of VMBIP were 
adapted for  the H1N1  pandemic.  But  federal 
planning  guidance for  mass vaccination is 
driven  by  US dependency  on traditional 
vaccine production  techniques and offshore 
sources that traditionally  have produced an 
unreliable vaccine supply.  As the US policy  of 
vaccine production self-sufficiency  produces 
a  more re l iab le supply  o f vacc ine , 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y 
implementation strategies will  be merited. 
Policy  strategies should be amended for  a 
time when  vaccine distribution  will  not be 
based on  scarce allocation  schemes or  vaccine 
rationing, but instead will  be based on 
vaccine self-sufficiency. In  light of the 2009 
H1N1  pandemic  and as new  vaccine 
production technologies come online,  the 
discussion of distribution  policy  ought to 
consider  what the nation’s pandemic  vaccine 
system should look like. 
A  policy  for  pandemic  vaccine distribution 
should include strategies that  strengthen the 
distribution  model and enhance herd 
immunity. Extensive guidance exists for 
vaccine administration  to target groups; this 
achieves the ethical principle of social justice 
while managing  who gets vaccinated.  What is 
absent in  the model and its guidance is how  a 
vaccine is distributed (strategies),  where the 
vaccine is distributed (venues), and by  whom 
(vaccinators). 
A NEW MODEL FOR PANDEMIC 
VACCINE DISTRIBUTION
Based on  this evaluation  of the public health 
and the private  sector  models, a  new  model 
can  be developed. It  is a  public-private 
partnership that  builds upon current private 
sector  relationships by  incorporating  the 
distribution component  for pandemic events 
where vaccination  is the mitigation  strategy. 
It builds on  decades of the United States 
government and s tate governments 
partnering with  the private sector  to 
implement  a  cost-effective, policy-based 
vaccine supply  for  such  programs as Vaccine 
for  Children (VFC), 27  and the more recent 
response to H1N1.  A  partnership with  the 
pharmaceutical industry  has existed in  one 
form  or  another  since the 1950s but has been 
limited to the supply  of vaccines.  The 
pharmaceutical industry  has the production 
capacity; what  has been missing is a  private 
sector-driven medical  logistics capability.  The 
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2009  H1N1  mass vaccination  campaign 
demonstrated a  core competency  of the 
private sector  – its centralized distribution 
capability  – that  had been  a  key  component 
in seasonal flu campaigns. 
Figure 4  depicts the public-private 
partnership model  for  pandemic vaccine 
distribution (PVD). The federal government 
is the purchaser  but  contracts with  the 
private sector for  both  vaccine production 
and distribution  logistics in  pandemic events. 
The federal government,  in  concert  with  state 
and local departments of health, collaborates 
with,  recruits,  and registers the provider 
network in advance of a public health 
emergency. This last element was introduced 
during  the 2009  H1N1  pandemic vaccination 
campaign. However,  the wholesalers and,  to a 
great  extent,  the large purchasers  (shown  in 
Figure 3) critical for  distribution to providers 
in  the private  sector  model were removed 
from  the supply  chain.  This hybrid model 
restores,  to some extent,  the private sector 
components of the distribution  network  that 
are missing  in  the public health  model  but 
prominent  in  the private sector  model.  It 
expands vaccination  venues by  incorporating 
retail  sector  in-store clinics,  pharmacies, 
grocery  stores, and big  box  sites – a  concept 
supported by retail executives. 28 
Centralized distribution  is critical  in  this 
model because it  replaces the labor-intensive 
distribution function inherent  in the public 
health  model that, due to attrition,  is either 
diminished or  no longer  operational.  Central 
distribution includes a  warehousing  function, 
where product is received, an  inventory  and 
data  system,  and a shipping and transport 
function.  An  additional essential  component 
is cold-chain management;29  the ability  to 
monitor  temperature fluctuation  during 
transport  may  compromise vaccine efficacy. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h i s s y s t e m  i n c o r p o r a t e s 
performance metrics to ensure private sector 















Figure 4. Public Private Partnership for PVD
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To distribute the H1N1  vaccine,  McKesson 
Specialty  Care Solutions assembled four 
depots in  six  weeks,30  strategically  located 
throughout the United States. 31  The five 
pharmaceutical  manufacturers shipped 
vaccine to these locations,  where it  was 
inventoried and stored.  The CDC provider 
network orders were pulled from  depot 
inventory  but the data  systems used by  states 
were a  patchwork of systems that fed into the 
CDC. As explained by  Delphi panelists,  the 
supply-side ordering  system  (a  pull system) 
competed with  the manufacturing system  (a 
push system).32  What  was missing  from  the 
H1N1  application  was a  supply  chain 
management  system.  Aspects of the CDC 
VMBIP project  had yet  to be implemented 
but project  elements will  eventually 
standardize an ordering system  to be used by 
all  states and US territories. (McKesson  filled 
H1N1  vaccine orders the day  they  were 
received and delivered vaccines the next  day. 
This metric was assessed daily, weekly, and 
monthly.)  
The hybrid model leverages private sector 
resources to achieve the goal of herd 
immunity  during a  public  health  emergency 
of national significance. The public and 
private sectors both work  toward delivering  a 
public good by  building  on their core 
competencies. The public  sector,  through  the 
federal  government, serves as the lead 
partner  coordinating activity  among  federal 
agencies, state governments, vaccine advisory 
c o m m i t t e e s ,  a n d p h a r m a c e u t i c a l 
manufacturers. The private sector  uses its 
production capabilities,  the strength of its 
logistics support technology,  and a contracted 
reasonable cost to the public  sector  to 
accomplish  the public  health  goal.  The 
private sector  is protected legally  and fulfills 
its social responsibility  as a  contributing 
corporate citizen. The public sector  meets its 
mandate to provide for the common good.
Planning  doctrine, published for  public 
health  emergencies of national significance, 
should be written  to support this hybrid 
model. It  builds on  the network  of providers 
used for  seasonal influenza  vaccinations and 
leverages the full scope of the private sector 
for  both distribution  and administration  of 
vaccine. Additionally,  it  recruits,  prepares, 
and readies a network of “emergency” 
vaccinators or  non-traditional vaccinators 
supplementing  tradit ional providers 
(illustrated in  Figure  4) as the provider 
network. The new  hybrid model integrates 
the public health  system  and its emphasis on 
target  populations with  the broad net  cast by 
the private sector  to maximize vaccine 
distribution.  This policy  strategy  ensures the 
emergency  distribution  of vaccine by 
maximizing  geographical reach  and using  a 
f u l l  r a n g e o f v e n u e s f o r  v a c c i n e 
administration  in a  given  community. It also 
follows the policy  and practice of emergency 
management  for  preparedness,  response, and 
recovery  and reflects National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) guidance.
BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION
There currently  exist  several  barriers to 
implementing the hybrid model.  These 
include scope-of-practice restrictions on 
potential vaccinators,  the lack of an 
integrated distribution  system  that  works for 
seasonal and pandemic  vaccines,  and the 
need for  a  formal public-private partnership 
for  pandemic response. This section  presents 
three recommendations for  removing  or 
mitigating those barriers. 
Recommendation 1. States, in  cooperation 
with  HHS and health  and medical specialty 
associations,  should change scope of practice 
restrictions that  block disciplines from 
serving  as vaccinators in  declared public 
health  emergencies where vaccination is the 
mitigation strategy.
The nation  has a  corps of health  and medical 
professionals with  the skill  set and desire to 
assist  during emergency  operations. The 
limitations and barriers to deploy  health  and 
medical  personnel  in  the aftermath  of 
Hurricane Katrina revealed the legal, 
licensing, and practice constraints.33  These 
issues were visited again  in  an  attempt  to 
deploy  vaccinators for  the 2009  H1N1 
pandemic. 34
State statutes define the scope of practice 
for  these professionals. However, there are 
legal,  regulatory, and licensure restrictions 
that  limit health  and medical professionals 
from  serving  as vaccinators in  public health 
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emergencies.  These became apparent  during 
the H1N1 mass vaccination campaign. 
This recommendation  addresses the 
quagmire of restrictions. It  expands the non-
traditional vaccinator’s scope of practice to 
include this skill set  for  public  health 
emergencies.  The scope of practice is a  state 
responsibility, but  HHS should serve as lead 
facilitator  (which would be not  unlike its role 
in  the past),  providing  the incentives and 
mechanisms for  states to upgrade laws 
pertaining to state emergency powers. 
Recommendation 2. The United States 
government  should support  an  integrated 
vaccine distribution infrastructure that works 
for  both  seasonal influenza  and pandemic 
influenza.
A n  i n t e g r a t e d v a c c i n e d i s t r i b u t i o n 
infrastructure could be used each  influenza 
season and when  a public health  emergency 
requires a  mass vaccination  strategy. This 
recommendation  has been  made in  the past, 
serves as recommended policy  in  Canada, 
and is currently  practiced in  the Province of 
Ontario. The Department of Health  and 
Human  Services must  understand that  its 
investments on the supply  side are 
insufficient if,  in  an  event,  supplies are not 
efficiently  distributed to those in  need. 
Delphi panelists described how  their  family 
members could not  get an  H1N1  shot, despite 
warehouses they  managed full of vaccine 
doses.  The public  health  model has 
distribution barriers that  should be 
addressed and resolved if the intended 
outcome is improved uptake rates and 
biosecurity.  Thus,  an  integrated distribution 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f f e r s d u a l - p u r p o s e 
application.
Recommendation 3. The United States 
g o v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d e s t a b l i s h  a 
comprehensive public-private partnership for 
pandemic vaccine distribution  that achieves 
the HHS goal and facilitates a rapid response.
Pandemic response should not stop at 
vaccine production self-sufficiency.  It  should 
incorporate a  distribution  policy  that 
supports the vaccine supply  chain from 
production  through  distribution  and 
administration  to individuals. A  policy  of 
vaccine distribution  would complement the 
policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency. 
A STRATEGIC POLICY FOR 
PANDEMIC VACCINE 
DISTRIBUTION
The new  hybrid model serves as the 
implementation strategy  for a  strategic policy 
that  targets pandemic  vaccine distribution 
(PVD). This final section  describes the 
strategy  and the six  strategic goals drawn 
from  the findings of this analysis. Finally, a 
framework is presented that  outlines a policy 
for pandemic vaccine distribution. 
THE POLICY STRATEGY
The United States government has invested 
$7.1  billion  in  pandemic preparedness,  of 
which  $3.2  billion  was invested in  enhancing 
vaccine production, 35  including  expanded 
capacity  and new  technology  for  cell-based 
vaccine. In the near  future,  the return  on 
investment will be realized,  but  funding 
investments should be redirected into PVD 
infrastructure projects.  For example,  $176 
million is used annually  for  egg  embryos to 
sustain  the egg-based vaccine production 
process of the 1940s. 36  Once cell-based 
vaccine technology  is proficient, these 
investments could be redirected to offset 
costs to improve distribution  strategies. One 
such  project could assist  states and medical 
associations to review  statutory  and licensure 
barriers that  prohibit non-traditional 
professionals with  vaccination skill sets from 
administering  vaccinations in a  declared 
public health emergency.
A  policy  strategy  directed toward 
distribution, accompanied by  similar 
investments and initiatives,  should be 
pursued.  It  should incorporate six  key  goals 
t h a t  d r a w  f r o m  t h i s a n a l y s i s .  T h e 
r e c o m m e n d e d p o l i c y  p a r a l l e l s t h e 
Congress ional Budget  Of f ice (CBO) 
document U.S.  Policy Regarding Pandemic-
Influenza Vaccines,37  which details the US 
strategy  for  achieving  vaccine production 
self-sufficiency.  
T h e s t r a t e g y  i s t o e s t a b l i s h  a 
comprehensive public-private partnership for 
PVD that  can achieve the HHS goal. The 
objective of this approach  is to incorporate an 
executable staffing  strategy  for  the HHS goal 
stated in  the 2005  pandemic plan and its 
claim “to facilitate rapid response.” 38 
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POLICY GOALS
Six specific policy  goals offer  guidance to 
p o l i c y m a k e r s a n d p l a n n e r s i n  t h e 
development of a new model. 
1. Augment  the current  emergency 
mass vaccination plan with  a  staffing 
model  sufficiently  sized to meet the 
mass vaccination goal. 
This first  goal  is predicated on a staffing 
strategy  that  supports the HHS goal to 
vaccinate 300  million Americans in  six 
months. Three enablers are crucial to support 
an  executable mass vaccination  plan.  These 
included a publicly  funded vaccination 
campaign, a  staffing  strategy  or model, and 
technology  that  would sustain  the ordering, 
distribution,  and metrics requirements.  H1N1 
was a publicly  funded campaign  and, while 
federal  guidance implies that  a  campaign 
could be publicly  funded, there is currently 
no policy  that  supports publicly  funded 
campaigns. Actions of the government  show 
that  it will fund medical  countermeasure 
purchase and distribution,  but the key 
enabler is a staffing model sized for response. 
2. Expand the vaccinator  corps to 
support  the staffing of multiple venues 
with  a mechanism  that  permits 
capacity to expand or contract. 
The second goal is to develop a  vaccinator 
corps that can  provide the workforce capacity 
for  the staffing  model  called for  in  the first 
goal. It  expands the current  model to include 
non-tradit ional vaccinators such  as 
pharmacists, paramedics, dentists, and even 
veterinarians. This goal advocates for 
primary  care physicians with  an  emphasis on 
the medical home,39 but  recognizes that, in  a 
medical  emergency, this network  is 
insufficient to reach  most Americans. 
Therefore, multiple venues must be 
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n  t h e n e t w o r k .  T h i s 
dependence builds on  the traditional public 
health  model and adds non-traditional 
venues such as pharmacies, in-store retail 
clinics, and the workplace. 
The public health  mass vaccination model 
is built around 3,036  local  and tribal 
departments of health. 40  In  contrast, 
Walgreens reports 7,100 pharmacies and CVS 
boasts another  3,000 pharmacies, most  of 
which  give flu  shots. 41  This contrast 
illustrates the scalability  of the private sector 
resources used for  the seasonal flu  campaign 
that  could be tapped for pandemic mass 
vaccination. 
3. Adopt  client-centered strategies to 
maximize vaccination rates. 
To maximize vaccination  rates,  mass 
vaccination  campaigns should take advantage 
of client  familiarity  and routine behavior, 
convenience, and accessibility.  Nations that 
have cultivated client-centered strategies 
experience greater  vaccination uptake.  For 
example,  Canada reported the highest H1N1 
vaccination  rates in the world at  46  percent,42 
while the United States reported 27 percent. 43
Customer  convenience and accessibility 
has attracted the attention  of retailers hosting 
in-store clinics and vaccination  is a  service 
that  has become part of the retail mix. To 
illustrate this point,  consider  this statement 
published in  a  California  Health  Care 
Foundation  report: “Retail companies are 
ready  to cater  to this new  kind of healthcare 
consumer  by  offering  what they  believe their 
shoppers want: convenient  basic  medical 
service at a fair price, stated in advance.” 44
A  strategy  used in seasonal flu  campaigns 
is point-to-point service.  This is similar  to the 
practice instituted by  Southwest Airlines that 
has contributed to its success.  Southwest  and 
manufacturers understand that  airline 
commuters seek transportation that will take 
them  from  home to their destination  without 
layover  and that  smaller  aircraft  can 
a c c o m m o d a t e i n c r e a s e d f r e q u e n c y . 
Manufacturers build more,  smaller  aircraft. 
Southwest  uses these aircraft to service the 
same routes with  greater  frequency  to 
accommodate passengers.  This contrasts with 
the current  “hub-and-spoke”  system  used by 
most airlines. 
Concentrating  resources and setting  up 
clinics only  in  public facilities or  establishing 
a  “mass vaccination center”  is, from  a  client 
perspective,  a  hub-and-spoke system. In 
contrast,  clinics in  the workplace, pharmacy, 
or  retail  store are examples of point-to-point 
service.  This is the essence of the client-
centered strategies used to maximize 
vaccination rates in Canada. 
The public  health  model  is not  built 
around client-centered strategies that 
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encourage high  vaccination  rates.  The public 
image of a  public  health  mass vaccination 
center  involves long  lines,  lengthy  wait  times, 
traffic congestion,  and few  conveniences. As a 
result,  this model  may  do more to discourage 
vaccination than to enhance uptake. 
4. Adopt  provider-centered strategies 
to recruit  and expand the traditional 
provider network.  
Explicit strategies to encourage and 
maximize both  traditional and non-
traditional provider  participation  in  public 
heal th  emergency  mass vacc inat ion 
campaigns must be developed.  The seasonal 
flu  campaign  models a number  of these 
strategies while,  in  contrast, the public  health 
model (PHM) for  mass vaccination  is void of 
such  innovations. As a  result, the PHM was 
limited in  its efforts to recruit  participation 
by  private physician  practices until  H1N1. 
The challenge for  the public  sector  is how  to 
incorporate incentives in  a  model  for 
pandemic response that  approximates the 
inherent  strengths of the public  sector  model 
but  encourages physic ians,  through 
incentives, to adopt  immunization  practices. 
For  example,  public  funding  is one incentive 
that  could be strengthened by  including an 
administrative reimbursement fee for 
patients whose insurance does not  cover such 
expenses.
5. Adopt  an  implementation strategy 
that  supports an  integrated vaccine 
distribution  infrastructure and view 
each  seasonal campaign as an exercise 
for pandemic response.  
It has been  decades since public health  last 
managed a  pandemic using  the public health 
model as its sole strategy  and, at  that  time, it 
h a d t h e w o r k f o r c e n e e d e d f o r 
implementation.  The integration  concept 
argues that  public  health  no longer  has the 
capacity  to sustain  a  separate model for 
pandemic vaccine distribution  and must 
develop alternative strategies.  The “blended” 
model incorporated for  H1N1  was an 
alternative model, and the Vaccine for 
Children program  (VFC) represents yet 
another model from  which  elements were 
adopted for the H1N1 campaign. 
Integration  suggests pandemic  response 
be developed around a  single  model; this 
represents a  philosophical shift  of strategy 
from  that  described in  current planning 
guidance.  In  a  review  of H1N1  barriers,45 the 
Association  of State and Territorial Health 
Officers (ASTHO)  recommended use of 
normal distribution  channels. According  to 
ASTHO,  the initial limited supplies could 
have been  sent to the public  health 
departments using  the CDC identified 
priority  vaccination  providers (e.g.,  those 
participating in VFC).
6. Expand federal planning guidance to 
incorporate proactive distribution 
strategies. 
Most  published federal planning  guidance for 
mass vaccination  is driven by  US dependency 
on  traditional production  techniques and 
offshore sources that  contribute to unreliable 
vaccine supplies. Thus, considerable 
emphasis is placed on vaccine rationing,  such 
as the CDC priority  targets. This article 
argues that with  the establishment  of the US 
policy  of vaccine production self-sufficiency, 
a  time will  come when vaccine production 
will be more reliable.  Future strategies should 
be accompanied by  federal planning  guidance 
to assist  state and local  planners with the 
development of plans that  are both 
comprehensive and identify  the resources 
necessary to accomplish the goal. 
A POLICY FRAMEWORK
The framework for the development of a 
policy  for  US pandemic influenza  vaccine 
distribution,  depicted in  Figure 5, provides a 
starting  point  for  discussion. It  represents a 
composite of strengths identified from  the 
analysis of vaccine distribution  models used 
in  the United States for  either  emergency 
vaccination  (e.g., pandemic) or  the seasonal 
influenza campaign.
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1. What Makes the U.S. Pandemic Plan Executable
a. A publicly funded campaign
b. The staffing model strategy
c. An implementation philosophy for an integrated system
d. The use of new technology
• Vaccine Management Business Improvement Project
• Supply Chain Inventory Management System
2. The Scalability for Pandemic Response
a. A robust vaccinator corps
• Physicians and the emphasis of the medical home
• Allied health professionals ready to serve in new roles





c. How technology may offer vaccine production scalability
3. Adoption of a Client-centered Approach to Vaccination Practices
a. The medical home remains the first choice
b. Point-to-Point service
• The workplace clinic for most Americans
• Retail sector in-store clinics, pharmacies
c. The role of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
4. Adoption of Provider-centered Approach to Maximize Vaccination Rates
a. Improved communication with an expanded provider  network  addresses issues of  efficacy, safety  and 
contraindications
b. Insure a single vaccine ordering system compatible for states with electronic interfaces
c. Expand provider  network by  offering tax  breaks for  registered participants who administer vaccine 
during a public health emergency
5. An Integrated Vaccine Distribution System
a. A single vaccination distribution system
b. Exercised annually through the seasonal campaign
c. Optimal readiness at all times
• Act of bioterrorism
• Emerging infectious disease
• Influenza pandemic
6. Federal Planning Guidance
a. Vaccine Production: A policy for vaccine production self-sufficiency
b. Vaccine  Administration: A multidisciplinary, collaborative approach  to provide guidance for  safe and 
effective vaccine practices.
c. Vaccine  Distribution: A  performance  based system to transport vaccine from manufacturer  to provider 
front door.
Figure 5. Framework for U.S. Policy: Pandemic Vaccine Distribution46
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CONCLUSION
How  does this new  hybrid model fit  into the 
current discourse on  mass vaccination 
strategy? This article has briefly  described the 
progress that has been  made toward vaccine 
production self-sufficiency  and demonstrated 
that  vaccine administration  guidance is well 
documented. 47  What has not progressed is 
the process of vaccine distribution  for 
emergencies.  Three distinct  processes should 
define  a  US pandemic response using 
vaccination  as the mitigation strategy: 
production,  distribution, and administration. 
These three processes are conceptualized in 
Figure 6  as a  triangle, which  illustrates the 
equivalency  of the relationships among  the 
three vaccination  processes.  The three sides 
form  an  interdependent  triangular  network, 
each  equal  but requiring  a  body  of knowledge 




















Figure 6. Vaccination: A Triangular Network of Interdependencies
Each  process is distinctive and warrants a 
body  of work essential for  success; however, 
the interdependency  of all three is necessary 
to achieve herd immunity  during a  public 
health  emergency. The public-private 
p a r t n e r s h i p f o r  p a n d e m i c  v a c c i n e 
distribution offers a  model for  developing  the 
distribution process. It  becomes the building 
block that  compliments the HHS pandemic 
plan and contributes to an  executable 
vaccination model.
V a c c i n e d i s t r i b u t i o n s h o u l d b e 
differentiated from  vaccine administration  in 
federal planning guidance. Too often  in 
guidance,  distribution  is discussed in  the 
context  of vaccine administration while the 
discussion focuses exclusively  on  protocols 
for  vaccine inoculation.  If the discussion  were 
framed in  the context  of the National 
Incident Management  System  (NIMS) and 
incident  command (ICS),  vaccine distribution 
would be a  function  of logistics, whereas 
vaccine administration  is a  function of the 
operations section. A  public  policy  should be 
adopted that differentiates between  these 
functions and establishes a  deliberate course 
of action. It  should build on  current 
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capabilities while encouraging  constructive 
change of distribution limitations. 
This article has presented a  new  hybrid 
model  that  could serve as a  conceptual 
f ra m e w o rk  f o r  a  p a n d e m i c va c c i n e 
distribution policy.  Six  goals were outlined 
based on the findings of the  analysis of two 
existing  vaccine distribution models: the 
public health  model (pandemic  influenza) 
and the private sector  model (seasonal 
influenza). The new  hybrid model builds 
upon  the strengths and weaknesses within 
each  of these and serves as the basis for  a 
strategic  implementation  policy  for  pandemic 
vaccine distribution. 
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Letter to the Editor
February 2012
THE POWER OF THE FEW
I read with  interest Professor  Nieto-Gomez’s recent  article published by  Homeland Security 
Affairs.  While it may  be the case that  the “few”  are becoming  more powerful,  the article 
inaccurately presents this phenomenon and thus misleads the journal’s readers.
The article states “on September  11,  2001, ‘a  few’ hijackers were able to bring  to a  halt the 
entire nation, cripple the economy,  place continuity  of government at  risk and inflict more than 
3,000  casualties.”  Only  the last of the claims in  this sentence is true.  The economy  grew  in  the 
quarter  that included 9/11  and grew  every  quarter  after  that  through 2007. The attack thus did 
not cripple the economy  or  bring  the nation  to a  halt.   Furthermore, at no time did the attack put 
at  risk the continuity  of government. (GDP figures available at  http://www.bea.gov/iTable/
iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1)
The article states “current  technologies make it  possible for  small groups of individuals (‘the 
few’ or  ‘the one’) to alter  the Earth’s weather patterns.”  What  Professor  Nieto-Gomez means 
here is unclear. According  to the chaos theory  he cites,  even  butterflies may  alter  the weather,  so 
it  is not  clear why  it is news that  Bill Gates can. But  if the claim  is that Bill  Gates or  anyone else 
can  now  reshape the earth’s weather  to some purpose, this is clearly  false. The news article 
Professor Nieto-Gomez cites makes clear  that weather  engineering  is merely  experimental, at 
least  decades away,  if possible at all,  and hardly  to be accomplished by  the efforts of one or  even 
a few.
Professor Nieto-Gomez’s article repeats the now  familiar  contrast  between  the supposedly 
nimble few  and a  “slow-reacting bureaucracy.”  In  considering  this claim,  the article’s readers 
should reflect  on  the contest between al  Qaeda  in  Iraq and the US military. The US military 
proved itself more adaptable than  al  Qaeda. Moreover, the military  adapted not by 
“networking,”  but by  using  the centralized authority  of a  bureaucracy.  This example and many 
others one could cite belies Professor  Nieto-Gomez’s claim  that  “the small  and unstructured 
‘few’ are capable of adapting  to the pace of change faster  than  vertical organizations or  big 
governments.”  
Like most  commentators on  such  issues,  Professor  Nieto-Gomez does not  take into account 
sufficiently  the strengths of “the many” or  centralized organizations. This is one reason  that the 
comparisons he draws with  Pearl  Harbor (in  words) and Operation  Overlord (in  an  image) are 
misleading. Behind both  the Japanese attack on  Pearl Harbor  and the Normandy  invasion  were 
powerful organizations (nation-states and their  militaries) capable of exercising  that power  in  a 
sustained manner. Al Qaeda  did not  have such  power  and lacked the capacity  to follow  up on the 
9/11  attack.  In particular, Professor  Nieto-Gomez does not recognize how  the new  technologies 
empower  governments, already  more powerful  than “the few,”  as much  and probably  more than 
they empower “the few.”
Homeland security, as an  academic endeavor  and as a national  priority, is not  enhanced by 
misleading  accounts of the threats we face. More specifically, an accurate assessment  of the 
contest between  “the few” and “the many”  might call into question  the need for  the Homeland 
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency that Professor Nieto-Gomez advocates.
David Tucker, PhD
Associate Professor, Department of Defense Analysis
Naval Postgraduate School
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Letter to the Editor
February 2012
THE POWER OF THE FEW - RESPONSE
I read Professor  Tucker’s letter  to the editor  the same week that Eastman  Kodak filed for 
Chapter 11  bankruptcy  protection, and Apple introduced the iBookstore platform  (a disruptive 
effort  of disintermediation reducing  the publishing  business to the scale of “the few”). In both 
cases, we are witnessing two organizations dealing  with  the challenge of disruptive innovations 
in very different ways.
In  his letter, Professor  Tucker  claims that  my  article – “The Power  of the Few” – presents an 
either/or  proposition  between  networks and bureaucracies.  It  does not.  As stated in  the article,  I 
am  convinced that “bureaucracies are good organizations for  managing  iterative processes that 
are subject  to continuous improvement  loops and must  be executed every  time in  the same 
way… They  are the best  solution to the problem  of containing the same level of quality  in a 
repetitive process.”
The real  challenge resides not  in this false  dichotomy  between  networks or  centralized 
bureaucracies,  but  in  the innovator's dilemma and the need to create managerial tools for  the 
homeland security  enterprise  to deal with  the fundamental differences between  sustaining and 
disruptive vulnerabilities.
In  the same way  that  highly  structured backbones seem  to be an  unavoidable necessity  for  an 
optimal response to most  operational iterative  challenges,  innovation  platforms (spaces created 
by  managerial choices that are mostly  free of standard operating  procedure and adhocratic in 
nature) have proven their  effectiveness to deal with  disruptive innovation, both  in  the private 
sector and in the public administration.
If what  Professor  Tucker  argues in  his letter  were  true,  and “new  technologies empower 
governments already  more powerful than  ‘the few’ as much  and probably  more than  they 
empower  ‘the few,’”  then  there would be no innovator’s dilemma. Powerful  actors would always 
become more powerful by  adopting the new  technologies.  Eastman-Kodak would still  be the 
dominant  actor  in  imaging  and photographic  equipment,  Internet Explorer would be a far 
superior  browser  than  Mozilla's Firefox, DARPA would be a  redundant  use of DoD assets, and a 
“failure of imagination”  – when  “the few”  terrorists found a  new  highly  innovative, highly 
disruptive way  of recombining  the “airplane hijacking”  meme on 9/11  – would have never 
occurred.
Professor Tucker  fails to take into account  that  the few  are not empowered by  disruptive 
innovation  “more”  or  “less”  than  the powerful dominant  actors,  but differently. Vertical 
structures need ways to process those changes beyond their  normal patterns to complement 
their  otherwise incremental learning  process. Centralized bureaucracies are not  designed to be 
creative or disruptive or, for that matter, to adapt to disruption. 
Thus, if we accept  the either/or  fallacy  of this critique, not only  the existence of HSARPA 
might  be called into question,  as Professor  Tucker  concludes,  but  also the existence of DARPA, 
ARPA-E, HPlabs,  the X-prize,  or  the 20-percent  time for  Google engineers.  All these innovation 
platforms would seem  to be unnecessary  because vertical bureaucracies would be enough  to 
prevent strategic surprise and the failure of imagination.
Instead,  I am  certain  that  homeland security  would benefit from  an institutional framework 
that  can  gain  the initiative  in  the innovation  process,  embracing rather  than  resisting the 
uncertainty  created by  the commoditization  of key  technological resources that  empower  small 
groups of individuals to recombine technologies faster than ever before.
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez
Research Professor, National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
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Strengthening the Value of the National Network of Fusion 
Centers by Leveraging Specialization: Defining “Centers of 
Analytical Excellence”
Justin Lewis Abold, Ray Guidetti, and Doug Keyer
ABSTRACT
This article  reports  on the main findings  of a 
project sponsored by the National Fusion 
Center Association to  more precisely define 
the term  “Centers  of Analytic  Excellence.” 
Secretary Janet Napolitano,  Department of 
Homeland Security previously used this 
term to  focus public  attention on the 
analytical component of the fusion process. 
Drawing upon the input of a select group of 
federal,  state, and local intelligence expert 
professionals  through the application of the 
Delphi Method, the article proposes  the  (re)
definition of the term “Centers  of Analytical 
Excellence” to  mean a validation of a fusion 
center’s  demonstrated excellence  in a 
particular subject area of analytical 
methodology.  This is  a significant departure 
from  the sense in which this term  has been 
used previously and provides a next state  for 
individual fusion centers  that aspire to share 
their analytic  competencies  across  a 
national network.  This  article  also  discusses 
a number of additional perspectives 
regarding the state of analysis in fusion 
centers  as raised by the experts  consulted in 
the project. 
INTRODUCTION
In  the recent history  of the National Network 
of Fusion  Centers, the expression  “If you  have 
seen one fusion center  you  have seen  one 
fusion  center”  was used to emphasize the 
multiplicity  of ways that  fusion  centers were 
developing. It also demonstrated the need for 
a  nationwide effort  to standardize processes 
and capabilities across all  state and major 
urban  area  fusion centers.  While it  remains 
important that fusion  centers maintain 
uniform  baseline capabilities, today  there is a 
renewed interest  in  acknowledging the value 
individual fusion centers can provide with 
unique expertise and specializations. 
This should be no surprise since the 
strength  and influence of the larger  and older 
United States Intelligence Community  (IC) 
derives as much  from  the individuality  of its 
core members as from  its commitment to 
collaboration. Each  of the sixteen IC member 
agencies has a  different  purpose and function 
and therefore different strength  that  adds to 
the power  of the collective federal intelligence 
network.1  With  the best  practices of the IC as 
a  model for  success,  one could argue that  the 
same attribute of specialization  should be 
extended to the network of fusion  centers. 
This notion  of specialization  among  state  and 
major urban  area fusion centers is taking 
shape through  the recognition that fusion 
centers with  specialized expertise should 
have the opportunity  to contribute their 
special strengths to the larger  network  as 
Centers of Analytical Excellence. 2
Developing a  set of common  operating 
procedures and capabilities across the 
network made collaboration  and cooperation 
between  fusion  centers achievable.  It  united a 
diverse group of centers not only  around a 
common cause of securing the homeland but 
also around a  common framework for 
communicating  and doing  business. 
Broadening  the ways in  which  individual 
fusion  centers can  contribute within  the 
network will  enrich  the collaborative power 
of the network  without threatening either  the 
unity  of purpose or  their  ability  to interact 
successfully.  This article contends that 
developing Centers of Analytical Excellence is 
an  important  next  step toward strengthening 
America’s homeland and hometown defenses. 
Drawing  upon the input of a  select  group of 
federal,  state, and local  intelligence expert 
professionals, the article redefines the term 
“Centers of Analytical  Excellence”  to capture 
this forward looking  vision  of a  collaborative 
network in  which the individual nodes can 
share a  common approach  while developing 
specialized areas of excellence.  
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 7 (JUNE 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
THE ANATOMY OF A FUSION 
CENTER
Fusion  centers are multiagency  task forces 
designed for  receiving, gathering, analyzing, 
and disseminat ing information  and 
intelligence among  constituencies that  have a 
law  enforcement, counter  terrorism, public 
safety, or homeland security  mission  or 
focus. 3 The purpose of a  fusion  center  is to 
aid law  enforcement, homeland security, 
public safety, and private sector  entities in 
better  understanding  their  environments as 
they  relate  to the risk and threat  of crime, 
terrorism, and other  crises. Additionally, 
fusion  centers are intended to serve as the 
primary  focal point for  information  sharing 
among  broad jurisdictions where multiple 
entities reside,  such as a  state or  Urban  Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) region. 
The catalyst  behind the concept  of fusion 
centers stemmed from  the general admission, 
following  the tragic  events of September  11, 
2001,  that  the nation’s law  enforcement 
community's information  sharing and 
intelligence capability  necessary  to inform 
decision-makers about  the threat of terrorism 
was both  ineffective and inefficient. 4  The 
fusion  center  concept started as grassroots 
efforts in  jurisdictions like Arizona, Georgia, 
New  York,  and the Los Angeles region  to fill 
the void of combining information  and 
intelligence sources at  the local level to ferret 
out terrorist activity, thereby  underpinning  a 
national effort to share information  that 
could be used in  overall preparedness efforts. 
Today, there are seventy-seven fusion  centers 
designated by  governors across the nation 
that  integrate all aspects of public  safety 
information.5  While their  origin  may  have 
been  rooted in  counter  terrorism, state and 
local officials have come to find fusion 
centers to be of equal importance for 
assessing  crime and other homeland security 
trends or issues.
The federal government  quickly  realized 
the significance of the fusion  center  as a 
keystone in  its national  effort  to share 
information  needed to guard against 
terrorism  and respond to national  crises.  The 
National Network of Fusion Centers was 
erected to bolster  this much-needed 
capability.6  While the identification  of the 
network itself may  have stemmed from  an 
i n f o r m a l  d e s i g n a t i o n  g i v e n  t o t h e 
collaboration among  federal interagency 
partners with  state, local,  tribal, and 
territorial  partners, today  it  is used to 
formally  recognize this national partnership. 
Moreover, it  is this formal  recognition  that 
underpins a  programmatic effort  by  the 
Department of Homeland Security  Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) to 
follow  guidance derived from  the Information 
Sharing Environment  (ISE) established by 
the United States Intelligence Reform  and 
Terrorism  Prevention  Act  of 2004.  Under 
that  authority, DHS I&A in  cooperation with 
the Department  of Justice’s (DOJ) Federal 
Bureau  of Investigation (FBI) provides 
coordinated support  to recognized fusion 
centers in  a given area  across the nation. DOJ 
has recognized the usefulness of fusion 
centers for  identifying  terrorist  and criminal 
trends and processing suspicious activity 
reports in  state and local jurisdictions.  It  is 
the recognition  of these two federal 
departments that has fueled the growth  of 
fusion  centers since the concept first  came to 
the fore early in the millennium.
The “National Network of Fusion  Centers” 
has been embraced by  the Departments of 
Homeland Security  and Justice as a  focal 
point of collaboration in  support of federal 
counterterrorism efforts  and other 
homeland security  priorities. In fact, the 
2010 National Security  Strategy  of  the 
United States  specifically  cites fusion 
centers  as a central element in  preventing 
future acts of terrorism. Simply put, this 
decentralized and organically  developed 
n e t w o r k i s a  n a t i o n a l a s s e t , a n d 
sustainment of that asset is  a shared 
responsibi l i ty  across a l l  leve ls o f 
government. In the absence of fusion 
centers, there is  no other nationwide 
mechanism for leveraging  the breadth and 
depth  of  more than two million public 
safety  practitioners in every  corner  of  the 
country for  homeland security  purposes. 
Notably, as seasoned intelligence experts 
and information  analysts from  all  levels of 
government will concede, some of the most 
important information and actionable 
intelligence that we depend on  to protect 
the country flows up, not down – the 
knowledge is  collected at a  granular  State 
or local level  and then  fused to permit all 
levels of  government to act decisively in  the 
protection  of Americans. That is a central 
ABOLD, GUIDETTI, AND KEYER, CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE   3
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 7 (JUNE 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
purpose for the fusion centers, and one that 
has been well-served by their existence. 7
Despite the fact  that  state and local  law 
enforcement  and homeland security 
professionals mainly  staff fusion  centers, 
these centers are also comprised of personnel 
and systems from  the federal government. 
The DHS and FBI footprints within  fusion 
centers serve as gateways to the intelligence 
community  for  state, local,  and private  sector 
entities.  State and local fusion  center analysts 
c o n d u c t  a s s e s s m e n t s a n d p r o d u c e 
intelligence products related to state and 
local  level  threats and risks that otherwise 
would not be addressed by  federal 
authorities. This information  is shared 
nationally,  and provided to the federal 
government  and the intelligence community 
to answer  standing  information  needs related 
to homeland security. 
While  each  fusion center  enterprise may 
differ  on  how  they  refer  to their  respective 
intelligence product  frameworks,  the key 
assumption  is that  finished intelligence 
informs state  and local  decision-makers 
about  the threat  environment in  a  manner 
that  supports planning, operations, resource 
allocation,  and training. Achieving  this 
dynamic  requires fusion  centers to answer 
four  very  important questions for  their 
consumers:
• What has happened?
• What is happening?
• What is about to happen?
• What could happen?8
In answering  the above four  questions, 
fusion centers across the network likely 
arrange their  intelligence products in  four 
distinct  categories: investigative support/
research  products, situational  awareness 
r e p o r t s , a n a l y s e s ,  a n d f o r e c a s t s .9 
Investigative support/research  products 
focus on  past and current  events and issues 
that  require  additional information  for 
decision  makers and investigators to better 
understand or  to assist  with  the describing 
evidence of a  crime.  Situational  awareness 
reports aim  specifically  at  answering  the 
question  of what is happening in a particular 
environment  or what  is about  to happen. 
Analytical  products go a step further  and 
determine the impact  of an  event, threat,  or 
issue on  a  particular environment  or 
constituency.  Finally, forecasting  products 
seek to answer  the question of what may 
happen  in  the future that  will require a  policy 
decision, operations response,  or  resource 
allocation. 
Each  fusion center  is responsible for 
determining who within  their  area  of 
responsibility  (AOR)  requires information 
and intelligence products that address threat 
and risk related to crime,  counter terrorism, 
and homeland security. These constituencies 
include law  enforcement, public  safety, 
emergency  management,  government, and 
private sector  personnel and organizations. 
While the intelligence and information 
products created are based on  the needs of 
the requestor, the decision  maker  individual 
fusion  centers aim  to inform  runs the gamut 
from  line level  police,  investigators,  fire, and 
EMS personnel  to mayors and governor; 
from  attorney  generals and homeland 
s e c u r i t y  a d v i s o r s t o s t a t e  p o l i c e 
superintendents to municipal police chief; 
from  private sector security  managers to 
emergency  management and risk mitigation 
planners. 10  Each  of these decision  makers 
requires a  different type of product or  service 
from  the fusion  center  to inform  them  about 
threat,  risk, and problems within  the 
environment. 
Although  fusion  centers share many  of the 
characteristics discussed in  this section, there 
is no “standard model”  of a fusion  center, 
owing  to resourcing,  funding,  and capability 
constraints. As the value of the fusion  centers 
became more central to the counterterrorism 
intelligence and information  sharing 
relationship between and amongst  the  federal 
government  and the states and major urban 
areas,  several  initiatives were undertaken 
from  2006  to 2010  to build a  platform  for 
increased communication  and collaboration. 
The first  initiative produced the Guidelines 
for Fusion Centers  (2006) and the related 
document Baseline Capabilities  (2008).  A 
second initiative undertook to evaluate how 
well  the Guidelines  and Baseline Capabilities 
had created the necessary  conditions for 
desired levels of interoperability  amongst 
fusion  centers and between fusion  centers 
and the federal  government. This second 
initiative produced the Critical Operational 
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Capabilities  (2010).  The emphasis during  the 
period 2006-2010  as reflected in  these 
initiatives was on  developing  a  more 
“standardized model”  fusion  center while 
recognizing  that  the diverse environments in 
which  the fusion  centers developed 
circumscribed the benefits of pushing  all  the 
way to a “standard model.” 
PROJECT GENESIS AND 
OVERVIEW
For  the past  two years,  Secretary  Janet 
Napolitano,  Department  of Homeland 
Security,  has highlighted the centrality  of 
analysis in  fusion  center  capability  by  calling 
them  “Centers of Analytic  Excellence”  in  an 
effort  to focus public  attention  on  this core 
component of the fusion  process.11 The use of 
the term  “Centers of Analytic Excellence” 
succeeded in  drawing  attention to the 
important role fusion  centers play  in  securing 
their  communities.  As the term  became more 
widely  used,  it  raised an  important question: 
What exactly  is a  “Center  of Analytic 
Excellence?”  While the genesis of the term 
may  have been  a  speechwriting  flourish, 
those in  the fusion  center  community  viewed 
it  as an  important  opportunity  to reflect on 
both  the current and future state of analysis. 
Rather  than  leave it  a  tagline, several  leaders 
in  the National Network of Fusion  Centers 
argued that exploring the definition  of the 
term  could positively  impact  the National 
Network by  elevating  the capability  of 
analysis. 12  In  providing  an answer  to the 
question, it  opens up the opportunity  to 
illuminate a desired end state  for  fusion 
centers – an  end state that  could drive 
training,  resources,  and the sustainability  of 
the analytical elements within  fusion centers. 
Moreover, the definition could be a  critical 
step in  defining  evaluative metrics for  the 
analysis component in a fusion center.
The National Fusion  Center  Association 
convened a  project  team  comprised of fifteen 
state and local fusion  center  analysts and 
DHS and FBI intelligence practitioners to 
research  and craft  a  definition of Centers of 
Analytical  Excellence.13 [See Appendix B for  a 
list  of participants.] This work resulted in  a 
definition  that depicts a  Center  of Analytical 
Excellence as a  specialized component within 
the national network.  The following 
definition  recognizes the application  of 
analytical  techniques in  a  consistent manner 
that  strengthens the nation’s information 
sharing environment:
Proposed “Center of Analytical 
Excellence” Definition
Centers of Analytical Excellence, as 
they  relate to the National Network  of 
Fusion  Centers,  are defined as those 
fusion  centers that  have demonstrated, 
and been  recognized by  an  interagency 
committee for, an  accomplished record 
of information  fusion and analysis on  a 
given  topic  or  domain  area  that  has 
demonstrably  s trengthened the 
network and provided value to the 
network’s customers. Centers are 
recognized because of their  advanced 
proficiency  in  analysis,  which  includes 
high  quality,  accurate, timely, and 
actionable products,  standing operating 
procedures and well-defined product 
lines,  outreach  and mentorship across 
the network and with  other entities, 
and a  focus on  strategic outcomes and 
customer  impact. Nominated Centers 
are evaluated by  an  interagency 
committee to ensure all qualifications 
are met or  exceeded for  this two-year 
designation.
This definition  for  Center of Analytical 
Excellence differs substantively  from  the 
original use of the term  by  Secretary 
Napolitano. Rather  than  a  term  that 
describes an  aspiration that  all fusion centers 
arrive at  a  point  where they  do “excellent” 
analysis as it  relates to assessing  the local 
implications of federal threat  information, 
this definition  recognizes fusion  centers on 
the basis of specialized analytic expertise in  a 
particular  subject area  or  methodological 
approach. 
In  developing  this definition, the group of 
subject  matter  experts involved in  the project 
has charted a  new  possible future for  the 
fusion  center  network  that  had not  been 
previously  envisioned. This future introduces 
the idea  that  specialization  can  complement 
t h e f o u n d a t i o n a l i n v e s t m e n t s i n 
interoperabil ity  that  so defined the 
development  of fusion centers,  especially 
ABOLD, GUIDETTI, AND KEYER, CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE   5
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 7 (JUNE 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
from  2006  to 2010. This article discusses 
what  led to the definition  of a  Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence in  this particular  way  as 
well  as the broader findings by  the project 
team. The article also identifies many  of the 
challenges that fusion  centers and their 
analysts face during  this adolescent stage of 
development. Lastly, the article calls for  an 
independent body,  which  will objectively 
recognize those fusion  centers that have the 
demonstrated expertise and can  leverage this 
capability across the national network. 
METHODOLOGY
One of the guiding principles for  this project 
was to use a research  methodology  that 
modeled the collaboration  that  has made the 
fusion  center  network so successful.  The 
desired objective was to develop a  definition 
of Center  of Analytical  Excellence that would 
reflect  the expertise and perspectives not  only 
of the research  team  but  of the fusion  center 
community.  In  this manner,  the resulting 
definition  would be founded upon  a much 
richer  basis than that of only  a  few 
individuals and also be more likely  to be 
applicable across the diverse members of the 
fusion  center  network.  The project  team 
adopted the Delphi Method as its core 
research  methodology  because it enables a 
group of individuals to bring  their  collective 
expertise to bear  on  a  complex  problem  in  a 
structured manner. The Delphi Method also 
has the advantage of being  a  “tried and true” 
research  method with  proven  success since 
its development  by  RAND in  the 1950s and 
1960s.
The Delphi Method typically  utilizes a 
series of questionnaires that  enable a  group 
of individuals to express their  opinions 
anonymously, learn  the results of the group’s 
input, and then  provide additional input on 
the basis of those results. 14 The project team 
used a  combination  of three questionnaires 
and one one-and-a-half-day  in-person  group 
discussion to solicit  input  from  a group of 
fifteen  analytic  experts nominated by  each 
region  of the fusion center  network  and the 
federal  government.   Since the quality  of the 
Delphi Method depends to a  great  extent  on 
the composition and expertise resident  in  the 
group of respondents, 15  considerable 
attention was given  to ensuring  the 
nomination process resulted in  the selection 
of well-respected experts within  the fusion 
center  community. The National Fusion 
Center  Association led the nomination 
process that  identified the experts. Each  of 
the four  National Fusion Center  Association 
regions,  represented by  their  regional co-
chairs,  identified those persons who 
exhibited a  high  degree of expertise in  fusion 
center  analysis or  policy  development from  a 
regional  area. In  addition, DHS and FBI 
identified personnel  from  their  agencies who 
are considered experts in  the field of fusion 
centers and analysis. This group of analytic 
experts, chosen  by  the National Fusion 
Center  Associat ion and the federal 
government  for  their  demonstrated analytical 
expertise, had ten days to respond to each 
questionnaire. The project team  provided the 
group of analysts with  a  summary  of the 
results of the previous questionnaire as the 
context  for  answering  the subsequent 
questionnaires. 
The project  team  used the first two 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e s t o e x p l o r e g e n e r a l 
perspectives about  what  analytical excellence 
meant  to the group, what the group of 
analytical  experts viewed as their  customers’ 
perspectives on  analytic  excellence, and how 
they  distinguished between  simply  achieving 
the ability  to do “good analysis”  and 
becoming  a  Center  of Analytical Excellence. 
The one-and-a-half-day  off-site was used in 
between  Questionnaires Two and Three as an 
intensive learning  opportunity  for  the group 
and as an  opportunity  for  an  in-depth 
exploration  of the potential qualities of the 
term, Centers of Analytical Excellence. The 
project team  used the third questionnaire to 
solicit feedback  from  the group of analytical 
experts on the specific wording  of a  definition 
of Center  of Analytical Excellence and the 
challenges that  the group felt  their  fusion 
center  might face in  working toward 
becoming  a  Center  of Analytical Excellence. 
[See Appendix  A  for  the questions included in 
each questionnaire.]  The use of three 
questionnaires and the offsite session 
brought  the project  methodology  into accord 
with  the classic  Delphi method which 
assumes Delphi groups reach  decision-
making stability  in  four  iterations of 
questions. 16 
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ARRIVING AT A PROPOSED 
DEFINITION
QUESTIONNAIRE ONE
The project team  e-mailed the first 
questionnaire to the group of analytical 
experts (here on  referred to simply  as the 
“participants”) on  May  1, 2011  and requested 
responses by  May  10, 2011. The purpose of 
Questionnaire One was to set the stage for 
future discussion  by  soliciting  input on  what 
a  Center  of Analytical  Excellence should be. 
In  the absence of an existing definition  (as 
noted previously, while the phrase had been 
used in  speeches by  the Secretary  Napolitano, 
there was no explicit  definition  behind the 
phrase),  the first  step was simply  to ask 
participants what  they  imagined a  Center  of 
A n a l y t i c a l E x c e l l e n c e w o u l d b e . 
Questionnaire One included two questions,17 
the first asking  about  the fusion  center 
p e r s p e c t i v e a n d t h e s e c o n d a s k i n g 
participants to think about  their  customers’ 
perspectives.
Question  1.A: From  your  perspectives 
and experience,  please describe what 
you  imagine a  Center  of Analytical 
Excellence should be within  the context 
of the future of fusion centers. 
In  the responses to Question  1.A,  the 
project team  did not  see a  definition  for 
Center  of Analytical Excellence emerge that 
differed significantly  from  a  general 
definition  of what  “good” analysis is. The 
initial  perspective from  the group of experts 
was that a  Center  of Analytical  Excellence 
was a  fuller  realization  of a  fusion  center’s 
existing analytic capability  rather  than 
something  new. In their  responses, 
participants placed emphasis on ensuring 
that  a  Center of Analytical Excellence would 
be able to: produce both  tactical and strategic 
analysis; customize products for  a  wide 
variety  of customers; have access to necessary 
information; have well-trained analysts,  who 
would become experts; and have sufficient 
resources. These aspects of their  vision for  a 
Center  of Analytical Excellence resonate with 
the general  concerns expressed by  fusion 
centers about  resources,  training, access to 
information, and the need to balance tactical 
and strategic analysis.
Question  1.B: For  this question, 
please put yourself in the “shoes”  of 
fusion  center customers. Based on  your 
perspectives and experiences,  please 
describe what  you  think fusion  center 
customers envision  when  they  hear  the 
term  Center  of Analytical Excellence 
within  the context of the future of 
fusion centers. 
In  the responses to the Question  1.B, 
there was no observable gap between  what 
participants articulated as their  own  vision 
for  a  Center of Analytical Excellence 
(Question  1.A) and what they  imagined their 
customers’ visions of a  Center  of Analytical 
Excellence to be. Many  of the same themes 
about  quality  analysis emerged in  both 
questions.  There were some additional areas 
of focus, however, when  participants 
discussed their  customers’ perspectives.   In 
particular,  participants highlighted a  concern 
that  a  significant  part  of their  customer  base 
is unclear  as to what  it  wants from  fusion 
centers much  less from  a “Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence.”  The participants did 
not suggest  that  customers have a  negative 
view  of fusion  centers but  instead made a 
general  observation that their  customers have 
not yet  figured out  how  to best  integrate  the 
fusion  center  and its products into their  own 
business processes.  Some remarks indicated 
that  customers may  be experiencing 
di f f icul t ies in art iculat ing  concrete 
requirements for  fusion  centers and this may 
have complicated participants’ abilities to 
narrowly  define what a  Center  of Analytical 
Excellence would be from  their  customers’ 
perspectives.  These perspectives align  with 
other research  findings that suggest fusion 
centers are “undergoing a  marketing phase” 
where some customers understand them  and 
buy-in  while at the same time “they  are not 
yet  equally  or  well-understood by  the 
collective law enforcement community.” 18 
QUESTIONNAIRE TWO
The project  team  e-mailed the second 
questionnaire to participants on  June 1  and 
requested responses by  June 10. As noted 
above,  after  analyzing  the results of 
Questionnaire One, a  specific  definition  of 
Center  of Analytical  Excellence did not 
appear  to emerge either  from  the fusion 
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c e n t e r  p e r s p e c t i v e o r  f r o m  t h e i r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f t h e i r  c u s t o m e r s ’ 
perspectives.  Furthermore,  it  was difficult  to 
distinguish  between  participants’ views of a 
Center  of Analytical Excellence and what one 
generally  understands “good”  analysis to be. 
The project  team  decided to probe this area 
further  and attempt to gain  greater  insight 
into whether  the participants saw  any 
difference between  a fusion  center  that  has 
achieved a  level  of “good”  analysis and a 
fusion  center  that  has become a  “Center  of 
Analytical Excellence.” 
To gain  this insight, the project  team 
needed to identify  a  definition of good 
analysis that  the participants would 
understand and be able to visualize.  The 
project team  decided to rely  upon an  existing 
framework  with  which the fusion  center 
experts would be very  familiar  – the Critical 
Operational Capabilities (COC). 19  The COC 
were defined by  the leadership of the fusion 
center  community  in  coordination  with  the 
federal  government  in  2010.  The four  Critical 
Operational Capabilities are:20
COC 1  – Receive: Ability  to receive 
classified and unclassified information 
from federal partners;
COC 2  – Analyze: Ability  to assess local 
implications of threat  information 
through  the use of a  formal  risk 
assessment process;
COC 3  – Disseminate: Ability  to further 
disseminate threat  information  to their 
state,  local,  tribal, and territorial 
(SLTT) and private sector  entities 
within their jurisdiction; and
COC 4  – Gather: Ability  to gather 
l o c a l l y  g e n e r a t e d i n f o r m a t i o n , 
aggregate  it, analyze it, and share it 
with federal partners, as appropriate.
With  this in  mind,  the intent of 
Questionnaire Two was to see whether 
participants did indeed distinguish  between 
fusion  center  COC 2  (Analysis) and an  idea of 
what  a  Center  of Analytical  Excellence should 
be. A  second area  of focus was to see how 
participants viewed the risk  assessment 
process,  a  key  component of COC 2, within 
the context  of a  Center  of Analytical 
Excellence.
Question  2.A: From  your  perspective, 
how  would a Center  of Analytical 
Excellence differ  from  a  fusion center 
that  has fully  achieved Critical 
Operational Capability  (COC) #2 
“Analysis” (if at all)? 
In  their  responses to Question  2.A, 
participants expressed a strong  opinion  that 
there is a  difference between  attaining  COC 2 
and becoming  a  “Center  of Analytical 
Excellence.”   Participants indicated that  a 
Center  of Analytical Excellence has a  higher 
level of capability  than  a fusion  center  that 
has simply  achieved COC 2.  They  also 
indicated that  a  fusion  center  should achieve 
COC 2  before working toward status as a 
“Center  of Analytical  Excellence.”  This may 
sound obvious, but  it  is important  to 
highlight  because it set the foundation  for 
arriving  at a  definition. It  was an  important 
advance in  the dialogue from  the responses to 
Question  1.A  – in  which  it appeared 
participants might  have felt  that a  Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence was synonymous with 
doing “good” analysis – to a  distinct 
perspective in  which a  Center  of Analytical 
Excellence is something  more than  being  able 
to perform “good” analysis.
At the same time, participants provided 
less direct commentary  on  exactly  how  a 
Center  of Analytical Excellence differs from  a 
fusion  center  that  has attained COC 2. They 
did note  that a  Center  of Analytical 
Excellence would display  a  consistency  of 
excellence across a  broad range of analytical 
functions beyond solely  the aspect  of risk 
assessment highlighted in  the definition of 
COC 2. This aspect  – that  fusion  centers 
should perform  a  broader  range of analysis 
than  risk  assessment  – appears to be a 
strongly  held concern  by  participants as they 
also stress this issue in  their  responses to 
Question  2.B. This likely  relates to the 
experience of fusion  centers that  they  already 
provide a  variety  of additional analytical 
services (presumably  of benefit  to their 
customers) and they  value these areas of 
analysis as highly, or  more highly,  as the 
conduct of formal risk assessments.
Participants also took  the opportunity  to 
raise additional concerns related to the 
process of achieving  status as a  “Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence.”  One concern  was that 
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efforts to define a Center  of Analytical 
Excellence could result  in  pressure on  fusion 
centers to fit  within  one narrow  definition  of 
excellence (rather  than share a  common 
approach  and yet  have the flexibility  to meet 
a  diverse set of AOR-specific requirements). 
This aligns with  concerns raised throughout 
the evolution  of fusion  centers that  the 
federal  government  (or  some other  entity) 
not drive in  a  single-minded fashion toward 
standardization  at  the expense of a  fusion 
center’s ability to meet its customers’ needs. 
Another  concern was the potential for a 
Center  of Analytical Excellence designation to 
create unhealthy  competition  between  fusion 
centers to achieve this title.  This competition 
might  harm  the network  by  reducing the 
willingness of fusion  centers to work  together 
(as a  result of trying  to achieve a  Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence status by  exceeding 
other fusion  centers’ capabilities).  Similar  to 
the issues that arose in  Questionnaire One, 
training and hiring/retention  of analysts were 
a lso concerns that  weighed on  the 
participants. Other  earlier research  on  fusion 
centers also identified training – especially 
the lack  of standardized training  – as a 
significant  concern among  fusion  center 
analytic personnel.21 
Question  2.B: For  this question, 
imagine you  are working  in  a  CoAE and 
you  are assessing the local  implications 
of threat  information  through a  formal 
risk assessment  process.  From  your 
perspective, what  would make the risk 
assessment  process in  a  CoAE 
“excellent”?
In defining  what  “excellence”  is in terms of 
a  formal risk  assessment,  participants 
provided more specifics in  response to 
Question  2.B than in  defining the particulars 
of a  Center  of Analytical  Excellence itself in 
Question  2.A.  In  terms of the risk assessment 
process,  participants defined excellence in 
terms of conducting  a  formal risk assessment 
on  the basis of a  well defined,  well 
documented and broadly  accepted (across the 
fusion  center  network)  risk  assessment 
approach. This aspect  of defining  excellence 
may  emanate from  participants’ concerns 
that  they  have not been  provided with  the 
substantive guidance they  need to implement 
a  risk assessment  process.  It  appears that 
participants are still seeking  very  specific 
guidance from  the federal government  as to 
“how  to do”  a  formal risk assessment. 
Participants expressed the opinion  that an 
excellent  risk assessment  methodology 
should be consistently  applied and produce 
results that are internally  consistent 
(meaning  that the methodology  will produce 
the same outputs when using  the same 
inputs; i.e.  it is reliable).  Participants also 
highlighted their  perspective that a  Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence should be proactive in 
conducting  risk assessments.  This proaction 
is defined both in  terms of gaining  access to 
the needed vulnerability  data  ahead of time 
(i.e.  before a risk manifests itself) and in 
terms of using  local information  to produce 
risk assessments that  are shared with  the 
federal  government (rather than only 
producing  risk assessments when provided 
with  threat  information  from  the federal 
government).  
The most strongly  expressed aspects of 
participants’ answers to Question  2.B were 
the concerns they  raised about formal risk 
assessment. These concerns appear  to reflect 
continued apprehension by  fusion  centers 
about  the responsibility  assigned to them  by 
the federal government  to conduct  “formal 
risk assessments.”  The concerns centered on 
three core issues. First, participants offered 
perspectives that  fusion  centers may  not be 
the most  effective place to conduct formal 
risk assessments. They  suggested that  other 
state and local agencies may  have been 
assigned the responsibility  by  the non-federal 
leadership and/or  that  other  agencies will 
have greater access to data or expertise, etc. 
Second, in line with  this latter  aspect, 
participants expressed concern that fusion 
centers do not  have access to the data and 
expertise required to conduct  formal risk 
assessments.  Participants stressed that fusion 
centers rarely  have all  the required data 
under their  own  control  and this complicates 
their  ability  to conduct  a  formal risk 
assessment. They  implied that gaining  access 
to the needed data  is very  challenging 
perhaps due to bureaucratic resistance by 
other agencies to their gaining access. 
Third, participants communicated their 
opinions that there are other  tasks that 
should be a  higher  priority  within a  fusion 
center  than conduct ing  formal r isk 
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assessments.  Participants also took the time 
in  Question  2.B to emphasize  again  their 
opinion  that a  Center of Analytical  Excellence 
should be defined in  broader  terms than the 
ability  to conduct  an  “excellent”  formal risk 
assessment. 
While  it  is outside the scope of this project 
to resolve these three core issues about fusion 
centers’ responsibility  to conduct formal risk 
assessments,  it  is important to raise them. 
Any  attempt  to define a  Center of Analytical 
Excellence within the context  of conducting  a 
formal risk assessment will  be impacted by 
these related concerns about  the overall roles 
and responsibilities of fusion  centers 
(whether a  Center  of Analytical  Excellence or 
not).  
OFF-SITE DISCUSSION
To help participants formulate  their 
perspectives on  the definition  of a  Center  of 
Analytical Excellence – and to provide 
learning  and networking  opportunities for 
the participants – a  one-and-a-half-day  off-
site session featuring outside expert 
presentations was held June 8  – 9, 2011 
before responses to Questionnaire Two were 
due.  An  off-site meeting,  consisting of state 
and local fusion  center  personnel and 
intelligence practitioners from  the federal 
government,  was held at the New  Jersey 
Regional Operations Intelligence Center  (NJ 
ROIC), West Trenton, New  Jersey.  The off-
site included thirteen  of the fifteen analytical 
subject  matter  experts from  each of the four 
National Fusion  Center  Association regions 
already  participating in  the Delphi Method 
questionnaires as well as outside experts in 
l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  r i s k 
assessment, and intelligence community 
analysis.   [See Appendix  C for  a  list  of outside 
experts participating in the off-site.]
The off-site supplemented the Delphi 
research  methodology  and offered an 
opportunity  for  the Delphi group members to 
meet one another  and exchange ideas. The 
agenda included topics designed to inform 
participants about emerging issues in  law 
enforcement  intelligence and analysis, 
perspectives on  risk  assessment  in  the private 
sector, and current  issues in the national 
intelligence community.  These discussions 
helped participants formulate their  responses 
to Questionnaire Two (which  were due 
shortly  after the off-site) and culminated in  a 
facilitated brainstorming session  on  the 
specifics of a  definition  for  “Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence.”  The use of a  face-to-
face session  was a  deviation  from  a 
traditional Delphi approach,  but it  had the 
advantage of providing the experts with  a 
better  understanding of on-going  efforts 
related to the central topic  of discussion. It 
also enabled the experts from  within  the 
fusion  center  to take advantage of outside 
expertise as they  considered the question  of 
what  a  Center  of Analytical  Excellence should 
be. In  essence,  this incorporated additional 
expertise to enhance the Delphi method and 
helped increase the expertise of the core 
Delphi group of fusion  center  analytical 
experts.
In  th is fac i l i ta ted bra instorming 
discussion,  the off-site participants identified 
several  characteristics that  a  Center  of 
Analytical Excellence should incorporate. 
These characteristics built  on  the most 
current  outside expert  opinion  on  law 
enforcement  intelligence and analysis shared 
with  the participants at  the off-site while also 
incorporating  the participants’ own  expertise 
and experience of how  practitioners work in 
the field.  These characteristics included: 
• Relevant product line
• Outcome metrics
• Individual standards and skill sets
• Information sharing capacity
• Credentials for  classified information 
access
• Outreach
• Standard Operating Procedures
Just  as importantly,  the working group 
offered their  insights on  the processes that 
should surround a definition of a  “Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence.”  Several key  takeaways 
resulted from  these discussions that  would 
assist  with  the development  of a  definition. 
The takeaways included:
• Center  of Analytical Excellence should 
not be another  capability  level within  the 
fusion center lexicon. 22
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• Center  of Analytical  Excellence should be 
a specialization.
• Center  of Analytical  Excellence should be 
peer- or self-nominated.
• Center  of Analytical Excellence should 
include a  vetting  committee and an 
established objective process.
• Center  of Analytical Excellence should 
strengthen  the national  network by 
leveraging  expertise residing  in  individual 
centers.
• Center  of Analytical Excellence should 
i n c l u d e t r a i n i n g  a n d m e n t o r i n g 
opportunities.
• Centers of Analytical  Excellence should 
be recognized by  the intelligence 
community  for  their  demonstrated 
expertise in a given area.
After  the conclusion of the off-site, the 
task team  synthesized the results of the 
discussion  and developed a  proposed 
definition:
Proposed Center of Analytical 
Excellence Definition
Centers of Analytical Excellence, as 
they  relate to the National Network  of 
Fusion  Centers,  are defined as those 
fusion  centers that  have demonstrated, 
and been  recognized by  an  interagency 
committee for  an  accomplished record 
of information  fusion and analysis on  a 
given  topic  or  domain  area  that  has 
demonstrably  s trengthened the 
network and provided value to the 
network’s customers. Centers are 
recognized because of their  advanced 
proficiency  in  analysis,  which  includes 
high  quality,  accurate, timely, and 
a c t i o n a b l e p r o d u c t s ,  s t a n d a r d 
operating  procedures and well-defined 
product lines, outreach and mentorship 
across the network and with  other 
entities, and a  focus on  strategic 
outcomes and customer  impact. 
Nominated Centers are evaluated by  an 
interagency  committee to ensure all 
qualifications are met or  exceeded for 
this two-year designation.
QUESTIONNAIRE THREE
After  the off-site discussion  revealed that 
expert opinion  appeared to be strongly 
coalescing around the idea  of a  definition for 
a  Center  of Analytical  Excellence that 
involved certification in  a  particular  area of 
expertise rather  than  a capability  level, the 
project team  used Questionnaire Three to test 
the level of consensus around this idea  and 
around the specific  wording of a  definition. 
Rather  than  rely  on  the free-form  narrative 
used in  Questionnaires One and Two, the 
project team  designed Questionnaire Three 
as a  survey  both  to gauge consensus and to 
gain specific  feedback on  each  aspect of the 
definition.  The use of a  ranking  tool is 
consistent  with  the range of participant 
interaction  used in  previous Delphi  method 
studies.23 
Questionnaire Three’s survey  format  was 
designed to solicit  participant  feedback  on 
the proposed definition  of “Centers of 
Analytical  Excellence.”  The survey  asked a 
series of questions about participants’ levels 
of comfort with  the wording  of the definition, 
their  sense of whether  the standard was 
appropriately  challenging, and whether  they 
felt  their  fusion  center  would pursue 
certification  as described in  the proposed 
definition.  Overall,  the results indicated 
participants were comfortable with  the 
proposed definition  (though some minor 
adjustments were proposed), felt  it  was 
appropriately  challenging  (or  slightly  too 
challenging), and overwhelmingly  felt their 
own  fusion  center would pursue certification 
as described in the proposed definition.
The first  question  in  the survey  asked 
participants to rate their  level of comfort  with 
each  portion  of the proposed definition. As 
can  be seen  in  the table below, participants 
expressed high  levels of comfort with  all 
portions of the proposed definition.  The two 
highest  portions are highlighted in bold and 
the lowest portion is annotated with italics.
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I	  disagree	  completely	  and	  this	  should	  not	  be	  part	  of	  the	  de6inition.
I	  disagree	  somewhat	  but	  I	  don't	  rule	  this	  part	  out	  entirely.
I	  am	  neutral	  about	  this	  part.
I	  agree	  somewhat	  but	  I	  am	  not	  entirely	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  wording.
I	  agree	  completely	  and	  this	  should	  be	  part	  of	  the	  de6inition	  as	  it	  is.
Rating	  Average
Centers	  of	  Analytical	  Excellence,	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  National	  Network	  of	  Fusion	  Centers,	  are	  de6ined	  as	  those	  fusion	  centers	  that	  have	  demonstrated	  an	  accomplished	  record	  of	  information	  fusion	  and	  analysis	  on	  a	  given	  topic	  or	  domain
0 1 1 7 9 4.33
that	  demonstrably	  strengthened	  the	  network 0 1 1 6 8 4.31
and	  provided	  value	  to	  the	  network’s	  
customers. 0 0 1 3 13 4.71Centers	  are	  recognized	  because	  of	  their	  advanced	  pro6iciency	  in	  analysis 0 0 1 4 12 4.65
which	  includes	  high	  quality,	  accurate,	  
timely,	  and	  actionable	  products 0 0 1 3 13 4.71standing	  operating	  procedures	  and	  well-­‐de6ined	  product	  lines 1 0 3 0 13 4.41outreach	  and	  mentorship	  across	  the	  network	  and	  with	  other	  entities 0 0 2 5 10 4.47and	  a	  focus	  on	  strategic	  outcomes	  and	  customer	  impact. 0 0 1 7 9 4.47
Nominated	  Centers	  are	  evaluated	  by	  an	  
interagency	  committee 1 0 3 6 7 4.06to	  ensure	  all	  quali6ications	  are	  met	  or	  exceeded	  for	  this	  two	  year	  designation. 0 1 3 4 9 4.24
Participants were also provided a free text 
comment block to indicate if there were other 
aspects to a  definition they  would like to see 
included. Participants highlighted a  number 
of additional  areas to consider, including: 
inserting  a  section  on  privacy  and civil 
liberties; evaluating  if there  are opportunities 
to align the certification process to existing 
best practices in  use in  universities;  avoiding 
the insertion  of a  new  “certification 
bureaucracy”  by  making use of existing 
oversight structures already  in  place in  the 
fusion  center  network; and being cautious 
about too much emphasis on “strategic” 
services given that  some fusion  centers, 
especially  state regional centers,  may  be 
primarily tactically oriented.
The second question asked participants 
how  challenging the proposed definition  of 
certification  would be for  fusion  centers to 
successfully  attain. Just  over  50 percent  of 
participants (55.6  percent)  felt  the proposed 
standard was neither too high  nor  too low. 
About  a quarter of participants (27.8  percent) 
felt  the definition  was slightly  too high  and 
just over  10  percent  felt the standard was 
slightly  too low  (11.1  percent).  These 
perspectives suggest  the proposed definition 
would be attainable by  most  fusion centers 
but that  progress across the network  would 
need to be monitored to see how  well the 
standard works in practice.
The project team  used the third question 
to gauge how  likely  participants felt  their 
f u s i o n  c e n t e r  w o u l d b e t o p u r s u e 
certification.  Participants were asked to 
respond positively  or  negatively  to the 
following  statement: “My fusion center is 
likely  to work  toward certification as  a 
Center of Analytical Excellence  as defined in 
t h i s  q u e s t i o n n a i r e . ”  P a r t i c i p a n t s 
overwhelmingly  (94.4  percent) indicated they 
agreed with  the statement.  Participants were 
also provided a  free text  comment  block  to 
further  explain  why  they  felt  their fusion 
c e n t e r  w o u l d o r  w o u l d n o t  p u r s u e 
certification.  Many  participants noted that 
certification  would lend additional credibility 
to their  fusion  center  in  the eyes of their 
customers or  senior  police leadership because 
of the evaluation  by  an expert,  impartial 
committee.  Similarly, participants felt that 
certification would contribute to the 
c o n t i n u e d d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d 
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professionalization  of fusion  centers by 
defining  a  higher  threshold of analytical 
achievement. 
For  these participants, certification  is 
viewed as providing a  structured opportunity 
for  their  fusion centers to reflect on their 
internal processes,  products,  and standards 
a n d m a k e i m p r o v e m e n t s t o a t t a i n 
certification.  Additionally,  certification is 
seen to contribute to a  potential  rise in the 
standing  of the fusion  center  analytical 
occupation.  The concern  over  the standing  of 
the law  enforcement analytical  profession 
(especially  its perception  by  its uniformed 
counterparts) is a  long-standing  one in  the 
law  enforcement  community.24  Participants 
also expressed some reservations about 
certification,  most  notably  in  connection with 
the challenges they  may  face in  attaining 
certification.  The next  section  discusses the 
challenges that participants highlighted as 
potentially  impeding  their  fusion  centers’ 
ability to achieve certification.
POTENTIAL CHALLENGES FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION
As noted above, Questionnaire Three also 
included survey  questions that  were intended 
to solicit  participants’ perspectives on the 
challenges they  anticipated facing  in 
attaining  certification.  Participants did not 
ne ce ssar i ly  v ie w  an ince nt ive as a 
requirement  for  pursuing  certification – and 
disagreed strongly  with  the statement  that 
their  fusion center  would not pursue 
certification  – but  they  did express concerns 
about their  current  ability  to achieve 
certification.  Participants most  strongly 
expressed a  need for additional analytical 
training (88.9  percent  agreed completely  or 
agreed somewhat) and analytical  resources 
(83.3  percent  agreed completely  or  agreed 
somewhat)  to be able to achieve certification 
(as described in  the proposed definition).  An 
additional area  of concern was a  need for 
increased resource levels to achieve 
certification  (61.1  percent agreed somewhat 
or  agreed completely).  The chart below  shows 
how  participants responded to questions 
about  the challenges their  fusion  centers were 
likely  to face in  the pursuit of certification. 
While  it  is not  a  new  finding, the repeated 
emphasis by  participants on the need for 
training continues to underscore that  this is a 
major concern  for  the fusion  center  analytical 
community.  This echoes a  similar  concern 
about  the need for  training  and the lack of 
opportunities that  has surfaced for  at least 
the past  thirty  years in  the broader law 
enforcement analytical community.25 
Underscoring  both  of these issues is the need 
for  additional funding. Many  fusion  centers 
face uncertain  times due to the current  fiscal 
climate in  their states, so it  is difficult  to 
place emphasis on specialization.
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Concerns	  Related	  to	  Pursuing	  CertiCication
NEXT STEPS
The new  definition  is a  significant  departure 
from  the sense in  which this term  has been 
u s e d p r e v i o u s l y .  I t  n o w  r e l a t e s t o 
demonstrating  excellence in a  particular 
domain  or  topic area  involving analytical 
methodology. The definition  is a  major  step 
toward increasing  the value – and stature – 
of the National Network  of Fusion  Centers 
because it  provides recognition  for  domain or 
topic  area expertise of individual fusion 
centers within  the collective  whole of the 
network.  Individual fusion  centers that 
achieve this status can  serve as touch points 
within  the network to offer  specialized 
support  for  the variety  of threat  and risk 
issues that  face the nation.  In  crafting  a 
description  for Center  of Analytical 
Excellence this research  provides a  next  state 
for  individual fusion  centers that  aspire to 
share their  analytical competencies across a 
national network  for  the sole purpose of 
strengthening  the collective enterprise of 
fusion  centers within the homeland security 
domain.  
At the  most fundamental level,  a  Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence consists of a team  of 
fusion  center personnel who promote 
collaboration  and have been recognized for 
using  best practices around a  specialized 
focus area. By  being  identified as a  Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence in a  given  area, a fusion 
center  should be able to offer  support  to 
other  fusion  centers,  the intelligence 
community,  and state and local intelligence 
units that  require assistance related to the 
“Center  of Analytical Excellence’s”  specialty. 
Individual Centers of Analytical Excellence 
will have standards, methodologies,  and tools 
they  could share with interested partners. 
Additionally, the accomplishments of the 
Centers of Analytical  Excellence will be 
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quantified through measurements aligned 
with output metrics. 
The purpose of the project, on  behalf of 
the National  Fusion  Center  Association,  was 
to clearly  define Center  of Analytical 
Excellence for  the federal government  and 
state, local, tribal,  and territorial entities. 
Within that context, by  leveraging  the 
insights of subject  matter  experts nationally, 
the project met  its objective: define “Center 
of Analytical Excellence.”  However, for the 
definition  to truly  have meaning  and add 
value in  safeguarding  our homeland,  it  must 
be linked to a  mechanism  that enables its 
application. To that  end, the progress of this 
initiative was briefed to the Criminal 
Intelligence Coordinating  Council (CICC) on 
September  28,  2011. The CICC looked 
favorably  upon  it,  and requested that the 
project team  continue to take steps towards 
implementation.  
With  that guidance in  mind, the next step 
in this overarching initiative will be to 
convene a  group of subject matter  experts 
who would delineate a  governance structure 
and associated processes that  are needed to 
identify,  assess,  support,  and evaluate 
Centers of Analytical Excellence. A  Center of 
Analytical  Excellence validating  entity  would 
ensure that fusion centers that achieve Center 
of Analytical Excellence status do so within 
an  objective and endorsed framework,  which 
would hold up to scrutiny  and enable those 
fusion  centers to deliver  value to the rest  of 
the national  network.  After  all,  fusion centers 
should be more than just  information 
exchange brokers. 
However,  it  is worth  noting  that one 
concern  that might  arise from  those among 
the fusion  center  leadership is how  those 
centers that  choose not  to pursue CoAE 
recognition  may  be perceived.  Will they  be 
assumed to be mediocre because they  did not 
pursue this recognition? First, it  is important 
to note that  the recognition  as a  Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence is not intended to be 
another rung on  the progression from  critical 
operational  capabilities to achieved baseline 
capabilities. This was clearly  not the way  the 
group of experts envisioned the way  ahead. A 
Center  of Analytical Excellence instead 
designates a  particular  specialization. 
Second, an  easy  fix  to this misperception 
would be to append the recognized 
specialization  after  the term  Center  of 
Analytical Excellence as in  "Center of 
Analytical  Excellence – SARs”  or  "Center  of 
Analytical  Excellence - Gun  Violence." This 
would make it  clear  that the particular  fusion 
center  is not  any  more excellent than  it's 
counterparts with  regard to overal l 
capabilities, but instead that  it  has identified 
and developed a  particular  area of analytical 
excellence it  can  bring  to bear  on behalf of 
the national network of fusion centers. 
It is entirely  likely  that  some fusion 
centers will  simply  choose not  to participate 
in  the Centers of Analytical  Excellence 
initiative regardless of the endorsement by 
t h e l a r g e r  N a t i o n a l F u s i o n  C e n t e r 
Association. The reasons for  not  participating 
may  run  the gamut  owing  to resourcing, 
timing, or  other localized issues affecting  a 
particular  fusion  center.  A  decision not  to 
participate at  a  given  time should not  be seen 
as a detriment  or  an  obstacle to the effort, 
since the overall initiative is aimed at  the 
strengthening  the capacity  of the whole 
network  as opposed to assessing  the 
capabilities of an individual fusion center.  
CONCLUSION
The National  Network of Fusion  Centers is 
integral  to the nation’s homeland and 
hometown  security.  A  decentralized, 
distributed network that involves all  levels of 
government  and collaborates routinely  on 
information  analysis and sharing with  federal 
intelligence and law  enforcement partners is 
precisely  what  the Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Acts 
Upon the United States  and the Intelligence 
Reform  and Terrorism  Prevention  Act of 
2004  (IRTPA) envisioned.26  Within this 
network, there are now  individual nodes that 
strengthen, bolster,  or  intensify  the network’s 
collective impact. These nodes have 
developed an  expertise  in  a  given  area  and 
their  proficiency  lends itself in  a  manner  that 
can  greatly  benefit the overall capability  of 
the national network. In  this, the National 
Network of Fusion  Centers is no different 
than  many  other similar, decentralized 
networks.
Using  the momentum  created by  Secretary 
Janet  Napolitano’s use of the term  “Centers 
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of Analytic  Excellence” to describe fusion 
centers,  a  grassroots effort  has ensued. 
Through  the support of the National Fusion 
Center  Association and DHS Office of 
Intelligence Analysis,  a  group of fusion  center 
subject  matter experts convened and worked 
towards defining “Centers of Analytical 
Excellence.”  The resulting definition focused 
on  a  process of identifying  those fusion 
centers with  a  specialized expertise that  could 
greatly  benefit the national network. This 
article presents this fusion  center network 
effort  both  to generate discussion and to 
facilitate acceptance of the arrived at 
definition.
The definition  includes two main 
components: (a)  recognition by  an  inter-
agency  committee for  a  demonstrable 
accomplished record of information  fusion 
and analysis and (b) recognition of a 
specialized focus in  a  given  subject  matter 
with  a  demonstrable benefit  to the overall 
National Network of Fusion  Centers. This 
definition  is a  significant  departure from  the 
original,  albeit inferred,  use of the term, 
which  seemed to focus more on a  general 
standard of excellence for  all recognized 
fusion  centers within  the network. The new 
definition  instead places emphasis on 
identifying  those fusion  centers whose 
excellence in  a  given  area  needs to be 
recognized in  order  for  the network  as a 
whole to increase its capacity.
By  the time this work  is published, a 
second phase of the Centers of Analytical 
Excellence effort  will have commenced 
through  the support of the National Fusion 
C e n t e r  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  D H S O f f i c e o f 
Intelligence & Analysis,  the Program 
Manager’s Office of the Information  Sharing 
Environment,  and the Criminal Intelligence 
Coordinating  Council.  This follow  up effort 
will  focus on  how  best  to integrate the 
Centers of Analytical  Excellence concept into 
the National  Network of Fusion  Centers by 
defining  standards, processes,  time lines,  and 
a  governance body. This effort  wil l 
u n d o u b t e d l y  s t i m u l a t e a d d i t i o n a l 
policymaking  and discussions of validation 
and accreditation  programs and processes. 
These aspects, as they  relate to fusion 
centers, are worthy  of future research 
opportunities. 
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS
QUESTIONNAIRE ONE
Question  A: From  your  perspectives and experience, please describe what  you 
imagine a  Center  of Analytical  Excellence should be within the context  of the 
future of fusion centers. You might wish to  comment on what would make it a  center of 
Analytical “excellence;”  how  this  differs  from the analysis  taking place in fusion centers  today 
(if it does); how  information should be managed, processed, and fused; what processes may be 
needed to leverage existing ones; and what types of analysis and Analytical products  should be 
produced.  If you are aware of best practices  within fusion centers  today, you may opt to 
highlight them as well.
Question  B: For this question, please put  yourself in the “shoes” of fusion center 
customers. Based on  your perspectives and experiences, please describe what  you 
think fusion center customers envision  when they  hear the term Center of 
Analytical Excellence within the context  of the future of fusion  centers. You might 
wish to  comment on what you think fusion center customers would want from a Center of 
Analytical Excellence, how  this differs from the products and services they are receiving from 
today’s  fusion centers,  and what would make a fusion center a Center of Analytical 
“Excellence” from  the perspective of fusion center customers. If you assess  that different 
customers  might have different views  of a Center of Analytical Excellence,  please feel free to 
comment on those different perspectives and customers as well.
QUESTIONNAIRE TWO
Question  A: In their responses to Questionnaire 1, respondents  identified several areas that 
are important to their vision of a Center of Analytical Excellence (CoAE) to include: providing 
value to their customers; performing both tactical and strategic  analysis; having access  to a 
broad spectrum  of information; being able to  hire,  train and retain expert analysts; being 
resourced with an adequate number of analysts; and being able to customize intelligence 
products  / assessments for specific customers.  As  one looks across  these areas, it appears  to 
suggest that many respondents  view  a CoAE as a fusion center that has achieved a solid level 
of performance in the four Critical Operational Capabilities  (COCs) rather than possessing 
other more distinct capabilities.  This raises  an important question: Is  a  CoAE different from  a 
fusion center that has mastered the four COCs?
From  your perspective, how would a Center of Analytical  Excellence differ from 
a  fusion  center  that  has fully  achieved Critical  Operational  Capability  (COC) #2 
“Analysis” (if at  all)?  You might wish to  comment on what would a CoAE do differently 
than a fusion center that has  achieved COC #2?  Is  it doing the same things  as a fusion center 
that has  achieved COC #2 but doing them  better (or more frequently or in greater quantities)? 
Is a CoAE the same as a fusion center that is fully capable in COC #2?
Question  B: Respondents  appeared to focus their comments in Questionnaire  1 on the crime 
control and crime reduction missions  of fusion centers. Respondents only infrequently 
referenced the role that a Center of Analytical Excellence (CoAE) may need to  play in the  risk 
assessment process  included in the Critical Operational Capabilities (COCs).  This  raises  an 
important question about how  respondents  view  the role of a CoAE in a risk assessment 
process.
In particular, COC #2 states  that fusion centers  will demonstrate the “Ability to  assess local 
implications of threat information through a formal risk assessment process.”  
For this question, imagine you  are working in a  CoAE and you are assessing the 
local implications of threat  information through a  formal risk assessment  process. 
From  your perspective, what  would make the risk assessment process in a  CoAE 
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“excellent”? You might wish to comment on what a formal risk assessment process  should 
mean to a fusion center. 
QUESTIONNAIRE THREE
See following pages.
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1 An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress accessed at http://www.dni.gov/
overview.pdf  provides a thorough understanding of how the intelligence community is an assemblage of different 
intelligence agencies each with their own strengths and purpose.
2 Throughout this research project, the terms “analytic” and “analytical” were used interchangeably. Not until the 
final stages of the project did the project team recognize that it was important to drop the reference of “analytic” from 
the discussion surrounding fusion centers, and instead stay consistent with the term analytical. The reason being is 
that “analytic” connotes a mathematical relationship whereas “analytical” connotes assessing information. While the 
final published product has removed all references to “analytic” unless associated with a quoted reference, the 
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3 In early 2010, leaders from the National Network of Fusion Centers representing leaders from federal, state, and 
local agencies met to discuss the critical operational capabilities (COC) required of the nation’s primary and 
recognized fusion centers. The integration of the four COC (receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather) have now 
become synonymous with a mature fusion center because these centers typically have plans and standard operating 
procedures in place to fully execute each COC. In 2010 and 2011, federal interagency partners assessed fusion centers 
against the COC to better understand the strength and maturity of the National Network of Fusion Centers. 
4 In August of 2002, the International Association of Chiefs of Police published Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A 
National Plan for Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, State and Federal Levels: Recommendations from the IACP 
Intelligence Summit. The report was a call to action for law enforcement leaders across the country following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, to engage in greater intelligence sharing to improve public safety. The document 
highlighted, as barriers toward this capability, the “absence of a nationally coordinated process for intelligence 
generation and sharing; the hierarchy within the law enforcement and intelligence communities; federal, state, local 
and tribal laws and policies that prevent sharing; the inaccessibility and/or disaggregation of technologies to support 
intelligence sharing; and deficits in intelligence analysis.” 
5 Statement of Ross Ashley III, Executive Director of the National Fusion Center Association before the 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives (March 
7, 2012), 2. 
6 For more information, see the National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet, http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/
gc_1296484657738.shtm. 
7 Ashley, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 2.
8 Neil Quarmby in his chapter entitled “Futures Work in Strategic Criminal Intelligence,” in J. Ratcliffe, ed., Strategic 
Thinking in Criminal Intelligence, 1st ed. (The Federation Press, 2004), provides a descriptive overview regarding 
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representing the interests of the larger network, thought it necessary and beneficial to the overall network to further 
explore the impact of defining Centers of Analytic Excellence. Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis has committed to assisting fusion centers in becoming centers of analytic excellence to 
serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-
related information (see http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm). These two factors have made 
it necessary to further delineate what a Center or Analytical Excellence means for the National Network of Fusion 
Centers.
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The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders 
How to Function in the Edge of Chaos
Cynthia Renaud
ABSTRACT
The National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) has  become a subject of controversy, 
as many practitioners  find severe limitations 
with the system’s  field effectiveness.  To label 
NIMS a complete failure and look  for a 
different response tool would be rash and 
premature.  A deeper exploration of NIMS 
shows  that it is  very useful in structuring 
response  efforts  for large-scale incidents, but 
only  in later operational periods,  when a 
certain amount of order has been restored. 
The NIMS failure point,  however, is  that it 
offers limited help to  those first-arriving 
responders who must deal with the initial 
chaos inherent at the outset of every scene. 
This article explores  the dynamics of the 
initial edge-of-chaos that characterizes  the 
first phase of every large-scale  incident and 
offers  recommendations  for additions  to 
NIMS that will better prepare first-
responding incident commanders  to work 
their way through that chaos and later 
apply the NIMS process with purpose.
INTRODUCTION
Public safety’s handling  of large-scale 
incidents is always judged by  how  well  they 
ended.  How  many  lives were saved or  lost? 
How  much  property  was lost  or  destroyed? 
How  quickly  was the affected community 
returned to normal? Some response efforts 
are judged kindly  (Oklahoma  City  Bombing), 
some mercilessly  (Hurricane Katrina), and 
others reveal learning points and spark 
national growth in the discipline (9/11).  
Critiques of New  York City’s response 
efforts to the cataclysmically  overwhelming 
events on  September  11,  2001  can  be found in 
many  sources.1  Through  a  fairly  surgical 
dissection of 9/11  that  benefits from  the 
clarity  of hindsight,  two main points have 
emerged: (1)  the lack of interoperable 
communication  severely  hindered response 
efforts; and (2) there was little cross-
discipline coordination,  and no framework in 
place to foster  or  create the ad hoc 
organization  needed to respond to such  a 
massive event.  
Having  these tangibles to tackle,  the 
federal  government  has given  large amounts 
of Urban  Area  Security  Initiative (UASI) 
grant funds to local agencies as they  further 
their  regional interoperability  goals. It  has 
also created and mandated the use of the 
National  Incident Management System 
(NIMS) as the framework  all  agencies must 
use when  responding  to large-scale events. 
The first-responder  community  has been 
galvanized to address these two main  points, 
subsequently  focusing on  the ancillary 
equipment  and training  necessities that  go 
along  with  them.  Over  the past ten  years, 
working  on  just these two points has become 
quite a cottage industry in and of itself.
But  something  is missing in  this critique. 
We have looked at  the parts so individually 
and specifically  that  we have divorced them 
from  the context  in which  they  need to be 
considered. The question, considered on  the 
national stage,  of “how  does one attempt to 
tackle a spontaneous event  the size of 9/11?” 
has resulted in an  over-zealous focus on 
breaking  down  that  event into manageable 
parts.  In  doing  so,  we have gone after  the 
“ l o w - h a n g i n g f r u i t ”  o f i m p r o v e d 
communication,  radio interoperability, 
uniform  planning forms, and creating  a 
common language among  responders.  We 
have created checklists and terms. But  we 
have not yet  taken  a step back  to consider  the 
problem as thinking practitioners.  
IMPETUS FOR THE CREATION OF THE 
NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM
After  9/11,  Homeland Security  Presidential 
Directives (HSPD)  5  and 8 mandated 
establishment  and implementation of the 
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National  Incident Management System 
(NIMS) as the standard that all  first 
responders must  use when  handling  large-
scale incidents. The stated purpose of HSPD 
5  is “To enhance the ability  of the United 
States to manage domestic incidents by 
establishing  a  single,  comprehensive national 
incident  management system.”2  Two key 
points in the HSPD 5  policy  section  stand 
out:
(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security is 
the principal  Federal  official  for  domestic 
incident management. Pursuant to the 
Homeland Security  Act of 2002, the 
Secretary  is  responsible for  coordinating 
Federal  operations within the United States 
to prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from  terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 
other emergencies. The Secretary  shall 
coordinate the Federal  Government’s 
resources utilized in  response to or 
recovery  from terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, or other emergencies if and when 
any  one of the following  four conditions 
applies: (1) a Federal department or agency 
acting under its own authority has 
requested the assistance of the Secretary; 
(2) the resources of State and local 
authorities are overwhelmed and Federal 
assistance has been requested by the 
appropriate State and local authorities; (3) 
more than one Federal  department or 
agency has become substantially  involved 
in  responding  to the incident; or (4) the 
Secretary  has been directed to assume 
responsibility for  managing the domestic 
incident by the President.
 (6) The Federal Government recognizes 
the roles  and responsibilities of State and 
local  authorities in  domestic incident 
management. Initial  responsibility  for 
managing  domestic incidents generally  falls 
on State and local  authorities. The Federal 
Government will assist State and local 
authorities when their  resources  are 
overwhelmed, or when  Federal  interests are 
involved.3
These two sections need to be evaluated 
not so much  for  what  they  say, but  more 
importantly  for  what they  don’t say, and for 
the vast, unexplored terrain  they  create. For 
in  these two policy  sections, HSPD 5  says that 
locals are responsible  for  handling  the initial 
phase  of large-scale event  response. When 
that  event  gets so big, as described in  the four 
subsections of policy  item  #4, then  the 
federal  government comes in to help and 
NIMS is deployed.  Clearly,  by  the time the 
federal  government  assets arrive on  scene, 
the event  will  be well past  its initial phase and 
into later  operational periods. And it is at this 
point  that  HSPD 5  says NIMS will be able to 
manage effectively  the ad hoc organization 
created to respond to the event. And HSPD 5 
is probably correct.  
HSPD 8  goes on to elaborate on  the stated 
purpose of NIMS:  
[To] prevent and respond to threatened or 
actual  domestic terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies by 
requiring a  national  domestic all-hazards 
p r e p a r e d n e s s g o a l , e s t a b l i s h i n g 
mechanisms for improved delivery  of 
Federal  preparedness assistance to State 
and local  governments, and outlining 
actions to strengthen preparedness 
assistance to State and local governments, 
and outlining actions to strengthen 
preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, 
and local entities.4  
HSPD 8 is an  “all hazards”  approach to 
preparedness, prevention,  and response.  It 
defines several  terms, including  “first 
responder.”  First responders are those who 
“in the early stages of an incident (italics 
added) are responsible for  the protection and 
preservation  of life,  property,  evidence, and 
the environment.” 5  
Taken  in  total,  then, HSPD 5  and 8  both 
realize that  local first  responders will  be the 
ones handling major events at  their  outset. 
Both  HSPD tacitly  understand that  there is 
an  initial phase of every  event  and that 
federal  resources will probably  not be called 
in  until after  this initial phase has passed. 
And yet,  these HSPD mandate the use of a 
NIMS that  does not  address this initial  phase 
of an  event  clearly  enough to help first 
responders work their  way  through  it. 
Because the HSPD do mandate that all locals 
train  and be proficient in NIMS and use it 
during  response efforts to large-scale events, 
many  in  the first-responder  community 
complain  that  NIMS does not work. Is it  fair 
to label NIMS a  failure, or  should we perhaps 
consider  what  piece now  missing  could, if 
added, make it a useful tool? 
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STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL 
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Consider  how  NIMS looks when in  use.  Based 
on  the Incident  Command System  (ICS),  it 
establishes sections, divisions, and branches, 
and describes the job duties of each.  It  is a 
management  organization  that can  expand or 
shrink based on the size  and complexity  of 
the incident.  In  its most  basic form, it  gives 
an  incident commander the responsibility  for 
m a n a g i n g t h e a d h o c r e s p o n d i n g 
organization. It  establishes an  operations 
section  chief to order  the troops carrying  out 
the mission  decided upon by  the incident 
commander, planned by  the planning  section 
chief,  supported by  the logistics section  chief, 
and paid for  through  the finance section 
chief.  
If the incident  or  event happens in  a  city 
wi th  a  s ta te-of - the-ar t  Department 
Operations Center  or  Emergency  Operations 
Center,  all of these people come together  in  a 
room  wired with  flat  screen  televisions to 
watch the event unfold on  the news. Phones, 
radios, and computers are connected so they 
can  talk  to each  other  and to their  troops in 
the field. All the ICS forms they  need are in  a 
template on  the computer,  ready  to be filled 
out for  federal compliance and possible later 
reimbursement. Anyone who has been  in  one 
of these rooms during a  large-scale event  or 
incident, whether  planned or  unplanned, 
knows that it  quickly  becomes quite a 
bureaucratic machine.  
To help manage an  event, NIMS creates 
operational  periods,  usually  twelve hours in 
length,  so that incident  commanders can 
consider  the event  in  specific, shorter  time 
frames. Each operational  period begins with 
a  briefing  so that  mission  objectives can  be 
defined,  or  re-defined,  and communication 
among  all levels of the ICS  organization  can 
be fostered. These operational periods help 
NIMS operate in  a  very  linear  fashion, from 
the outset  of the event  through  the response 
efforts and into recovery. It  forces the event 
and response efforts into a  sort  of organized, 
chronological timeline, as represented below.
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Figure 1.  Event/Incident Chronological Timeline Representation  
While  this looks good on  paper,  every  first 
responder  knows that no event is so neatly  or 
quickly  organized. Consider  that  NIMS was 
used to structure the organization  created to 
handle Hurricane Katrina.  Does anyone in 
the first-responder  community  consider 
those initial response efforts an  unmitigated 
success?  
Perhaps it  is unfair  to judge NIMS 
effectiveness by  such  catastrophic  events as 
Hurricane Katrina  or  something akin to the 
9/11  attack. Truly,  events of that type are so 
large, so unimaginable,  so horrific to handle, 
that  no first  responder  could adequately 
provide any  sort  of immediate,  effective 
management. Yet someone must.  
NIMS instruction for  the first responder 
states that  he/she must  “size up the incident” 
and then,  as quickly  as possible,  resolve it.6 
After  this brief mention, the remaining thrust 
of NIMS is focused on creating  the 
organization  that  manages those working to 
resolve the issue.  Little attention is paid to 
how  one must  first “size up”  the incident.  The 
NIMS focus on  resolving  the issue without 
first  understanding  it can  lead to inaccurate 
direction  and potential  loss of life and 
property.  
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THE MISSING PIECE OF THE NATIONAL 
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
What  is the missing  piece of NIMS? To 
answer  this question, we must  first  consider 
one all-important, never-talked-about,  fact 
regarding  the culture of our discipline. As 
first  responders, we are supposed to be calm, 
cool,  and collected at all  times.  Nothing 
should faze us, nothing should scare us,  and 
nothing should jolt  us out of our  comfort 
zone.  We arrive,  we solve the problem,  we go 
home. In some sense, NIMS has incorporated 
that  cultural  philosophy  into its content. The 
NIMS calmly  discusses how  forms are filled 
out and checklists are followed in  order  to 
restore order.  
What  NIMS does not  discuss in  enough 
detail is that  when  first  responders are called 
to a  large-scale event, they  can arrive to the 
sounds of gunfire,  screaming  or  mortally 
wounded people,  fires raging,  crowds 
rushing, mobs forming, and other  officers or 
firefighters so overcome by  events that  they 
cannot function.  Responders are confronted 
with  having  to understand this utterly 
confusing  problem  and then  somehow  solve 
it. In  short,  first-responding  incident 
commanders arrive to a  scene of complete 
chaos.  
Every  first responder  knows this initial 
phase exists.  Retired Los Angeles Police 
Department Deputy  Chief Mike Hillmann 
calls it  “The Golden  Hour.” 7  Other  first 
responders probably  have their  own term  for 
it.  But while everyone knows it  exists,  few 
discussions focus on it.  And no organization 
trains its incident  commanders how  to 
function in it, how  to understand it,  and how 
to end it.  
Also never  acknowledged is that  this chaos 
is a  normal, natural part of the event. 
Because this is not  routinely  taught  or 
practiced,  first-arriving  incident commanders 
feel a  push  to end the chaos immediately  and 
if they  cannot  do so,  believe they  are 
ineffective failures.  This can  result in  incident 
commanders taking action  even if they are 
not quite  sure  yet what they have or what 
they should be trying to  accomplish.  These 
first  actions,  taken  for  the sake of appearing 
efficient  and effective, can lead event 
response efforts down drastically  wrong 
paths and ultimately cost lives.
What  truly  determines an  incident 
commander’s final success in  restoring order 
is how  effectively  he/she can  understand 
what is happening in the chaos and 
determine a  course of action.  How  quickly 
can  he or she work  through  a mental process 
that asks and answers the following 
questions? 
 
• What has happened here?
• What  have I never  seen  before; what 
is completely foreign to me?
• What  have I seen before; what  is 
familiar to me?
• What do I know?
• What do I need to know?
Once these questions are answered, the 
incident commander can then consider:
• What do I want to do?
• What do I have to do?
• What can I do?
Once these  questions are answered, an 
order  emerges from  the chaos and the 
incident  commander  can  consider  the last, 
most important question:
• What am  I trying to  accomplish 
here?
From  here,  the forms,  checklists, and 
organization  of NIMS can  structure a 
response to the event and bring  order to 
chaos.  But  without  dealing  with  these 
questions first, response efforts will  either  fail 
or  be seriously  misguided. Without them, 
field practitioners operate by  what  retired 
Long  Beach Police Department  Lieutenant 
Steve Nottingham  calls “check-box  tactics.”8 
The NIMS must  expand to include a  full, 
complete discussion  of this first  phase of 
chaos.  It  must teach  ways to think through 
the problem  at hand and apply  process with 
purpose. It  must  find a way  to teach  these 
skills to incident  commanders. This is the 
crucial, missing piece of NIMS.  
RENAUD, THE MISSING PIECE OF NIMS  5
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 8 (JUNE 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
THE CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK:  A 
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE IN 
CONSIDERING THE LIFE OF AN INCIDENT
The NIMS currently  offers a  linear, 
chronological timeline upon  which  to 
structure event  response efforts.  Consider, 
though, if the premise of the Cynefin 
framework might  be more a  more applicable 
tool. 9 “Cynefin  (pronounced ku-ne-vin) is a 
Welsh  word that  signifies the multiple factors 
in  our  environment and our  experience that 
inf luence us in  ways we can never 
understand.” 10  David J.  Snowden  has 
borrowed this term  and applied it  to a 
framework of his creation  that  separates the 
different spheres in  which  leaders operate 
into the following  contexts:  simple (or 
known),  complicated (or  knowable), 
complex, and chaotic.  
Figure 2: Depiction of the Cynefin Framework11
Having  done a  great  deal  of research  into 
the characteristics of each  context, Snowden 
distilled the leader’s job  within  each  of these 
contexts and determined danger  signals that 
indicate when  a  leader  is not functioning 
properly  within that  context as well as ways 
he or  she can respond to these danger  signals 
to ward off disaster.  This framework,  and 
Snowden’s subsequent  research  relating  to it, 
is intended to help leaders operate more 
effectively  in  whichever  context  they  find 
themselves.  
Snowden has been apply ing th is 
framework  to governments,  industries, 
businesses,  and fire responders for the past 
decade.  He believes that  “the purpose of the 
Cynefin  Framework is to help leaders 
determine the prevailing  operative context  so 
they  can  make appropriate choices.” 12 
Recently, it  has also been  applied to help 
understand the field of homeland security  as 
well.  Christopher Bellavita  describes its 
component parts as follows. 13
1. The known: a space where cause and 
effect  are understood and predictable, 
hence “everyone”  knows what to do about 
the issue.
2. The knowable: a space where cause and 
effect  relationships may  be difficult  to 
derive or  understand,  but  researchers and 
experts – given  sufficient time and 
resources – can determine.
3. The complex: a space where one knows 
cause and effect only   retrospectively. 
What  appears logical  after  the fact – i.e., 
when  the dots have been connected – is 
but one of many  other  logical  outcomes 
that could have occurred.
4. The chaotic: a  space so turbulent  that 
c a u s e a n d e f f e c t  a r e u n k n o w n ; 
strategically,  it  is not  clear  what  to do with 
any measure of certainty.1 
Instead of using  the linear  approach 
(presented earlier  in  Figure 1) to evaluate 
r e s p o n s e e f f o r t s i m a g i n e ,  i n s t e a d , 
understanding  the life of an  event  as seen 
through  the lens of the Cynefin Framework. 
Analyzing  the response to a  large-scale event 
through  this framework shows that  the “The 
Golden  Hour”  exists in  the realm  of the 
chaotic.  Here,  the forms,  structure,  and 
checklists of NIMS are of little use.  As an 
incident  commander  effectively  works 
through  the chaos,  or what  Sid Heal  details in 
his book Tactical Primer as “fog”  and 
“friction,” 14 the event  gives way  to a  phase of 
complexity. Now  the incident  commander 
can  begin  to establish  some of the NIMS 
positions and responsibilities that  can  assist 
in  restoring  full  order, such  as Operations, 
Logistics,  Planning, and Intelligence.  Then, 
RENAUD, THE MISSING PIECE OF NIMS  6
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 8 (JUNE 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
as the event  subsides into the knowable,  the 
NIMS organization is now  valuable in 
managing the organizational  structure. 
Finally,  the known  realm  offers that  place 
where NIMS can  supervise the business of 
recovery.
THE EDGE OF CHAOS
Another,  complementary  way  to consider  the 
problem  of response efforts during  the initial 
phase of chaos is through  an  analogy  using 
“the edge of chaos.” 15  Molecular  biology 
research  has defined “the edge of chaos”  as a 
place on  the edge of every  living  cell  where 
actors and agents interact  with  each  other 
and their  environments in  seeming  chaos and 
disorder. 16   In  this space,  the interactions 
affect  the life or  death  of the cell.  In  this 
space,  a  self-created order  emerges from  the 
chaos.  
Based on this definition,  the edge of chaos 
is a  place one can  be “in,”  and a  place that 
remains in  existence until  order  emerges.  If 
actors and agents (suspects, victims,  officers, 
firefighters)  can  interact  appropriately  with 
their  environment (scene of the event, 
weather conditions, crowd formations, media 
attention, elected officials responding to the 
scene),  then order  can  begin  to emerge from 
the chaos. This chaos is that “white space” 
between  the words in  HSPD 5; that initial 
period when  the local  first  responder  is on 
scene before federal assets arrive and the 
NIMS is stood up to manage the organization 
responding to the event.
This analogy  means that  the first-
responder  community  must look at how, 
holistically,  they  can  establish  ways to 
influence these actors and their environment 
during  that crucial,  initial period.  But this 
approach  must be based on  overarching, 
main point  beliefs,  not a  NIMS checklist  of 
items to be accomplished by  each  ICS section 
position.   To work effectively  in  “the edge of 
chaos,”  or  “the golden  hour,”  actions must  be 
based on the following tenets.
WORKING IN THE EDGE OF CHAOS
Like the national defense effort  described in 
chapter  1, the emergency  response to the 
attacks on 9/11  was necessarily  improvised. 
In  New  York,  the FDNY, NYPD, the Port 
Authority,  WTC employees, and the building 
occupants themselves did their  best  to cope 
with  the effects of an  unimaginable 
catastrophe – unfolding  furiously  over  a  mere 
102  minutes – for  which  they  were 
unprepared in  terms of both  training  and 
mindset. 17 
THE FIRST TENET OF WORKING IN 
CHAOS:  FIND THE RIGHT INCIDENT 
COMMANDER
Not every  person  can  be a  doctor. Not every 
person  is geared toward being an  engineer. 
Not every  police officer  will make an  excellent 
detective.  And not every  police officer, high-
ranking  or  not, can be an  effective incident 
commander. In the ideal situation, agencies 
determine well  ahead of a  large-scale event 
w h i c h  o f t h e i r  c o m m a n d s t a f f a r e 
experienced, educated, and trained for 
assuming  the role of incident  commander. In 
the next-to-best  case scenario,  agencies 
dispense with  niceties and remove from  the 
scene of the event  those officers who truly 
cannot function  in  this role.  In  the reality  of 
the middle ground we occupy,  agencies 
usually  go with  the theory  that  hope is  indeed 
a  strategy,  and they  just hope that  the right 
person  is on-duty  when  a  major  incident 
happens. In most agencies,  help will  be 
shortly  on  the way  as tactical  teams and 
command teams are called out from  home, 
but the work done by  the first  arriving 
incident  commander  in that  “golden  hour” 
will certainly  set the initial  tone,  pace,  and 
direction of the response efforts.
In  The Unthinkable, Amanda  Ripley 
dedicates a  section  to finding  the “right” 
person, entitled “Special Forces Soldiers Are 
Not Normal.” 18  She details what  Charles 
Morgan  III,  an  associate clinical  professor  of 
psychiatry  at Yale University, found after 
fifteen  years of studying  how  people are 
p h y s i c a l l y ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ,  a n d 
physiologically  wired differently. Some 
people with certain  chemical make-ups and 
psychological profiles react efficiently  and 
effectively  under  extreme stress,  while others 
cannot  optimally  function  in  such  an 
environment.  
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He found that  blood samples of special 
forces soldiers and enlisted military 
servicemen  who fare well in  survival school 
showed higher  levels of the chemical 
neuropeptide Y, a  compound that  helps one 
stay  focused on  tasks performed under 
stressful  conditions.  These soldiers reported 
few-to-no incidents of disassociation in 
events they  had endured up to that time. 
Some psychological profiles indicated most of 
them  had suffered through  diff icult 
childhoods or  previous traumatic  events. 
Morgan’s research,  in  total,  explained why 
not all  soldiers are alike and why  some can 
endure stressfully  chaotic situations better 
than  others. Applying this finding  to law 
enforcement  officers is not a  far  stretch. 
Clearly, the implications of these findings for 
local  first  responders working  in  the chaos of 
early  large-scale response efforts are 
widespread.  
The NIMS is a  useful framework 
comprised of section  descriptions, checklists, 
and job duties that  most  people can  be taught 
to apply  in  managing complicated incidents. 
However,  the unique skills, abilities and even 
chemical-physiological makeup that comprise 
effective incident  commanders probably 
cannot be taught  or  cultivated in  every  first 
responder, but  rather  must  be developed in 
those found to possess the natural proclivity 
for performance under stress.
THE SECOND TENET OF WORKING IN 
CHAOS:  “NOT EVERY INCIDENT HAS A 
PLAY BOOK!  SOMETIMES YOU JUST 
NEED TO THINK…”19
How  does one “think”  when  confronted with 
a  scene that could encompass masses of 
injured people, hurt  first  responders, 
environmental destruction, conflicting 
information, and the stubborn refusal of that 
incident  to bend,  initially, to the “playbook” 
checklists supplied in  the NIMS forms and 
section responsibilities? Law  enforcement 
literature and teaching  curricula are curiously 
silent  on  this topic. Yet  it  must  be explored if 
public safety  is to better  handle the next 9/11 
or Hurricane Katrina.
Karl  Weick  has researched this question as 
it pertains to emergency  response, and 
framed answers using the concept  of 
“sensemaking”  – the way  human beings make 
sense out  of complex  situations.  It  is the 
sociological study  of how  people confronting 
chaotic,  challenging events manage to work 
with  and through the myriad components to 
bring some sort  of resolution  and calm  to a 
turbulent  or  uncertain situation. “To engage 
in  sensemaking is to construct,  filter,  frame, 
create facticity  and render  the subjective into 
something more tangible.” 20 
When should sensemaking be used? Not 
every  situation one confronts is problematic. 
Many  everyday  events follow  known,  readily 
u n d e r s t o o d p a t t e r n s a n d o r d e r s . 
S e n s e m a k i n g  i s n e c e s s a r y  w h e n a 
practitioner  confronts a  situation  falling into 
the Cynefin framework  area  of complex  or 
chaotic.  When the practitioner’s goal is to 
move that  situation out of these realms and 
into the complicated,  and eventually  the 
understandably  simple, he or  she must 
engage in  sensemaking.  As Weick describes 
it,  “In  order  to convert  a  problematic 
situation  to a  problem, a  practitioner  must do 
a  certain  kind of work. He must make sense 
of an  uncertain situation that initially  makes 
no sense.” 21 This type of situation  presents a 
daunting task  in which  known  methods rarely 
provide applicable resolutions because the 
situation is new and untested. And so, 
Sensemaking begins  with  the basic 
question, is it still  possible to take things 
for  granted? And if  the answer  is no, if  it 
has become impossible to continue with 
automatic information  processing, then the 
question becomes, why is this so?  And, 
what next?22
Sociologists and social  anthropologists 
have found that  East and West  appear  to 
approach  problems differently.  P.E. Drucker 
found that the West focuses on  the answer to 
a  problem  where the East  focuses on  defining 
the quest ion . 23  Sensemaking causes 
practitioners first  to define the question  and, 
in  doing  so,  to consider how  the various parts 
can  work together  to frame the answer.  The 
NIMS, as a  framework,  rightly  focuses on  the 
answer to a crisis situation. Because it  means 
to impose order  as quickly  as possible,  it 
offers a  robust  management structure to 
perpetuate order.  Defined management 
positions break  an  incident  into workable 
pieces so that  one person or group can  focus 
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on  logistical tracking,  another on intelligence 
gathering  and dissemination,  another still on 
operational and tactical concerns, et cetera.
But  what  of defining the question?  When 
do practitioners responding to the initial 
phase of a  large-scale event  have the 
opportunity  to first  define the question? 
What  are they  trying  to accomplish at  that 
particular  scene? How  did this happen? What 
type of enemy  are they  facing? Is there still an 
active force inside the event  that must  be 
neutralized,  or  is the event  past  that and are 
life-saving  measures the main  focus? These 
questions,  and many  others like them, must 
first  be considered and answered so the very 
applicable structure of NIMS can  effectively 
move the event further toward the Cynefin 
realm  of “simple.”  Without answers to these 
questions,  incident  commanders and first 
responders could make missteps costing  lives 
or  delaying  the apprehension  of dangerous 
suspects.
THE THIRD TENET OF WORKING IN 
CHAOS:  MANIPULATION AND 
IMPROVISATION ARE NOT DIRTY WORDS
Imagine a  large earthquake in  the Southern 
California  area; a  terrorist  event  in  the Los 
Angeles/Long  Beach Port  complex; a 
Mumbai style attack  in a  crowded tourist 
area. From  the outset, a host of police 
officers,  fire fighters,  private security,  media, 
innocent  bystanders, critically  wounded 
victims, business firms, politicians,  and a 
host  of other  entities will implode on  the 
scene and create an  ad hoc working  group 
with  all representatives dependent  upon each 
other  for  survival  and a  successful 
conclusion. In the eye of this hurricane, 
however, will be one person carrying the 500-
t o n w e i g h t o f t h e t i t l e “ I n c i d e n t 
Commander.”  In any  of these events,  one fact 
stands out:  the incident commander  (most 
likely  a  law  enforcement officer) will  be 
charged with  making  disparate groups work 
together  toward a  common  goal. Most  of 
these groups do not  work for  the law 
enforcement  agency  and cannot  be “ordered” 
to act  in  a  particular  way. In  this situation, 
the ability  to manipulate people,  things,  and 
events can be the difference between success 
and failure.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
manipulate as being  able “to handle; esp. 
with  dexterity.” 24 One way  of considering  the 
skill  of manipulation  during incident 
command is to look  at Mike Hillmann’s ideas 
about  in  extremis decision making and in 
extremis leadership; the latter  is defined as 
“giving  purpose,  direction  and motivation  to 
people where there is eminent  physical 
danger  and where  followers believe that 
leader  behavior  will  influence their  physical 
well-being or survival.” 25
Based on  a  several-decade career  of 
responding to large-scale incidents,  Hillmann 
has found the challenges for  the incident 
commander  working  in  the initial  phase of 
chaos involve the reality  of: imminent  death 
or  serious bodily  injury; problems with 
control  versus true command; “overwhelmed 
by  events” (OBE) and the inability  to react; 
confusion and ambiguous and conflicting 
information; environmental  problems (such 
as noise, destruction,  death, chaos,  dark, wet, 
uncertainty); competitive issues of time and 
priority; a  lack of think  time; and the weight 
of the consequences resulting  from  success or 
failure. 26 Hillmann  further  believes that the 
effective incident  commander  must  be: calm 
in  the face of danger; focused; possess the 
ability  to prioritize; have a  positive attitude; 
be  decisive and relentless in achieving 
objectives; apply  experience from  prior 
assignments; be able to set  aside his or  her 
ego; be in  good physical  condition; have the 
ability  to overcome obstacles; and anticipate/
manage change.27  The successful incident 
commander must fulfill  the following 
expectations those in  the event  have of him  or 
her:  assume command; focus on  the mission 
and “get it  done;”  establish  priorities; 
determine objectives; define expectations; 
maintain  situational  awareness; trust 
subordinates;  constantly  evaluate and 
readjust; at the right  time, develop incident 
organization (ICS); and be decisive.28  
I saved decisive for  last.  It  appears a  little 
earlier  on  Hillmann’s bullet-point  list,  but it 
provides a  nice segue into another  topic few 
people like to discuss openly,  for  it  seems 
somewhat  akin  to calling  for  treason  against 
the King. But  here it  is:  some of us (and when 
I say  “us”  I mean ranking  officials in  law 
enforcement  agencies who will  be called upon 
as incident  commanders in  large-scale 
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events) are not  good at making decisions. 
Some of us are simply  incapable of making 
decisions quickly. It’s not  our  fault, really. 
Once we hold rank in a  police department  we 
become “managers”  as well  as leaders.  We 
have to learn to work  with  our  fellow 
command officers,  liaise with  elected 
officials,  accommodate community  groups, 
mediate employee problems,  mete out 
discipline,  work through  union  meet-and-
confer  issues, et cetera.  All of that teaches us 
to make decisions carefully  and thoughtfully 
i n  o u r  d a y - t o - d a y  b u s i n e s s l i f e . 
Unfortunately,  that carefully  developed skill 
– carried over  into responding to the initial 
chaos of a  large-scale incident  – could prove 
disastrous.
We all  remember from  our  Police 
Academy  recruit  training  days that how  we 
train  translates to how  we perform  in  the 
field.  We,  as leaders, must train  ourselves 
daily  to make decisions.  Even  if the decisions 
are small,  do not put  off until  tomorrow  what 
you  can decide upon  today.  That  way  of 
thinking  and acting will  carry  over  into 
actions taken  and decisions made at the 
outset  of large-scale events.  This seemingly 
small point is a vitally important one.
Finally,  because it  has been established 
that  checklists will not  work  in  chaos,  one 
must  ask,  then, what is the opposite  of a 
checklist?  The answer  is improvisation  and 
creativity. Weick asserts: “What  we do not 
expect  under  life-threatening  pressure is 
creativity.” 29 However, when confronted with 
a  situation never  exactly  encountered before 
(e.g., 9/11) or  one of an  unfathomable 
magnitude (e.g., Hurricane Katrina), the 
successful f irst responding incident 
commander  must employ  creativity  and 
improvisation as quickly as possible. 
THE FOURTH TENET OF WORKING IN 
CHAOS:  FIND LEVERAGE POINTS AND 
CREATE MENTAL SLIDES
Leverage points are “the starting point  for 
insightful problem  solving,”  the “focus for 
building  a solution.”30 Leverage points can be 
specific things, events or  people.  They  can 
rise from  relationships established long 
before the event occurs and involve social 
capital.  As defined by  Don  Cohen and Larry 
Prusak  in  In Good Company, social capital is 
“the stock of active connections among 
people; the trust, mutual  understanding, and 
shared values and behaviors that  bind the 
m e m b e r s o f h u m a n n e t w o r k s a n d 
communities and make cooperative action 
possible.” 31  Finding leverage points in  the 
chaos can help incident commanders work to 
restore normalcy.  
Finding leverage points means that one 
first  needs to be able to recognize them  and 
then  understand what  to do with them  in  the 
context  of that  situation.  How  does this 
happen? Arjen  Boin and others researched 
response efforts to several national,  large-
scale incidents for  their  book The Politics  of 
Crisis Management and found the following:
Experienced incident commanders rarely 
arrive at  situational  assessments through 
a n e x p l i c i t c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s o f 
deliberation, as researchers of many stripes 
and colors were long wont to assume. 
Professional  commanders of  this kind have 
developed a  rich  store of  experience and a 
repertoire of tactics upon which they  draw 
when confronting a critical incident. The 
minds of  these crisis commanders work like 
a mental slide carousel  containing 
snapshots of a wide variety of contingencies 
that they have encountered or learned 
about. When they find themselves in a new 
situation, this is  immediately compared 
with  their  stored experiences. This mental 
slide carousel  quickly  revolves until  an 
adequate match  is  found. Each  slide 
contains not only  an image of  the situation 
but also a recipe for action.32
Incident commanders with  a vast  store of 
these “mental slides”  recognize leverage 
points and use them  to their  advantage.  But 
how  do we create such slides among our 
community  of first-responding incident 
commanders? Anyone who has endured the 
ICS 100, 200,  300,  700,  or  800 classroom 
lectures knows that  the current  NIMS 
training model certainly  does not  support  the 
creation or  use of mental slides.  And it  is 
important,  here,  to differentiate between 
education  and training.  Where training 
molds one’s brain  to perform  a  specific task 
in  a  way  an  outside influence wants it 
performed, education enables the person to 
think for  him/herself.  First responders need 
both  training and education  to perform  their 
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jobs effectively. Unfortunately,  in  police work 
and firefighting, the emphasis is mostly  on 
training and much  less on education. 
Although  NIMS is useful  training, it lacks the 
educational component needed to make it 
effective for event response.
Such a  vast  area  of need within the first 
responder  community  must  be immediately 
addressed. This article will  recommend ways 
to train  and educate incident commanders t0 
create, enhance, and strengthen  the mental 
slides needed to respond to the initial  phase 
of chaos inherent in large-scale incidents.
THE FIFTH TENET OF WORKING IN 
CHAOS: THE PARTY ALREADY 
STARTED…YOU’RE LATE
Another  important  point  all incident 
commanders must  remember  is that when 
they  arrive at  the scene of large-scale event 
they  are, indeed, late. Whenever they  arrive, 
others who were there at  the outset were, in  a 
sense,  part  of that cataclysmic incident  – 
trained first  responders or  civilians and 
citizens caught  in  the vortex  of being  in 
decidedly the wrong place at the wrong time.  
In  certain  situations, though,  these 
victimized people might be acting heroically. 
They  might be further  along in  the 
sensemaking  process than  the arriving 
incident commander  is or  can  be.  With 
whatever  little piece of their  contributing 
complexity  making up the chaos that  they 
have latched on  to, they  might  very  well be 
doing  something right.  They  might  be doing 
something  positive in  one little area that will 
start  a  chain  reaction  among  other  aspects of 
the chaos. Arriving incident commanders 
often  blunder  by  stopping  those actions and 
breaking  that  forward momentum  because 
they  do not  understand what  is going  on. 
They  feel  extremely  uncomfortable and 
unable to make any  sense of the situation 
until  they  have been “fully  briefed.”  Their 
quest  for situational awareness and their 
need to feel  – and be seen  as – in command 
of the situation  can  cause them  to interfere 
with positive action at the event.
While  it  seems counterintuitive to the 
need to take immediate  and decisive action,  a 
good incident commander  will take a 
moment to go through  some simple,  cognitive 
sensemaking steps on arrival. He/she will 
think,  what has happened here? What  am  I 
trying to accomplish? What do I recognize in 
this event?  What have I never  seen or  heard 
about  before? What  do I know? What  do I 
need to know? What can  I begin  to do? In 
doing  this,  the incident commander’s 
challenge is to “catch  up”  to the event, not 
attempt to stop the quickly  spinning  carousel 
of chaos so he/she can step on to participate 
in the ride.
CHANGING POLICE CULTURE: 
MULTI-ASSAULT COUNTER TERRORIST 
ACTION CAPABILITIES (MACTAC) AND 
THE USE OF EMERGENCY ACTION TEAMS 
(EAT)
The Los Angeles Police Department has 
initiated a  training course for  its line-level 
officers in response to tactics used in  such 
incidents as the Beslan  School  Massacre and 
the more recent  Mumbai attack. Multi-
Assault  Counter  Terrorist  Action  Capabilities 
(MACTAC) was created to respond to the 
challenges of highly  dynamic “violent 
incidents”  involving  a  combination  of 
multiple subjects,  victims, and locations; 
simultaneous attacks; seizure of hostages; 
active shooters; barricaded subjects; and use 
of explosives.  MACTAC is aimed at the first 
responding officers tasked with  neutralizing 
the threat. It  teaches the importance of 
Immediate Action Rapid Deployment 
( I A R D ) , “ T h e s w i f t  a n d i m m e d i a t e 
deployment  of law  enforcement resources to 
on-going,  life  threatening  situations where 
delayed deployment could otherwise result  in 
death  or  serious bodily  injury  to innocent 
persons.” 33  The imperative of MACTAC is to: 
Stop the violence now [by] engaging 
adversary(s) with  a  minimally safe team; 
move quickly to the sounds/sources of 
violence; search only when  the source of 
the violence is unknown; move past victims 
and threats (IEDs, etc.) and engage and 
neutralize adversaries.34
MACTAC is essential  training  for  line-level 
officers.  The Long Beach  Police Department 
instituted similar  training  about  twelve years 
ago after  the Columbine shooting through 
teaching  Emergency  Action  Teams (EAT) and 
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the concepts discussed above that  involve 
moving  toward the sound of gunfire and 
neutralizing  the threat without waiting  for  a 
commanding officer’s order to do so. 35
MACTAC and EAT training  raise an 
almost  explosive  question.  Why  do we do this 
type of training  for  our  line-level officers 
specific to their  jobs,  yet  we do not train  and 
educate our  incident commanders in the 
skills specific to their jobs? While there is 
NIMS and ICS training,  these checklists and 
forms are not  helpful  in  that  first, crucial 
response timeframe. If our  industry  is now 
recognizing that  certain  events such  as 
Mumbai and Beslan  require different  training 
to equip the mind and body  of those line-level 
officers to think about  handling active 
shooters, why  does it  not recognize that 
incident  commanders have their  own unique 
circumstance they  must train  for? They  must 
learn  how  to work in  the edge of chaos,  that 
initial  “golden  hour” that exists in  every 
large-scale event. Tactics of old that dictated 
a  “contain  and wait  for  SWAT”  mentality 
have been replaced by  MACTAC and EAT and 
an  immediate engagement of active shooters. 
Now  we must  move our  first-responding 
incident commanders into a  comparable 
education and training  model that teaches 
them  how  to work in  the initial chaos so that 
they  can bring  the event through  the 
complexity  and into an  area  where the 
checklist,  forms,  and structure of NIMS are 
so useful  in  allowing  disparate agencies to 
work together and restore order.
CHANGING THE COMMAND OFFICER 
CULTURE
Just  as MACTAC and EAT were a  culture 
shift  in  law  enforcement,  so is the idea  of 
educating  and training incident  commanders 
to work  in  the edge of chaos.  Chiefs and 
commanding officers often  question  how  they 
can  change the culture of an  organization. 
The most common  response is  “through 
hiring  and training.”  And while  that is still  a 
valid place to instill  cultural changes, 
another,  often  overlooked place is through 
internal promotional testing processes.  
The Long  Beach  Police Department 
conducts a  lieutenant’s exam  consisting  of 
multiple phases.  One of those phases is,  and 
has been  for  decades,  a  “Critical  Incident 
Management”  exercise. It simulates a  real-
time event  and begins when  candidates are 
placed in  a  room  for about fifteen  minutes 
with  an  initial scenario description.  Each 
candidate is allowed to make notes, look at 
their  patrol resource list  and generally 
consider  the problem  at hand. The candidate 
is then  taken  into another  room  where a 
rating  panel sits behind a  table. He or  she 
stands at  a board with  a  map of the city  and is 
given  additional  updates to the situation at 
timed intervals.  Candidates are expected to 
manage the critical incident as a  lieutenant 
would in  the field by  talking aloud and telling 
the raters how  they  would assign  resources, 
what missions they would assign, et cetera.
A  routine tactical exam  goes something 
like this: it  might start with  a  shooting  and 
one victim  down  with  a  suspect who fled in  a 
car.  There might be a  vehicle pursuit,  a  crash, 
and an  officer-involved shooting. Finally, the 
suspect might run  into a  house, barricade 
himself and take hostages. All of this 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s g i v e n  n e a t l y  a n d 
understandably  to the candidate.  The final 
question  is always “The duty  chief is on 
scene. Please brief him on this incident.”
The exam  is stressful and requires an 
ability  to demonstrate supervisory  and 
leadership skills as well as knowledge of 
policy.  Over  the years,  however,  this test  has 
become fairly  incestuous,  as the past  group of 
recently  promoted lieutenants trains the next 
group of sergeants preparing  to take the 
lieutenant’s test. There are different theories 
about  how  candidates should address and 
solve the tactical  scenario. Some opt for  the 
“clock  method,”  in  which you  remember  to 
circle back to each crime scene continuously 
in  a  clockwise fashion  to ask for  updates and 
ensure you have handled everything.  Others 
operate in  the “quadrant philosophy” where 
you  separate the map into four  quadrants and 
work one quadrant of crime scenes to 
completion before moving to the next. 
Our  field supervisors have been  studying 
for  these tactical exams for  years. Because 
they  have prepared and memorized ahead of 
time, every  candidate regurgitates the 
necessary  lists,  stating, “I am  the incident 
commander, my  command post  location  is 
_______ (fill in  the blank), I need porta-
potties, barricades, Public Service to respond 
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with  lights, a  scribe,  and command post 
security…..”  I have listened to many 
candidates recite these lists during  their 
exam  and I often  wondered how  many  of 
them  really  knew  why  they  put their 
command post  where they  did,  why  it  was 
necessary  to secure it, really  considered 
whether or  not  they  would need porta-potties 
or  if they  even needed lights brought  out to 
the scene. But all  of these items are on  the 
checklist,  and so they  go through  that 
checklist  process.  I have lost  faith  that  they 
apply  any  of this checklist-process with 
purpose.
 More disturbingly, I came to realize that 
supervisors operate the same way  in  the field. 
This makes some supervisors ill equipped to 
deal with the chaos inherent  in  the initial 
phase of every  large-scale event. So we 
decided to change how  we structured the 
lieutenant’s tactical  exam.  We created a 
Mumbai style attack  in the downtown Long 
Beach  area  and gave the candidates little 
information  at  the outset. Instead of feeding 
them  further  information, we clogged them 
with  questions and uncertainties from  their 
officers in  the field.  Instead of progressing 
through  an incident  in  an  orderly  manner, we 
kept them  in  that initial “golden  hour”  with 
two teams of active shooters, multiple 
victims, the press crawling  all over  the 
location, a  sergeant with an EAT  who refused 
to engage the active shooters,  the chief and 
e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s c a l l i n g  i n , t h e 
Communications Center  overwhelmed with 
phone calls, a shortage of AR-15  rounds in 
the field, and,  in  short, utter  chaos for  the 
twenty-five minutes of their  exam. The final 
question  was not  that  the scenario was over, 
their  duty  chief was on  scene, and they  were 
to brief him  or  her. Instead,  we asked them, 
“What components of ICS would you  use to 
manage this incident, and why?”
Some candidates complained bitterly. 
They  said it wasn’t  what  they  were expecting. 
They  said it  was unfair  because it  was not  like 
past  tests and so it  was not  what they  were 
used to. They  felt  it  was too open-ended 
because they  never  got  a chance to solve the 
incident  completely,  wrap it  up with  a  nice 
bow, and hand it off to the duty  chief. They 
complained that they  were not  given  updates 
of information, only  useless noise and mostly 
insignificant  questions from  operators.  They 
said it was just complete chaos.
We told them  welcome to the reality  of 
their  jobs as lieutenants and as incident 
commanders.
RECOMMENDATIONS
As Arjen  Boin  and his fellow  researchers 
discovered through  studying  decades of crisis 
management  at  large-scale,  volatile  incidents, 
“The initial phase of crisis coordination  can 
do without  rules,  but  successive phases 
require a  few  key  rules that  facilitate the 
interaction  between the various actors and 
structure information  flow.” 36  The NIMS 
provides those rules that,  if used effectively, 
form  the needed framework to structure 
event  response in  successive phases of an 
incident.  The area  remaining  unexplored by 
NIMS, however,  is,  the initial  phase of the 
crisis. What  are the characteristics of this 
phase? Are there any  consistent, recurrent, 
predictable pieces? Or  is the chaos of this 
phase the only  predictable part of it?  If so, 
how  can we understand the nature of chaos 
in  ways that will  better  prepare first 
responders to work it  to a  point  where NIMS 
becomes applicable?
The Boin research team also found that 
A  truly effective crisis response cannot be 
forced: it is to a large extent the result of a 
naturally  evolving process. It cannot be 
managed in  linear, step-by-step and 
comprehensive fashion from  a single crisis 
center, however  full  of top decision makers 
a n d s t a c k e d w i t h s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t 
information technology.37 
These discoveries suggest  the need for  an 
exploration  of that unsettled place sorely 
lacking in  clearly  defined rules, set  policies, 
procedures, protocols,  and cause-and-effect 
constructions.  In  short, Boin’s discoveries 
regarding  the nature of crisis response lead to 
an  area  where most  police officers and 
firefighters fear to tread.  
First  responders spend a  majority  of their 
careers training  for  specific  events.  This is 
their  known  world.  If a  fire happens, 
determine the type (chemical,  wood,  wildfire) 
and apply  the proper  solution. If facing an 
active shooter  adversary  in  a  high  school, 
police officers will  form  emergency  action 
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teams and move toward the threat  using the 
best  possible  cover  and practicing such 
proven  building  search  techniques as “pie-
ing”  around corners.  But who knows how  to 
respond to planes being  flown  into buildings? 
Who can  prepare for  the mass chaos of 
attempting  to manage a  response to 
Hurricane Katrina?
There is certainly  no suggestion here that 
NIMS be abandoned nor training for specific, 
known events halted. But the first-responder 
community  would greatly  benefit  from  an 
addition to the NIMS literature recognizing 
the initial,  edge-of-chaos phase existing at the 
beginning  of large-scale events.  This chaos is 
normal and to be expected. First responders 
arriving  at  a  scene should not  believe they  are 
ineffective if they  cannot issue direct  orders 
that  end the chaos immediately. Instead, they 
should realize  that  it  might take some time to 
work through  the chaos and that their 
barometer  for  success is not whether  they  can 
immediately  end the chaos,  but  rather, how 
quickly  and effectively  they  can  manipulate 
all elements to work through it.  
While  there are  no checklists for working 
through  chaos, evidence suggests that 
sensemaking is useful for  first  responders 
who find themselves in these situations. 
While  NIMS currently  teaches organizational 
structure,  it is silent regarding how  an 
incident commander comes to determine 
what that structure should be trying  to 
achieve and the direction  in  which  it should 
be moving.  Some work  with  sensemaking as a 
strategy  for  determining mission,  path,  and 
direction for  the ICS structure created to 
handle subsequent  phases of the event would 
be invaluable.  In fact,  it  is everything.  A  well-
functioning  team  is useless if they  have 
misidentified the problem  and are, therefore, 
following the wrong path.
As Boin found, “Leaders are important  not 
as all-powerful  decision  makers but rather  as 
designers, facilitators, and guardians of an 
institutional  arrangement  that produces 
effective decision-making  and coordination 
processes.”38  These concepts cannot  be 
taught  by  simply  including them  in  the 
current NIMS checklists written  for  each 
section position.
Because of this, NIMS should also 
recognize that not every  person has the 
innate skill set  necessary  to perform  well in 
crisis situations.  Not  every  first  responder 
will be able to grasp and apply  the concepts of 
sensemaking in  chaos. In  any  local first 
responder  community, however,  there are 
people who do have those innate skills.  These 
people should be sought  out and developed. A 
federal approach  to supporting and 
standardizing  some of the education  they 
undergo would create a  nationwide 
community  of best practices.  As these 
experienced first responders come together to 
talk about how  to work  an  edge-of-chaos 
situation,  they  contribute to the useful 
literature on the subject and to creating and 
broadening  the education  that could lead to 
lives saved in  future large-scale events, 
whether caused by terrorists or nature.  
Thousands of years of warfare teach  us the 
striking  importance of the leader  at  a  crisis 
event. As Philip II of Macedon  said, “An  army 
of deer led by  a lion  is more to be feared than 
an  army  of lions led by  a  deer.”39 Decades of 
law  enforcement  experience prove what most 
have felt – that  leaders must possess the one 
trait  that  cannot be taught  or  acquired: 
courage,  for  “everything  rests upon 
courage.” 40 What  can be acquired,  though,  is 
experience. And experience is another  vitally 
necessary  component  to effective leadership 
in  an  edge-of-chaos event  because it  helps 
first  responders recognize component pieces 
imbedded in  the overall chaos. These pieces, 
if thoughtfully  considered, can  help incident 
commanders make sense of an  unusual 
situation  and begin  to formulate  plans to 
restore order.  
“It  has been said that  a warrior’s most 
formidable weapon  is his mind. It  follows 
then  that  the sharper  the commander’s mind, 
the sounder  the decisions.” 41  The most 
effective way  to sharpen  the mind is through 
education built  on  realistic scenarios that 
force the student  to become actively  involved 
in  the course of study.  The NIMS currently 
hosts large area-wide events in  different  parts 
of the nation  meant  to bring varying local 
agencies and disciplines together to 
participate in  a table-top exercise. Scripted 
and publicized well  in  advance,  they  allow 
agencies to practice using  the NIMS 
organizational framework to manage the 
event  and allocate and track resources. While 
there is certainly  value to these exercises, a 
few  adjustments to this practice could leave 
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first  responders better  prepared to deal  with 
the initial  phase of chaos inherent  in  large-
scale events.
A  small group should be brought  together 
to research  this phenomenon of “edge of 
chaos”  further. Such  a body  would include 
experienced, open-minded practitioners 
along  with  a  selected mix of academically 
focused teachers. Together,  this group would 
craft  the most  realistic scenario possible 
evolving  in  actual  time. This is no small 
undertaking.  It means having  a  physical 
facility  where some type of chaos can  be 
convincingly  played out.  The coordination 
alone of resources and role-playing “actors” 
will be challenging.  First  responders will then 
be let  loose in  this environment  to interact  in 
the chaos and attempt to bring  about 
resolution. This will be the antithesis of a 
controlled,  table-top exercise in  the safety  of 
an Emergency Operations Center.
Along  with  what happens during the 
scenario itself,  the debrief and observation  of 
the instructors afterwards will  be invaluable. 
This type of continuous discussion  and 
learning  focused on  a  sensemaking  approach 
will create a body  of knowledge about  how 
first  responders can  best work within  the 
chaos known  to exist  at  the  outset  of large-
scale events. Truly  devious instructors who 
craft  the scenarios their  unsuspecting 
students will “live through”  at  this training 
facility  will  undoubtedly  add to the mental 
slides of every  student  they  affect.  Because of 
this, first  responders who arrive at  the scene 
of what  would otherwise have been  a 
completely  new  experience to them  should 
feel more confident  beginning  their 
sensemaking of the situation  because they 
had experienced something  close to it  or 
analogous to it  in  their  scenario work.  While 
expensive, such a  real ist ic  training 
presentation  will undoubtedly  pay  for  itself 
by how it readies first responders.  
Ultimately, this type of education  provides 
the all-important why because, as General A. 
M. Gray  found,  “Tactics is not whether  you  go 
left  or  right,  tactics is why  you  go left  or 
right.”42 Understanding the chaos of an event 
enough  to piece together  why  certain things 
need to be accomplished will  allow  first 
responders to make the best decisions 
possible.
Finally,  these small  classes participating  in 
the realistic  scenarios must include cross-
discipline and multi-jurisdictional students. 
The value of pre-existing  relationships cannot 
be emphasized enough for effective event 
response. Personal  relationships that  have 
created a  level of trust among  parties provide 
the foundation for  the strong  bonds 
necessary  to achieve a  coordinated response 
to any event. As the 9/11 Report found:
While no emergency response is flawless, 
the response to the 9/11 terrorist attack  on 
the Pentagon was mainly a  success  for three 
reasons: first, the strong professional 
relationships and trust established among 
emergency  responders; second, the 
adoption  of  the Incident Command System; 
and third, the pursuit of  a  regional 
approach  to response. Many  fire and police 
agencies that responded had extensive 
prior experience working together on 
regional events and training exercises.43
The NIMS and ICS are an invaluable tool 
for  a  structured event response and provide 
an  organization  that  best  handles the 
complicated nature of a  coordinated response 
effort.  But  in  the initial,  chaotic  phase 
inherent in  every  large-scale event, the 
organizational  structure of ICS is not  yet 
useful. First responders with  the inherent 
skill set to “function  in  an  environment 
fraught  with  uncertainty,  friction,  and risk” 
will have “the most  profound impact  on  the 
successful  resolution  of a  conflict.” 44  These 
first  responders must  be educated through 
participation  in  reality-based scenario 
training that will help them  practice 
sensemaking techniques,  add to their  library 
of mental slides,  and foster  relationships with 
e a c h  o t h e r  a c r o s s d i s c i p l i n e s a n d 
jurisdictions so that, if the unthinkable  does 
occur  yet  again,  those men and women  will 
be as ready  as possible  to insert  themselves 
into chaos and wrestle it back to normalcy.
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Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?
Al Mauroni
ABSTRACT
There has  been significant discussion 
regarding federal and state preparedness 
for nuclear terrorism within the United 
States.  This is a very  broad and complex 
public policy  issue.  The  efforts  of federal 
agencies  provide a sense of the  framework 
and capacity of the US government to 
prevent,  protect, respond,  and recover given 
the scenario of a terrorist group’s  use of an 
improvised nuclear device.  There are 
numerous federal programs  supporting 
prevention and protection actions, with 
somewhat lesser development of response 
and recovery actions. However, it remains 
difficult to assess whether these actions  are 
adequate or if more needs to  be done, 
because the overall metrics for success have 
not been determined. A public policy 
approach to  evaluating preparations for a 
nuclear terrorist event is  required to allow 
decision makers to evaluate and better 
implement these efforts. 
INTRODUCTION
Of the original  National  Planning  Scenarios 
developed in the mid-2000s, the first 
involved the threat  of terrorists employing  a 
10-kiloton  improvised nuclear  device in  a 
large metropolitan  area. 1  Using highly 
enriched uranium  stolen  from  another 
country, an unnamed group builds its own 
nuclear  weapon and drives to the center  of a 
city  to detonate the device.  In  addition  to 
wrecking  havoc on  the city,  the nuclear 
weapons effects – heat, blast,  radiation,  and 
EMP – create significant challenges to the 
immediate area  around the explosion.  The 
scenario depicts hundreds of thousands of 
injured people and more than a  million 
displaced persons. This scenario is offered to 
state and local emergency  managers as a 
basis to plan  for  how  they  are going  to deal 
with  this possibility  – a  scenario that 
mandates involvement by  the federal 
government because of the catastrophic 
scope of the damage.
I can’t  answer  the question as to whether 
state and local emergency  responders across 
the nation  are prepared for  this scenario. 
What  I can offer  is that  the problem  isn’t  as 
challenging or  as hopeless as one might 
believe.  This scenario is not  a  certainty,  nor  is 
it  nearly  as probable an  event  as many  other 
natural disasters or  other deliberately  caused 
incidents.  But many  planners fixate on  this 
particular  scenario as if the threat  was 
imminent. Fortunately, the United States 
government  (USG) has been  working  to 
reduce the threat  of nuclear  terrorism  to the 
public for  some time.  This article will  discuss 
the federal government’s approach  to the 
potential threat  of a  sub-state group planning 
to use a  nuclear  weapon  against  a  US city. In 
particular,  I will  discuss the general threat; 
identify  what the federal  government is 
currently  doing to reduce the threat; what the 
state/local emergency  managers can  do; and 
finally,  the issue of whether  the USG is doing 
enough. In  this examination,  I will  use a 
public policy framework.
Public  policy  analysis provides a  sound 
methodology  to understand anything  that  the 
USG decides to do, or  not do, in  executing  an 
effort  in  response to the public’s needs.  I 
prefer  to use a  book  by  Charles Jones titled 
An Introduction to  the Study of Public Policy 
to provide a  framework for  this analysis.2 
Jones outlines a general process for  how 
public policy  is executed and discusses the 
roles of four  sets of actors involved in  any 
public policy  discussion.  He identifies four 
types of participants who vary  in  the roles 
they  play  in  the policy  process,  the values 
they  seek to promote,  the source of goals for 
each, and their  operating styles.  This model 
can  also group the main  participants within 
each  category  of actors with  regards to a 
discussion of responding  to nuclear  terrorism 
threats. 
Rationalists include those people who 
employ  reasoned choices about  the 
desirability  of adopting different  courses of 
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action  in resolving  public  problems, 
identifying  the mission,  and determining 
what  it  would take to accomplish  stated 
objectives. The top policy  makers in  the 
Department of Defense (DoD),  Department 
of Homeland Security  (DHS), Department of 
Health  and Human  Services (DHHS), 
Department of State (DoS), Department of 
Energy  (DoE), Department  of Justice (DoJ), 
and Director of National  Intelligence (DNI) 
are in this group. 
Technicians implement policy,  focused on 
specialized work  associated with  particular 
stages of decision-making. They  are generally 
expected to use their  professional training to 
meet specific annual  targets that  are  defined 
by  others. In this case study, this includes the 
Federal Emergency  Management  Agency 
(FEMA), Customs and Border  Protection 
(CBP), Domestic  Nuclear  Detection Office 
(DNDO), Federal Bureau  of Investigation 
( F B I ) , N a t i o n a l N u c l e a r  S e c u r i t y 
Administration  (NNSA), DoE National Labs, 
US Northern  Command and US Special 
Operations Command,  the Bureau  of 
International Security  and Nonproliferation, 
and the National Counterproliferation  Center 
and National Counterterrorism Center. 
Incrementalists include the politicians 
who enable the policy  to be executed, but  do 
not  believe that  comprehensiveness and 
rationality  are possible in  the real world.  As a 
result,  they  are satisfied with  working  at  the 
margins,  building  from  a  base.  This includes 
Congressional  representatives as well as state 
and local politicians who fund policy 
initiatives, often  in  increments with  limited 
objectives rather  than  in  the full amount 
expected by policy makers.
Last,  the reformists are those who believe 
that  the urgency  of the problem  demands 
more sweeping  measures to successfully 
achieve certain  policy  objectives. They  do not 
usually  care about  limitations of money, 
power, or  ability  when  advocating  for  a 
particular  solution. In  this case,  we see the 
“Global Zero”  movement,  Nuclear  Threat 
Initiative, arms control advocates, missile 
defense advocates, industry  vendors,  and 
think tanks such as the  Harvard University 
Belfer  Center,  CSIS Project on  Nuclear 
Issues, and the Ploughshares Fund.
The agenda for  any  political issue shifts 
according  to which  actor’s agenda is most 
powerful or  in  play  at  any  given  moment. 
This can  shift  over  time, and these actors can 
ally  with  each  other or  act  against  others. 
Each  actor  has strengths and weaknesses that 
complicate the discussion.  These dynamics 
create a natural tension  that  can result  in 
inefficiencies and challenges that  set  a 
particular  pace of government action (or 
inaction).  Understanding this process can  aid 
in  understanding to what  extent  the 
government  is successfully  addressing  public 
concerns. This issue in  particular  is too broad 
and complex  to be addressed in  something 
less than  a  heavy  book.  There are many 
executive branch  agencies with policy  and 
decision  makers determining  the level of 
effort  and what  programs ought to be funded 
to address this threat.  Similarly,  Congress has 
an  important role in  the oversight  and annual 
funding of these efforts.  There may  be some 
benefit  to focusing on the role of the 
“technicians,”  as they  have to implement 
government  policy  through  particular 
projects to prevent, protect against, respond 
to, and recover  from  the threat  of an 
unconventional nuclear weapon. 
FORMALIZING THE NEED FOR 
ACTION
In  April  2010, President Obama said,  "The 
single biggest threat  to US security,  both 
short-term, medium-term  and long-term, 
would be the possibility  of a  terrorist 
organization  obtaining  a nuclear  weapon.” 3 
This concern  over  the threat  of nuclear 
terrorism  is not new. For decades, policy 
makers and analysts alike have worried that 
increased global  access to nuclear materials 
and public  knowledge of how  nuclear 
weapons work would certainly  lead to a 
nuclear  terrorist  incident.  In  the 1970s,  the 
concern focused on  the vulnerability  of 
nuclear  power  plants; in  1997, it  was Russian 
“suitcase nukes.”  Today,  it’s the concern  that 
al  Qaeda  will obtain  one of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons and move it to the United States. 
Over  the last  decade in  particular,  the rise of 
transnational  terrorism  and growth of 
nuclear  technology  have increased concerns 
that  the event  will happen sooner  rather than 
later  (hence the saying,  “it is not a  matter of 
if,  but when”). Many  believe we are overdue 
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for  such  an  event. For instance, in  2005, 
n e a r l y  t w o t h i r d s o f a  g r o u p o f 
nonproliferation  experts believed that the 
probability  of a  nuclear  attack  somewhere in 
the world before 2015  was between  10  and 50 
percent. 4 
W h i l e t h e r e h a s b e e n  n o p u b l i c 
confirmation  that  a  terrorist  group has ever 
obtained,  is about  to get,  or currently  has a 
nuclear  weapon, anxieties over that  end-state 
have been  converted into conclusions. We do 
know  that  a  nuclear  weapon  detonation 
would have catastrophic effects on a city.  We 
do see the steady  rise in  transnational 
terrorist  incidents. As a result,  the federal 
government  believes it  has a  responsibility  to 
protect  the American  public  from  the threat 
of nuclear  weapons.5 Based primarily  on the 
potential (theoretical)  impact of a  tactical 
nuclear  weapon  on a city  and the increased 
availability  of information  on  nuclear  science 
and technology, the USG  has decided to make 
this low  probability/high  consequence event 
a  t o p n a t i o n a l p r i o r i t y . P r i o r  t o 
understanding whether  the response is 
appropriate, we need to better  understand 
what  the actual  threat  is and how  it  would 
emerge. 
There are a  number  of threats that can be 
considered under  the category  of “nuclear 
terrorism.”  At the less probable end of the 
spectrum,  a sub-state group could construct  a 
small-yield nuclear  weapon. People like to 
use the figure “10 kiloton”  because that  is 
seen as the minimal  yield of a  plausible 
improvised nuclear  device using  25  kilograms 
of highly  enriched uranium  or  eight 
kilograms of plutonium. Others suggest  a 
sub-state group might  steal or  purchase a 
nuclear  weapon from  a  “rogue state.”  On  the 
more probable s ide are a t tacks on 
commercial nuclear  facilities,  either  to take 
radioactive  material or  cause an  accident to 
release radioactive contamination, and the 
theft  of commercial  radiological isotopes to 
create a  “dirty  bomb” or  radiological 
dispersal  device (RDD).  Some people believe 
in  the scenario of a  terrorist-induced 
electromagnetic  pulse (EMP) that  could wipe 
out the nation’s electronic grid. 6  For  the 
purposes of this discussion, I am  going  to 
focus on the threat  of a  nuclear  device being 
used by  a  sub-state group on  a  city  within  the 
United States.
The source of the threat  is important to 
this discussion,  even more so than  the 
specific  nature of the threat.  By  merely 
stating  their  intent  to obtain  “weapons of 
mass destruction”  and their  presence in 
Pakistan,  a  nuclear weapon-owning  state, al 
Qaeda has caused the USG to attribute the 
group with nearly  apocalyptic  power  to 
successfully  attack the United States with  a 
nuclear  weapon.7 Most  USG literature on  the 
topic of WMD terrorism  does not talk  about 
al  Qaeda  specifically; rather,  the general term 
“terrorist  groups”  or  even more generic term 
“non-state actors”  is used.  I prefer  the term 
“sub-state groups”  to describe these 
organizations.  The phrase “non-state actor” 
can  apply  to a  large cast of characters, 
including private security  firms, paramilitary 
units,  criminal organizations,  drug  cartels, 
“lone gunmen,”  and vigilantes, as well as 
terrorists and insurgents – basically  anyone 
who is using  violence as a  method of 
persuasion  outside of the government’s 
authority.  We are mostly  concerned about 
those foreign  violent  extremist groups who 
aspire to transnational activities. 
The popular assumption  is that  terrorists 
are actively  working  with  “rogue nations”  to 
exploit WMD materials and technology,  or 
bidding  for  materials and technology  on 
some nebulous global  black  market. They 
might  be buying  access to scientists and 
engineers who used to work on  state WMD 
programs. The historical  record doesn’t 
demonstrate that.  An examination  of any  of 
the past  annual reports of the National 
Counterterrorism  Center  reveals that  the 
basic  modus operandi of terrorists and 
insurgents is to use conventional  military 
weapons, easily  acquired commercial (or 
improvised) explosives,  and knives and 
machetes. 8  It is relatively  easy  to train 
laypersons to use military  firearms, such  as 
the AK-47  automatic rifle and the RPG-7 
rocket  launcher.  These groups have technical 
experts who develop improvised explosive 
devices using  available and accessible 
m a t e r i a l s f r o m  t h e l o c a l e c o n o m y . 
Conventional  weapons have known  weapon 
effects and minimal  challenges in  handling 
and storing. Terrorists get their  material and 
technology  where they  can. They  don’t have 
the time, funds,  or  interests to get  exotic.  It’s 
what we see, over and over again.
MAURONI, NUCLEAR TERRORISM  4
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 9 (JUNE  2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Military  chemical/biological (CB) warfare 
agents,  radiological  material, and nuclear 
weapons are not easily  obtained, outside of 
government  laboratories.  Nation  states invest 
large amounts of people and funds to develop 
and test specific  unconventional  weapons, 
and if they  were to give or  sell  these weapons 
to terrorists,  one of two things could happen 
– either  the weapons would be traced back  to 
them,  or the weapons might be used 
someplace where the nation-state really 
didn’t  want  those weapons used. In theory, 
scientists recruited by  sub-state groups could 
develop small quantities of military  CB 
warfare agents, but  the lack of access to fissile 
material would frustrate any  ambitious 
engineer  trying  to build an  improvised 
nuclear device.
There are other  hypotheses as to why  sub-
state groups have been  unable to obtain 
nuclear  weapons and/or  fissile material on 
the “global market.”  It  could be that,  despite 
the available information about nuclear 
weapons, these groups haven’t  developed the 
expertise, skills, or  experience to design  a 
nuclear  weapon. It  takes time, resources,  and 
a  secure facility  to successfully  develop such  a 
weapon,  and international efforts to combat 
terrorism  may  have been  successful  in 
stopping  such efforts. It could be that  the 
scientists and engineers who are attracted to 
sub-state groups are not capable of designing 
weapons. It  is a  particularly  challenging  task 
to take a  particularly  hazardous material, 
developed in  a  laboratory, and turn  it into a 
reliable military  weapon  of mass destruction. 
Last,  it  could be that  sub-state groups have 
been  frustrated by  the numerous black-
market  scams and intelligence sting 
operations,  in  which  fraudulent  persons 
claimed to have nuclear material.9
Sub-state groups are interested in 
chemical, biological,  radiological,  and nuclear 
(CBRN)  hazards, however,  because senior 
political leaders and military  leaders publicly 
state, over  and over  again, how  dangerous a 
release of these materials would be to the 
American  public.  So of course terrorists are 
interested in  CBRN hazards,  but they  don’t 
have the expertise to produce the specialized 
military  warfare agents,  they  don’t  have any 
training in  handling or  storing  them, and 
they  don’t  understand how  to deliver  the 
agents to their targets with  any  degree of 
effectiveness.  So one might see some 
attempts to steal chlorine gas cylinders from 
water treatment sites, some occasional 
attempts to produce ricin  toxin  from  castor 
beans, stories about  a  few  grams of 
radioactive  material stolen  from  a  facility  – 
these are not  materials that  cause mass 
casualty  events.  But  the fear  persists, and so 
government  leaders spend billions every  year 
to reduce the already  minute possibility  that 
some sub-state group does develop or  steal a 
nuclear  weapon  for  the purposes of 
employing  it  against the United States.  This 
leads to our  public  policy  discussion: to 
understand how  effectively  the USG  is 
performing in this case.
IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY
The federal  government uses a  combination 
of nonproliferation, counterproliferation,  and 
combating  terrorism  tactics in  its strategy  to 
counter  terrorist  WMD threats. 10  There are 
significant challenges to the government’s 
strategy,  including developing  intelligence on 
sub-state groups and nuclear  material 
sources,  securing  fissile material and other 
radiologica l  hazards , detect ing  and 
interdicting  the transportation of nuclear 
material,  rendering the nuclear  device 
harmless, and determining  where the nuclear 
device/fissile material came from. These 
challenges require  significant technical 
expertise, and may  require engagement  with 
and active support  from  other  nations to be 
successful.  Since  we cannot guarantee the 
perfect  collection of intelligence,  the 
continuously  ready  military  assets for  global 
interdiction, and quick attribution  of the 
perpetrators,  one requires an  emphasis on 
nonproliferation  activities to frustrate sub-
state actors from  acquiring  fissile material in 
the first place.
The federal  government  uses the terms 
“ p r e v e n t ,  p r o t e c t ,  r e s p o n d , a n d 
recover”  (which  probably  sound very  familiar 
to the homeland security  professional) to 
describe the general tenets of this strategy. 
The definitions of these mission areas are 
found in  the Presidential Decision  Directive 
(PPD) 8,  National Preparedness.11  This is a 
linear  approach that  attempts to eliminate 
the chance of a  successful terrorist  WMD 
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incident  in  the United States by  applying 
multiple layers of effort in  a  “defense in 
depth”  approach. It  involves a  host of 
government  agencies,  most  of which  address 
conventional terrorism  as well as WMD 
terrorism.
For  the purposes of this discussion,  I am 
not going to address the mission  area of 
“mitigation.”  The current definitions of 
“prevent”  and “protect”  in  PPD-8  appear  to 
be focused on  terrorism  as a primary  threat. 
It’s unclear  why  mitigation  was broken away 
from  the “protection” mission  area, other 
than  perhaps to allow  some focus on  actions 
that  the state or  local governments might 
take to reduce the damage caused by  natural 
disasters .  The “National Mit igat ion 
Framework”  is still  a  work in  progress.  But  at 
least  for  this discussion  on  what  actions the 
federal  government undertakes with  regard 
to nuclear terrorism, there does not  appear  to 
be a clearly  defined set  of activities for 
“mitigation.”
The first  mission  area, prevention, 
includes those capabilities required to 
prevent sub-state groups from  developing a 
WMD capability,  including efforts to stop the 
illicit  acquisition  and movement of special 
nuclear  material and associated technology. 
These measures include intelligence and law 
enforcement  activities,  supported by  military 
counter-terrorism  and technical  response 
units,  and also nonproliferation activities that 
would impede transfer  of technical 
information  or  materials to sub-state groups. 
Under the Atomic Energy  Act, the FBI is the 
lead federal  agency  for  investigating  all illegal 
activities involving  the use of nuclear 
materials within  the United States,  including 
terrorist  threats involving  special  nuclear 
materials.  The FBI has its WMD Directorate, 
which  investigates any  known cases involving 
the illicit  procurement and intended use of 
WMD materials. 
The DoE Nuclear  Emergency  Search  Team 
is a  well-established asset  that  supports 
“render  safe” procedures in  addition  to 
providing capability  to search  large areas for 
radiological and nuclear sources. The State 
D e p a r t m e n t w o u l d o v e r s e e a n y  U S 
government support  to a  radiological or 
nuclear  terrorist  incident in  another  nation 
(similar  to its recent  role in  Operation 
TOMODACHI).12  The Army’s 20th Support 
Command and US Special  Operations 
C o m m a n d s u p p o r t  d o m e s t i c  a n d 
international law  enforcement  activities 
(respectively) ,  as wel l as providing 
capabilities to state/local requests for  federal 
assistance in a pre-detonation situation. 
There is a  National Counterterrorism 
Center  and a  National  Counterproliferation 
Center. While the two communities use 
similar intelligence sources and may  be 
looking  at  similar  regions in  the world, they 
a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t . T h e 
counterproliferation  community  largely 
focuses on nation-states and means of 
producing  WMD materials and technology. 
The counterterrorism  community  focuses on 
the people who may  be seeking  WMD 
materials and technology.  Both  communities 
are looking  for  WMD, but  from  different 
perspectives,  using  different agencies and 
different funding. Because of the classified 
nature of intelligence and law  enforcement 
activities, there is not  a  great  deal  of detail 
that  can  be discussed here, other  than  their 
broad missions and objectives.
There are several arms control  measures 
that  attempt  to reduce the proliferation of 
weapons and/or  technology  to other  non-
weapon states. These include the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear  Terrorism  (with 
eighty-two nations as members), G8  global 
partnership (focusing on  nonproliferation 
and combating  terrorism  topics),  United 
Nations Security  Council Resolution  1540 
(which  obligates UN members to enforce laws 
against WMD terrorism), and Global Threat 
Reduction  Initiative  and Global Research 
Reactor  Security  (both  administered by  the 
NNSA) programs. These programs all  require 
the willing consent of partner  nations to 
allow  US agencies into their  countries and to 
undertake the necessary  changes in  their  own 
laws and regulations to secure nuclear 
material and technologies.
The DoD has a  Cooperative Threat 
Reduction  (CTR) program  that  aims to 
increase security  at former  Soviet  Union 
nuclear,  biological,  and chemical weapon 
sites and to support  destruction  of said 
weapons. The Nuclear  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  (NPT) attempts to reduce the number 
of nuclear  weapon-owning  states by 
encouraging  nations not to start  nuclear 
weapon programs,  and to encourage the 
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nuclear  weapon-owning  states to decrease 
their  stockpiles.  However,  the CTR program 
and NPT measures do not directly  address 
the threat  of nuclear  terrorism, other  than  to 
further  limit  the access of nuclear  weapons to 
sub-state actors.
The second mission  area – protect – 
includes those capabilities necessary  to 
secure the homeland against acts of 
terrorism. There are specific  measures 
designed to interrupt  the flow  of special 
nuclear  material  that might be transported 
along  international trade routes.  Probably  the 
most well known  is the Proliferation  Security 
Initiative, a  DoS-led effort  that  relies on 
existing national and international laws to 
interdict  international transportation  of 
weapons and material.  Currently,  the US 
Navy  leads the sea-borne interdiction 
exercises and operations, but there is the 
concept  of air  and ground interception 
capabilities as well.  The Global  Nuclear 
Detection  Architecture (GNDA) is a  DNDO-
led effort  to place radiological  monitors at 
every  border  crossing  point,  airport, seaport, 
and major  city.  The CBP runs the Container 
Security  Initiative,  which works with  partner 
nations to put  radiological monitors and 
processes at  major overseas trading  ports.  In 
addition,  the NRC  works within  the United 
States and with  other nations to foster 
nuclear security at reactor sites. 
The GNDA attempts to develop a  multi-
layered,  international system  that  offers 
multiple opportunities to detect  and intercept 
illicit  trafficking  of radiological and nuclear 
material.  The desire is to intercept the 
material  close to or  at the “point  of origin” 
instead of when  the weapon  is in transit or  at 
its eventual  destination. This effort includes 
support  from  DoD, DoS,  DoE, DHS,  and 
NRC. Because it  is a  “system  of systems,”  it is 
difficult to determine the success of the 
overall  process based on its parts. Similar  to 
the nonproliferation  activities,  GNDA 
requires the willing participation  of US 
partners to be effective. 
The DoE Second Line of Defense program 
aids in  establishing capabilities to detect 
nuclear  and radiological materials in  foreign 
countries at  ports of entry,  border  crossings, 
and other  designated locations.  The DoS 
Export Control  and Related Border Security 
Assistance Program  undertakes similar 
efforts to provide radiation  detection 
capabilities at  border  crossings,  in  particular 
in Eastern Europe.  The CBP uses both 
handheld and portal-based radiation 
monitoring to detect  nuclear  and radiological 
materials entering the United States 
(Container  Security  Initiative and the Secure 
Freight  Initiative).  DOE leads the Megaports 
Initiative (addressing  US-bound cargo from 
other nations’ ports of departure).
The challenge in  executing this ambitious 
effort  is the ability  to sustain  such  a  massive 
architecture and to employ  state-of-the-art 
instruments that  can detect  small amounts of 
special nuclear material, even  if it  is shielded 
or  not  accessible  to visual inspections. DNDO 
has had some technical challenges with  the 
sensitivity  of its current detectors, but 
developing and deploying more sophisticated 
d e t e c t o r s h a s s i g n i f i c a n t  f i n a n c i a l 
implications. In  addition, while DHS has 
been  successful in addressing  the flow  of 
cargo through  most  border crossing points 
and major  seaports, there are many,  many 
other avenues by  which  a  determined sub-
state group could move radiological material 
into the country. 13 
The most significant  question  is this:  at 
what  point  do the federal government’s 
attempts to interdict  radiological and nuclear 
material  become cost-prohibitive? When  is 
the risk-based resourcing decision  made that 
a  certain  level of preparedness is good 
enough? And is that level  acceptable to 
Congress and the public? Those partner 
nations who have major  seaports and airports 
that  move cargo to the United States are very 
sensitive about  the impact  of any  additional 
regulatory  process on  their  economy. 
Inspecting  every  cargo ship  sailing  to the 
United States for  radiological  material costs 
m o n e y . O n  t h e o t h e r  h a n d ,  s o m e 
congressional  politicians have demanded 100 
percent  screening  of all in-bound US cargo 
and personnel to eliminate  any  chance of 
moving a nuclear weapon past the ports. 
The third mission  area  is response to the 
threat, including those capabilities necessary 
to save lives, protect  property  and the 
environment,  and meet basic human needs 
after  an  incident has occurred.  I probably  do 
not need to go into great  detail here,  as many 
are familiar  with  the National Response 
Framework (NRF) and the role of the federal 
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government  here. The NRF has a special 
annex  to address roles and responsibilities 
for  responding  to nuclear/radiological 
incidents. 14 If a  nuclear  weapons event were 
to occur, there would be considerable damage 
as a  result  of the explosive blast  and thermal 
energy,  in  addition to the radioactive release. 
DHS/FEMA  would coordinate the incident 
response,  with DoE and DoD providing 
technical  expertise, special  capabilities,  and 
logistics support. NASA  gets involved if the 
response is for  an  incident involving  the 
failure of a  USG satellite that  is powered by  a 
nuclear  reactor. DHHS would be supporting 
all  medical  response to any  radiological or 
nuclear  incident  with its Strategic  National 
Stockpile and other assets. 
Within its “CBRN Response Enterprise,” 
DoD has more than 18,500  personnel in 
National Guard and active duty  units across 
the nation,  ready  to deploy  in support  of the 
federal response to a  domestic  CBRN 
incident.  In  addition, there would be a 
focused effort on  determining  the origin  of 
nuclear  material through  technical  forensics, 
not only  to attribute the blast  to a  particular 
agent  but  also to attempt to identify  and 
interdict  any  possible additional  nuclear 
threats following  the first  incident.  Both  DoE 
and DoD have nuclear  forensics capabilities. 
DoE supports nuclear  forensics missions 
prior  to a  terrorist nuclear  detonation, while 
DoD focuses on  the post-detonation 
assessment. Other  federal agencies, including 
the DHHS,  EPA, and FBI would be heavily 
involved in  any  response to a  radiological  or 
nuclear incident, all as outlined in the NRF.
Everyone recognizes that  the impact  of a 
10-ki loton  nuclear  device would be 
significant, and that  the state/local 
emergency  responders would be, for all 
practical purposes,  instantly  overwhelmed. 
Much  of the needed support would not be 
technical; rather,  there would be a great 
demand for  medical  response,  security, and 
logistics capabilities. Certainly  radiological 
and nuclear  technical experts would be 
required.  However,  it may  be that  the real 
“value-added”  by  federal agencies would be 
from  the more generic support units, similar 
to what  would arrive in  response to a  major 
natural disaster  event. DoD, in  particular, 
would play  a  significant  role given its ability 
to move and command large numbers of 
personnel in  a  very  short  period of time. The 
scale of destruction  of any  nuclear  detonation 
would certainly  require that  intense 
application of manpower. 
The last  mission  area  – recovery – 
addresses those capabilities necessary  to 
assist  communities affected by  an incident to 
recover  effectively  over  the long-term.  This 
step, identified as Emergency  Support 
Function #14  in  the NRF, is not  specific  to 
nuclear  or  radiological events, but  certainly 
in  such  an  event, the USG  would address 
many  issues required to restore a  community 
back  to pre-incident  status.  Perhaps the most 
significant issue of a  nuclear  or  radiological 
event  would be the time required to fully 
recover  from  the radiological contamination, 
which  could take decades, depending on  the 
particular  isotopes involved. As an  example, 
we can  certainly  look  at  the Japanese efforts 
in  responding  to the challenges involving  the 
recent  Fukushima reactor  melt-down  and 
envision similar  steps with  regard to an 
American  response to any  nuclear  detonation 
within its borders. 
Overall,  the state/local role in  the 
response to a  nuclear  terrorist  incident  is not 
remarkably  different  in  nature than  any  other 
disaster or  incident  response. The “all-
hazards” model presents an effective 
framework by  which  to exercise this 
capability,  with  the obvious need to 
understand exactly  what  technical challenges 
this specific  hazard presents.  It’s not  as if the 
physiological  nature of radioactivity  – 
specifically,  alpha,  beta,  and gamma 
radiation  – has changed within  the last  sixty 
years.  But the desired balance between  the 
long-term  threat of radiological hazards and 
ever-present political desires to minimize 
public risk  need to be clearly  defined and 
addressed.
The real challenges for  state  and local 
emergency  managers include directing 
resource allocation  and prioritization, 
working  with  the federal government,  and 
managing  expectations. The Government 
Accountability  Office has noted that, in 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  r e c o v e r y  p l a n n i n g  i s a 
responsibility  of the state and local 
authorities,  but it’s a  safe bet  that  the states 
and local communities are not  thinking  about 
or  putting  aside funds for  long-term  recovery 
after  a  nuclear  terrorist incident.15 It  is vitally 
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important that state/local authorities work 
with  the federal government  on  what 
measures would be required to address these 
issues in the event of such an incident. 
In  April 2010,  more than  700  personnel 
from  federal,  state and local agencies and the 
private sector  participated in  a five-day 
homeland security  exercise in  Philadelphia. 
The EPA-sponsored exercise, called Liberty 
RadEx, was the largest  drill of its kind to test 
the country’s capability  to clean  up and help 
communities recover  from  a  dirty  bomb 
t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k . T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a 
Department of Environmental Protection  and 
City  of Philadelphia  co-sponsored the drill. 
The participants thought it  was a great 
experience, considering  the size and scope, 
the diversity  of agencies,  and skills of players. 
It offered an  opportunity  for  the state and 
city  to gain  valuable experience on  recovery 
operations,  and several  areas of improvement 
were identified.  This could be a  great  example 
for  other  states and cities to develop their 
recovery  process prior  to the involvement  of 
federal agencies. 
EVALUATING THE POLICY
Despite the repeated warnings of a  nuclear 
terrorist  incident “within  the next  three to 
five years,”  there have in  fact been  no nuclear 
incidents.  There have been  no reported “loose 
nuclear  weapons.”  There are no known 
attempts by  terrorist  groups to build a 
nuclear  weapon. One of the reasons for  this 
current state of affairs is that  having the 
intent to become a  nuclear-weapon-owning 
state is not  the same thing  as having the 
capability  to build and use nuclear  weapons. 
This s tatement  appl ies to terror is t 
organizations even  more than  nation-states 
seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
It is not  easy  to obtain  or  build a  nuclear 
weapon, to determine how  to employ  a 
nuclear weapon, and then transport  the 
device across the oceans without  discovery 
and successfully  detonate it  within  a  city.16 
There are a  number  of significant  steps in 
which  the terrorist group has to be successful 
in  order  to obtain,  move,  and use a  nuclear 
weapon.  As the complexity  of these steps 
increases and more people are involved, the 
footprint  of these groups increases in 
visibility.  This allows the USG a  number of 
opportunities to intercept and defeat  any 
group attempting to obtain  these weapons. 
The more sophisticated the terrorists get  and 
the more casualties they  want  to cause,  the 
easier  it  is to catch  them.  But  since there’s 
always a  very  slim  possibility  that  an 
unconventional  nuclear  event  could happen, 
the US government  has developed a  plan  to 
respond to that contingency. 
It’s clear  that the US government does 
have a  strategy  to counter  unconventional 
nuclear  weapons use in the United States. 
There are numerous federal agencies 
involved in  the preparation  for such  a 
contingency,  and probably  billions of dollars 
spent  each  year  on  their  individual projects. 
But  the important  part  of public  policy  is 
evaluating  the overall success of efforts to 
determine whether changes are necessary  or 
whether the effort  is no longer  needed.  In  this 
case,  the actual metrics of success are 
unclear, if anyone is in  fact  trying  to assess 
the effectiveness of the strategy  at  all.  Part  of 
the difficulty  is that  it  is difficult  to identify 
the actual scope of and monetary  investments 
made in  each area  of the federal efforts,  so it 
is difficult  to state whether  federal 
preparations are in  fact adequate to address 
this particular challenge. 
Another  challenge is that it is very  unclear 
what  the measures of success are.  Some will 
state that the measure of success is “zero 
nuclear  detonations,”  but  it  becomes difficult 
to relate  specific  federal  programs to that 
measure.  That  is to say,  were there no 
terrorist  incidents because all sub-state  group 
efforts were interdicted, or  were there no 
terrorist  incidents because no sub-state 
groups were really  trying? What  is the 
baseline,  if  there are in  fact  no terrorist 
groups actively  attempting  to gain  a  nuclear 
capability? How  do you  determine which 
projects are performing  well and whether 
others are not  value-added? Do we really 
need to equip every  mile of US border,  every 
port  of entry,  and every  city  with  radiation 
monitors? We cannot  afford a  “Fortress 
America”  approach  that  relies on  numerous 
monitors and cargo searches to stop nuclear 
terrorism. 
As national energy  programs become 
more stressed by  competition  for  oil 
resources,  many  countries will look to 
MAURONI, NUCLEAR TERRORISM  9
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 9 (JUNE  2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
nuclear  technologies for  relief,  a  practice 
p e r m i t t e d u n d e r  t h e N u c l e a r 
Nonproliferation  Treaty, as long  as those 
countries aren’t  looking  for  weapons 
technologies and as long as they  allow 
international inspections. While in the past 
we have focused on  nuclear  weapon-owning 
states and sub-state groups, countries 
b u i l d i n g  n u c l e a r  r e a c t o r s b e c o m e 
increasingly  important potential targets to 
monitor as well. 17  This complicates the 
evaluation of the process.  And at  the end,  the 
question  isn’t  just  “how  is the federal 
government  doing  against  nuclear  terrorist 
threats?”  it is “how  is the federal government 
serving  the public in  its efforts to protect  and 
respond to all  hazards?”  It becomes a 
question of cost/benefit.
It’s difficult  to say  what  we as a  country,  at 
the federal and state levels,  should be doing 
better.  It  all depends on  the level of effort 
desired.  In  2003, the Congressional 
Research  Service noted that  there is a  need to 
balance the amount of funding  that  would be 
required to increase security  in  an  effort  to 
ensure “zero nuclear  attacks”  against the 
diversion  of security  personnel and resources 
from  other, more likely  threats.  On the other 
hand,  not  paying enough  attention  to the 
threat  will  have political costs. 18  There 
probably  is a middle ground somewhere, but 
it  is difficult  to articulate what  that middle 
ground is (due to differences of opinion 
b e t w e e n  i n t e r e s t e d p o l i c y  m a k e r s , 
technicians, politicians,  and advocates). For 
instance,  in  2007, the Defense Science Board 
made a  series of recommended actions to 
reduce vulnerabilities to weapons of mass 
destruction  that offered very  high  payoff at 
relative low  cost.  Its report noted, “despite 
the high payoff and low  cost,  the task force 
found no evidence that  these efforts are being 
aggressively pursued.” 19 
As an example of the need to manage 
limited resources against many  threats, let’s 
examine the DHS-sponsored “Securing  the 
Cities”  initiative that  started with  a  pilot 
project  with  the New  York  City’s police 
department.20  Its state and city  emergency 
managers believe they  are at  an  increased 
level  of risk  from  attack by  terrorists, 
including  the potential detonation  of a 
nuclear  weapon. Because the city  lacked the 
funding and expertise to address this kind of 
threat, DHS funded the design, development, 
and deployment of sensitive radiological 
monitors and cameras throughout  the city 
and tested them  in  several exercises.  If this 
pilot  project  were successful,  it  would be 
exported to other cities.
And there’s no question, when  one deploys 
sensitive radiation  monitors all over the city 
and trained operators are actively  looking for 
trace detections of radiological material 
during  an exercise, one can  track  vehicles 
that  may  be carrying  unshielded radioactive 
material  and intercept them.  The theory  is 
sound,  but  it is also costly, assuming  the 
desire is to maintain  this capability  24/7 
throughout  the  year.  And one should 
understand that DHS paid for  the monitors 
and the exercises, not  New  York City.  So after 
a  three-year  effort,  probably  due to the 
exorbitant  cost of the project,21 the decision 
was made to terminate the program  after 
2010 and not expand it to other cities. 
Now  there may  be a  more modest effort 
that  could be sustainable,  where the city 
emergency  responders could deploy  this gear 
for  special security  events,  such  as 
inaugurations or  specific holidays such  as 
New  Year’s Eve.  But sustaining  this extensive 
capability  throughout the year  does not 
appear  to be an  affordable proposition, 
considering  the need to address other 
existing and more probable threats.  However, 
in  2011,  Rep.  Peter  King  (R-NY) sponsored a 
provision to continue and expand the effort. 
The White House has included a request for 
$27  million  for  this program  in the fiscal year 
2012  budget, 22  but  there are many  other 
demands on  DHS along with  projected cuts 
in  its budget.  It  remains unclear  what the 
future of this initiative will  be and when  (if) it 
will eventually end.
CONCLUSION
In  his book Will Terrorists  Go Nuclear? 
Brian M. Jenkins points out how  the threat of 
nuclear  weapons has been exaggerated by 
nuclear  weapon  analysts and political 
officials.  He suggests that  there has not  been 
much attention paid to the reality  that 
terrorists are not  obtaining nuclear 
capabilities, even  though  they  might  have 
“ i n t e n t . ”  H e b e l i e v e s t h e m e d i a 
MAURONI, NUCLEAR TERRORISM  10
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 9 (JUNE  2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
sensationalizes the story  rather  than  being 
skeptical and looking  for  more rational 
discussions on the topic. In  his book,  he 
admits to have focused as a  defense analyst 
on  the relative threat of nuclear  weapons and 
terrorism  in  the 1970s, instead of the 
absolute threat  of nuclear terrorism  in 
comparison  to other, more probable public 
dangers.  He suggests that  the public’s fear  of 
nuclear  terrorism  is not  an  isolated case,  that 
the American public  in particular is 
susceptible to concerns over  the general 
decline and eventual doom  of the larger 
community.  Because of the nature of nuclear 
weapons (cataclysmic, massively  destructive) 
and general fear  of terrorism,  people give into 
their fears and expect the worst to occur.23
As a result of expectations that the federal 
government  should protect  the public against 
the threat  of unconventional nuclear  attacks, 
there is a  federal  strategy  in  place.  This 
strategy  was developed by  a number  of policy 
makers across several  government agencies, 
and is implemented by  specific federal 
agencies with directed agendas and budgets. 
Congress has an  inherent  role in  deciding 
how  much  money  goes to this effort,  in  its 
review  of all  government activities.  There are 
numerous advocates for  developing 
additional measures to reduce the threat  of 
nuclear  terrorism, with varied levels of 
influence.  Further studies of these actors 
would highlight  additional issues and 
challenges to how  the federal  government 
addresses this public policy issue.
The federal government uses a  model of 
“prevent,  protect,  respond, and recover”  to 
implement its counter-nuclear  terrorism 
strategy.  Federal efforts within  prevention 
and protection  are probably  more extensive 
than  the response and recovery, perhaps 
because the public  (and Congress) expects 
the US government  to prevent  nuclear 
terrorist  incidents from  happening, rather 
than  allocating  large amounts of resources for 
responding to a  nuclear  terrorist  incident.  In 
addition,  the prevention/protection  efforts 
require more technical skills and expertise to 
address special nuclear  material  and 
activities of sub-state groups, while the 
response/recovery  phases,  being  more 
general  in  nature (because of the all hazards 
approach),  are already  in  place at  the state 
and local level.
There is a  significant  challenge in  trying  to 
protect  every  aspect  of US territory  from 
terrorists obtaining or  transporting  special 
nuclear  material, largely  due to the sheer size 
of the United States and continued growth  of 
nuclear  technologies across the globe.  There 
have been no specific metrics identified to 
state what  exactly  the US goals are  and if they 
are on  track  or  even  achievable. This is not a 
unique problem  – developing  a  resource-
based strategy  with  measurable goals is 
difficult, and yet  no one wants to be accused 
of doing nothing. So yes,  there is a  significant 
federal  effort  in  place,  but is it  adequate? The 
challenge,  as it is with  all public policy 
discussions,  is identifying  the actors and their 
motivations,  developing  an  agenda and 
legitimizing  the program, getting  the 
program  funded and executed, and finally 
evaluating  the program  to determine whether 
it  is meeting  its goals. Only  then can  we 
determine whether  the policy  has been 
successful  and whether  more needs to be 
done.
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Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism
Reviewed by David Brannan
Paul Shemella, ed., Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism 
(Stanford University Press, 2011).
The attacks of 9/11  resulted in an  inevitable 
landslide of literature on  terrorism. Some of 
it  was good,  much  of it  was not – but all of it 
tried to respond to the initial  and seemingly 
insatiable appetite for  information on 
terrorists. Information  about terrorists was 
suddenly very important to the United States. 
Those aware of what to look for  gravitated 
to resources like Bruce Hoffman’s,  Inside 
Terrorism,  published three years before the 
attack. 1  This work gave the astute  reader  a 
chance to appropriate a s ignif icant 
understanding  of the phenomena.  Hoffman’s 
encyclopedic understanding  of terrorism, 
based on  twenty  years of research,  was then  – 
and remains now  – head and shoulders above 
most commentary on the issue. 
From  a  different  but  still research based 
perspective, Philip B.  Heymann’s Terrorism 
and America framed how  security  policy 
might  be considered in  light  of the terrorist 
threat,2  especially  following  the Oklahoma 
City  Bombing  in  1995  that killed 168  people. 
Students of terrorism  question how  aware 
political decision  makers were of the need for 
careful consideration  of terrorism’s impact 
given  the United States’ action/inaction, 
following  the two nearly  simultaneous East 
Africa  Bombings in  1998,  or  the attack on the 
USS Cole in  which  seventeen  sailors were 
killed as the destroyer  refueled in  the Yemeni 
port in the Gulf of Aden.
What  seemed slow  in  coming immediately 
after  the 9/11  attacks was research-based 
material  that  government decision  makers, 
who appeared to be caught  off guard by  the 
attack  on  our  homeland,  could use to form  a 
coherent  strategy  to fight  back effectively 
against terrorists. While think  tank  research 
from  places like the RAND Corporation, 
funded by  the military  and intelligence 
communities, provided specific  answers to 
terrorism  questions, there was little available 
outside of that  realm. One exception  was 
Christopher Hewitt ’s Understanding 
Terrorism in America,3 which  argued, rather 
convincingly,  that  governments impact 
terrorism  using  traditional law  enforcement 
efforts. While this does not appear  to be a 
groundbreaking insight  at this point, in  2003 
much  of the nation was focused on  purely 
military  responses.  Nearly  ten  years later 
many  now  agree with  Hewitt’s early 
assessment.
Hard-line Likud Party  leader  and now 
two-time Israeli Prime Minister  Benjamin 
Netanyahu  wrote the first edition of Fighting 
Terrorism  in  1995.4  The publisher  quickly 
brought  a  new  edition  of the text  back to the 
market  in  2001  following  the September 
attacks. Though  interesting  as a  primer  on 
the Israeli  experience,  the Palestinian  focus, 
Israeli-specific threat  environment, and a 
completely  different  government  situation 
left  little  for  US policy  makers to take from 
the work. Netanyahu wrote a  foreword trying 
to tie Israeli experience to the events of 9/11, 
but the scale and lack of research-based 
direction made the work  woefully  inadequate 
to the task facing American  policy  makers. 
Importantly, the work was Netanyahu’s 
perspective on  the Israeli experience not  the 
research-based guidance needed at  that 
critical time.
Real  research as the base of counter 
terrorism  and insurgency  strategies was key 
to what  was needed then, and indeed, what  is 
needed now. It is unclear  why  the policy 
community  believed that  research  meeting 
their  needs would immediately  spring  from  a 
government  environment in  which  few 
seemed willing  to recognize that  a post-Cold 
War  conflict  period left US hegemony 
vulnerable to asymmetric  strategies devised 
in  ungoverned and hostile regions. By  2004, 
authoritative commentators on the issue, 
such  as Michael Scheuer  writing under  the 
pseudonym  Anonymous,  warned us in  his 
book,  Imperial Hubris,5  that trusting  our 
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nation’s security  to a  bi-polar  framework  that 
no longer existed was indeed hubris. 
The Center  for  Civil Military  Relations 
(CCMR) at  the Naval Postgraduate School  in 
Monterey,  CA has been  building  US partner 
nation  capacity  in  governments, on  issues 
related to terrorism, since 1994.  Paul 
Shemella  is both  the program  manager  for 
the Combating Terrorism  Fellowship 
Program  at CCMR and the editor  for this 
volume.  Shemella  has put  together  an 
impressive array  of subject  matter  experts 
from  CCMR faculty  to address the question  of 
how  a  government can  “fight  back”  against 
t e r r o r i s m  i n  F i g h t i n g B a c k : W h a t 
Governments Can Do About Terrorism. 
Shemella,  serving as editor  in  the Stanford 
University  series on  security  studies,  weaves 
together  a  three-part framework  to address 
the “complex  problem  of terrorism”  facing 
nations around the world. The first  section  of 
the book deals with  many  of the most 
important concerns governments now  face in 
relation to terrorism.  Serious research-based 
analysis is brought to bear  on six  important 
terrorism  topics, dispelling  unsubstantiated 
claims and giving the reader  a firm  base upon 
which  to build  a  strategy  for  how  to fight 
back. 
In  the June 2008  edition  of Homeland 
Security Affairs,  David Tucker  made the 
argument that the conventional  wisdom  is 
wrong  when  it  comes to terrorism, networks, 
and strategy.  Tucker’s article challenges the 
oft  heard line that, “it  takes a  network  to 
defeat  a network.”  In  Fighting Back, Phil 
Williams addresses both  what Tucker  calls 
the conventional wisdom  and an  argument 
related to Tucker’s 2008  discussion  that 
challenges that “wisdom.”  The chapter  is 
emblematic  of the approach  the book takes 
throughout.  The authors situate their  analysis 
within  the discussions relative to research 
today. By  understanding and presenting  the 
salient aspects of the various approaches, 
Fighting Back equips the reader  to use 
elements from  each  approach  in  constructing 
government strategies to combat terrorism.  
An issue not often  covered in  the literature 
is the threat  of maritime terrorism.  But with 
so much  of the nation’s global  economy 
delivered by  ship this is an  obvious deficit  in 
the literature. Peter  Chalk has long  been  a 
knowledgeable commentator  on  the issue.  In 
this offering,  Chalk makes a  strong  argument 
for  the danger posed in  the maritime domain 
as it relates to the global economy.  Noting the 
al  Qaeda  desire to bleed the US economy,  the 
impressive array  of sources and arguments 
the chapter uses leaves the reader  concerned 
with  this apparent  vulnerability  little 
discussed in  much  of the terrorism  literature. 
Beyond the economic  impact a  maritime 
attack  may  have, the idea  that  cruise ships 
present  a  possible mass casualty  target 
should give pause to a  nation  like the US, 
which is so focused on leisure. 
The book  then turns to government 
responses to terrorism  within  a  realistic  and 
critical framework that argues good 
governance is key  to countering  the terrorist 
threat. While consequence management  is 
appropriately  addressed,  it  does not serve as 
the hermeneutic  for understanding  how  to 
frame the fight.  This framework must  include 
government  capacity,  interagency  decision-
making, and the real “how  to”  of building 
counterterrorism  institutions in  a  balanced 
approach  that considers issues like ethics and 
measuring  effectiveness.  These topics are 
often  left out when  the framework  for 
understanding terrorism  is consequence 
management alone.
The question of ethics in countering 
terrorism  catches some people off guard.  The 
obviously  immoral and unethical actions of 
the terrorist in  targeting  non-combatants 
makes many  see any counter action  as 
ethical. The first question Robert Schoultz, 
the author  of the chapter  discussing  ethics 
asks is,  “Why  fight  ethically?”  The question  is 
i m p o r t a n t  a n d n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y 
straightforward or  easily  understood for 
those who are outside the conflict.  Schoultz 
deals with  all the standard background and 
moral  frameworks for  action in  war  – but 
then  he goes further  and shows the practical 
issues involved.  His argument is couched in 
what  he calls the “honorable warrior”  ethos. 
The series of small vignettes he uses to 
illustrate the various ethical questions are 
powerful and effective. 
The volume’s real  life vignettes also bring 
to mind how  the current  leader of al Qaeda, 
Ayman  al-Zawahiri, has talked about his 
imprisonment  in  Egypt.  In his own words he 
suggests that  the torture carried out  by  the 
Egyptian  government  against  him  helped 
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form  his ideas about how  and why  to carry 
out terrorist  attacks. That  unintended 
consequence of his torture is in  part shaping 
this vicious terrorist  today.  I am  not 
justifying  terrorist  actions; I am  suggesting 
that  Schoultz’s insights on  ethics are not  to be 
taken  lightly  and by  considering our  actions 
we may  avoid unintended consequences. This 
is particularly  poignant given  the recent  Arab 
Spring  destabilization of that  Egyptian 
government,  which  we financed for  many 
years but  now  admit  was brutal and 
dictatorial while at  the same time supported 
US foreign  policy  goals in  the region  vis-à-vis 
Israel.  These are  not  simple  questions and 
the chapter  is a  good guide to thinking 
through the various issues of the day.
Readers of Homeland Security Affairs are 
likely  aware of the impact  interagency 
relationships can  have on  attempts to form 
effective counterterrorism  institutions. Again, 
this book boldly  goes where few  academics 
are able to effectively  tread.  The faculty 
members who put  this work  together have 
extensive experience in  dealing  with  these 
same issues in  the field,  sometimes in  places 
which  where recently  conflict  zones.  The 
models they  propose are relevant  to the US at 
this moment  especially  given  the current 
budget  and economic situation  facing  our 
government  in  particular  and the nation  in 
general. 
The chapter  on  interagency  decision-
making, written  by  Lawrence Cline, suggests 
that  one of the primary  reasons he analyzes 
interagency  communication  difficulties is 
that  “…competing interests can  pose real 
obstacles to coordination  and cooperation.” 
The identification  of the issues is helpful – 
but really  it  is the roadmap to fixing them 
that  should be of the greatest  interest to us. 
Looking  at  real relationship hurdles between 
a g e n c i e s a n d d e p a r t m e n t s l i k e t h e 
Department of Homeland Security,  Federal 
Emergency  Management  Agency, Office of 
the Director  of National Intelligence, the 
National Counterterrorism  Center  and 
various Joint Terrorism  Task Forces allows 
the reader  to deal  with  the real and 
significant issues that  keep us from  being 
effective in  light of Shemella’s previous 
chapter  blueprinting  how  to build effective 
counterterrorism  institutions.  The two 
together  are a  powerful statement  that  should 
be heeded. 
Now  ten years into the post  9/11  reality, 
Fighting Back provides a quality  piece of 
research-based material for  students of 
terrorism  and policy  makers alike. While the 
research  is more substantial  than  I am  able to 
deal with  in  this short  review, each  of the 
topics is essential  and contributes to the 
overall  positive impact  the book  makes. Sure 
to take its place among  other  important and 
enduring  books such  as those mentioned 
above, Shemella  and colleagues have 
answered their  own sub-title  of What 
Government Can Do About Terrorism  – they 
are fighting back. 
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Homeland Security: Advancing the National Strategic Position
Sharon Caudle
ABSTRACT
In March 2011,  President Obama issued 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness  that began a new  chapter in 
the intent and scope of preparedness. To 
better understand the current policy,  this 
article  first chronicles  the decade of 
refinement in preparedness – from  its 
definition to  its  guidance – and then 
describes  a number of emerging policy 
themes. It identifies  policy concerns  for 
federal policymakers  to  consider as  the 
national preparedness  strategic  direction 
continues to advance.  These concerns  are (1) 
the operational approach to  meeting a 
n a t i o n a l p r e p a r e d n e s s  g o a l ; ( 2 ) 
implementation of capabilities  by the “whole 
community”—from  the federal government 
to individual citizens—to address  the 
“maximum  of maximums” threats; (3) the 
inclusion of slowly emerging threats as 
p r i o r i t i e s  f o r a c t i o n i n n e a r - t e r m 
preparedness  strategies; and (4) federal 
control over other governmental levels  in the 
national interest.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2011,  President  Obama  issued 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness.  Its issuance and resulting 
implementation documents affirmed existing 
policy  crafted under  President  George W. 
Bush,  but the directive began  a  new  chapter 
in  the intent and scope of preparedness. 
Preparedness goals, risk assessment, tools, 
programs,  and results expected from  them 
experienced,  to a greater  or  lesser  extent, 
major refinements. To better  understand the 
current policy, this article  first chronicles the 
decade of refinement  in  the definition  of 
national  preparedness, its doctrines,  and 
guidance from  early  framing  under  President 
Bush  to the modifications made under 
President Obama.
Building  on  this history,  the article 
describes a  number  of emerging  policy 
themes and identifies policy  concerns for 
federal  policymakers to consider  as the 
national preparedness strategic  direction 
continues to advance. These concerns are (1) 
the operational  approach  to meeting  a 
n a t i o n a l p r e p a r e d n e s s g o a l ; ( 2 ) 
implementation of capabilities by  the “whole 
community”  – from  the federal  government 
to individual citizens – to address the 
“maximum  of maximums”  threats; (3) the 
inclusion  of slowly  emerging threats as 
p r i o r i t i e s f o r  a c t i o n  i n  n e a r - t e r m 
preparedness strategies; and (4) federal 
control  over  other  governmental levels in  the 
national interest.  At  bottom,  these policy 
concerns have a  common root: whether the 
resources spent  on  the readiness efforts were 
worthwhile.  Going  forward,  more realistic 
assessment of threats and preparedness 
capabilities and the identification  of a  proper 
balance of responsibility  sharing  seem  in 
order.  In addition, appropriate measurement 
a p p r o a c h e s m a y  w e l l b e f o u n d i n 
management  system  standards already  in 
existence.
PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE 
FORMATIVE YEARS
After  the September  2001  terrorist  attacks, 
the federal  government raised terrorism  as 
the primary  domestic  threat. Major  policies 
developments,  the creation of a  new  domestic 
security  department,  and the issuance of a 
specific national homeland security  strategy 
reflected the criticality  of the threat. In  June 
2002,  President  Bush  released Securing the 
Homeland: Strengthening the Nation. 1  The 
president called the terrorist  threat  a 
permanent  national condition  and homeland 
security  a  new  national  calling. The 
document  previewed the first  homeland 
security  national strategy,  intended to be the 
national blueprint  for  confronting  terrorism 
and that  called for  the federal government to 
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partner  with  other  levels of government,  the 
private sector,  and citizens. In  another 
document, the president  presented the 
organizational  structure at  the federal level 
considered best suited to meet  the terrorism 
threat: the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). 2 The Homeland Security  Act  of 2002 
(P.L. 107-296) subsequently  authorized the 
new department.
In  July  2002, the Office  of Homeland 
Security  issued the first  National Strategy 
for Homeland Security. 3  The Strategy 
defined homeland security  as “a  concerted 
national effort  to prevent terrorist attacks 
within  the United States,  reduce America’s 
vulnerability  to terrorism,  and minimize the 
damage and recover  from  attacks that  do 
occur.” 4  Terrorism  prevention,  vulnerability 
reduction,  and minimizing damage and 
recovery  were set as homeland security’s 
strategic  objectives. This initial definition  of 
preparedness carried over  during the 
subsequent  decade. Prevention  meant  action 
at  home and abroad to deter, prevent,  and 
eliminate terrorism.  Reducing vulnerability 
meant  identifying  and protecting  critical 
infrastructure and key  assets, and detecting 
terrorist  threats and augmenting defenses, 
while balancing  the benefits of mitigating  risk 
against economic costs and infringements on 
individual liberty.  Response and recovery 
focused on  managing the consequences of 
attacks and building  and maintaining  the 
financial, legal, and social systems to recover.
THE OVERARCHING GOAL AND POLICY 
AND OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
S t a r t i n g i n  e a r l y  2 0 0 3 ,  t h e B u s h 
Administration  began  issuing  a number  of 
directives and guidance,  thereby  accelerating 
the formation  of a  national  preparedness goal 
and supporting  policy  and operational 
system.  In  February  2003,  the president 
issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5 requiring  a  National  Incident 
Management System  (NIMS) and a  National 
Response Plan.5  The Homeland Security  Act 
of 2002  also required the consolidation of 
existing  federal government  emergency 
response plans into a single national 
response plan. DHS issued the National 
Response Plan in  December  2004,6  which 
was subsequently  replaced by  the National 
Response Framework in January 2008.7
President  Bush’s December  2003  issuance 
of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
8 (HSPD-8) emerged as the major  policy 
development  for  national preparedness.8 
HSPD-8 crafted homeland security’s strategic 
position  as national preparedness for  all 
major events – terrorism, major  disasters, 
and other  domestic  emergencies. It  defined 
preparedness in  terms of planning, 
operations,  and equipment  at  all  levels of 
government  to prevent, respond to,  and 
recover  from  major  events. The directive 
mandated a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal,  established mechanisms 
to advance federal delivery  of preparedness 
assistance to other  governments, and 
described actions to further  improve federal, 
state, and local entity preparedness.
The national preparedness goal was the 
critical policy  requirement in  HSPD-8. The 
goal was to establish  measurable readiness 
priorities and targets, with  the caveat  that 
they  balance the potential threat  and 
emergency  events with  resources. Readiness 
metrics, standards, and a  system  to assess the 
nation’s overall  preparedness to respond to 
major  events emphasized actual  results. 
There was an  emphasis on  assessing  response 
in  comparison  to the objectives of prevention 
and recovery. The fiscal year  2005  DHS 
appropriations legislation  (P.L.  108-234) 
established a statutory  requirement for 
implementing  HSPD-8. The legislation  called 
for nationally  accepted first  responder 
preparedness levels by  January  31,  2005, 
state and local adoption  of national 
preparedness standards in fiscal year  2005  as 
part of federal grant  guidance guidelines,  and 
issuance of national preparedness goal final 
guidance by March 31, 2005.
DHS met the March  2005  deadline with 
the Interim  National Preparedness Goal.9 
DHS stated the Interim Goal enabled the 
nation  to answer: “How  prepared do we need 
to be?”  “How  prepared are we?”  and “How  do 
we prioritize efforts to close the gap?”  The 
Interim  Goal identified fifteen  national 
planning  scenarios and a  target  capabilities 
list  (to accomplish  necessary  preparedness 
tasks in  a  universal  task list)  as two planning 
tools.  The scenarios, issued earlier  in  2004  by 
the Homeland Security  Council, described 
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plausible terrorist  attacks and natural 
disasters intended to stretch  the nation’s 
prevention  and response capabilities for 
events such  as a  nuclear  detonation, 
pandemics,  chemical  and biological attacks,  a 
major hurricane or  earthquake, and a  cyber 
attack.  Collectively,  the scenarios identified a 
complete array of preparedness needs. 10
The target capabilities list identified what 
was necessary  to carry  out critical operations 
and tasks in  response to a  major  disaster  or 
catastrophe based on  the combined planning 
scenarios.  It  was derived from  a  universal 
task list  intended to respond to the planning 
scenario events.  For  example,  an  incident 
management  task included the coordination 
of transportation operations. The Interim 
Goal stated that  such a capability  was to 
provide the means to accomplish  one or  more 
tasks under  specific  conditions and to specific 
performance standards. It  also reflected 
national preparedness as a  continuous cycle 
of activity  to develop the necessary  elements, 
such  as plans, policies,  and equipment,  vital 
to maximize capabilities. The target 
capabilities list set forth  a  set of essential 
capabilities, stated as necessary  in  whole or 
in  part  by  various levels of government to 
carry  out  certain  tasks to prevent, protect 
against, respond to,  and recover  from 
terrorist  attacks and major  disasters. Further, 
the Interim Goal included a  number  of 
national priorities, such  as implementing 
NIMS and the National Response Plan.
The Interim  Goal results were intended to 
be national,  not purely  federal  products,  but 
clearly  governmental. However,  efforts would 
be needed by  all levels of government  and 
between  government and private-sector  and 
nongovernmental organizations to identify 
threats, determine vulnerabilities, and 
identify  required resources,  all part of 
capabilities-based planning and operations.
IMPLEMENTING THE PREPAREDNESS 
GOAL AND FURTHER GOAL UPDATES
With  the issuance of the Interim  Goal, 
implementing  guidance took center  stage, 
expected to solidify  the use of capabilities-
based planning  and related tools. Initial 
guidance was included in  fiscal  year  2005 
homeland security  grant program  guidance. 11 
In  April 2005, the DHS issued the National 
Preparedness  Guidance. 12  This document 
provided a  more detailed explanation  of the 
content and use of capabilities-based 
planning  that  was to support  achievement of 
the interim  goal, including  the national 
planning  scenarios, the universal task list, 
and the target capabilities list.  It  also 
expanded on  the national  priorities, 
standards and strategies for  preparedness 
assessments of capabilities, and included a 
timeline for  HSPD-8  implementation. 
Hurricane Katrina  exposed a  number  of 
preparedness gaps, so Subtitle C of the Post-
Katrina  Emergency  Reform  Act  of 2006 (P.L. 
109-295) continued the call  for  immediate 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f t h e H S P D - 8 
r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  a d d i n g  t o t h e 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f c a p a b i l i t i e s 
development because of legislative mandates.
F i s c a l y e a r  2 0 0 6  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s 
legislation  (P.L. 109-90) called for  DHS to 
issue a  final  national preparedness goal by 
the end of December  2005.  That month, DHS 
issued a  new  draft of the National 
Preparedness  Goal.13  This draft  Goal 
presented the achievement of capabilities as 
the central feature in  the road from 
prevention  to recovery  from  domestic 
incidents.  The draft expanded attention  on 
minimizing  the impact of major  events such 
as was experienced during the major 
hurricanes of 2005.  The DHS defined the 
goal as “to achieve and sustain  risk-based 
target  levels of capability  to prevent, protect 
against,  respond to,  and recover  from  major 
events, and to minimize their  impact on  lives, 
property, and the economy, through 
systematic and prioritized efforts by  federal, 
state, local and tribal  entities, their  private 
and non-governmental partners,  and the 
general  public.” 14 As was the case with  the use 
of target levels of capability  in  the definition 
of the goal, the definition  of preparedness 
was stated as “the range of deliberate,  critical 
tasks and activities necessary  to build, 
sustain, and improve the operational 
capability  to prevent,  protect  against, 
respond to,  and recover  from  domestic 
incidents.” 15  The draft  called again  for  the 
collective efforts at  all levels of government 
and between  government  and private sector 
and nongovernmental  organizations in  a 
collective effort.
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The December  2005  draft Goal further 
delved into the specifics of preparedness. 
Operationally,  for  example, it  meant 
establishing guidelines, protocols, and 
standards for planning, training  and 
exercises, personnel  qualification and 
certification,  equipment  certification,  and 
publication management. The draft  Goal 
reiterated previous policy  and guidance that 
the target  capabilities list  would be the 
primary  source of readiness metrics. 
Standards to assess national preparedness 
collectively  would be found in  the goal and 
the capabilities-based planning tools,  such  as 
the national  planning scenarios and the 
target capabilities list.
In  September 2007,  DHS updated the 
national preparedness goal  and its guidance 
in  the National Preparedness Guidelines.16 
The Guidelines  contained four  critical 
elements.  One was the national  preparedness 
vision, which  the Guidelines  called a  concise 
statement  of the nation’s core preparedness 
goal for  the nation: “a  nation prepared with 
coordinated capabilities to prevent,  protect 
against,  respond to, and recover  from  all 
hazards in  a  way  that  balances risk  with 
resources and need.” 17  Other  elements were 
the national planning  scenarios; the universal 
task list  of some 1,600 unique tasks to 
prevent, protect  against, respond to, and 
recover  from  the major events represented by 
the national  planning  scenarios; and the 
target  capabilities list containing  thirty-seven 
specific capabilities that  communities,  the 
private sector,  and the levels of government 
should collectively  have for  effective disaster 
response.
The DHS stated that the publication of the 
Guidelines  actually  finalized the national goal 
and its related preparedness tools.  The new 
Guidelines  retained a  capabilities-based 
approach  to organize and synchronize 
national efforts in and investments for 
prevention,  protection, response and 
recovery. The Guidelines  also incorporated 
lessons learned from  Hurricane Katrina and a 
2006  review  of states’ and major  cities’ 
emergency  operations and evacuation  plans. 
Readiness metrics remained a  feature of the 
national goal, although  specific  metrics and 
standards remained under development.
A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY
In  October  2007, the Homeland Security 
Council issued a  new  National Strategy for 
Homeland Security. 18 While the first  strategy 
identified terrorism  as the central threat, the 
2007  Strategy  reflected better  understanding 
of terrorist threats and additional risks, what 
it  called the full range of potential 
catastrophic events, including  natural 
disasters,  infectious diseases,  and man-made 
accidents. While the Strategy  said that 
effective preparation for  catastrophic natural 
disasters and man-made disasters was not 
homeland security  per  se, 19 such  preparation 
could increase homeland security.
Consistent  with  earlier  policy  documents, 
the Strategy  presented the bedrock principle 
of a  culture of preparedness and partnership 
that  would share  responsibility  for homeland 
security  across the entire nation  – local, 
tribal, state,  and federal governments, faith-
based and community  organizations,  and 
businesses. Further,  its four objectives 
remained consistent with  earlier  policies: (1) 
prevent and disrupt  terrorist  attacks; (2) 
protect  the American  people,  critical 
infrastructure,  and key  resources; (3) 
respond to and recover  from  incidents that 
do occur; and (4)  continue to strengthen the 
foundation  to ensure long-term  success.  The 
fourth  objective was targeted directly  at 
homeland security  management. The 
Strategy  consistently  stated the importance 
of capabilities to anticipate and handle 
incidents and the need to create and 
institutionalize a  comprehensive homeland 
security  management  system  incorporating 
all stakeholders.
The new  Strategy directly  discussed the 
establishment  and institutionalization  of a 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y 
Management System  that  would build on  the 
planning  and operations detailed in  the 
National  Preparedness Guidelines. The 
System  was to have activity  in  the four  phases 
of (1) guidance (presidential directives and 
other key  policies); (2) planning (family  of 
strategic,  operational and tactical  plans); (3) 
execution of operational  and tactical level 
plans; and (4) assessment  and evaluation  of 
both operations and exercises.
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In  sum, under  President Bush,  combating 
terrorism  within the United States was seen 
as a t ru ly  nat ional ,  not a  federa l , 
responsibi l i ty ,  a l though  the federal 
government  assumed control  of policy  and 
strategy  development,  buttressed with  federal 
grants to states and localities.  In  line with  a 
managing  for  results philosophy, homeland 
security  was to have specific  goals, 
performance targets, and performance 
measures. The emergency  management 
structure would continue its traditional  role 
of anticipating  the aftermath  of any  attack  or 
emergency.
PRESIDENT OBAMA AND 
STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENTS
The change of administrations after  the 2008 
national election  marked a  confirmation  of 
but  continued refinements in national 
homeland security  policies and strategies. 
Shortly  after  taking  office,  President  Obama 
initiated a  study  to examine the organization 
of the White House to deal with  homeland 
security  and counterterrorism.  He stated 
“Homeland Security  is indistinguishable  from 
National Security  – conceptually  and 
functionally,  they  should be thought of 
together  rather  than  separately.”20 The result 
was a new  national security  staff no longer 
divided between  national  security  and 
homeland security. 21 In  February  2010, DHS 
r e l e a s e d t h e l e g i s l a t i v e l y  r e q u i r e d 
Quadrennial Homeland Security  Review 
Report. 22  As was the case with  earlier 
policies,  the Report called for  a  national 
framework of collective efforts and shared 
responsibilities to build and sustain  critical 
homeland security  capabilities. The grave 
security  environment  (beyond terrorism) 
identified in  the Report clearly  supported a 
broader  security  stance: it  was expected that 
violent  extremist  groups would use terrorism 
to attack United States targets, social and/or 
political instability  would continue,  health 
threats would be more difficult  to prevent, 
technological developments and cyber  threats 
would pose threats,  climate  change would 
increase weather-related hazards,  multiple 
simultaneous crises were likely,  and 
complacency  would be a  danger as major 
crises receded from memory.
President  Obama released a  new  National 
Security Strategy that  reflected the 
homeland security  policies and concepts 
identified in  the Quadrennial Review 
Report.23  The Strategy  emphasized that  the 
traditional distinctions between  homeland 
and national  security  was no longer 
appropriate.  The Strategy reaffirmed the 
“whole of government”  approach,  which  is 
the need for  all levels of government, if not 
the entire country,  to strengthen  national 
preparedness.  The Strategy  retained the 
earlier  policy  notions of a  homeland security 
enterprise (federal,  state,  local, tribal, 
territorial,  nongovernmental,  and private-
sector  entities, as well as individuals,  families 
and communities sharing  a  common  national 
interest in  American safety  and security) and 
a culture of preparedness.
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 8
The 2010  Quadrennial Review  Report and 
the newer  National Security Strategy  set  the 
stage for  a  restatement  and revitalization  of 
the presidential direction  for  national 
preparedness.  President  Bush’s 2003 
HSPD-8,  which had been  codified by 
Congress, was replaced by  President Obama’s 
March  2011  Presidential Policy Directive 8 
National Preparedness  (PPD-8).24 The new 
directive reaffirmed past policies and 
direction.  PPD-8 stressed the need for 
systematic preparation  for  the greatest risk, 
the shared preparedness responsibility  from 
government  to the citizen  (“all-of-Nation”), 
and a  capabilities-based approach  to 
preparedness. The directive stipulated the 
development of (1)  a  national  preparedness 
goal  identifying the core capabilities 
necessary  for preparedness and (2)  a  national 
preparedness system  guiding  activities 
enabling the nation  to achieve the goal. 
National preparedness was defined as actions 
taken  to plan, organize, equip,  train, and 
exercise to build and sustain  the capabilities 
necessary  to prevent, protect  against, 
mitigate the effects of,  respond to,  and 
recover  from  the threats posing  the greatest 
risk to the nation’s security.
PPD-8  required that  a  new  national 
preparedness goal  address specific threats 
and vulnerabilities.  This overtly  reduced 
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reliance on  national planning scenarios 
issued several  years earlier  as yardsticks to 
measure preparedness capabilities. The goal 
was to define the core capabilities necessary 
to prepare for  incidents posing  the greatest 
risk  to the nation’s security.  This made 
concrete the new  policy  emphasis on 
maximum  capacity  for  any  major  disaster  or 
c a t a s t r o p h e t h a t w o u l d e m e r g e i n 
implementation efforts.
The directive also mandated a  new  piece 
to the national preparedness system  – 
planning  frameworks for  each  of the five 
preparedness objectives – from  prevention  to 
recovery. It was envisioned that  each 
planning  framework would include a  basic 
plan  to address all-hazards. There would be 
roles and responsibilities at  the federal level, 
but  annexes would address unique 
requirements for  particular  threats or 
scenarios. The directive also required a 
“ c a m p a i g n ”  t o b u i l d a n d s u s t a i n 
preparedness . This would integrate 
community-based, nonprofit,  and private 
sector  preparedness programs,  research  and 
development  activities, and preparedness 
assistance.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPD-8
The DHS has issued a  flurry  of documents in 
response to PPD-8’s mandates. In  May  2011, 
DHS issued the Implementation Plan for 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness.25  The Implementation Plan 
clarified that PPD-8’s reference to “all-of-
Nation” was the same as “whole community,” 
or  the participation  of the private and 
n o n p r o f i t  s e c t o r s ,  i n c l u d i n g 
nongovernmental organizations,  and the 
general  public. The DHS was to perform  a 
strategic,  national-level risk  assessment 
applicable to national,  regional,  and local 
levels. The assessment would help identify 
where core capabilities and associated 
performance objectives for  the entire 
homeland security  community  should be 
placed,  building  the maximum  preparedness 
capacity  needed to respond to a  catastrophic 
event.
Thus, the whole community  is to develop 
core capabilities for incidents posing the 
greatest  risk  to the nation’s security. FEMA 
administrator  Craig  Fugate described the 
change as planning  for a  “meta-scenario”  (or 
“maximum  of maximums”)  disaster.  This was 
a  worst-case scenario based on different 
hazards that challenges preparedness and 
overwhelms the response capabilities of every 
governmental level.26  The scenario, a  no-
notice event,  contemplated the impact area of 
at  least 7  million  population  and 25,000 
square miles,  and involving  several states and 
FEMA  regions. It  results in  190,000 fatalities 
in  its initial hours,  with  265,000  citizens 
requiring emergency  medical attention. 
There i s severe damage to cr i t i ca l 
infrastructure and key  resources, including 
transportation.  The fiscal  year  2011  Regional 
Catastrophic  Grant Program  guidance used 
the meta-scenario to promote preparing  for  a 
catastrophe where extraordinary  levels of 
mass casualties, damage, and disruption 
overwhelm  traditional and well-established 
government  response and recovery  plans and 
procedures.
In  September 2011, DHS issued the 
National Preparedness  Goal First Edition. 27 
The new  Goal included detailed tables with 
core capabilities for  prevention  through 
recovery  (called mission  areas) and their 
preliminary  targets. For  example,  prevention 
capabilities included planning,  public 
information and warning,  operational 
coordination,  forensics and attribution, 
intelligence and information  sharing, 
interdiction  and disruption,  and screening, 
search,  and detection.  Each  capability  was 
described; to illustrate, interdiction  and 
disruption is to delay, divert, intercept,  halt 
apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards.
The document  made clear that  these core 
capabilities presented an  evolution  from  the 
voluminous target capabilities list  developed 
in  response to HSPD-8. The core capability 
targets would be the performance thresholds 
for  each  core capability  and the basis to 
develop performance measures to evaluate 
progress in  meeting  the targets.  The 
description of the core capabilities and their 
preliminary  targets were significantly 
streamlined from  the task and capability  lists 
i ssued in  response to HSPD-8 and 
subsequently  tied to federal homeland 
security  funding. While still prescriptive,  it 
appears the notion  was that streamlining 
should create more room  for  members of the 
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homeland security  community  to craft 
capabilities tailored to local  and regional 
considerations, as well as the national 
interest.
The Goal stated that  a  strategic  national 
risk assessment  should confirm  the need for 
an  all-hazards,  capability-based approach  to 
preparedness planning. The DHS December 
2011  unclassified Strategic National Risk 
Assessment grouped threats and hazards into 
national-level events to test the nation’s 
preparedness. 28  These included natural, 
technological/accidental, and adversarial/
human caused threat and hazard groups:
Natural Animal disease outbreak,  earthquake, flood, human  pandemic 




Biological  food contamination, chemical substance spill or  release, 
dam failure, radiological substance release.
Adversarial or 
Human-Caused
Aircraft  as a  weapon,  armed assault,  biological terrorism  attack 
(non-food), chemical/biological  food contamination  terrorism 
attack,  chemical terrorism  attack (non-food), cyber  attack against 
data,  cyber  attack against  physical infrastructure,  explosives 
terrorism  attack, nuclear  terrorism  attack, radiological  terrorism 
attack.
The Goal did not address slowly  emerging 
threats or  drivers of threats such  as climate 
change identified in  the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review  Report. This was 
purposeful.  The unclassified Strategic 
National Risk  Assessment said it evaluated 
the risk from  known threats and hazards. 
Those events,  it  noted, had a  distinct 
beginning  and end and were clearly  linked to 
homeland security  missions.  Thus, political, 
economic,  and environmental,  and societal 
trends possibly  contributing  to a  risk 
environment but  not national events for 
homeland security  were excluded from  the 
assessment. Nevertheless, the document said 
non-national-level  threats,  such as droughts 
and heat waves,  could pose risks to 
jurisdictions and should be considered in 
preparedness planning.
In  November  2011,  DHS released a  brief 
description of a  new  National Preparedness 
System. 29  Its components included (1) 
identifying  and assessing risk,  (2) estimating 
capability  requirements, (3)  building  and 
sustaining capabilities,  (4) planning to 
d e l i v e r c a p a b i l i t i e s , ( 5 ) v a l i d a t i n g 
capabilities, and (6)  reviewing  and updating. 
To identify  and assess risk, the System 
document stated that the Strategic  National 
Risk  Assessment would analyze the greatest 
risks to the nation.  The Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk  Assessment guidance 
under  development  at  that  time would 
provide a  common, consistent  approach  to 
identify  and assess risks and associated 
impacts.
Measuring progress toward achieving the 
National Preparedness Goal could be done 
through  tools such as exercises,  remedial 
a c t i o n  m a n a g e m e n t p r o g r a m s , a n d 
assessments.  The National Exercise Program 
was deemed the principal mechanism  to 
measure readiness, supplemented by 
exercises done by  individual organizations. 
Training  and performance during actual 
events would test  and validate achievement 
of desired capabilities.  Ongoing  sharing  of 
lessons learned and monitoring also would 
occur  through  a  remedial action management 
program  and a  comprehensive assessment 
system  of the whole community.  A  National 
Preparedness  Report  was targeted for 
November 2012.
On March  6,  2012,  the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency  (FEMA) released draft 
national framework documents for  comment. 
The working  drafts included the National 
Prevention Framework,  the National 
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Protection Framework ,  the National 
Mitigation Framework,  and the National 
Response Framework. These documents 
briefly  described factors such  as stakeholder 
roles and responsibilities and coordinating 
structures to deliver  core capabilities. The 
J a n u a r y  2 0 0 8  N a t i o n a l R e s p o n s e 
Framework  will  be superseded once the new 
framework is finalized. Comments on  the 
drafts were due to FEMA no later  than  April 
2, 2012. FEMA  had already  released the 
National Disaster Recovery Framework  in 
September  2011. This framework  replaced 
the existing  National Response Framework’s 
Emergency  Support Function #14—Long 
Term  Community  Recovery.30  FEMA  also 
released a  draft  of the Recovery Interagency 
Operational Plan  intended to implement the 
already  published National Disaster 
Recovery Framework. The detailed draft 
specifically  covered items such  as the concept 
of operations for  federal recovery  support  to 
stakeholders and maintaining readiness.
CONCERNS IN STRATEGY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION
In  sum, national preparedness has been  the 
subject  of a significant  amount of Presidential 
and Congressional attention and direction 
since September  2001. Perhaps lost  in the 
detail is a  number of broad policy  themes 
running through  the refinement  in  the 
national preparedness strategic direction  to 
this point in time. These include:
• Homeland security  – previously  a 
domestic focus – is placed within  national 
security.  The federal government, 
particularly  the Federal  Emergency 
Management Agency,  is established as the 
lead for  national preparedness policy  and 
guidance.
• Preparedness is defined with  the full 
coverage of objectives: prevention, 
protection,  mitigation, response, and 
recovery, with  response and recovery  no 
longer the centerpieces of preparedness.
• The full range of potential  catastrophic 
events,  including natural disasters, 
infectious diseases, and man-made 
accidents join  terrorism  as the focus for 
homeland security.  Known  threats with  a 
distinct  beginning  and end are central to 
homeland security  risk management  and 
preparedness. Slowly  emerging  threats 
are not an initial emphasis. 
• Maximum  capacity  for  a  catastrophic 
event  (a meta-scenario) is set  as the 
benchmark for  preparedness,  replacing  a 
more generic “major  disaster”  on  a  local 
or regional level.
• The whole homeland security  community 
has the responsibility  to protect  national 
interests and way  of life, anticipating  that 
all  levels of government  will be initially 
overwhelmed. Core capabilities and 
targets for  a  national effort update  past 
prescriptive,  detailed individual tasks and 
target capabilities.
• A  homeland security  management  system 
detailed to accomplish  homeland security 
and crafted with  planning frameworks, 
p e r f o r m a n c e e x p e c t a t i o n s , a n d 
a s s e s s m e n t  a n d a d j u s t m e n t 
requirements. Measurable readiness 
priorities and targets to be developed and 
assessed,  primarily  through  exercises and 
actual events.
National preparedness policy  certainly  is 
not static: refinements will  continue as the 
newer  national preparedness directives and 
operational  guidance are implemented and 
others are issued.  There are three concerns 
that  federal policymakers might consider  as 
the national  preparedness strategic  direction 
continues to advance.  These are (1) the 
operational  approach  to meeting a  national 
preparedness goal; (2) implementation of 
capabilities by  the “whole community”  – 
from  the federal government  to individual 
citizens – to address the “maximum  of 
maximums” threats; and (3) the inclusion of 
slowly  emerging  threats as priorities for 
action in near-term preparedness strategies.
ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT 
CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACH
T h e c u r r e n t a n d e a r l i e r  n a t i o n a l 
preparedness goals and their  implementing 
documents,  as well  as federal legislation, 
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have identified the need to build and sustain 
specific preparedness capabilities for  the 
entire homeland security  community. 
Federal, state,  and local  governments, 
nongovernmental organizations,  private 
organizations,  and the general public are that 
community.  National preparedness comes 
from  capabi l i t ies across this whole 
community.  The DHS in  large part adopted 
the capabilities approach  (used by  the 
defense community  in  many  countries)  from 
the Department of Defense.31  HSPD-8 
required a  national preparedness goal  to 
define measurable  readiness (preparedness) 
priorities and targets,  but  also with  a  caveat 
about  the resource investments.  PPD-8 called 
for  actions to achieve a  preparedness 
approach  to optimize the use of available 
resources.
Developing capabilities may  have been  the 
optimal route at that time toward achieving 
preparedness, but  whether other  alternatives 
that  were better  investments were considered 
was not  made explicit – if,  in  fact,  they  were 
even  considered. The DHS has provided 
billions in  preparedness grants intended to 
aid states, urban  areas, tribal  governments, 
and nonprofit  organizations,  supposedly  to 
strengthen  their  capabilities to meet  threats 
associated with  potential  terrorist attacks and 
other hazards.  Over  time, the department  has 
attempted to link dollars spent  with  the 
development of capabilities.32
However,  whether this approach has been 
or  will be successful  is unclear,  as assessing 
preparedness based on  national preparedness 
capabilities remains very  elusive. Summing 
t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h e G o v e r n m e n t 
Accountability  Office (GAO) found that 
evaluation  efforts that collected data  on 
national preparedness capabilities faced 
limitations such  as data  reliability  and the 
lack  of standardized data  collection.33 
According  to GAO, FEMA had problems in 
completing a  comprehensive assessment 
system  and developing national preparedness 
capability  requirements based on established 
metrics. The GAO continues to cite  these 
operational  and implementation  weaknesses, 
even  though  the assessment  of capabilities 
and evaluation of preparedness is a  legislative 
requirement. 34  Concerns have also surfaced 
in  the defense community  regarding 
measuring  capabilities and their  results.  For 
example, an article in  2007  described 
significant ambiguity  in  the definition of 
capability  and its use.35  In a  similar  vein, 
another report  in  2011  stated that  no one had 
been  able to adequately  create analytical tools 
t o q u a n t i f y  c a p a b i l i t y  t o c o m p a r e 
effectiveness with “units of capability.” 36
In  addition,  GAO specifically  found 
problems with  at least  one tool  mentioned by 
the new  National Preparedness Goal as 
central  to measuring progress – the National 
E x e r c i s e P r o g r a m .37  T h e F E M A 
implementation of the national program  has 
run  consistently  into problems, such  as 
ensuring  that  federal and state governments 
addressed deficiencies identified by  the 
exercises.  In  March  2011, FEMA  developed a 
new  National Exercise Program  Base Plan 
that  extensively  revised the program, with 
major  changes in  requirements and 
leadership. 38 The verdict is still out  whether 
the past  history  of the DHS in  failing to 
adequately  measure progress will be 
reversed.
Thus, still  left  unanswered is the most 
significant question: What preparedness did 
the billions of dollars buy? With  federal 
funding constraints and similar  challenges 
for  other  levels of government  and other 
members o f the homeland secur i ty 
community  for  the foreseeable future, this is 
an  opportune time to consider  if other  policy 
options might be more cost  effective or, at  a 
minimum,  justify  the current policy  of 
capabilities development and sustainability.
The capabilities approach is not  etched in 
stone. There is at  least  one policy  option the 
federal  policymakers might  consider to 
contrast  with  the capabilities approach. This 
option  is grounded already  in  Congressional 
legislation  and administration  policies. 
Simply,  it  is the application  of national  and/
or  international  management system 
preparedness standards useful  for  all 
organizations. This approach  has been 
advocated in the past. 39
Two national  voluntary  programs use 
management  system  preparedness standards, 
not elusive core capabilities, as the 
benchmark for  preparedness requirements. 
Legislation  implementing  many  of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations (Section  524 
of the August  2007  P.L. 110-53) called for 
DHS to create a  voluntary  private sector 
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preparedness program  with  standards, 
including  accreditation  and certification 
processes.  In  June 2010,  DHS produced the 
Private Sector  Preparedness Accreditation 
and Certification  Program  (PS-Prep).  Three 
management  system  standards were 
approved for  adoption  in  the program: ASIS 
SPC.1-2009  Organizational Resilience: 
Security Preparedness,  and Continuity 
Management System; British  Standard 
2 5 9 9 9 - 2 : 2 0 0 7  B u s i n e s s  C o n t i n u i t y 
Management; and National  Fire Protection 
Association  1600: 2007/2010 Standard on 
Disaster/ Emergency  Management and 
Business  Continuity Programs.  At the end of 
September  2010, DHS announced a 
certification  program  tailored to the needs of 
small business.
T h e o t h e r  n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  u s i n g 
management  system  standards is the  current 
Emergency  Management  Accreditation 
Program  (EMAP),  a  voluntary  review  process 
for  state and local emergency  management 
programs. EMAP certifies government 
programs against  standards directly  based on 
NFPA  1600. State and local  entities can  use 
federal  homeland security  grant  funding to 
pay  for  EMAP activities.  Interestingly, at one 
time, FEMA used the EMAP standards to 
administer  its National  Emergency  Baseline 
Capability  Assurance Program. If there truly 
were to be a  “whole of community”  effort, it 
would seem  to be a necessary  condition  to 
have a compatible approach  for  all the 
entities involved.
Still to be resolved would be whether 
adoption of the management  system 
preparedness standards should be mandated, 
perhaps t ied to federal funding or 
regulations,  and how  certification  or 
accreditation  against  the standards would be 
conducted. Normally,  management system 
standards such  as those under  the PS-Prep 
program  or  EMAP are voluntary, although 
compliance with  such  standards may  be seen 
as part  of a  legal standard of care across an 
industry.
Government agencies such as DHS could 
implicitly  mandate standards by  using  them 
as guidelines for  complying  with  regulatory 
requirements. Or  the agencies may  forego a 
mandatory  regulation  if they  view  voluntary 
compliance as meeting policy  goals. This 
seems to be the legislative and executive 
branch  approach  taken  with  the PS-Prep 
voluntary  standards for  the private sector. 
Established provisions can be invoked for 
mandatory  adoption  as part  of national 
regulatory  frameworks or  legislation.  The 
N a t i o n a l T e c h n o l o g y  T r a n s f e r  a n d 
Advancement  Act  of 1995  and resulting  Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular 
A-119  (revised in  1998) mandated that  federal 
agencies use management system  standards 
developed by  either  domestic or  international 
standards bodies instead of federal 
government-unique standards (e.g.,  the 
National Preparedness Goal) in  their 
regulatory or procurement activities.
To date, DHS has not publicly  addressed 
how  the management  system  standard 
voluntary  program  is to be reconciled, if at 
all, with building  and sustaining  core 
capabilities.  At  a  minimum,  metrics 
identified as part  of implementing  the 
National  Preparedness Goal should be 
compared to those in  PSPrep and the EMAP 
standards. 
IMPLEMENTING WHOLE COMMUNITY 
EFFORTS FOR THE MAXIMUM OF 
MAXIMUMS
A  s e c o n d c o n c e r n  i s r e a l i s t i c a l l y 
implementing  a  whole community  effort in 
anticipation  of a  maximum  of maximums 
effort. In June 2011  testimony, FEMA 
Administrator  Fugate stated that emergency 
management  historically  planned for 
scenarios to which  government could 
respond and recover  from.40 He testified that 
modern  disaster planning  should be for  a 
“ m e t a - s c e n a r i o ” ( o r  “ m a x i m u m  o f 
maximums” event)  destined to overwhelm  all 
levels of government. Such  worst-case 
planning  would require the efforts of a  whole 
community  approach  intended to leverage 
the expertise and resources of governmental 
and non-governmental stakeholders—the 
entire emergency  management  community 
from  the federal government to individuals, 
families, and communities.  This philosophy 
was further  defined in  FEMA’s A Whole 
Community Approach to  Emergency 
Management: Principles, Themes,  and 
Pathways for Action.41
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The emphasis on  shared responsibility  and 
coordination  in  the whole community 
concept reaffirms past  policies.  President 
Bush’s June 2002  proposal  to create DHS 
expressed hope that the agency  would make 
state, local, and private sector  coordination 
one of its “key  components.” 42  The 2002 
National Strategy for Homeland Security 
viewed homeland security  as a  concerted 
national effort.  The approach  was based on 
shared responsibility  and partnership 
involving  the Congress, state and local 
governments, the private sector, and the 
American  people in  a  concerted national 
effort to prevent attacks. 43
The draft  national planning frameworks 
are very  general  in  their  discussion  of the 
roles and interactions of the whole 
community  to achieve capability  targets and 
what scarce resources practically  can  be 
expected for investment. Presumably,  explicit 
guidance will await  finalization  of the 
National Preparedness System  and the 
p l a n n i n g  f r a m e w o r k s a n d t h e i r 
implementation  plans. For  example, the 
National Disaster  Recovery  Framework  and 
the draft  Recovery Interagency Operational 
Plan are explicit  in  terms of requirements 
and hierarchy, but  not  the practical issue of 
funding and the sharing of resources within 
and across stakeholders from  the government 
to the individual citizen.
However,  is it  realistic  to root  whole 
community  preparedness in anticipation  of a 
truly  mega-disaster  scenario? A  mega-
disaster  is a  very  high bar for the initial  and 
ongoing  investment in  preparedness core 
capabilities defined in  the National 
Preparedness  Goal and draft  national 
planning  frameworks. All homeland security 
actors must anticipate and be ready  for  a  “no-
notice”  catastrophe much more severe than 
virtually  all past major  disasters in the United 
States, including  Hurricane Katrina, the 1964 
Alaska  earthquake and tsunami,  or  the 1993 
eastern  and central superstorm.  A  mega-
disaster, under FEMA’s criteria, would be 
akin  to “no notice”  devastating  earthquakes, 
tsunamis,  and volcanic eruptions that  killed 
or  injured hundreds of thousands and leveled 
cities. A  nuclear  event  in  a  major urban  area 
or  a fast-moving  worldwide pandemic also 
would overwhelm  immediate response and 
recovery for a good length of time.
It is not clear how  the federal  government 
can  direct and pragmatically  facilitate  the 
crafting  and sustaining  of capabilities across 
the whole community  necessary  for  a  mega-
disaster  with  these levels of devastation  going 
forward. Preparing for a  mega-disaster 
appears to run  counter  to the professed 
emphasis on  risk management  and setting 
priorities for  preparedness,  not  a  worst-case 
scenario for  the  entire nation  to anticipate.  It 
well  may  be that emergency  managers will 
actually  scale the requirements to a  more 
convincing  expectation. For  example, 
Northeast  emergency  managers have posited 
the following possible mega-disasters:44
• A  6.5  earthquake striking  a  heavily 
populated urban  area causing  billions of 
dollars in damage and killing hundreds,
• A  category  3  hurricane making  landfall 
over  Long  Island, NY and tracking  up 
through  New  England killing  hundreds 
and causing billions of dollars in damage.
• An F5  tornado striking  a  heavily 
populated area killing  a  thousand people 
and causing  hundreds of millions in 
damage.
• A  major  blizzard hitting  the Northeast 
during  a  heavy  rush  hour  commute with 
over  fifty  inches of snow  and hurricane 
force winds causing  billions of dollars in 
damage along  the coast,  widespread 
extended power  outages and stranding 
thousands.
EMERGING THREAT PRIORITIES
A  third concern in  the strategic direction  is 
addressing threats that are slowly  emerging 
as a  direct  threat to national security.  Among 
other  things,  the September  2010 Local, 
State,  Tribal,  and Federal Preparedness Task 
Force report  to Congress called for  (1) 
improving  the ability  to strategically  forecast 
emerging  preparedness requirements and 
associated policies and/or  capabilities and (2) 
develop a strategic policy  planning process 
that  prepares for  future challenges by 
performing  long-range assessments.45  The 
Task Force said that the complexity  of the 
envisioned homeland security  and emergency 
management  enterprise, especially  in terms 
of non-governmental roles,  means that 
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desired preparedness outcomes often  may 
take years to achieve.  In  their  view, a  range of 
dynamic  issues – such  as the environment, 
demographics,  economics,  and health  trends 
– are likely  to play  increasingly  important 
roles. Preparedness policies,  therefore, 
should be anticipatory,  not  reactionary, 
enabling  anticipatory  investments in  key 
areas.
As mentioned earlier,  the hazards listed in 
the National Preparedness Goal reference 
well-known, specific event  hazards and 
attacks determined by  the current  Strategic 
National Risk Assessment.  However, the 
current  National Security Strategy  and 
Quadrennial Homeland Security  Review 
Report explicitly  define a  strategic threat 
environment  and global trends that appear  to 
have national preparedness implications, 
although  they  are not described as imminent. 
These include the gradual  emergencies and 
disasters that  result  from  dependence upon 
fossil fuels,  global climate change,  fragile and 
failing  states,  and global illicit trafficking  and 
related transnational crime,  and economic 
and financial instability.
A  2009  article on  national  security 
strategies presented drivers of changes in 
security  on a  national  and global  scale,  such 
as pandemics,  population  changes,  and 
economic  stress.46  These drivers translate 
into threats to security,  whether  individually 
or  collectively,  which countries have 
incorporated into their  strategies. In  other 
countries, the security  environment  includes 
these longer-term  threats. In general, their 
national security  strategies (including those 
covering homeland security  or  domestic 
security) incorporate them  into the strategies 
and follow-on policy  and operational 
requirements and guidance. For  example, 
climate change or environmental change pose 
dangers that may  occur  on  a national or 
global scale,  such as more frequent  heat 
waves, droughts,  flooding, reduced crop 
yields, and wildfires.47
The National Preparedness Goal and 
supporting  documents target  building and 
sustaining  capabilities narrowly  for  the near 
term  threat of a  meta-scenario. It  is not  clear 
how  these capabilities will  prepare the 
country  for  the challenges of the longer-term, 
slowly  emerging threats.  Certainly  past 
history  is informative: flooding  and famines 
because of drought  and crop failure have 
killed millions worldwide.
There have been  a multitude of studies on 
t h e s e d r i v e r s o r  c h a n g e s w i t h 
recommendations for  immediate action.  The 
Organization  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and 
Development (OECD) presented an  analysis 
of “global  shocks”  – cascading risks that 
become active threats as they  spread across 
global systems. 48 These included pandemics, 
financial  crises,  critical infrastructure 
disruption,  and cyber  risks,  geomagnetic 
storms, and social unrest. As the OECD study 
pointed out,  surveillance is central to risk 
assessment and management.  In  addition, 
security  agencies,  working  with  regulatory 
agencies, should use, adapt, and implement 
risk-assessment  tools to design  more resilient 
national and international systems. 
Emergency  management  of future global 
shocks,  OECD said,  called for  policy  options 
such  as (1)  surveillance and early  warning 
systems, (2) strategic  reserves and stockpiles 
of critical resources,  (3) addressing where 
countermeasures to systemic threats have 
been  weak,  and (4) monitoring  of future 
developments that  could pose potential  risks. 
OECD cited challenges such  as insufficient 
skills and knowledge to manage global  shocks 
and obstacles to international cooperation 
and coordination.
The DHS certainly  understands the need 
for  action anticipating these global  shocks. 
The FEMA  Strategic  Foresight  Initiative, 
initiated in  2010,  emphasizes the importance 
of understanding and addressing  the drivers 
of future change.49  The FEMA  urges the 
emergency  management  community  to 
establish  a  foresight capability  – identifying 
key  future  issues, trends,  and other  factors 
with  an eye to executing  an agenda for  action 
over  the next  twenty  years. Not surprisingly, 
FEMA  identifies well-known  drivers – 
universal  access to and use of information, 
technological  innovation and dependency, 
shifting US demographics, climate change, 
global interdependencies and globalization, 
government  budget  constraints, critical 
infrastructure deterioration,  and the evolving 
terrorist  threat. The FEMA  study  says that 
through  the foresight  process,  over  the next 
few  decades,  very  rapid change and 
complexity  will  define the emergency 
management  environment.  FEMA  says that 
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even  slow-moving  and predictable  trends 
such  as demographic changes could be 
radically  changed because of drivers such as 
climate change or pandemics.
FEMA  sees a  number  of emergency 
management  capabilities as needed as part  of 
strategic  foresight  that  could be included in 
preparedness efforts.  For  example, these 
i n c l u d e a d d r e s s i n g d y n a m i c  a n d 
unprecedented shifts in local and regional 
population  characteristics and migratory 
flows; anticipating  emerging challenges and 
d e v e l o p i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e p l a n s a n d 
contingencies; employing  alternative surge 
models to meet  the challenging confluences 
of social,  technological,  environmental, 
economic, and polit ical factors and 
conditions; and remediating hidden 
vulnerabilities in  critical supplies from  water 
to energy  to medical products to offset 
threats to the full scope of emergency 
management activities.
FEDERAL CONTROL OVER OTHER 
GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS FOR THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST
A  fourth area  of concern that overarches the 
other three is the stated importance and 
needed leadership of the whole homeland 
security  community  and the actual federal 
control  over  other  levels of government.  An 
article discussing  federalism  and homeland 
security  noted that  the September  2001 
terrorist  attacks created a  high  demand for 
national  homeland security  policy  and 
action.50 The many  federal homeland security 
directives,  mandates,  and grant compliance 
requirements have framed and centralized 
control  of the national homeland security 
agenda,  even  if there was collaboration in  the 
development with  selected state and local 
officials. Hurricane Katrina  presented 
another opportunity  for  an  expanded federal 
government  role in  disasters because of the 
failures of individual agencies and weak 
intergovernmental collaboration.
As a  result,  it  is difficult to find the 
appropriate balance between  federal  control 
over  the national  interest and its objectives 
and local flexibility  and discretion  under 
federalism. The homeland security  links 
between  the broadened national security 
strategy  and national  preparedness goal  and 
then  state and local  support  depend on  state 
and local  implementation  of the national 
direct ion. At  present ,  the National 
Preparedness  Goal and its supporting 
documents have limited language about  state 
and local flexibility  and the meeting  of 
specific and direct  state and local interests. 
The streamlining of lists of core capabilities 
and their  preliminary  targets is encouraging, 
but  federal approval  of state and local 
implementation will be the proof if state and 
local jurisdictions can  craft capabilities 
responsive to their  needs as well as what  is 
seen as the national interest. This will  be a 
continuing  concern  as budget  decisions 
consider  fiscal austerity  and the funding 
needed to build and sustain  preparedness 
capabilities for a mega-disaster.
CONCLUSION
The September  2010 Local, State, Tribal,  and 
Federal Preparedness Task Force report 
commissioned by  Congress underscored the 
importance of preparedness as a  major  policy 
agenda,  but  also warned of the central 
difficulty. The Task Force determined, 
The basic tenets of preparedness…are 
relatively  uncontroversial  within both the 
emergency  management discipline and 
homeland security policy. What has 
c h a n g e d i s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t 
preparedness can  be only  as  effective as the 
goals  and priorities  for readiness. The 
challenge is  determining what our 
readiness goals and priorities should be, 
from which preparedness activities  are 
subsequently derived and then  measured 
against.51
Over  the past  decade, the federal 
government  has done much  to determine 
national preparedness or  readiness goals and 
priorities.  In  the next  decade of homeland 
security  as part  of national  security,  the 
t h r e a t  e n v i r o n m e n t – t h e s e c u r i t y 
environment  – is somewhat known,  but also 
uncertain. New  threats may  emerge and 
others wane. The larger  social and economic 
environment,  such  as fiscal austerity  and 
demographic  changes create instability  in 
what can, and should be done. 
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PPD-8  emphasizes the vital role of 
preparedness in  protecting  the nation, its 
people, its vital interests, and its way  of life. 
Preparedness on the part  of all members of 
the homeland security  community  in this 
national endeavor should be done in  ways 
that  emphasize the principles of clarity, 
sustainability,  integration,  balance,  and 
accountability.  This article suggests that 
federal  policymakers,  in  concert  with  others 
with  preparedness responsibilities, should 
consider  refinements in  a  number  of 
fundamental policy  areas that  are  in  line with 
these principles. 
Preparedness expectations to meet  all 
threats – whether  imminent or  slowly 
emerging  – should be clear.  Common  sense 
s h o u l d r e i g n . E x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t 
sustainability  of funding  to meet  whole of 
community  preparedness for  a  mega-disaster 
must  consider  and then reflect  the reality  of 
funding – whether  from  governmental  or 
other  sources. Even apart  from  funding, 
preparedness principles and activities should 
be seamlessly  integrated into ongoing 
programs and business processes, such  as the 
adoption  of management system  standards. 
Balance should be applied in  assessing  the 
costs and benefits of preparedness and 
required capabilities and their  impact  on 
n o n - p r e p a r e d n e s s g o a l s . L a s t l y , 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  c a l l s f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g 
preparedness accountabi l i ty  points , 
performance goals,  and measures reflective of 
the national  interest,  yet  also local flexibility 
and discretion within our federalist system.
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How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure 
Risk
Eric F. Taquechel and Ted G. Lewis
ABSTRACT
We propose a definition of critical 
infrastructure deterrence and develop a 
methodology to explicitly quantify the 
deterrent effects of critical infrastructure 
security strategies.  We leverage historical 
work on analyzing deterrence,  game theory 
and utility theory. Our methodology 
quantifies deterrence as the extent to  which 
an attacker’s expected utility from an 
infrastructure attack  changes  after a 
defender has  invested to deter attacks, as 
compared to their expected utility  absent 
deterrence.  We derive expected utilities  from 
a modified game theory approach, which 
uses probabilistic utility functions,  wherein 
utility  function probabilities are functions  of 
investment.  We vary these functions  based 
on different information availability 
assumptions  (e.g., perfect vs imperfect 
attacker information). We produce evidence 
that it is quantifiably more  advantageous to 
overtly deter, rather than conceal security 
information,  under specific conditions.  We 
also leverage these utility  functions to 
determine  the unconditional risk to  a 
defender if deterrence strategies  fail,  and we 
determine cost efficiency of those strategies. 
INTRODUCTION
DHS policy  advocates investing  in critical 
infrastructure (CI) protection to deter 
t e r r o r i s t  a t t a c k s . 1  T h e N a t i o n a l 
Infrastructure Protection Plan is replete with 
references to deterrence,  most  notably  on 
page 38: “account for  the adversary’s ability 
to recognize the target  and the deterrence 
value of existing  security  measures.”  Also, 
Homeland Security  Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 7  emphasizes deterrence of CI 
attacks.2  Since DHS also advocates 
quantitative terrorism  risk analysis,  to 
support  the goal to deter  attacks, DHS would 
benefit  from  a  methodology  to quantify  the 
deterrence value of CI terrorism  risk 
reduction  investments in  a  way  that 
complements and enhances exist ing 
traditional approaches to risk analysis.  Also, 
DHS would benefit from  a  working  definition 
of CI deterrence,  the lack of which  is 
identified by Morral and Jackson.3 
Given  this policy  context,  various elements 
within  DHS have begun  efforts to analyze 
deterrence,  or  influence adversary  decision-
making  before a  CI attack is executed. This 
necessarily  involves considering human 
factors; specifically, thinking  about  the 
adversary’s approach  to terrorism  planning. 
For example,  the US Coast Guard,  in 
conjunction with  the University  of Southern 
California’s Center  for  Risk  and Economic 
Analysis of Terrorism  Events (CREATE),  has 
begun  the development  of PROTECT,  a 
model intended to help Coast Guard units 
deter  adversary  planning by  patrolling CI in  a 
random  fashion.4  Recent  work  at  the Naval 
Postgraduate School  in  Monterey, CA  has 
produced a  model  that measures the 
resiliency  of supply  chains,  accounting for 
perceived attacker preferences for disrupting 
a  supply  chain  and increasing  commodity 
shipment costs.5  Additionally, DHS Science 
and Technology  (S&T) recently  undertook a 
r e v i e w  o f m u l t i p l e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
approaches to enhancing  traditional risk 
analysis by  incorporating  insights from 
intelligent adversary  modeling,  which 
accounts for adversary planning and goals.6  
While  well intentioned and promising, 
these efforts do not explicitly  quantify 
deterrence in  the context of critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) or  explain 
how  to incorporate measurable deterrence 
into CIP risk  equations to show  the CI risk 
reduction effects of deterrence.7  If DHS 
components are to implement  policies to 
deter  attacks, eventually  they  may  be asked to 
account to Congress on  how  they  are 
measuring  the effect iveness of that 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  a n d h o w  t h a t 
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implementation plays with  traditional risk 
reduction.  At  present, some DHS agencies 
such  as the US Coast  Guard report  risk-based 
performance metrics without  explicitly 
accounting for  measurable deterrence. 
Looking  ahead,  it  is possible that the Coast 
Guard and other  DHS agencies will have to 
start  reporting  deterrence effectiveness and 
resulting  risk reduction accounting for  this 
effectiveness. 8 This is our  present  motivation 
to develop a  quantitative approach  to 
deterrence measurement and to develop a 
method to incorporate that  approach  into 
traditional CIP risk analysis.
In  the spirit  of this DHS emphasis on 
deterrence,  and assuming  DHS components 
may  eventually  have to report  measures of 
effectiveness,  we propose that CI deterrence 
can  be quantified as the extent  to which  an 
attacker’s intent  to attack  a  CI target  changes. 
This change is a  result  of changes in  expected 
utility  from  a  potential  attack on  a  CI after  a 
CI defender  attempts to deter  an  attack, as 
compared to what the attacker’s expected 
utility  from  a potential  attack would have 
been  before the defender deterred.  Utility  is 
the value of an outcome. 
Our  approach is intended to complement 
existing,  traditional CIP risk  analysis tools, 
not replace them. In fact, our  approach relies 
on  input  from  reputable risk analysis tools. 
Our  example of how  we apply  this approach 
focuses on  deterring  terrorism. However, as 
long  as existing  risk  analysis tools or  best 
practices can  be used to analyze the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences of other 
intentional hazards such as sabotage and 
theft,  our  general principles can be applied to 
measuring  deterrence value of measures 
against any  sort  of attack  on  a  CI.  Indeed, 
some of our  literature review  will examine 
how  deterrence principles,  which  we leverage 
in  our  own  approach, have been  applied to 
issues other  than  terrorism.  Importantly, our 
approach  does not consider  unintentional 
threats to these CIKR such  as natural 
disasters or  industrial  accidents9.  Finally, our 
approach  incorporates elements of the DHS 
prevent,  protect,  respond, and recover 
approach, consistent with  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8.10 
DETERRENCE AND RISK: 
MUTUALLY INCLUSIVE IN 
THEORY
Deterrent tactics include investments to 
reduce at tacker  expected ut i l i ty  by 
influencing  attacker  capability,  target 
vulnerability,  and target consequence. These 
terms, along  with  intent  to attack,  make up 
the basic DHS risk  equation  Risk=T*V*C. 
Risk  is expected loss to a  CI defender from  a 
potential CI attack,  but this loss constitutes 
part of an  attacker’s gain,  or  utility. This 
equation incorporates all aspects of 
prevention protection, response and recovery 
as articulated in  HSPD-8: reducing  threat is 
preventing  an  attack, reducing  vulnerability 
is protecting against  an attack, and reducing 
consequences is responding to and 
recovering  from  an  attack.  Thus, if we 
measure deterrence as a  function  of changing 
components of threat, vulnerability  and 
consequence, our deterrence efforts 
encompass the entire HSPD-8 spectrum.
By  influencing  these components of 
attacker  utility,  a  defender may  attempt to 
influence an  attacker’s belief that the costs of 
an  attack  outweigh  the benefits or  utility,  or 
that  the probability  of successful attack is too 
low, so they  don’t  execute that course of 
action (COA). This is operational deterrence 
as proposed by  Morral  and Jackson. 11 Thus, 
deterrence strategies must convince the 
attacker  than  if they  execute a  certain  COA, it 
will yield benefits less than those yielded by 
their  best  course of action  without 
deterrence. Hence,  these strategies must 
account for  our  attackers’ goals as well as our 
own,  as long  as we can  influence their 
perspective on  attaining their  goals. This 
lends to a  game theory  approach  to 
quantifying  deterrence.  If we determine 
changes in  attacker  expected utility  in  a  game 
theory  format,  we can  measure change in 
intent and thus can measure deterrence. 
Deterrence thus inherently  includes our 
adversary’s assessment  of their  risk, or 
perceived reduction in utility, as well  as our 
assessment of our  own  risk.  Ultimately,  when 
deliberating  deterrence strategies, we want  to 
know  answers to three questions: (1)  what  is 
the extent to which  the attacker  is deterred, 
(2) what is the risk reduction,  or  change in 
expected defender  loss resulting  from  that 
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deterrence strategy; and (3)  what  are the cost 
implications,  or  defender  deterrence 
investment  efficiency,  of that  deterrence 
strategy.  All answers must be quantifiable to 
be useful in  quantitative deterrence analysis 
and terrorism  risk management.  Taken 
together,  deterrence quantification, defender 
expected loss as a result of that  quantifiable 
deterrence, and defender  investment 
efficiency  constitute a  deterrence “portfolio” 
of criteria  a  defender  must  consider.  This 
portfolio would support  existing  CIKR 
security  plans and risk analysis with 
additional rigor and measurable deterrence 
effect data.
GENERAL FORM OF OUR 
DETERRENCE QUANTIFICATION 
EQUATION
Formally,  quantifiable CI deterrence 
effectiveness of an  lth  defender  deterrence 
course  of action (COA) given  an  attacker’s kth 
post-deterrence action,  is the difference 
between attacker  pre-deterrence intent, 
which  we denote , or  probability  an 
attacker  desires to attack  a certain  target, and 
attacker  post-deterrence intent  , 
which  is then  normalized by  the pre-
deterrence intent. The i and k  subscripts 
denote specific  attacker  COA; i is an 
attacker’s pre-deterrence COA  and k is an 
attacker’s post-deterrence COA. This is 
shown in Equation 1.
Equation 1. Quantification of deterrence
These intent  values are functions of 
attacker  expected utilities from  an attack. 
These expected utility  values are outputs of a 
deterrence game in a game theory format.  
For  the attacker, expected utilities are 
probabilities of an  attack succeeding  given  it 
is already  desired (attacker  capability 
multiplied by  target  vulnerability),  multiplied 
by  the maximum  utility  (in  dollars)  if the 
attack  were to succeed.  The attacker’s utility 
or  defender’s consequence is a combination 
of deaths12  and economic  consequence (in 
dollars of annualized profit for  that  target), 
and the economic consequence is multiplied 
by  a mitigation  factor  based on  the extent  to 
which  the defender  could mitigate that 
economic consequence if an  attack was 
successful. 
Threat  is generally  attacker  intent  * 
attacker  capability; our  methodology  only 
incorporates the capability  part  of the 
traditional threat  probability  equation  in  the 
attacker  expected utility  function.  This is 
because we treat intent  as the output  of our 
expected utility  calculation  methodology, 
rather  than  an  input, but  we apply  intent  into 
the defender’ s unconditional risk equation  to 
reflect  how  CI risk  changes given quantifiable 
deterrence so as not  to wholly  depart  from  a 
traditional risk  analysis approach. We now 
elaborate on  our  approach  to leveraging 
threat with utility functions.
OUR PHILOSOPHY ON THREAT AND 
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
T h e r i s k  e q u a t i o n  R ( r i s k ) = T V C 
(threat*vulnerability*consequence) is the 
general  standard for  CIKR risk analysis 
because it  has a  threat  component.  There are 
n u m e r o u s v u l n e r a b l e a n d h i g h l y 
consequential CIKR in  the US, and leveraging 
threat judgments helps differentiate and 
reduce the defender’s workload based on  the 
likelihood that  an  attacker may  prefer  some 
target  types more than  others. However, that 
threat  is often  high  level and strategic,13 
without  accounting for  target nuances that 
may  influence attacker  perception  of specific 
target  attractiveness. Incorporating  our 
quantifiable deterrence,  as a  function  of 
intent changes based on  individual target 
expected attacker  utility,  adds this nuance 
and we believe this more accurately 
represents unconditional risk.
We claim  that intent  is not  critical 
component of an  attacker  expected utility 
function.  We invest  to deter  and influence 
desirability  or  intent.  Traditionally, intent is 
an  input  to the standard risk equation,  as a 
component of threat. However, we claim  that 
desirability  is a  function  of attacker  beliefs 
about  probability  of successful  attack 
initiation,  execution, consummation, and 
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consequence of that  consummation. 14 Thus, 
deterrence investments must  influence these 
factors,  but  desirability  or  intent  is an 
outcome of that  process. Intent then need not 
be included in  probabilistic risk  functions or 
utility functions in a deterrence game.
There are those, such  as Louis Cox  who 
believe that  threat,  or  intent  and capability  to 
attack,  should be an  outcome of a 
probabilistic  risk analysis product  rather  than 
an  input. 15 The outcome of the games in  our 
research  will  result in  intent  probabilities.  We 
will show  that only  intent  need be an 
outcome; we believe that  capabil ity 
probabilities should remain  inputs within  a 
risk or  utility  equation. Intent  is still useful  in 
a  CIKR risk equation  when  considering  how 
to allocate resources based on risk, from  the 
defender  perspective only. This means if we 
don’t explicitly  consider  deterrence effects,  or 
changes in  attacker  intent  as a  result  of 
changing  expected utility,  we can  justifiably 
leave intent in the risk equation. 
Excluding intent, expected loss should 
include capability, or  the probability  an 
attacker  can  initiate an  attack. The defender 
invests in offensive, counterterrorism  actions 
to reduce attacker  capability  to initiate  and 
execute an  attack.  This is one aspect of 
investing  to deter.  If capability  reduction 
investments fail,  the attacker  is not  deterred 
because they  believe a  high  probability  that 
the attack can  be initiated.  But, expected loss 
should also include the probability  that  the 
attack  can be successfully  executed, and will 
bring about a  consequence to the target once 
consummated, which  are components of 
vulnerability. If vulnerability  investments 
fail, the attacker  is not deterred because they 
may  believe a  high  probability  that  the attack, 
once initiated,  can  be executed and 
consummated.
Finally,  expected loss must include 
consequence, but  only  to the extent  it  is not 
reduced by  defender  recoverability  and 
redundancy  measures. 16  These measures 
constitute the final  aspect  of investing  to 
deter, because if the attacker  believes any 
consequence will  be quickly  mitigated, they 
may  be deterred as they  may  not  achieve 
their goals.
Thus, expected utility  functions in  a 
deterrence game must  include capability 
probabilities,  vulnerability  probabilities, 
m a x i m u m  c o n s e q u e n c e v a l u e s , a n d 
probabilities of consequence mitigation. 
Intent or  desirability  probabilities are not 
needed. If intent probabilities were included 
in expected loss equations, since intent 
reflects the desirability  to carry  out  an  attack, 
and desirability  is a  function  of probability  of 
successful init iat ion,  execution and 
consummation,  then  we would be double 
counting the deterrent  effects of defender 
investment in  those expected utility 
functions. Thus, our  expected utility 
functions will treat  expected utility  as a 
conditional probability: they  reflect  the 
expected utility  of attack,  if the attack  already 
desires to attack, or intent=100%. 
DETERRENCE AND RISK: 
MUTUALLY INCLUSIVE IN 
PRACTICE
Our  utility  functions upon  which  the intent 
values in  Equation  1  are based, account  for 
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l 
risk=threat*vulnerability*consequence 
approach. In  fact,  our  methodology  depends 
on  traditional risk  analysis tools to provide 
this input; it  cannot function without  existing 
risk=TVC  tools such  as the Coast  Guard’s 
Maritime Security  Risk Analysis Model 
(MSRAM), 17 TRAM,  CARVER, or  any  legacy 
probabilistic CI risk analysis tool that 
leverages threat, vulnerability, consequence, 
and mitigation  data.  Thus, our  methodology 
is not  intended to supplant  existing 
probabilistic  CI risk  methodologies and tools, 
but  complement them  and extend their 
functionality.  Additionally,  myriad CI 
protection  efforts such  as Design  Basis Threat 
analysis , Crime Prevention  through 
Environmental Design,  and others can  easily 
be leveraged with  our proposed methodology, 
as they  contribute to our  understanding  of 
threat,  vulnerability  and consequence-all 
critical input for  our  methodological 
approach. Thus, even  if a  CIP best  practice is 
not formally  considered a  risk  assessment 
tool  or  methodology, if that  practice produces 
data  that  can  meet  the basic  definition  of 
threat, vulnerability, or  consequence, then  its 
input could be leveraged by  our  deterrence 
quantification methodology.
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Equation  1  will  help us answer  the first 
deterrence strategy  question.  The deterrence 
game that  produces those utilities that 
support  intent values in  Equation  1  can also 
produce defender  risk equations, which  can 
be compared to answer  the second deterrence 
strategy  question.  Further,  attacker  and 
defender  utilities must  be modeled as 
funct ions of a t tacker and defender 
investment, since return on  investment  is 
critical for  risk-informed decision  making. 18 
This will  help answer  the third deterrence 
strategy question. 
Also, Equation  1  can be applied to quantify 
deterrence subject  to specific  theoretical 
analysis options for  how  a  CI defender  and an 
attacker  perceive the utility  of different COA. 
T h e s e a n a l y s i s o p t i o n s i n c l u d e ( 1 ) 
assumptions about  information availability 
circumstances, or the extent to which  an 
attacker  knows what a  defender  is doing  to 
defend their  CI; (2)  different  utility  theory 
assumptions,  or  assumptions about  people 
assess information  and make decisions about 
the value of an  outcome; and (3) assumptions 
about  how  risk  probabilities are reduced with 
defender investment. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND 
USEFULNESS OF THIS APPROACH
WHY SHOULD WE HAVE THE ABILITY 
TO QUANTIFY DETERRENCE?
This quantitative approach can  be applied to 
real-world CI protection.  Since we are 
quantifying deterrence in  a  way  that  will 
leverage traditional  probabilistic CI risk data, 
those involved in CI protection  can  report  a 
different metric  to our  policymakers, in a  way 
that  reinterprets the effect  of CI attack 
capability,  vulnerability  and consequence 
mitigation measures.
To explain,  the current  performance 
metric  that  DHS components report  on  is 
how  much risk, or  expected loss, we have 
reduced to CI by  implementing  vulnerability 
and consequence reduction measures.  The 
focus is on how  these measures would defeat 
an  attack already  in  progress,  or  how  they 
would mitigate effects after  the attack. 
However,  if we leverage this same data  to 
quantify  the deterrent  value of those 
measures, we could instead report  how  we 
believe we have changed the attacker’s 
expected utility  from  an  attack, and thus have 
c h a n g e d t h e i r  i n t e n t t o a t t a c k ,  b y 
implementing  these measures. Thus,  we gain 
insights into how  risk changes based on  our 
adversary’s interpretation of our  defenses, 
and we have now  accounted for  an  intelligent 
adversary. This is the reinterpretation  of the 
e f f e c t s o f o u r  c u r r e n t m e a s u r e s , 
contextualized for policy  that requires both 
risk analysis and deterrence.  Also, current 
risk methodologies generally  only  account for 
a n e n g i n e e r i n g a p p r o a c h  t o r i s k 
management, as they  focus primarily  on  the 
details of vulnerability  and consequence. 
They  include threat as well, but  often  this is a 
very  high-level , non  specif ic threat 
probability  estimation.  So,  our  methodology 
will account  for  more tactical aspects of 
threat  probabilities,  such  as how  individual 
target  engineering  characteristics such as 
security  measures actually  influence the 
attacker’s interest in  attacking, and thus 
threat  judgments can  be more granular  and 
target-specific.
That  said,  it seems necessary  to be able to 
incorporate our  quantitative deterrence 
effectiveness results back into the standard 
risk=TVC equation. There are theoretical 
challenges with  this,  but we believe they  are 
easily  overcome. In  brief,  adopting  our 
deterrence quantification methodology  and 
incorporating  its results in  back  into 
traditional probabilistic risk=TVC, where T 
represents intent and capability,  might seem 
to double count  the effects of our capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence factor 
reduction deterrent  measures.  It  would count 
those deterrence effects once against  those 
factors themselves,  and again in  intent. 
However,  we claim  that  unconditional risk, or 
risk including the probability  the attacker 
desired to attack  after  deterrence measures 
are implemented, appropriately  double-
counts the effects of those deterrence 
investments: once in  the reduction of 
capability, vulnerability,  and/or  consequence, 
and again  in  intent.  We must  account for  the 
likelihood the attacker  wants to attack, and 
the likelihood of success if they  do initiate an 
attack.  The current form  of risk  used for  CIP 
is unconditional  risk where we believe the 
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intent probability  modifies conditional risk, 
a n d c o n d i t i o n a l r i s k i s 
capability*vulnerability*consequence: the 
expected loss given  an  attack is already 
desired with 100% intent.  
This approach  is useful for  a wide 
audience: academics who will consider  the 
technical  aspects of our methodology,  CIP 
practitioners who may  implement the 
deterrence measures that  inform  our 
methodology  once the methodology  is 
accepted within academia; and DHS agencies 
who must  report  performance effectiveness 
measures to Congress and other  oversight 
bodies after practitioners have implemented 
the measures.
We expound on  how  we incorporate 
measurable deterrence into the traditional 
risk equation  in a  case study  example.  We 
also give examples of how  to apply  this 
methodology  to notional  real world CI in  a 
subsequent  section  of this research. Finally, 
we give examples of how  quantifiable 
deterrence effectiveness might change given 
d i f f e r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b i l i t y 
circumstances,  as that  seems the most 
practical of the theoretical  analysis options 
we have introduced: a  practitioner naturally 
wants to know  whether  they  should make 
their  security  measures overt  or  covert to 
deter! The other  two analysis options are 
areas of interest but  we do not  give examples 
of how  deterrence effectiveness might  change 
if those options are varied; we save this for 
future research.  We discuss the theories 
behind those analysis options briefly  in  our 
analysis of the need for  these  options and our 
literature review.
WHY THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
OPTIONS? DIFFERENT DETERRENCE 
EFFECTIVENESS DATA MAY RESULT
Equation  1  can  be applied to quantify 
deterrence subject  to specific  theoretical 
analysis options for  how  a  CI defender  and an 
attacker  perceive the utility  of different COA. 
These analysis options include assumptions 
about  information  availability  circumstances, 
or  the extent to which  an attacker  knows 
what  a  defender is doing to defend their  CI. 
In  game theory  modeling,  whether  actors 
have perfect (known) or  imperfect  (unknown) 
information  about their  opponents is critical 
to understanding  the game’s outcomes.  Since 
we will be leveraging  principles from  game 
theory  in  our  approach, we focus on  this 
analysis option.  These theoretical analysis 
options also include different  utility  theory 
assumptions, or  how  assumptions about 
people assess information and make 
decisions about  the value of an  outcome. 
Nikhil Dighe et.  al.  urge that  future work on 
analyzing  deterrence investment should 
consider  a l ternat ives to t radi t ional 
rationality, or  subjective expected utility 
(SEU). 19 Utility  functions can  assume either 
(SEU) or  an  alternative,  prospect  utility 
theory (PU). 
Finally,  these analysis options include 
assumptions about  how  risk is reduced with 
defender  investment. In theory, probabilities 
of attack  success may  change linearly  with 
investment, but  in  reality,  the relationship 
may  be an  exponentia l  funct ion of 
investment; it  becomes increasingly  difficult 
to reduce risk as more risk  is reduced. Dighe 
et. al.  advocate exploration of the effects of 
security  investments when  those investments 
do not reduce the success probability  of 
attacks to zero. 20  This nonlinearity  can  be 
observed in  engineering  problems; for  CI 
security  measures,  both  engineering  factors 
and social factors such  as public  resistance to 
increased security  may  contribute to 
nonlinearity.
T h e p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
experimenting with  the different theoretical 
analysis options are numerous. Uncertainties 
f a c i n g  a n  a t t a c k e r  a r e c r i t i c a l  t o 
understanding  deterrence,  but  are rarely 
leveraged in  game-theoretic analysis of 
counterterrorism. 21  We have done initial 
work  on  this and have produced evidence 
suggesting  whether  it  is more advantageous 
for  a  CI defender  to make defensive 
investments unknown, or  imperfect,  to 
would-be attackers rather  than  perfectly 
known. The defender  advantage in  such  cases 
would be lower  average unconditional  risk 
after  deterrence under  specific  information 
availability circumstances. 
If evidence supports an  advantage in 
deterrence effectiveness under  imperfect 
information  circumstances, implications are 
that  a  government should consider classifying 
its CI defensive investments and any  analysis 
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o f h o w  t h o s e i n v e s t m e n t s r e d u c e 
infrastructure vulnerability  and consequence. 
Conversely,  i f evidence supports an 
advantage of perfect information, a 
government  should instead act ively 
communicate to would-be CI attackers not 
only  its defensive investments but  also 
d e t a i l e d c a l c u l a t i o n s o f h o w  t h o s e 
investments reduce vulnerability  and 
consequence.  This approach  assumes the 
attacker  believes the defender’s disclosure of 
investment  and effectiveness information  is 
accurate. 
In  order  to generalize these findings, any 
advantage of a  specif ic information 
availability  circumstance must be robust 
given  different  utility  theory  assumptions, 
and also given different  probability-
investment  relationship assumptions. 
Behavioral science and historical research 
support  the need to analyze decision  making 
under nonlinear  or  biased circumstances and 
thus examine different  assumptions about 
utility  when we analyze deterrence.  Nonlinear 
engineering  phenomena  support the need to 
analyze how  system  performance,  or  CI 
attacker  capability,  vulnerability,  and 
consequence mitigation in CIP research, 
changes nonlinearly  as a function  of effort  or 
investment  expended. We do not  give 
examples of sustained defender  advantage 
from  a  specific information  availability 
circumstance across these different analysis 
option  assumptions in this paper,  but this is 
an area for future research.
DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT 
WORK
We now  examine relevant work to create 
context for  our  general methodology  to 
quantify  CI deterrence,  and for  our specific 
theoretical  analysis options. We integrate 
different aspects of this work with  our own 
techniques into a  methodology  to quantify  CI 
deterrence and create a  deterrence portfolio. 
There is historical  work  to measure 
deterrence effects in  other  areas,  including 
fishery  enforcement, drug  smuggling, and 
aviation  terrorism,  but  DHS currently  lacks a 
methodology  to explicitly  quantify  CI 
terrorism  deterrence. However, there is 
plenty  of research  on  quantitative risk 
measurement, analysis,  and management, 
which  suggests we should leverage 
quantitative risk to quantify deterrence.
RISK, RETURN ON INVESTMENT, AND 
DETERRENCE 
DHS defines risk as a  function  of threat, 
vulnerability,  and consequence.22  For 
terrorism, threat  is defined as the likelihood 
of an  attack being  initiated,  accounting  for 
both  adversary  intent  and capability.  Intent  is 
the probability  an  attack is desired, and 
capability  is the probability  it  can be 
executed.  Vulnerability  is the likelihood an 
attack  is successful given  it  is attempted. 
Finally,  consequences are the effects a 
terrorist  attack.  Thus, this approach  to 
analyzing  terrorism  risk is probabilistic in 
nature.  The probabilistic approach  to risk 
analysis has been widely  accepted for  some 
time.23 
Since DHS is using  probabilistic  risk 
analysis techniques for  counterterrorism,24 
the relationship between probabilistic  risk 
analysis and general  deterrence theory  must 
be examined before we attempt to quantify 
deterrence effectiveness of CI protection 
strategies. In  general,  there  is much 
precedent  for  integrating risk analysis with 
deterrence.  Richard Lebow  and Janet Stein 
propose that  deterrence effectiveness 
depends upon an actor’s attitude toward 
risk.25 Elaine Bunn advocates that deterrence 
policies must account for  adversary  attitudes 
toward risk.26 However,  these arguments are 
not  specifically  focused on CI attack 
deterrence, and contain  no explic i t 
quantitative calculations of probabilistic  risk 
that would support deterrence quantification. 
Other  literature focuses on  possible 
relationships between  CI risk  analysis and 
deterrence.  For  example, William  McGill and 
Bilal Ayyub claim  that  deterrence is a 
function  of infrastructure vulnerability,  a 
component of infrastructure risk.27  In  fact, 
the probability  an attack would be initiated, 
or  threat, is claimed to be a  function  of the 
perceived target attractiveness, and the target 
attractiveness is a  function  of the perceived 
probability  of success,  or  vulnerability. Thus, 
a  lower vulnerability  target means a less 
attractive target; a  less attractive target then 
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means a  lower  probability  of attack initiation; 
and a  lower  attack initiation  probability  then 
means the attacker  has been deterred. This 
suggests a  fundamental  relationship between 
probabilistic  risk and deterrence. We must 
now  examine deterrence theory  more closely 
and put our proposed definition  of CI 
deterrence measurement  in  context  of this 
historical discussion.
DETERRENCE THEORY 
Deterrence theory  has been  vigorously 
discussed and debated for  decades. Patrick 
and Audrey  Cronin  propose that  deterrence 
occurs when  an  actor  discourages aggression 
toward another  actor,  with  the intended 
outcome that the former  never  has to respond 
to aggressive action  by  the latter.28 In  other 
words,  the goal of deterrence is to convince 
an  adversary  to refrain from  aggressive 
action. Lebow  claims that  deterring  involves 
manipulating  an  adversary’s assessment of a 
situation  by  convincing  them  that  costs of 
acting  exceed benefits.29  Finally,  putting 
t h e o r y  i n t o p r a c t i c a l  g u i d a n c e t h e 
D e p a r t m e n t  o f D e f e n s e D e t e r r e n c e 
Operations Joint  Operating  Concept  specifies 
that  deterrence affects adversary  decision 
making  in  three ways: (1) imposing  costs on 
an  undesirable adversary  course of action; (2) 
denying the perceived benefits of such  a  COA; 
and (3) encouraging  restraint by  making it 
seem more attractive than action.30 
These approaches to deterrence suggest 
that  the only  way  to deter  is to convince an 
adversary  not  to attack.  But, applying  this 
approach  to deterring  terrorist  attacks on  CI 
is problematic for  two reasons.  One, the 
United States has so many  CI that  spending 
resources to prevent  attacks on  all  seems 
inefficient. Two, these deterrence theories 
were developed during the Cold War  when 
nation-states could be deterred by  threat of 
mutual ly  assured destruct ion.  With 
asymmetrical  warfare and terrorism, 
convincing our adversaries we can  eliminate 
them  is a  challenge since they  are difficult  to 
find. Thus,  a modified definition  of 
deterrence is needed for  CI protection. An  all-
or-nothing  approach  applied to DOD tactic 
(1) is impractical  because it is difficult to 
impose costs. For  (2),  denying  benefits would 
mean  defending all infrastructures, which  we 
attempt to do at  great  expense.  Finally, for 
(3), our  adversaries have stated their  intent to 
continue to attempt  to inflict damage; 
restraint will  likely  never  be acceptable to 
organizations such as Al-Qaeda  whose raison 
d’être is to inflict  damage upon the United 
States and its allies. Thus,  our  form  of 
deterrence for  CI protection – influencing an 
adversary’s decision making  process such 
that  their expected utility  from  attacking a  CI 
changes after  we deter  by  investing  – is 
appropriate.
The idea  of accepting  losses is not without 
precedent. For  example, John Major 
proposes the concept of equilibrium  expected 
loss (EEL): a  defender  moves resources to 
various high-risk  infrastructures,  making 
them  equally  unattractive to an  attacker and 
c r e a t i n g  a n E E L . A n y  u n p r o t e c t e d 
infrastructure,  if attacked, will yield a gain  to 
the attacker that is less than the EEL. 31  
Two critical  components of deterrence are 
credibility  and signaling.  Bunn  claims that 
credibility  is critical: to deter, we must be 
able to signal  to the adversary  we have both 
the credible capability  and the will to impose 
costs or  deny  benefits. 32  Thus,  for  CI 
deterrence,  a  terrorist  must  believe that  we 
can  deny  them  benefits by  defending  our 
infrastructure.  That belief can  be reinforced 
by  the terrorist’s own observations of our 
defenses,  and our explicit  signaling  of those 
defenses.  The former  type of reinforcement 
begs the question of whether the terrorist 
accurately  perceives our  defenses,  and the 
latter  begs the question of whether  the 
terrorist believes our  disclosures. These 
issues have been  researched; for  example 
Erik  Jenelius et.  al.  analyze the effects of 
adversary  perception  on their  decision 
making.33 The present research assumes that 
prior  to deterrent  investments at  the start  of a 
deterrence game,  all  information about the 
defender’s original  “pre-deterrence”  defenses 
is known  to an  attacker, and subsequent 
deterrence game outcomes determine how 
deterrence is quantified depending on 
whether the attacker  has perfect  or  imperfect 
information  about  the defender’s deterrence 
COA.  Thus, our signaling  of information 
should be a key  determinant  of how 
quantifiably  effective our  deterrence 
investments are. There is the possibility  that 
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an  attacker  could infer  weaknesses if we 
signal  prospective defenses before they  are 
implemented.  Importantly, we do not 
advocate actually  signaling the existence of 
security  or  response measures before they  are 
implemented.  We only  argue that when we 
are considering what  deterrence investments 
to implement,  we should determine whether 
making  those investments transparent  or 
obscured, once actually  implemented, would 
influence the attacker  more.  Also, we can run 
our  deterrence game simulation  with  as many 
CIKR targets as desired, using  computer 
programs if necessary, to account for the 
possibility  that  signaling  defenses at targets 
will focus the attacker  attention  elsewhere. 
We now  know  there is a  relationship between 
probabilistic  risk analysis and deterrence, 
and we have a  working definition  of CI attack 
deterrence as a  change in  attacker  intent. 
Thus, we will  use  a  probabilistic risk 
approach  to quantify  deterrence.  Next, we 
examine previous and ongoing efforts to 
analyze and quantify deterrence.
ANALYZING DETERRENCE 
There is a  considerable repository  of 
literature  offering  insights into how 
deterrence might  be quantified,  without ever 
explicitly  stating  how  to quantify  it  for CI 
protection. In  general, the literature shows 
that  analysis of drug smuggling,  fisheries law 
enforcement, critical infrastructure security, 
and aviation  security,  reveals that  lowering 
the chances of successful attack or  violation 
of a  law, and communicating the imposition 
of penalties if caught in  violation, tended to 
deter  would-be violators.  One study  gleaned 
that  the subjects interviewed would be 
deterred if they  knew  the high  probabilities of 
failure if they  attempted to violate a law, but 
they  had difficulty  estimating  those 
probabilities with  any  rigor.  Other  studies 
more e xpl ic i t ly  focuse d on cr i t i ca l 
infrastructure security,  postulating  that the 
change in  expected utility  or  outcome of a  CI 
attack  would influence the probability  an 
attacker  would want to attack in  the first 
place. Much of the more recent literature 
leverages ideas from  utility  theory  and game 
theory, and thus we leverage the ideas of 
influencing probabilities and consequences, 
along  with game theory  and utility  theory,  in 
our  approach  to quantify  deterrence.  We now 
expound on these theories. 
GAME THEORY AND 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
OPTIONS
Game theory  is an  analytical approach 
designed to help understand interactions 
between  competing  or  cooperating  decision 
makers.  It  treats decision  makers as “players” 
participating  in  a  “game” with  certain  rules 
and assumptions. 34 Two of these assumptions 
are that  decision makers are rational  and that 
they  simultaneously  account for their 
opponents’ anticipated behavior  when 
choosing  a  course of action. Game theory  is 
an  appropriate tool for  studying  the strategic 
interaction between  governments and 
terrorists.35
Game theory  assigns an  expected “payoff” 
value or  expected utility  from  certain  courses 
of action  to each  player.  A  payoff is the 
subjective value of the outcome of a  course of 
action. It  is assumed that  each player  wants 
to maximize his own payoff or  utility.36  But, 
game theory  often predicts an  outcome in 
which  each player  has a  payoff which  may  be 
less than  that  which  they  could gain without 
the influence of their  opponent. Our 
approach will create payoffs or  utility 
functions to be used in a  game, from 
traditional  risk  components: capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence. Ultimately, 
utility  is a  function  of probabilistic risk.  We 
treat the defender’s probabilistic  loss as the 
attacker’s gain  or  utility  in  the present 
research. We also derive detailed expected 
utility  functions for  an  attacker,  reflecting the 
belief that  terrorists perform  cost-benefit 
analyses.37 
We also examine how  perfection  or 
imperfection  of attacker  information, 
assumptions which we call information 
availability  circumstances,  influences the 
quantifiable effectiveness of deterrence and 
other  components of our  deterrence 
portfolio. In  traditional game theoretical 
approaches, information  imperfection,  or 
lack of information about all opponent 
moves, lends to a pure strategy  Nash 
Equilibrium  (NE) as the predicted outcome 
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of the game,  whereas perfect  information 
generally  lends to a  mixed strategy  NE as the 
predicted game outcome in  a  Stackelburg 
leader-follower game.
However,  we do not  follow  the traditional 
game theoretical  approach  in our  research.  In 
essence,  we eschew  the traditional game 
theoretical  approach of leveraging  a  pure 
Nash  Equilibrium  (NE) or  a  mixed strategy, 
to account  for  the likelihood that adversary 
decision  making  is more complicated that 
what  a  simple equilibrium  predicts.  So,  for 
distinguishing  between  the effects of 
information  availability  upon deterrence 
effectiveness,  we create utility  functions in 
our  deterrence game that  reflect either 
perfect  attacker  information, or  one of what 
we propose are three possible “information 
imperfection  biases”  that the attacker  is 
assumed to have: neutral,  conservative, and 
overconfident.  These biases are part of 
assessing  the adversary  in  a  design-basis 
threat approach.
A  neutral bias means an “average 
attacker”, who will  assume the defender 
deters by  reducing target consequence and 
vulnerability  by  50% of what  they  were prior 
to deterrence investment. A  conservatively 
biased attacker  will  assume the defender 
deters by  reducing target consequence and 
vulnerability  by  95% of what  they  were prior 
to deterrence investments,38  and an 
overconfidently  biased attacker  will assume 
the defender  invests nothing  to deter; thus 
post-deterrence attacker expected utilities are 
the same as pre-deterrence expected utilities. 
We offer  these biases as a  start to exploring 
what  we call a  “theoretical  analysis option” 
for  quantifying  deterrence; more research 
into modeling  attacker  decision  making 
under imperfect information conditions is an 
area  for  future research. There is some 
literature on  this subject,  for  example see 
Jenelius et. al.39 
There are additional  “theoretical analysis 
options” to apply  to our  methodology.  These 
options will allow  us to vary  the composition 
of the utility  functions that we will  use in  our 
methodology  to quantify  deterrence.  Game 
theory  leverages utility  functions and we use 
a  basic game in  our  approach,  and so we 
expound upon  utility  theory  and explain 
different views on  how  people assess 
subjective value in  our  extended literature 
review. In  brief,  subjective expected utility 
claims people make decisions linearly; 
whereas prospect utility  claims people make 
decisions nonlinearly,  subject  to biases. 
There is experimental evidence to support 
nonlinear  decision-making; hence a  well-
informed approach  to quantifying deterrence 
must  consider  these different  ideas as a 
sensitivity  analysis.  Prospect  utility  would 
require us to modify  components of our 
utility  functions with  weights and other 
modifiers to reflect nonlinear  biased 
decision-making. 
The other  theoretical analysis option  is 
probability-investment  relationships.  We 
model utility  function  components such  as 
capability  and vulnerability  probabilities as 
functions of investments,  to capture cost 
information  for return on  investment 
calculations.  That said,  evidence from 
engineering  sciences supports a  nonlinear 
relationship between  effort  applied to solve a 
problem  and the extent  to which  the problem 
is solved. There are linear  and nonlinear 
(exponential)  ways to model how  these 
probabilities change as we invest  more 
money to reduce them. 
Now  that we have examined literature on 
how  deterrence might  be quantified, and 
introduced theories that  are relevant to 
creating the utility  functions in a  game 
theoret ical  approach  to quanti fy ing 
deterrence, we will  explain  our  general 
methodology  to quantify  deterrence in 
context  of a  case  study.  Also,  we will  show 
how  to quantify  defender risk  as result  of the 
deterrence strategies in  the case study,  and 
we will  show  how  to determine deterrence 
investment  efficiency  or  ROI. Before we move 
to our  case study, we summarize the 
applicability  of our  different  theoretical 
analysis options to CI attack deterrence in 
Table 1:
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Applied if we believe the attacker knows 
everything about the defender’s deterrence 
investments
Imperfect Information
Applied if we believe the attacker does not know 
everything about the defender’s deterrence 
investments; the attacker biases their estimates 
based on whether they are overconfident, 




Applied if we believe the attacker analyzes 
probabilities of attack success and probabilities of 
producing consequences, in a linear fashion
Prospect Utility
Applied if we believe the attacker analyzes 
probabilities of attack success and probabilities of 
producing consequences in a nonlinear fashion. 
They bias toward overweighing expected utility 
when in the domain of loss, or behind a reference 
point. 
Thus, an attacker may be more likely to prefer 
attacking a target that objectively is very hard to 
attack or would suffer minimal consequence, if a 






Applied if we believe the attacker’s and 
defender’s investments change attack success and 
consequence mitigation probabilities linearly  (e.g. 
it is possible to attain 100% vulnerability 
elimination)
Exponential
Applied if we believe the attacker’s and 
defender’s investments change attack success and 
consequence mitigation probabilities nonlinearly, 
or more specifically exponentially (e.g. it is 
impossible to attain 100% vulnerability elimination; 
and it becomes progressively harder to reduce the 
same amount of vulnerability with the same dollar 
amount, as we continue to reduce vulnerability)
Table 1: Applicability of Theoretical Analysis Options to CIP
DETERRENCE QUANTIFICATION 
METHODOLOGY - A REAL WORLD 
CASE STUDY
Since we are proposing a methodology  to 
support risk analysis with  deterrence 
measurement,  and risk  analysis is largely  a 
quantitative process,  we develop a  technical 
approach  to quantify  deterrence.  We 
summarize the results of this technical 
approach  here in the context  of a  case study, 
focused on  the potential deterrence 
effectiveness of notional FEMA  Port  Security 
Grant  Program  (PSGP)  infrastructure 
security  grants. 40  In  general,  we must 
compare attacker  expected utilities from  both 
before and after  deterrence investments, 
those investments being  PSGP grants 
improve CIKR security,  in  order to quantify 
deterrence. 
In our  example we create deterrence 
portfolios showing the quantification  of 
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deterrence given  certain  deterrence COA, 
how  defender  unconditional risk  changes as a 
result  of that  quantifiable deterrence, and 
defender  investment efficiency  or  ROI of 
those deterrence COA.   We also can  show 
how  the results of these portfolios vary  based 
on  information  availability  circumstances: 
either  the attacker  has perfect  information 
and defender  deterrence COA  perform  a 
certain way, or  the attacker  has imperfect 
information  and the defender  deterrence 
effectiveness may  vary  depending  on the 
attacker’s information  imperfection  biases. 
We assume subjective expected utility  and a 
linear  probability-investment  relationship 
throughout our  example in  this paper; future 
work  would analyze deterrence effectiveness 
under different utility  theory  and probability-
investment relationship assumptions.
In  our  example we leverage notional  CI 
risk data  from  an  existing  DHS CI risk 
analysis tool, the US Coast  Guard’s Maritime 
Security  Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM), 
though  any  CI risk  analysis tool  that 
leverages threat, vulnerability, consequence 
data, and mitigation  measures could be used. 
Our  methodology  incorporates MSRAM risk 
data  and extends the interpretation  of that 
data. We will demonstrate how  our 
methodology  can  be applied across multiple 
DHS CI sectors, as our  notional CIKR 
competing for  grant allocations to deter 
attacks are in different CIKR sectors41.
Importantly,  in  our example we assume 
the federal government allocates the 
deterrence funding.  Obviously ,  this 
assumption can  be changed depending  on the 
scenario modeled. We also assume an 
attacker  is not  motivated to attack a  specific 
target  type (e.g.,  an  eco-terrorist  only  wanting 
to attack chemical refineries).  Rather,  the 
attacker  is expected to want to maximize its 
possible utility,  irrespective of target type. 
But, the methodology  could be applied to 
include only  targets of a  specific type in 
future research.
CASE STUDY: QUANTIFYING 
DETERRENCE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
DEFENDER INVESTMENTS, AND 
RESULTING TERRORIST ATTACK RISK 
REDUCTION FOR A CHEMICAL FACILITY 
AND A FERRY TERMINAL 
Suppose we want  to determine the 
quantifiable deterrence effectiveness of 
different CI investments at two different 
targets: a maritime chemical  facility  which  we 
denote target  A, and a  ferry  terminal which 
we denote target  B.  The “defender”  is the 
government  and target  owner/operators 
working  in  collaboration, and the design-
basis threat  for  the “attacker”  is a  non-
specific terrorist  organization  that  attacks 
these targets in  one specific  way  (e.g.,  boat 
bomb).  Our two notional targets are in 
different DHS CI sectors;  yet they  often  exist 
together  in  a local  operational environment 
such  as a  port. We note that  we only  use two 
targets for  simplicity  in  illustrating the 
methodology; however  our  methodology  can 
be applied to as many  targets as desired. The 
deterrence game can  be expanded as 
necessary; computer  programming  may  be 
required to capture CIKR in a large game.42
The defender  has already  invested to 
reduce vulnerability  and consequence at 
these targets,  and thus we can  estimate how 
we have reduced risk in  the traditional sense. 
However,  given  DHS encouragement to 
examine deterrence, and given  that  agencies 
currently  report  risk reduction  performance 
effectiveness metrics to Congress and thus 
conceivably  may  be required to report 
deterrence effectiveness and resulting  risk 
reduction in  the future, we now  want  to 
analyze the potential  deterrent effects of 
hypothetical future deterrence investments, 
in a quantifiable way.
There are eleven basic steps to quantifying 
deterrence and creating our  deterrence 
portfolio to address all three deterrence 
strategy  questions introduced at  the 
beginning  of this paper. In  sum, there are 
three phases of analysis: pre-deterrence 
analysis, post-deterrence analysis, and 
comparison  to quantify  deterrence and create 
the deterrence portfolio. This portfolio would 
add data  to the existing  library  of CIKR 
security  plans and supporting  decision-
TAQUECHEL AND LEWIS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK  12
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 12 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
making.  We discuss these three analysis 
phases in context of our case study. 
PRE-DETERRENCE ANALYSIS FINDINGS
Pre-Deterrence Attacker  Expected 
Utilities
The notional expected utility  values in  Table 
2  include capability  to attack, vulnerability  to 
attack  as a  function  of security  investments, 
and consequence mitigated by  recovery/
response measures. For  example,  suppose the 
intelligence community  estimates a  terrorist 
organization’s capability  to initiate an  attack 
with  a  boat  bomb against either  type of 
facility.  Also, prior  to implementation  of 
PSGP grants intended to deter, suppose both 
the chemical  facility  and ferry  terminal have 
measures to detect an  attack  in  progress (e.g., 
cameras); training and equipment  to engage 
an  attack  before it  reaches the focal point  of 
the infrastructure for  detonation  (such  as 
armed guards stationed within  a reasonable 
response time from  where an  attack would 
initiate); and has the means to defeat that 
attack  (guards have proper  weapons and 
training).  Finally, suppose each  facility  has 
business continuity  plans and coordinates 
with  stakeholders to ensure recoverability  if 
attacked.  These are all pre-deterrence 
mitigation capabilities.  These data  are 
assumed to represent (1)  the attacker’s 
perceptions of their  attack capabilities and 
(2)  target vulnerability  and consequence 
based on attacker  “scoping”  reflecting 
extensive research  and observations of the 
above-listed target attributes.
Attacker ith attack option
Notional expected utility value ($)
Attack chemical facility
 $257,142.86
Attack ferry terminal $763,636.36
Attack both $1,020,779.22
Refrain from attack $0
Table 2: Notional attacker pre-deterrence expected utilities
Table 2  shows that  given  our notional pre-
deterrence vulnerability, and consequence 
data  for  the chemical  facility  and ferry 
terminal,  and attacker  capabilities to attack 
each respectively,  attacking  both  targets 
simultaneously  yields the greatest  expected 
utility  to the attacker. This is intuitive,  but we 
quantify  that  intuition  here in  dollars, and in 
comparison  to the utility  of other  attack 
options. 
Pre-Deterrence Attacker Intent Values
Given  the above expected utilities,  we can 
create intent values:
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Attacker ith attack option
Notional intent value (%)
 
Attack chemical facility 12.60%
Attack ferry terminal 37.40%
Attack both 50.00%
Refrain from attack 0.00%
Table 3: Notional attacker pre-deterrence intent values
Table 3  shows that attacker  intent  to 
attack  both  targets simultaneously  is greatest. 
Since Table 2  showed the greatest  expected 
utility  to results from  this attacker  option, it 
is no surprise  that  this option  results in  the 
greatest attacker intent value.
Pre-Deterrence Defender 
Unconditional Risk
We then apply  these intent values in Table 3 
t o c o n d i t i o n a l r i s k v a l u e s , t o g e t 
unconditional risk values:
Attacker ith attack option
Notional unconditional risk value ($)
Attack chemical facility $32,388.22  
Attack ferry terminal $285,634.98 
Attack both  $510,389.61
Refrain from attack $0.00
Table 4: Notional defender pre-deterrence unconditional risk values
Not surprisingly, Table 4  shows that  the 
unconditional  risk of having  both  targets 
attacked simultaneously  is greatest. So, going 
forward we can  expect  that  the attacker’s 
greatest expected utility  before we deter 
would result  from  attacking  both targets 
simultaneously; thus their  intent is greatest. 
And, our unconditional  expected loss, or risk, 
f r o m  h a v i n g  b o t h t a r g e t s a t t a c k e d 
simultaneously, is our greatest risk.
POST-DETERRENCE ANALYSIS 
FINDINGS
Post-Deterrence Attacker Expected 
Utilities 
We note that  there are sixteen  attacker 
expected utilities post-deterrence, as opposed 
to four  pre-deterrence, because the defender 
has four different deterrence investment 
options. These options are (1) to invest  PSGP 
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grant money  at  only  the chemical facility  (for 
instance to increase the CCTV capabilities to 
detect); (2)  invest grant  money  at only  the 
ferry  terminal (for instance to provide more 
training and equipment for  terminal security 
personnel); (3) award grants to both; or  (4) 
award grants to neither.43  The attacker  post-
deterrence expected utilities are as a  function 






















            
Notional expected 





$57,142.88 $257,142.86 $57,142.86 $257,142.86
Attack ferry
terminal 
$763,636.36 $190,000.00 $190,000.00 $763,636.36
Attack both $820,779.22 $447,142.86 $247,142.86 $1,020,779.22
Refrain from 
attack
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Table 5: Notional  attacker post-deterrence expected utilities, defender deters by investing in four different 
ways
Table 5  shows that  given  our  notional 
p o s t - d e t e r r e n c e v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  a n d 
consequence data for  the chemical  facility 
and ferry  terminal, and attacker  post-
deterrence capabilities to attack  each 
respect ively ,  at tacking  both  targets 
simultaneously  yields the greatest  expected 
utility  to the attacker, for  each  of the four 
defender  deterrence COA. This notional data 
may  reflect defender efforts to reduce 
capability  (prevent),  reduce vulnerability 
(protect),  and reduce consequence (response 
and recover),  though  in  this example the 
specific PSGP grants are intended to reduce 
vulnerability.  Overall the attacker would gain 
the greatest  expected utility  if they  attacked 
both  and the defender  invested nothing in 
deterrence,  as seen  in  Table 5. This seems 
intuitive, but here we quantify this intuition. 
Post-Deterrence Intent Values
Given  the expected utilities described above, 
we can create sixteen intent values. 
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3.48% 28.75% 11.56% 13.62%
Attack ferry 
terminal 
46.52% 21.25% 38.44%  37.55%
Attack both 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Refrain from 
attack 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 6: Notional  attacker post-deterrence intent values, defender deters by investing in four different 
ways
Table 6  shows that attacker  intent  to attack both  targets simultaneously  always dominates,  as 
would be expected since attacker expected utility is always greatest.
Post-Deterrence Defender Unconditional Risk 
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defender invests 
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Notional 
unconditional 
risk value ($), 
defender invests 
at both
             
Notional 
unconditional 






$1,989.15 $73,938.84 $6,606.11 $32,388.22
Attack ferry
terminal 
$355,235.90 $40,367.41 $73,034.68 $285,634.98
Attack both $410,389.61       $223,571.43 $123,571.43 $510,389.61
Refrain from 
attack 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Table 7: Notional  defender post-deterrence unconditional risk values, defender deters by investing in four 
different ways
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Table 7  shows that regardless of what  the defender  does to deter, the greatest risk is of having 
both  targets simultaneously  attacked; but  intuitively  – by  investing  at  both targets – this risk  is 
minimized. These unconditional  risk scores reflect  the vulnerability  reduction  effects of the 
notional grant investments,  but  also reflect the deterrence effects (changing attacker intent)  of 
the investments.  Now, we compare this pre-deterrence and post-deterrence data  to develop our 
deterrence portfolio.
COMPARING PRE-DETERRENCE AND POST-DETERRENCE DATA
Quantification of Deterrence
We compare intent  values from  Tables 3  and 6, using Equation  1  to quantify  the deterrence 
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N/A N/A N/A 0.00%
Table 8: Notional quantification of deterrence effectiveness of four different defender deterrence COA
Notice that  investing at  target A  reduced 
attacker  intent to attack target  A  nearly  72%, 
whereas the negative sign  for attacking  B 
means the attacker  is actually  incentivized to 
attack  target  B.  Thus,  this deterrence COA  is 
quantified as 72% effective at  deterring  an 
attack  against  target A,  whereas it  is 24% 
ineffective at deterring  an  attack against 
target  B.  It is intuitive that we would transfer 
intent to B by  deterring  attacks on A,  and we 
can  quantify  this intuition  here.  Now, we 
want to know  the deterrence effectiveness of 
investing at target B.
As expected,  investing  at target B 
incentivizes the attacker to attack target  A,  by 
increasing  intent 128%, whereas it  reduces 
intent to attack  B and thus deters by  43%. 
Thus, this transfers intent to attack target A. 
Given  that  we have to make a  decision  on 
where to invest  to deter,  would we rather 
invest at  A  or  B? To support this decision,  we 
must  know  how  defender  unconditional  risk 
changes given each  possible deterrence COA. 
Transfer  of intent  and quantifiable deterrence 
effectiveness are useful metrics but are also 
means to an  end: determining  the resulting 
change in unconditional risk. 
Finally,  we examine the deterrence 
effectiveness of investing  at both targets. The 
attacker  is marginally  incentivized to attack 
target B,  perhaps because of the large 
consequence as compared to that  of target  A, 
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and the attacker  is slightly  deterred from 
attacking target  A  in  response.  As with  the 
previous two deterrence investment  options, 
we must  determine the resulting  defender 
conditional risk across all attacker  options, if 
the defender  deters by  investing  at  both 
targets.  We note that  the deterrence 
effectiveness of refraining  from  investment is 
0% for all  attacker  options; attacker  post-
deterrence intent does not  change from  pre-
deterrence intent  if the defender  does 
nothing.
New Defender Unconditional Risk
Given  this deterrence quantification  data, we 
now  analyze the second component of a 
deterrence portfolio,  or  how  defender 
unconditional  risk  changes as a  result  of 
quantifiable deterrence. We leverage Table 7 
data  and aggregate defender  unconditional 
risk given an lth deterrence COA. 
Deterrence COA 




Invest at ferry 
terminal
$337,877.67
Invest at both $203,212.22
Invest at neither $828,412.81
Table 9: Comparing aggregate defender unconditional risk given certain defender deterrence investments
Overall,  the best quantifiably  effective 
defender  deterrence COA is to deter  by 
investing  at  both  the chemical facility  and the 
ferry  terminal,  as the resulting unconditional 
risk is lowest.  The least  quantifiably  effective 
deterrence COA  is to do nothing, as the risk  is 
highest. From  a  deterrence effectiveness and 
unconditional risk reduction perspective, 
these seem  intuitive decisions,  but  with our 
methodology  we can  quantify  the deterrent 
effect  of these COA  and quantify  the impacts 
on  risk  reduction,  relative  to the impacts of 
other COA.  Thus we see relative strengths 
and weakness of each  option,  and a  decision 
maker can  improve their  risk reduction  and 
deterrence performance measurement 
reporting  beyond just reporting  “we’ve 
invested to deter  and reduce risk.”  Also, this 
t e c h n i q u e o f a g g r e g a t e d e f e n d e r 
unconditional  risk across all attacker  options 
assuages the concern  with  transferring intent 
or  risk from  one target  to another;44  if we 
simply  compare all  possible outcomes before 
deterrence and after deterrence,  we now  have 
a  metric that  acknowledges possible transfer 
of intent  between  targets,  but looks at  the big 
picture. We believe a “transfer  of intent” does 
not necessarily  equate to a  transfer  of risk. 
We must  consider  the capability  to execute an 
attack,  vulnerabi l i ty  to attack,  and 
consequence of an  attack on all  targets in  the 
game. If the resulting  intent  to attack  target 
B, when  combined with  these other  risk 
f a c t o r s ,  r e n d e r s a n  o v e r a l l l o w e r 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l r i s k t o B t h a n  t h e 
unconditional  risk of an attack on  target A,  in 
fact we have not transferred risk.
Return on Investment
Suppose the grant to defend the chemical 
facility  with  additional CCTV  is for  $1 
million; the grant to defend the ferry  terminal 
by  training and equipping  security  personnel 
costs $2  million, and $3  million is the cost  to 
defend both  simultaneously.  We show  the 
ROI of each deterrence COA:
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Deterrence COA
ROI (unitless)
Invest at target A 2.66*10^-7
Invest at target B 3.01*10^-7
Invest at both 3.12*10^-7
Invest at neither N/A
Table 10: ROI of certain defender deterrence investments (ROI unit-less since risk reduction in $)
Notice that  there is no ROI of refraining 
from  investment,  as we cannot divide by  $0. 
Since we invested the same total dollar 
amount  for  each  lth  deterrence COA  in  this 
example,  we get  the best  ROI from  investing 
in  both  targets, as that created the lowest 
aggregate  defender  unconditional risk  as seen 
in  Table 9.  This is an additional  performance 
measurement  for  a  decision  maker  to report. 
However,  if we were to use different  dollar 
values for  the different  lth  COA,  the ROI 
rankings might be different.
Using  Tables 2  through  10,  we can  now 
create deterrence portfolios for  each  lth 
deterrence COA. For  example the deterrence 
portfolio for  lth  COA=investing at target  A, 
with  respect all  possible kth  attacker  post-
deterrence options, is:
Figure 1: Values for deterrence portfolio, 
defender deters by investing at chemical facility 
alone (target A), perfect information
In  Figure 1,  represents average 
unconditional  risk resulting  from  deterring at 
target  A.  We can  repeat  this consolidation  of 
Tables 2  through  10  for the remaining three 
deterrence COA, which  will  show  that 
investing  at  both  targets is the best  option  for 
reducing risk and ROI. These deterrence 
portfolios are a  succinct way  for  government 
agencies and CI owners/operators to report 
the deterrence effectiveness of deterrence 
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measures, and resulting  CI risk  reduction  and 
ROI. Decision makers may  value different 
components of these portfolios differently; if 
both  the government and CI operators will 
invest to deter, then they  must  decide what 
the most  important component of the 
deterrence portfolios are. If industry  is the 
only  contributor of deterrence funding, then 
perhaps ROI may  be the most important 
component. If government is the only 
contributor,  the public  may  expect  risk  to be 
reduced as much  as possible,  regardless of 
ROI. Our  methodology  simply  supports the 
need to analyze the data; decision  makers 
must then make the decisions.
COMPARING CASE STUDY 
RESULTS TO THOSE OF A CASE 
STUDY WITH IMPERFECT 
INFORMATION ASSUMPTIONS
Since we assumed perfect information  for  the 
results of our  case study,  we want  now  to 
show  how  these deterrence portfolios change 
f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a t t a c k e r  i n f o r m a t i o n 
imperfection  biases. We show  this analysis, 
using  the same notional data  as before but 
including  each  of the three attacker 
information  imperfection  biases: neutral, 
overconfident, and conservative. These biases 
are part  of the scenario development, often 
referred to as “design-basis threat.”  This 
analysis is available from  the authors, and 
has practical implications for  decision 
makers. We summarize our limited analyses:
1. We get  counterintuitive results for  when a 
neutral attacker is assumed; we can 
actually  show  that  when  we have little to 
invest at  the chemical facility  (target A) it 
actually  makes sense to make that 
information  known  to the attacker, 
because the average unconditional risk to 
the defender  is less if the  deterrence 
i n v e s t m e n t i s k n o w n  g i v e n  t h i s 
deterrence COA. In  contrast,  if we have a 
lot  to invest  at the chemical  facility,  we 
can  show  that  it  makes sense to withhold 
that  information. These findings are due 
to the disparity  in  the notional maximum 
economic  consequence values of the 
chemical facility  and the ferry  terminal, 
and may  not  hold if we change the 
n o t i o n a l t a r g e t  d a t a . T h u s ,  i n 
circumstances similar  to those of our 
notional example,  a decision  maker  may 
prefer  to make a counterintuitive decision 
and ensure perfect information  if they 
deter  by  investing  at the chemical facility, 
even if they do not invest much. 
2. For  when we assume an  overconfident 
attacker, it  makes sense for  the defender 
to withhold information  i f their 
deterrence COA  is to invest  at  a  target 
with  lower  maximum  economic value. 
This seems counterintuitive as in  general 
if we have an  overconfident attacker, 
making  our  deterrence information 
known to the attacker  might reduce their 
confidence,  but  we show  that this is not 
necessarily  true. Thus, a  decision  maker 
in  circumstances similar  to those of our 
notional examples may  prefer  to invest  at 
the chemical facility  but ensure that the 
details of that  investment are withheld 
from an overconfident attacker.
3. F i n a l l y , f o r  w h e n  w e a s s u m e a 
conservative attacker,  it makes sense for 
the defender  to communicate deterrence 
information  if their  deterrence COA is to 
invest at  a target  with  a  lower  maximum 
economic value. This also seems 
counterintuitive as in  general if we have a 
conservative attacker  they  might be 
emboldened by  information  about  what 
the defender  is doing  to deter,  but  we 
show  this is not  necessarily  true.  Thus,  a 
decision  maker  in circumstances similar 
to those of our  notional examples may 
prefer  to invest  at  the chemical facility, 
and should ensure the details of that 
investment  are communicated to a 
conservative attacker.
DETERRENCE METHODOLOGY 
AND APPLICATION: SUMMARY 
We have shown  how  to quantify  deterrence 
effectiveness of different  defender  courses of 
action, based on  the changes in  attacker 
intent values after  the defender  deters,  as 
compared to the attacker  intent  values before 
the defender  deters.  These intent  values are 
functions of attacker  pre-deterrence and 
post-deterrence expected utilities,  and those 
utilities are functions of attacker  capability  to 
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attack, CI target vulnerability, and CI 
consequence if attacked. Together,  capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence make up 
defender  conditional risk, or  the risk given  an 
attack is already desired (intent=100%). 
We have also shown  how  to quantify  the 
average defender  unconditional risk, or 
conditional risk multiplied by  the attacker 
intent  probability,  both  before and after 
measurable deterrence.  Finally,  we have 
shown how  to calculate return on  investment 
of the  deterrence COA, and we have shown 
how  to incorporate these data  into a 
deterrence portfolio which CI officials and 
government  agencies can use to report  both 
quantifiable deterrence and resulting  CI risk 
reduction/ROI. This approach  allows a 
practitioner  to implement  DHS policy,  which 
advocates both  deterrence and risk  reduction, 
in  an  integrated fashion. Our  methodology  is 
general  enough  to be applied to CI in  multiple 
sectors,  as our  example demonstrated, and 
the genera l concepts o f capabi l i ty , 
vulnerability,  and consequence can be 
a p p l i e d t o a n y  t y p e o f i n t e n t i o n a l 
act. 
Our  example of how  our methodology 
would be applied produced deterrence 
portfolios of four  different  deterrence COA. 
Overall, we found that  investing in  both 
targets in  a  two-target  game yielded the best 
quantifiable deterrence effectiveness, the 
lowest unconditional  risk  to the defender, 
and the best ROI.  Our brief analysis of a 
deterrence portfolio under  imperfect 
information  circumstances revealed some 
counterintuitive results with  implications for 
decision makers. 
DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK
Our  methodology  and findings are based on 
many  assumptions. Future work on 
quantifying  CI deterrence must  consider 
these assumptions and vary  them  in order  to 
discover  new  insights into this challenge.  We 
offer the following specific suggestions.
CIKR SECTOR SPECIFICS
While  we believe our  proposed methodology 
is general  enough  to be applied to all  DHS 
sectors, future work should examine ways to 
tailor this broad methodology  to reflect 
nuances of CIKR in different CIKR sectors.
OWNER/OPERATOR ROLE
Future work  may  be necessary  to modify  this 
methodology  for  scenarios where owners/
operators implement security  measures 
intended to deter, but  bear  the costs 
themselves. 
INITIAL TARGET AND ACTOR DATA 
ASSUMPTIONS
We have assumed specific  CI target 
characteristics,  defender  pre-deterrence 
investments in  vulnerability  and consequence 
reduction,  attacker  investment  in  capability 
enhancement,  and other  factors.  Future work 
should modify  this data  before drawing 
conclusions from  this methodology  to 
quantify  deterrence.  Also, future work could 
change the complexity  of various risk 
equation  components as desired; for 
example,  the consequence equations could be 
expanded to include factors such  as loss of 
public trust.
UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS
There is inherent  uncertainty  and subjectivity 
in probabilistic risk analysis. Since our 
methodology  uses probabilistic capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence mitigation 
estimates, future work must  address the 
uncertainty  associated with  these estimates 
and determine the implicat ions for 
quantifiable deterrence effectiveness and 
resulting risk  reduction. Tools such  as 
MSRAM,  which  inform  and are improved by 
our  deterrence quantification  methodology, 
have built-in  subjectivity  reduction  measures 
that could be leveraged.
GAME THEORY APPROACH 
ASSUMPTIONS
We have used an  unusual  approach  to a  game 
theoretical  analysis by  discarding  the notion 
of using either  a  pure or  mixed strategy  Nash 
Equilibrium. We also have taken  the unusual 
approach of using attacker  information 
imperfect ion  biases as a  proxy  for 
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information  when  perfect  information  about 
defender  investments is not available. Our 
approach  is suited for  our  assumptions that 
neither  pure nor mixed equilibrium  strategies 
are appropriate for  our  present  focus on 
quantifying the deterrence effects of defender 
investments.  Nonetheless, future work 
should leverage more traditional game 
t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s t o q u a n t i f y 
deterrence.  In  support  of such  future work, 
we have already  hypothesized how  defender 
expected utility  functions should be 
formulated for  a more traditional game 
theoretical  approach.  The defender  expected 
utility  at  equilibrium  would be converted to 
loss,  and then  combined with  attacker  intent 
to attack  (presumably  with  a  pure NE that 
intent is 100%) to show  the new  defender 
unconditional risk. 
Also, we assumed a two-target game; 
future work  should examine how  deterrence 
can  be quantified in  a  game with  more than 
two CI targets. This may  require computer 
programs.  Also,  there are many  repositories 
of CIKR data  and risk  information,  such  as 
MSRAM,  ACAMS,  and other databases to 
assist with this endeavor.
ADVERSARY TARGET PREFERENCES
Our  example assumes the attacker  has no 
preference for a  certain target  type; they 
simply  want to maximize their  overall 
expected utility  from  attacks.  Future research 
can  apply  this methodology  for  issue-specific 
groups such  as eco-terrorists who only  want 
to target specific  target  types. This can 
support  decision  making  on  where to allocate 
defensive resources amongst  similar  target 
types in a defined geographic area. 
OTHER RISK METHODOLOGIES
Our  example has leveraged notional data 
from  one risk analysis tool,  the Coast  Guard’s 
MSRAM.  Future work  may  use risk  data  from 
different tools and techniques to get  the CIKR 
vulnerability  and consequence data, and 
attacker  capability  data  our  approaches 
requires.
NETWORK ANALYSIS AND CIKR 
INTERDEPENDENCIES
Future work will examine how  to quantify  the 
deterrence effects of investments to secure 
networks of infrastructure from  attack, 
including cyber  networks.  Network analysis 
uses different  mathematical  techniques to 
calculate network risk,  but  our  methodology 
could still be applied. Future research  could 
also consider  the deterrent effects of 
investments in  CIKR when those CIKR are 
co-located in  or  close proximity  to other 
CIKR.
UTILITY FUNCTION COMPOSITION 
ASSUMPTIONS
We assumed attacker  utilities and defender 
expected losses (risk)  did not  subtract their 
respective expenditures from  the CI target 
values; the utility  functions were only 
capability,  vulnerability,  and consequence 
modeled as functions of those expenditures. 
However,  one could easily  claim  that  attacker 
utility  and defender  risk must  account  for  the 
respective lost  expenditures, and subtract 
them  from  the expected benefit  or  add them 
onto the defender loss if an  attack on  a CI 
succeeds.  Future work  could create utility 
functions that  subtract expenditures from 
target  value. Also, we assumed the attacker’s 
expected utility  as a  function  of capability, 
vulnerability,  and consequence, was the same 
as the defender’s expected loss,  thus creating 
a  “symmetry”  between attacker  and defender 
functions.  Introducing  costs and budgets to 
the utility  functions for  each  actor  could 
create an asymmetrical game.
INFORMATION AVAILABILITY 
CIRCUMSTANCE ASSUMPTIONS
We have assumed that  CI information  was 
known to the attacker  prior  to defender 
deterrence efforts; future analysis could 
assume that  the defender wants to quantify 
the deterrent effect  of additional defensive 
investments even  when  their  original  CI 
investments and resulting  security  were not 
clear  to the attacker. We have also assumed 
that  attacker  information  is perfectly  known 
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to the defender; in  reality  this is likely  not 
true and should be examined.
In situations where perfect  information  is 
determined to be more advantageous,  the CI 
operator  must  work actively  with  law 
enforcement  and other  government entities 
to aggressively  communicate security  and 
consequence mitigation  deterrence measure 
information, in  great  detail to potential 
attackers.  Obviously, this wil l  be a 
challenging and imperfect  endeavor,  but  the 
effort  is still  warranted if the methodology 
shows it  is to our  advantage to make 
information  known to prospective attackers. 
The intelligence community  could contribute 
to this effort  as they  glean  information  on 
what  the adversary  knows and believes about 
our  deterrence efforts,  but  much  work must 
be done by  CI operators and law  enforcement 
authorities,  as well as public figures that 
communicate effectively  and reach  a  broad 
audience.
However,  if the effort required to develop 
and execute a  public affairs deterrence 
campaign  exceeds the expected loss to the 
government  if deterrence fails,  perhaps the 
campaign  is not  worthwhile,  and the 
quantitative result  supporting  a  perfect 
information advantage may be discarded.
In  situations where imperfect  information 
is determined to be more advantageous, the 
CI operator  and law  enforcement, as well  as 
public figures, must collaborate to ensure 
security  measures are not  obvious to any 
observer.  This could entail  conduct  “red cell” 
exercises where someone simulates a 
terrorist  planning cell and visit  a  CI to see 
what  security  they  can  identify,  and/or 
researches open  source documentation  on 
the security  and economic  value of CI.  Also, 
the government  may  even have to classify 
security  measures, such  as federal  grant 
funding.
UTILITY THEORY ASSUMPTIONS
We assumed subjective expected utility  in  our 
case study.  In our  initial work to expand this 
methodology  leveraging  prospect  utility 
theory, we have used a  linear scale for  the PU 
utility  and probability  modifiers, but  the 
work  of Daniel Kahneman  and Amos Tversky 
suggests a nonlinear  scale. 45  Future work 
should leverage a  nonlinear scale, and can 
exercise that  scale by  assuming  different 
deterrence investment  amounts in  the 
deterrence game and determining  which 
modifier applies.  Kahneman  and Tversky 
have done other work on decision analysis 
that  could be applied to the utility  functions. 
Also,  Lisa  Carlson  and Raymond Dacey 
suggest that  the PU probability  weighting 
functions may  determine the difference 
between  behavior  of attackers under  SEU 
assumptions and under  PU assumptions;46 
thus the extent to which deterrence might  be 
more quantifiably  effective under one 
assumption as compared to the other  could 
be analyzed by  explicitly  observing  the effects 
of different probability weights.
PROBABILITY-INVESTMENT 
RELATIONSHIP ASSUMPTIONS
Future work should also change the slope of 
the exponential  probability-investment 
relationship curves that  support  capability, 
vulnerability, and economic consequence 
estimates. We assumed elimination  fractions 
of 5% vulnerability  and 5% capability  to 
attack  in  our  initial work  to create deterrence 
portfolios leveraging  exponential probability-
investment  relationship assumptions; these 
fractions could be modified to yield different 
curves and possibly  yield different  deterrence 
portfolio results.  Also, we have assumed a 
linear  relationship between  target  economic 
value retention  and defender  consequence 
mitigation  investment  in  this paper’s 
example.  In  reality,  this relationship may  be 
nonlinear. We only  assumed that  CI target 
vulnerability  and attacker  capability 
probability-investment relationships could be 
nonlinear  on  theoretical  grounds; future 
work  should analyze relationships between 
probability  reduction  and investments to 
develop rough  cost  curves.  Finally, we have 
assumed attacker capability  is reduced by 
defender  offensive counterterrorism 
investment, but the attacker  does not 
counteract  this effect  by  increasing their 
investments. Future work should model the 
simultaneous effects of attacker  and defender 
investment upon attacker capability.
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A Maritime Threat Assessment of Sea Based Criminal 
Organizations and Terrorist Operations
Terrance G. Lichtenwald, Mara H. Steinhour, and Frank S. Perri
ABSTRACT
This article  reviews the United States 
Department of Defense, law  enforcement, 
and intelligence agencies’ use of the 
Maritime Strategic Doctrine and the Drug 
Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act to  combat 
drug smuggling vessels and boats during 
counter-drug smuggling operations. Threat 
analysis, using strategic warning indicators, 
is proposed and employed to analyze a 
range of factors: coalitions  between drug 
trafficking and terrorist organizations,  self-
propelled semi-submersible vessels, low-
profile vessels,  robotically controlled and 
human-piloted submarines, and recruitment 
of captains and crews  with the ability to 
pilot these vessels and boats.  Drug 
trafficking organizations and terrorist 
groups’  inter-technology transfer of sea-
based smuggling and terror tactics  are 
analyzed.  Circumstances  under which 
s t r a t e g i c w a r n i n g i n d i c a t o r s  m a y 
necessitate  policy changes  to  the Maritime 
Strategic Doctrine are described.
INTRODUCTION
Tell me what you know. Tell me what you 
don’t know. Tell me what you think. Always 
distinguish which is which.
General Colin L. Powell, USA, CJCS, 
1990 
Within the past year,  two different  drug 
trafficking  submarine construction projects 
were discovered: one in  Ecuador near  a 
tributary  close to the Colombian border  and 
the second in  Timbiqui, Colombia. The 
discovery  of submarine construction  sites 
again  raised the issue of threats posed by 
S o u t h  A m e r i c a n d r u g  t r a f f i c k i n g 
organizations (DTO) and terrorist  group 
coalitions. Upper  level  US policymakers are 
concerned about  terrorist  groups’ substantial 
control  over  construction sites for  low  profile 
vesse ls (LPV) , se l f -propel led semi-
submersibles (SPSS), and submarines in 
South  America.  US Representative Ted Poe, 
R-Texas,  announced during a  speech  in the 
House in May 2011:
Just to be clear, Mr. Speaker, intelligence 
tells us that these submarines are made by 
the Revolutionary  Armed Forces of 
Colombia, or FARC. That is the military 
wing of the Colombian Communist Party. 
Of course, that is how they finance their 
revolution  and the revolutionary  ideas in 
South America.1
 There are reports that the FARC has 
substantial control over  the construction 
process,  in  large part  due to the FARC 
controlling  the drug labs in  the jungles and 
the exit routes for drug trafficking. 2
FARC terrorist  groups, their  connection 
with  DTO,  and control of construction  sites 
raise concerns that  Middle Eastern  terrorist 
groups, which  have metastasized from 
western  Asia  to South America,  will gain 
access to SPSS and LPV  and use them  in 
terrorist  attacks. 3  These groups include 
Hezbollah  and Hamas, as well as Shining 
Path  Maoist-style narco-terrorists of Peru. 
Submarine discoveries in  Colombia  and 
Ecuador  raised questions of how  to assess the 
probability  that  DTO or  terrorist  groups 
employing  LPV, SPSS, or  submarines might 
attack  the United States, what form  the 
attacks would take, and whether  there is a 
method by  which  the United States could 
verify that an attack is imminent. 
The 1960s intelligence mission  of the 
National  Indications Center  provided 
strategic  warning  of possible attack  to the 
United States from  the Sino-Soviet  Bloc. The 
center’s threat  assessment model,  developed 
in  1963, shows promise when adapted for 
today’s threat  of sea-based drug smuggling. 
To achieve its mission, the center  developed a 
basic  inferential structure, referred to as an 
indicator  list,  which  defined 123  types of 
specific behaviors that  a  Sino-Soviet  Bloc 
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country  might  take if it  intended to wage war 
against the United States.  The specific 
occurrence of one of these behaviors was 
called an indication. “Indicators were used to 
develop strategic  warnings, which  differ  from 
tactical warnings in  timeliness and in 
derivation.” 4  Tactical  warnings rely 
exclusively  upon  mechanical  detection 
devices, such  as sonar nets which  cannot 
trigger  warnings until  the attack  has been  set 
in  motion,  thus providing no more than a  few 
hours and probably  much  less for  US forces 
to react. Conversely,  strategic  warnings given 
before a  strike is launched are derived from 
estimating enemy  intentions as well as 
specific behaviors. While the warnings are to 
some extent  dependent  upon  signals from 
mechanical detection  devices, they  also 
involve the analysis of a  great  deal of other 
data less easily quantified and correlated. 
The Ramsey  and Borner  model is based on 
a  research  study  that  quantified and ranked 
the relevance of different types of indicator 
patterns of different types of hostile  action 
indicating a  premeditated surprise attack  on 
the United States by  the Soviet  Union. In  this 
article,  probable strategic  warning  indicators 
based on analysis of observed behaviors of 
DTO and terrorist group coalitions are 
examined using  a  modified Ramsey  and 
Borner model.  The Colombian  Norte del Valle 
drug  cartel  and the FARC are compared 
against the Liberation  Tigers of Tamil  Eelam 
(LTTE),  a Sri Lankan  rebel/terrorist  group 
and the only  terrorist  group to have its own 
navy,  including  submarines. Terrorist  sea-
based attacks, such  as the Mumbai attack  of 
2008  during which  terrorist  kill teams were 
inserted in  country  by  way  of open water 
craft; North  Korea’s attacks on South  Korea, 
employing  submarine warfare; the 2005 
Abdullah  Azzam  Brigades rocket  attack on  US 
amphibious assault ships; and the al-Qaeda 
attacks in  January  and October  of 2000 
employing  open water  craft  are compared 
and contrasted using  the modified Ramsey 
and Borner model.5
Observable behaviors of DTO and terrorist 
groups in  South  America  indicate that 
smuggling and terrorist  group coalitions’ 
intentions and capabilities to construct LPV 
that  operate at  the surface, SPSS capable of 
dropping  several  feet below  the surface,  and 
submarines that  operate at depths as shallow 
as sixty-five feet  will  exist  as long  as they  are 
financially viable. 
Prior  to the demise of the LTTE in  2009, 
the group developed a  smuggling warfare 
navy  called the Kadal Puli,  or  Sea Tigers, 
which consisted of a  variety  of vessel 
classifications: suicide bomber,  LPV,  and 
SPSS for  penetrating  the Sri Lanka  Navy 
blockade, as well as patrol boats,  gunboats, 
and submarines. The Sea  Tigers constructed 
some of these craft in  their  own  boatyards. 
The Sea  Tigers also had a  flotilla  of 
commercial vessels including,  but not  limited 
to,  cargo and fishing vessels. Their initial 
missions were smuggling supplies (military 
supplies, weapons, etc.)  through  the narrow 
straits between  India  and Sri Lanka,  as well 
as piracy, robbery,  and finally  drug 
smuggling, the profits from  which  supported 
the antigovernment cause. 6  Additional 
missions included attacking  and sinking  Sri 
Lankan  Navy  vessels and supporting  the 
Black  Tigers – the ground troops of the 
LTTE.7   The Sea  Tigers are of interest  as a 
touchstone for a  three-way  comparison 
among DTO with  no terrorist  intent, 
narcoterrorists,  and terrorist  groups that  also 
engage in narcotic smuggling for profit.  
There may  be a concern that  DTO and 
terrorist  groups may  not cooperate because 
they  have different  motives.  However  an 
analogy  can be drawn  to land-based 
relationships that exist  between  organized 
crime and terrorist  groups. 8  The authors 
suggest caution  in making  assumptions 
concerning interactions in  reference to sea-
based interactions. For  example,  the 
problems of organized crime and terrorism 
were often considered separate phenomena 
prior  to 9/11.  Security  studies, the military, 
and law  enforcement seminars discussed the 
emerging  threat of transnational organized 
crime or  terrorism,  but  the important  links 
between  the two were rarely  made. This lack 
of linkage may  be due in  part  to the fact that 
organized crime and terrorism  are usually 
viewed as two different forms of crime. 
Organized crime’s main focus is economic 
profit, while terrorism  is often  viewed as 
motivated by  ideological aims and a  desire for 
political change. 
The 1990s can  be described as the decade 
in  which  the crime-terror nexus was 
c o n s o l i d a t e d a n d t h e t w o s e p a r a t e 
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organizations identifiable by  their  distinct 
motives began to reveal operational  and 
organizational  similarities.  In  fact, organized 
crime and terrorism  appear  to be learning 
from  one another  and adapting to each 
other’s successes and failures.9  Since 
September  11,  2001  nations acknowledge the 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e s e 
organizations, especially  since terrorist 
groups now  use the services of organized 
crime to assist  their  activities and terrorists 
themselves engage in  organized crime 
activities as a  means of financial support. 
Furthermore,  terrorist  groups adopt methods 
to finance their  operations that were once 
believed to be within the province of 
organized crime. 10  Just  as land-based 
terrorist  groups have blurred motives and 
tactics that  may  resemble those of organized 
crime groups that  operate on  land, it  is not 
unreasonable to extrapolate the same 
analysis to the issues presented herein. 11
South  American  DTO’s inclusion  of 
submarines in their  smuggling  navies, with 
the capability  to cruise into US territorial 
waters,  raises the question of what the 
similarities and differences are between the 
vessels in  the DTO navies and the terrorist 
navies.  Moreover,  can  the similarities and 
differences between  the drug trafficking  and 
terrorist  navies be reliably  identified? To 
what extent do the similarities and 
differences indicate  shifts in  strategic 
thinking  and provide indicators of different 
types of threats to United States?
WHAT WE KNOW
South  American DTO constructed LPV  that 
cruise between  western and northern parts of 
South  America into eastern  and western  parts 
of Central  America.  LPV  have been  identified 
setting to sea  from  the west coast  of Colombia 
(Buenaventura).  These vessels cruise the 
Pacific  Ocean  and rendezvous off the 
southwest coast  of Mexico with  smugglers 
who transport  the drugs inland. A  second set 
of LPV  go to sea  from  the north  coast  of 
Colombia  and cruise through  the Caribbean 
Sea and rendezvous off the southeast  coast  of 
Mexico. Advantages of launching smuggling 
operations in  the Pacific  are the calmer 
waters and a  coast  that  is not  as closely 
monitored or  densely  populated as the 
Caribbean  shoreline. However,  the Caribbean 
shoreline offers access to hideaways in  the 
islands and direct routes to Central America 
and Europe. 12  LPV  smugglers have further 
increased the probability  of getting  through 
sea-based security  by  employing  navigation 
and communication equipment, stealth 
technology, and avoidance tactics.
A  common  land-based smuggl ing 
technique is to simultaneously  send multiple 
smuggling  vehicles using  a  variety  of 
smuggling  methods to cross territory, 
including  official entry  points. Sea-based 
smugglers mirror that  strategy  by  employing 
multiple LPV  or  SPSS simultaneously  to cross 
a  country’s territorial  waters. The United 
States’ sea  based national security  policy 
addressing the threat  posed by  sea-based 
smugglers was explained in  detail in  A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, presented by  the chief of naval 
operations and the commandants of the US 
Marine Corps and US Coast  Guard at  the 
International Seapower  Symposium  in 
Newport, R.I.  on  Oct 17,  2007. The strategy 
draws the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast 
Guard even  closer  together  in  working to 
protect  and sustain the American  way  of life 
and is referred to in  this paper  as the 
Maritime Strategic Doctrine.13
What is different  about  sea-based 
smuggling  strategy  – from  a  national  security 
threat  assessment perspective – is that these 
smuggling  craft  are coordinated to penetrate 
territorial sea  boundaries on  both coasts of 
Central  America, a  strategy  analogous to 
coordinated penetration of Pacific  and 
Atlantic coastal territorial waters of the 
United States simultaneously.  To date, 
coordinated simultaneous penetration of a 
country  from  two different  directions of its 
land or  coastal borders has not  been observed 
except during  a  time of war.  Three factors 
inherent  in  South  American  DTO using  LPV 
and SPSS necessitate a  review  of sources and 
methods used to evaluate  threats they  may 
pose to US national security:
• Inherent  similarities between (a) 
underwater  penetration  of territorial 
waters and behaviors identical  to a  state-
sponsored prelude to war and (b) 
terrorist groups using similar methods. 
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• The possibility  that  terrorist groups use 
drug  terrorist  coalitions to gain  sources 
and methods that  can  be modified for 
t e r r o r i s t  a t t a c k s t h e n  p a s s t h i s 
informat ion  to another  terror is t 
organization  (i.e.,  LTTE sharing sea-
based methods,  including  suicide sea 
bombing techniques, with al-Qaeda). 
• The conditions that  enable  terrorist 
groups to gain  control  of an LPV, SPSS, or 
submarine capable of penetrating  US or 
allied territorial waters.  An  example of 
this is where a  terrorist group, which  has 
onsite access and operational knowledge, 
uses an  LTTE Sea Tigers terrorist  method 
and gains access to an  LPV,  SPSS, 
smuggling  torpedo,  or  submarine via 
hijacking  (while at  sea) or  sea  robbed 
(while in  the “harbor”) of the craft from 
the DTO.14 
IDENTIFYING DRUG TERRORIST 
BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS
During  the Cold War, intelligence agencies 
that  monitored and analyzed threat 
potentials had a  general sense of how  many 
Sino-Soviet Bloc sea  vessels (including 
submarines)  were produced each year,  dry-
docked for  repairs,  and operated at  sea. 
Conversely, US agencies do not know  the 
number  of smuggling  LPV  and SPSS,  or  the 
possible existence of submarines, in  the 
Pacific and Caribbean on  a  mission  at  any 
one time.  Also unknown  are the numbers of 
LPV and SPSS under  construction, produced, 
and ready  to be outfitted.  The calculations 
regarding  the possible size of the smuggling 
fleet is derived from  captured vessels. For 
example,  during  the past  three years, 
Colombia  has succeed in  intercepting  sixteen 
SPSS and LPV  in  the Pacific  on  courses 
toward Central America.15  During 2007, 
thirteen of the LPV were seized on  Colombian 
dry  land or  stopped at  sea. In  the first  six 
months of 2008, the US Coast  Guard and the 
US Navy detected forty-two LPV or SPSS. 16 
The general  behaviors of LPV  and SPSS at 
sea  are known.  A  small  but  notable number 
of LPV  and SPSS set  to sea  from  Ecuador, 
travel  around the Galapagos Islands and 
then, bearing on  a  northeast course, head to 
the coast  of Central  America.  Another  set, 
which  constitutes the majority  of the vessels, 
leaves South  America  and cruises to the east 
of the Galapagos,  bearing  north  to Central 
America.  A  third smuggling  fleet  leaves 
northern  Colombia, cruises north  along  the 
South  American  coastline,  and arrives in 
Honduras,  Guatemala,  and Belize.  A  fourth 
fleet leaves northern  Colombia  and cruises to 
Haiti,  Jamaica,  or  around the southeast of 
Cuba  and north  to the Florida  Keys.  Thus,  if 
an  applied behavioral  analysis indicates that 
DTO have fallen  into predictable behavior 
patterns such  as “always”  or  “usually,” 
mechanical detection  warning  devices can  be 
placed across the path  of the smuggling 
vessels.
United States and allied submarines in  the 
Pacific or  the Caribbean may  lie in  wait  to 
gather  information  (including  tracking  of 
LPV,  SPSS, or  submarines as they  leave the 
harbors) and run  on  a  finite range of course 
headings or  through  known  choke points 
such  as off the southeast  coast of Cuba or  the 
Galapagos Islands. These opportunities can 
be exploited,  as occurred during  the 
Caribbean  U-Boat  battles of World War II 
and the Cold War intelligence operations in 
the Atlantic and Caribbean. The authors 
acknowledge that  heavy  traffic  of LPV  and 
SPSS on  defined smuggling routes necessitate 
considering the possibility  that DTO will send 
submarines by  an  alternative route,  less 
defined and thus less monitored,  and along 
the littoral  zone to take full  advantage of its 
inherent poor  acoustics for  tracking 
submarines.
INDICATORS RELATED TO COMMAND 
AND CONTROL STRUCTURES 
South  American DTO employing  sea-based 
smuggling operations have developed 
command and control  structures with  loose 
and fixed polar  ends of a  continuum. The 
loose structure includes construction of LPV 
for  individuals or  coalitions of smugglers who 
pool their  money  and purchase a  single vessel 
for  smuggling operations for  which  they 
decide the departure time,  course, and crew. 
Highly  organized DTO encourage poorly 
organized independent  smugglers to operate 
in  an  area  targeted by  law  enforcement  and 
intelligence agencies in  a  classic strategy  that 
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is enormously  beneficial  to the DTO.  This is 
because the independent smugglers create a 
rich  target field for  interdiction  vessels to 
pursue and consequently  deplete intelligence 
and law  enforcement resources.  In  this 
strategy,  the highly  organized DTO attempts 
to gain  the advantage of its vessels, 
successfully  completing  the mission  using 
intell igence and counter-intell igence 
information  they  have gathered.  As predicted 
by  the Developmental Smuggling Model  (a 
model used to both  describe different 
smuggling  organizations and the strategies 
they  employ),  what  appears to be chaos,  in 
respect to the multiple smuggling  targets 
sighted in  the Pacific  and Caribbean,  fits into 
a  predictable transnational criminal 
smuggling strategy gestalt.17  
Fixed command and control structures 
construct  LPV,  SPSS, and submarines and 
determine for the fleet  when, where,  and how 
smuggling  vessels are sent to the Pacific and 
the Caribbean and how  captains and crews 
are to return to home base. Therefore, the 
authors put forth  as a  priority  the need to 
find indicators to identify  leaders and 
workers in the sea-based fixed smuggling 
command chain  and how  the leaders 
communicate while on  land, as well  as the 
communication  methods and secret  codes 
used to communicate with  sea-based 
smuggling  vessels.  Additionally,  identifying 
the number  of groups as well as nationalities 
of those involved in  each  LPV, SPSS,  and 
submarine des ign and construct ion 
illuminates possible intent of the vessel or 
boat and thus provides warring indicators. 
For  example, information  gathered from 
the 2011  Colombian  submarine construction 
indicates that  the supplies came from 
multinational sources such  as Russia,  China, 
and the United States,18  thus offering  a 
variety  of possible leads,  each of which  can  be 
traced back  to one command and control 
center. Information  derived from  local 
sources indicated the nationalities of 
individuals involved in  the design and 
construction, as well as their  probable ethnic 
backgrounds.  This information  may  include 
the locations where they  obtained the 
training experience and the contact with  the 
DTO necessary  to be recruited for  and 
participate in  such  a  project, as well  as who 
rented the facility  and the probable 
connection to the DTO. Technological 
indicators cannot gather  information alone 
and will require human information-
gathering methods.
INDICATORS RELATED TO SECRET 
CODES AND COMMUNICATION 
PATTERNS
At this time,  there is no evidence that  LPV  or 
SPSS, either in  the Pacific or  Caribbean,  are 
communicating with  each other  or  employing 
“wolf pack”  smuggling tactics such  as 
employing  a  lead vessel  or  boat  to scout for 
interdiction  ships and then signaling  others 
to avoid detection.19   However, during  one 
South  American  LPV  crew’s debriefing, the 
captain reported that  operations included 
radio communication  using  codes sent  and 
received from  different  locations at different 
times during  the smuggling mission. The first 
set  of communication  consisted of an LPV 
sending  a  transmission to Colombia as often 
as twice a  day  to verify  and correct  course, so 
that  each  vessel would arrive at  the correct 
time and location.  The second set  of 
communication  was sent to receivers within 
the targeted country.  When  the LPV  was at 
the rendezvous point, the targeted country’s 
criminal  organization sent the receiving  boats 
to meet  the LPV to off-load the drugs.20 Thus, 
it  appears,  at least  in  some circumstances, 
that  LPV had an  intersecting  communication 
pattern: Colombian  base to vessel, criminal 
group in  targeted country  such  as Panama  or 
Mexico to the vessel. It  is unknown  whether 
the Colombian base  was communicating  with 
the criminal  group using  the same radio 
frequency  and codes,  or  switching  to other 
methods such  as the Internet,  thereby 
creating a triangle communication pattern. 
INDICATORS RELATED TO VESSELS IN 
THE SOUTH AMERICAN FLEET: A 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
An open-source review  of South  American 
DTO sea-based smuggling  strategy  indicates 
that  DTO have expanded their  surface 
smuggling  fleet  to include a  “silent service” 
consisting  of LPV  and SPSS.  Further,  DTO 
have made at least four  attempts to construct 
with  the intention  to launch  sophisticated 
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SPSS and submarines to the Pacific and one 
attempt to use an  SPSS to retrieve cargo off 
the coast  of Spain.  Comparison  between  the 
vessels and boats that  were in  the Sea  Tigers 
fleet and those belonging  to South  American 
DTO reveal that  the former consisted of 
logistic  craft,  attack  craft,  and suicide craft. 
Some vessels in  the Sea  Tiger  fleet  had special 
modifications,  such  as metal barbs on  the 
front  of the suicide boats to hook into the 
ship they  rammed prior to exploding, 
whereas such  vessels have not been  captured 
under the control of South American DTO. 21 
The capabilities of vessels in  the Sea 
Tiger’s navy  reflected a  different mission. For 
example,  in a manner  similar to Los Zetas 
(the Mexican-based DTO that  employs 
military  grade weapons and tactics to 
temporarily  control areas on  the United 
States-Mexico border  and protect  its 
smuggling  interests) the LTTE navy  was 
engaged in  ship protection  and temporary  sea 
control,  in  addition  to carrying  out  raids and 
delivering supplies.  Thus, there are 
similarities and differences between  the 
militarized capabilities of land and sea-based 
DTO.22 The authors searched for  documents 
listing  the types of vessels in  the South 
American  smuggling  fleet that  would either 
support  or  refute the premise that  South 
American DTO have built vessels with 
capabilities similar  to those of the Sea Tigers, 
such  as suicide craft  and armed fast  water 
craft.
A  classification system  that  described the 
various types of smuggling  craft  known  to 
have been  constructed and employed by 
South  American  DTO is provided in Table 1.23 
For  purposes of discussion,  the authors 
propose the addition of robotic submarines 
divided into two types: Type 1-C,  which  is a 
true submarine in  that  the entire vessel 
remains submerged except  when surfacing  to 
check  positioning or refuel,  similar  to the US 
Navy  Autonomous Underwater  Vehicles 
research  projects; and the second, Type 1-D, 
which  is an  SPSS controlled by  an  antenna 
that  remains above the water  line and is 
remotely piloted similar to a predator drone.
Smuggling Submarines, Torpedoes & Semi-submersibles
Classification System
Type Classification Propulsion Cost Number Dive Control Stealth
Type 1-A Submarine Self propulsion Millions Rare 65 feet to over 300 feet Excellent
Type 1-B Towed torpedo Towed Simple and cheap Several Depth set then towed Moderate 
Type 1-C*Torpedo robotic 
autonomous Electric $500,000 One Set by software Excellent
Ty p e 1 -
D*
Torpedo robotic
remote controlled Electric $500,000 One
Runs just  below 
surface Moderate-excellent
Type 2
Semi-submersible Self propulsion Complex and expensive
Only few 
captured
Ballasting down to 
lower its surface 
profile 
Moderate to excellent
control over its running 
depth but not fully 
submerging
Type 3 Low-profile vessels Self propulsion $250,000- 500,000 Many captured Boat designed to run awash 
Moderate minimize 
radar cross-section
*Authors propose new classification
Table 1: Smuggling Submarines, Torpedoes, and Semi-submersibles Classification System
INDICATORS RELATED TO SOUTH 
AMERICAN SMUGGLING FLEET 
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
The authors identify  three distinct  phases of 
development  for  smuggl ing  vessels: 
experimentation  through  trial and error 
(1992-2004); rapid prototyping  with 
increases in  capability  and use of SPSS 
(2005-2006); and the current  phase of 
mature designs and greater  standardization 
(2007-present).24 At  issue in  this paper  – in 
light of drug  terror group coalitions and rebel 
groups obtaining submarines – is whether 
South  American  smuggling  vessels will go 
into a next phase that entails capabilities that 
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could be used to attack  the US homeland or 
US interests abroad. A  possible alternative 
development phase for  smuggling  fleets is 
evident in  a  comparison  between  the South 
American  drug  smuggling fleet  and land-
based smuggling  vehicles used by  narco-
terrorist  groups operating  in  Mexico. In this 
comparison, the common  feature is the 
behavior  of DTO as they  exercise control over 
territory.  This comparison  raises the question 
of what conditions would be necessary  for 
example when  DTO attack each  other  to sink, 
steal loads or  are attacked by  pirates while at 
sea  for  South  American  sea-based smuggling 
organizations to morph into the militarized 
developmental  stage whereby  they  equip and 
operate sea vessels in  a  manner  similar to 
combat-equipped land-based smuggling 
vehicles recovered in Tamaulipas, a  northern 
border  state of Mexico in  2011. 25  This 
question  is examined in  greater  detail in  the 
threat assessment section of this article.
INDICATORS RELATED TO TRANSFER OF 
SMUGGLING TECHNOLOGY
Theories holding  that  advances in  smuggling 
strategies arise from  adaptation to detection 
methods hypothesized the existence of LPV 
and SPSS before any  were captured. These 
t h e o r i e s s u g g e s t e d t h a t s m u g g l i n g 
organizations would transform  go-fast  boats, 
hobbyist-built  submarine kits,  tourist 
submersible “submarines,”  or  submersibles 
found working ocean-based oil  rigs into craft 
that  adapted to the interdiction  pressure. 
Because an  LPV  or SPSS had not been 
captured, such  craft  were nicknamed “big 
foot”  in  reference to a  mythical creature 
rumored to exist but  not  captured. Since 
1992, when  “big foot”  vessels shifted from 
theory  to reality, observers discovered 
u n a n t i c i p a t e d l e a p s i n  s u b m a r i n e 
development due to transfer  of technology 
from  sources such as the Soviet  Union and 
former Soviet Republics (FSUR). 
The amount  of submarine technology 
transferred from  professional navies to drug 
terrorist  coalitions indicates that significant 
leaps forward in  smuggling  submarines’ 
capabilities must  be anticipated. For 
example,  although  arguments have been 
presented that the Ecuador  submarine was 
“crude”  (i.e., not  capable of diving  below 
sixty-five feet),  the counter argument  is that 
the submarine was constructed without 
unnecessary  expenditures – diving to that 
range effectively  neutralized thermal  imaging 
capabilities. The submarine’s efficient  design 
supplanted that  of the overwrought  Bogota 
2000  steel  double-hulled smuggling 
submarine design.  The Ecuador  submarine 
was covertly  constructed in  a  jungle, in  hope 
of avoiding the fate of the Cartagenita/
Facatativa Colombia  submarine (2000) that 
was detected while undergoing  construction 
in  the village of Cartagenita,  Colombia.  In 
addition,  the Timbiqui,  Colombia, smuggling 
submarine (2011)  was outfitted with essential 
technology  to enhance its anti-detection 
capabilities, demonstrating  that  the designers 
adapted to recent interdiction methods using 
thermal  imagery  detection  technology  on 
o v e r h e a d f l i g h t s . W i t h  r e s p e c t t o 
construction, the authors noted that  drug 
terrorist coalitions reverted to the prior 
strategy  in  that  the 2011  Colombian 
submarine was detected hidden in  a  jungle in 
the Timbiqui region.  
Although  LPV  have a  lower  upfront  cost, 
s m u g g l e r s m a y  r e a s o n a b l y  t u r n  t o 
submarines as a  cost-effective alternative, 
employing  leapfrog  advances gained from 
technology  transfers, requiring fewer total 
crew  members for  the “silent smuggling 
service,”  increasing  range and covert  mission 
time, and enabling round trips using  internal 
f u e l t a n k s . M o r e o v e r , p r o f e s s i o n a l 
submariners have been  trained and 
conditioned to spend months at  sea  operating 
complex machinery  and to remain  silent 
about  their  missions.  These professionals are 
available from  a  variety  of sources,  including 
FSUR. 26 Alternatively,  if DTO do not  want to 
rent an  FSUR captain  or  crew, Russia  is 
offering  submarine courses and training, 
including purchasing or  renting  submarines 
to a  number  of countries – India, Iran,  China, 
Poland, Romania,  Algeria, and Vietnam  – 
with  a  deal  to upgrade Venezuela’s old 
submarines. 27  The transfer  of technology 
through criminal- as opposed to state-
sponsored agreements must  also be 
considered.28 
Based on this reasoning,  South  American 
DTO inevitably  will exploit  technology 
transfers and training opportunities.  Thus,  it 
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would be beneficial  to know  which 
individuals from  South  America  attended 
submarine training  programs (in  such  places 
as the training center  in  Sosnovyy  Bor  near 
St.  Petersburg) and what,  if any, connections 
they  have to smuggling or  terrorist 
organizations.29 In many  respects, the FSUR 
submarine training programs are similar  to 
the flight school the 9/11  terrorists attended. 
Given  the technical assistance and transfer  of 
technology  from  the former  Soviet Union, 
smuggling  submarines now  have a  significant 
tactical advantage: once at  sea,  there may 
rendezvous with  cargo ships carrying  drugs 
and fuel far  away  from  traditional smuggling 
routes.  These vessels will  likely  have been 
purchased or  controlled by  a  DTO,  which 
would likely  provide a  command vessel 
disguised as a  trawler  for  insertion  of smaller 
manned or robotic submarines. 30 
Also, the smuggling submarine can  use 
professional submariners and thereby 
leapfrog ahead in  operational methods,  such 
as remaining submerged as it  approaches, 
off-loading within a  targeted country’s 
territorial waters,  or  moving into the littoral 
zone in  a  manner  similar  to an  SPSS. In 
terms of gaining tactical advantages,  the 
authors argue that  it is reasonable to 
anticipate that  DTO will upgrade as the 
technology  is obtained from  the Type 1-B 
torpedo to the Type 1-C or  Type 1-D. Finally, 
the authors posit  that just  as submarine 
technology  was transferred from  DTO based 
in  South  America  to others based in  Southern 
Europe,  DTO will transfer  the Type 1-C and 
Type 1-D technology  to African- and 
European-based enterprises as well  as to 
terrorist groups.
INDICATORS OF CHANGE IN SMUGGLING 
FLEET STRATEGY
Go-fast  vessels continue to represent 40  to 
almost 50 percent of trafficking in  the 
maritime environment, however,  there has 
been  a  decline in  the use of LPV  and SPSS 
after  they  peaked in  2008. 31 A  critical factor 
in  this decline was the arrest of key  criminals 
by  employing  the Maritime Strategic 
Doctrine (i.e.,  Operation  Panama Express, 
the multiagency  organized crime drug 
enforcement  task force). The arrest of 
Colombian national  Enrique Portocarrero 
(nicknamed Captain Nemo) was key  because 
it  was reported that  he was the principal 
builder of about a  third of the LPV  in  2003, 
although  where the plans came from  is still 
not clear. 32 The arrest  in  Argentina of Ignacio 
Alvarez Meyendorff, one of the  main 
organizers of a  DTO submarine building 
operation, reflected the pressure applied 
through  the Maritime Strategic Doctrine.  The 
suspect, also known as “Old Man”  and “Big 
Brother,”  was identified as working for  the 
Colombian  Norte del Valle drug  cartel. It’s 
believed that  Meyendorff was tracked down 
via  information  obtained by  the US Office of 
Naval Intelligence and the Drug Enforcement 
Agency.33  Many  other factors could account 
for  the decrease of smuggling  craft spotted at 
sea:
• Limited number  of craftsmen, such  as 
Portocarrero, with  the dry-dock skills to 
build vessels.  Even if the drug  traffickers 
are able to mass-produce vessels, the 
arrest  of that one builder  has a  profound 
impact on the construction rate.
• Drug  traffickers reverting  to go-fast  boats 
with  advancements in  packaging  that 
adjust for  shifting  fuel and cargo loads 
while at sea.
• Smuggling vessels navigating within  the 
territorial waters of each  country  as they 
travel  north  with  the goal of avoiding 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  w a t e r s w h e r e t h e 
multinational drug  interdiction  forces are 
most likely to patrol.
• Recent  attempts by  the Colombian 
government  to control the availability  of 
fiberglass used to construct the LPV.34 
• Appe al o f succe ss fu l  land-base d 
smuggling  methods such  as tunnels that 
transport multiple contraband. 35   
• Discovery  of construction sites, thus 
shifting DTO strategy  back to land and air 
methods. 
• Decrease in the availably  of LPV and 
SPSS captains and crews.
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INDICATORS RELATED TO 
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, CAPTAINS, 
AND CREWS
Available information  indicates that  LPV  in 
the Pacific and the Caribbean are piloted and 
crewed by  Colombian  nationals,  with  notable 
exceptions.  For example, during  Operation 
Panama Express, a  smuggling  vessel 
interdicted off the coast  of Costa  Rica  had 
among  its crew  four men: two Colombians, a 
Guatemalan, and a  Sri Lankan  Tamil, who 
claimed that  he was a  resident alien of 
Colombia. 36 However, as of yet,  there are no 
open  source documents that  indicate the 
nationality,  training,  and recruitment  of any 
of the submariners who would have crewed 
either  the Colombian or  Ecuadorian  SPSS or 
submarines.  
LPV sent to sea  from  organizations with 
fixed command and control  structures consist 
of a  captain, two or  three crew  members who 
work  in  twelve-hour  shifts, and an  enforcer, 
as described by  one LPV  captain  who talked 
to a  news reporter. Somewhat  analogous to a 
Russian political  commissar  or  politruk, the 
drug  enforcer’s loyalty  is to the DTO and not 
to the captain  and crew. In contrast  to the 
political commissar  of the USSR, the drug 
commissar  aboard an  LPV  has the authority 
to countermand the sea  captain’s orders and, 
as such, is responsible for  maintaining crew 
discipline with  authorization to use lethal 
force. Moreover,  the LPV commissar  is the 
individual who informs the LPV  captain  of 
the course and rendezvous point  after  the 
LPV has been towed to sea  and cut  loose. 
Available information  regarding  LPV 
captains suggests that  they  may  be licensed 
sea  captains,  may  have successfully 
completed smuggling  runs on surface  vessels, 
may  have completed previous LPV  missions, 
and may  have knowledge through  prior 
experience of avoiding  the targeted countries’ 
radar and sonar.37 
DRUG TRAFFICKING VESSEL 
INTERDICTION ACT: DEBRIEFING 
CAPTAINS AND CREWS
With  the passing  of the Drug  Trafficking 
Vessel Interdiction  Act  (DTVIA), LPV  and 
SPSS captains and crew  can  be arrested and 
prosecuted even  after  they  have scuttled the 
vessel.  The opportunity  to debrief captains 
and crews provides opportunities to gather 
detailed information  regarding  all  the events 
from  their  recruitment to arrest,  which  can  be 
used to develop a quick interdiction  response. 
There is little  open  source information about 
crew  members, but what is known  suggests 
that use of submarines implies military 
training.27
The case of Enrique Portocarrero serves as 
an  example of how  to capitalize on  the arrest 
of sea  smugglers and demonstrates the 
importance of analyzing  each individual’s 
background.  Portocarrero led a  double life as 
a  shrimp fisherman  in  Buenaventura, 
Colombia,  and has been  credited as the 
creator of LPV, having designed and 
constructed, in  a  mangrove swamp twenty 
miles south  of the city, as many  as twenty 
fiberglass Type 3  vessels. Each  LPV was a 
custom  design  detailed to the specifications 
of the packaging  and weight of the cargo to be 
smuggled – thus the variations inherent in 
Portocarrero vessels, from  Buenaventura  in 
South  America  to Central America  and 
Mexico. The Type 3  construction  included 
innovations such  as a  bow  that  produced very 
little wake, a  conning tower  that raised only  a 
foot above the water  (implied Type 2  SPSS), 
and a  valve system  that enabled the crew  to 
scuttle the SPSS or LPV in  ten  minutes. 
Portocarrero developed a  signature design: a 
sleek  V-shaped hull,  a  sturdy  keel, and an 
exhaust  system  that reduced the thermal 
image. At the time of his arrest,  Portocarrero 
had $200,000  hidden in  the spare tire of his 
car.  He had invested his reputed $1  million 
per-vessel  fees to purchase five shrimp boats. 
The extent  to which  the shrimp boats served 
as tenors or spotters is unknown. 38  
Captured crew  members refer to LPV  as 
floating  coffins.  The authors surmise that this 
reference illustrates the drop-off of potential 
crew  members willing to make more than one 
trip.  An additional  problem  for  smugglers is 
that  the effectiveness of LPV  stealth 
measures, such  as running diesel smoke 
underwater  and shielding  hot engines with 
lead pads to avoid detection, is limited by  the 
crafts’ structure.39  The authors propose that 
these factors, weighed against  the inherent 
positive factor  of the covert nature of 
smuggling  submarines capable of operating 
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in  the littoral zone and the transfer  of 
technology  and engineering  capability  from 
FSUR,  make the smuggling  submarine an 
attractive alternative and natural  progression 
from  the LPV.  Thus,  similar to the hypothesis 
regarding  a  “big foot”  progression  from  go-
fast  boats to LPV,  once the leapfrog  in 
technology  and operational  skill is included, 
the authors support  the  likelihood of a 
progression  from  LPV  to smuggling 
submarines.  The capture of the sophisticated 
SPSS and smuggling submarines in  Colombia 
in  2000, Ecuador  in  2010, and Colombia  in 
2011  (with  the 2010 and 2011  discoveries 
occurring  within  eight months of each  other) 
is worthy  of concern  when placed on  a time 
line.  The probability  that  drug  terrorist 
coalitions are engaged in  multiple ongoing 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d S P S S a n d s u b m a r i n e 
construction projects should be considered.  
TRANSFER OF SMUGGLING 
TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF THE 
ENGINEER FROM SPAIN
Inferences that DTO intend to expand LPV, 
SPSS torpedoes, and submarine operations to 
the Atlantic have been  voiced. 40 The strategic 
advantages of employing covert measures, 
rather  than speed alone in  smuggling 
operations,  especially  across vast  distances, 
have been understood for some time. “When 
speed no longer  won the day,  traffickers,  to 
avoid detection, turned to parasitic devices 
on  the bottom  of ship hulls,  towed array 
devices and ultimately  LPV  and semi-
submersible boats.” 41  It  is surmised that 
technology  from  South  American DTO will 
appear  in  Africa  and Southern  Europe, and 
there is speculation  that  the FARC will  use 
Brazil to move drugs to these regions.42
Such conjecture  is founded on  the belief 
that  Type 1-B torpedoes and Type 3  vessels 
have been  interdicted while being  towed by  a 
larger  ship off the coasts of Africa  and 
Southern Europe. The authors were unable to 
locate any  news or  government reports of 
LPV,  SPSS,  or  submarines off the coast of 
Africa. However, LPV and SPSS are reported 
to have been  found in  Spain and Sri  Lanka, 
raising  the issue of the vessels’ origins.43 The 
Office  of Naval Intelligence team  calculated 
that  the Ecuador  submarine had a  range (on 
internal fuel) of about  12,000 kilometers, 
which  supports the position that  DTO have 
achieved the technical  ability  to construct a 
boat  that  could launch  from  the east  coast of 
South  America, cruise the Atlantic,  and reach 
Africa  and possibly  Southern Europe or, 
alternatively,  leave the west  coast of South 
America  and reach  into the United States.44 
The authors searched newspapers and 
government  documents in  South  America, 
Africa,  and Southern  Europe to locate 
documented cases of successful  LPV, 
submersible, or  submarine transatlantic 
smuggling  operations originating  from  the 
east  coast of South  America. The authors 
could locate stories that speculated that an 
SPSS Type 2  vessel had crossed the Atlantic. 
However,  they  could not  find any  evidence 
that  submarines Type 1-A  or  SPSS Type 3  had 
either  been  towed or  had cruised from  South 
America  to the coast  of Africa  or  Southern 
Europe.  
The search  indicated that  in  2006  the 
Spanish  Civil  Guard followed up on  a 
telephone tip  and found what  they  reported 
as a  Type 2  SPSS, which  contained no drugs, 
in  an  inlet  near  the Atlantic in Spain’s 
northwestern  Galicia  coastal region. 45  There 
was no indication  that  either  an  SPSS or 
submarine had been  towed from  South 
America to the African or Spanish coastline.
Further  searches of Spanish  documents 
indicated that  in 2009,  during  the beginning 
of the legal  case regarding  the captured 
smuggling  SPSS in  Spain, Spanish  media 
reported that  Manuel Clemente, alias “The 
Engineer,”  built  a  nine-meter  Type 2  SPSS in 
his garden  shed at  his home in  Galicia. The 
SPSS was discovered by  police empty  of 
drugs but  with  its motor  running, afloat  off 
the coast  of northwest Spain.  It had room  for 
one person, who received oxygen  from  a pipe 
that  stuck  up above the surface, fitting  the 
description of a  Type 2  SPSS. The smuggling 
method entailed Clemente accompanying  the 
SPSS to a rendezvous point  off the Spanish 
coast in  a  yacht. Clemente’s only  avoidance 
tactics were scanning  the horizon  for  patrol 
boats. His intent  was to meet the Colombian 
boat  containing the cargo, load the drugs, and 
then  travel to the Spanish  coast. Clemente 
reported that a  Colombian  drug  cartel had 
paid €100,000 for  the SPSS to be built  in  the 
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hope that  it  could imitate the success of 
similar SPSS. 
The case of the Spanish  engineer  points up 
four  crucial  concepts in  the development of 
indicators for sea-based smuggling. First, 
with respect  to the transfer from  one 
continent to another  of SPSS smuggling 
technology  by  a  criminal enterprise, 
Clemente alleged he received the blueprint 
for  constructing the SPSS from  a  Colombian 
DTO. Second, Clemente reported that  the 
man hired to pilot  the SPSS jumped ship 
when  it began  to behave erratically  on its first 
mission. Clemente then  made sure the SPSS 
was discovered so he could tell the 
Colombians he had been  the victim  of a  police 
raid rather than  explain  to the Colombians 
that  the SPSS did not function  as expected or 
that  the pilot  abandoned the vessel. The 
authors also note the difficulty  Clemente 
experienced recruiting  a  pilot  with  the skill 
and knowledge to handle the smuggling 
vessel.  It  is unknown  whether the blueprints 
for  the SPSS were based on  a  design  for 
operations in  the littoral zone on  the west and 
north  coasts of Colombia  and thus had flaws 
that  impeded the vessel’s operation in  the 
littoral zone in Spain. 
Third, with respect  to the difficulty  in 
constructing the vessel and transporting  it to 
the sea, the police did not need to be told 
about  the vessel because they  had been 
tailing  Clemente after  spotting his SPSS 
during  one of their  many  trips to the local 
docks.  The difficulty  Clemente experienced 
while trying  to build a  sea smuggling  vessel, 
along  with  the problem  of how  to get  the 
vessel  to the sea,  is universal  in  that 
smuggling  vessels built  in Colombia  and 
Ecuador  face similar  difficulty  in avoiding 
detection. Thus, the construction  of the 
vessel, transportation  to sea, possible 
reassembly  of the vessel  prior  to launch, as 
well  as the specifics of launching  the vessel, 
present  discreet phases for  evaluation  from  a 
s t r a t e g i c  w a r n i n g p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e 
importance of gathering  land-based 
intelligence during  any  one of the these 
distinct  phases is similar  to the type of 
intelligence gathered about submarines from 
the Sino-Soviet Bloc in  the modified Ramsey 
and Borner  model.  This may  include any 
offensive capabilities – internal or  external 
torpedoes, mine laying  apparatus, and diver 
lockout  chambers – that  a  smuggling 
submarine might possess. 
Another  important  indicator  in  the case of 
the engineer  from  Spain  is the importance of 
geography  in  developing strategic  threat 
assessments about  where (what  type of 
littoral zone and sea conditions)  and when 
(daylight  versus nighttime) smuggling  craft 
are launched. If specific times and locations 
are known, space-based data  collection 
platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or 
reconnaissance aircraft  can  be employed to 
support  human  intelligence collection efforts. 
One source opined,  based on an  analysis of 
Clemente’s vessel, that it  was not  closely 
related to the Colombian subs in  design.  For 
example,  the vessel was made from  steel,  had 
ballast tanks on  the flanks, and used separate 
propellers for the diesel (main) and electric 
drive.  This critic of the Spanish  SPSS 
concluded that  the craft  was likely  intended 
for  short  transits between  the cargo ship and 
shore and not  for  long  Atlantic Ocean 
cruises. 46  The authors observe that  steel 
rather  than fiberglass has been found in 
Colombian  constructed LPV.  Thus, a hull 
other than fiberglass may  not  be a  telltale 
sign of the origin of design origin. 
INDICATORS DERIVED FROM LOCATION 
OF CONSTRUCTION SITES
The Soviet  Union’s hidden  submarine base at 
Balaklava – carved in  rock and offering sea 
and bay  entrances that  submarines could use 
while remaining submerged – was similar  to 
South  American  DTO facilities in  specific 
geographic areas under  the control of the 
FARC,  which  offer  specific advantages for 
covert operation. The South  American  DTO 
use the triple jungle tree canopy  that blocks 
or  retards satellite penetration  to cover  their 
behaviors and intentions. There has been  one 
attempt to use a metal-covered construction 
building  in  a  remote location. Thus, two 
factors assist in  narrowing  the area  to be 
searched. The first  is that  the areas are under 
the control  of the FARC and secondly, the 
areas shield the construction from  overhead 
surveillance. Analysis of the Sea  Tigers 
construction  sites is instructive because the 
group had deve loped boat-bui ld ing 
“shipyards”  and a  system  by  which  the vessels 
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would be taken  by  trailer  to a  launching  site, 
complete a  mission,  placed back on  a  trailer, 
and hidden  again  in  the jungle. The authors 
note that construction  of a  submarine, 
possibly  by  an  independent  enterprise 
outside of those protected by  the FARC but 
within  an  area  where a  variety  of rebel groups 
resided, was discovered in 2000 in Colombia.
FORMER SOVIET UNION’S 
DISTRIBUTION OF LITTORAL 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE TECHNOLOGY
The 1992  Navy  and Marine Corps White 
Paper  “...From  the Sea”  and its follow-on 
“Forward...From  the Sea”  (1995)  recognized 
the dissolution  of the USSR and the end of 
the Cold War  (1989-1991) and logically 
predicted the increased importance of the 
littoral battle space.47  However,  the white 
paper understandably  did not foresee the rise 
of the drug  terrorist coalitions’ blatant 
development of smuggling  submarines, rebel 
groups constructing  their  own  submarines, or 
the USSR or  FSUR selling or  leasing 
submarines and/or  crews and providing 
training facilities for anyone who wishes to 
acquire the knowledge and skill to pilot  a 
military  grade submarine.  It  is reasonable 
t h a t a s t u t e i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d 
counterintelligence officers were not 
surprised to learn  that the power  vacuum 
resulting  from  the readjustment  of sea 
warfare policies of the two great navies of the 
world would be filled by  transnational crime 
and terrorist groups. 
A  further  outcome was that  Ludwig 
Fainberg, a.k.a. “Tarzan,”  proposed a  deal  to 
sell a  Tango class diesel-powered patrol 
submarine to move cocaine from  Colombia  to 
the coast of California with  the plan  that 
drugs, packed into capsules attached to 
buoys ,  would be f i red through  the 
submarine’s torpedo tubes and float at sea 
until  speedboats made the pickup. 48  The 
submarine was based in  Kronshtadt,  a  large 
Russian  submarine base on  the Gulf of 
Finland,  off St.  Petersburg.  During the 
negotiations, the price of the submarine, 
which  included a crew  of twenty  for  a year, 
dropped from  $9  million to $5  million. The 
deal fell through  when  the Colombians 
backed out,  apparently  feeling such  an 
enterprise was too ambitious. 49  Ludwig 
Fainberg  was also accused of trying  to sell 
eight  Mi-8  military  helicopters.  What is 
notable about Fainberg’s failed logic  was the 
assumption  that  a  Russian  Tango class 
submarine could repeatedly  fire torpedoes off 
the coast  of the United States without having 
been  trailed to the area  or  that the noise of 
the multiple torpedo launches would go 
undetected or ignored.50 The authors deduce 
that  the DTO reasoned that operating  a 
military  grade submarine off the coast  of the 
United States was inviting  a military  rather 
than  a law  enforcement response,  thus 
inviting a disaster. 
SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG TRAFFICKERS’ 
AVOIDANCE OF MILITARIZATION
A  review  of smuggling  vessels discovered in 
South  America  shows that none of the 
designs include torpedoes, mine laying 
features, diver  lockout  chambers, or  armor 
plating. The avoidance of militarization  of the 
LPV,  SPSS, and submarines is a  significant 
indicator.  The authors argue that  detection of 
any  one of the four  features in  smuggling 
submarine armor  –plating, weapons (e.g., 
either  internal or  external torpedo systems, 
etc.),  diver  lock out, or  mine laying 
capabilities – would be a  significant indicator 
and signal  a  profound shift  in  DTO 
intentions.  Given  the expense of constructing 
a  submarine,  it appears unlikely  that  using 
one as an explosive would be a  reasonable 
cost-effective means to strike at an  enemy. 
Potential  vessels in  the smuggling  fleet that 
could reasonably  be modified for  littoral 
warfare are Type 1-C and Type 1-D,  as well  as 
Type 3 vessels.  
The general consensus that robotic  Type 1-
C and Type 1-D submarines were too 
unpredictable  to be used by  smuggling 
organizations was rejected by  the findings 
from  Operation  Panama Express. The 
operation  identified three men, Gustavo 
Garcia-Velasquez,  Lope Lopez-Ortega, and 
Carlos Vera,  each  with  their  own  specialty: an 
electrician,  a  fiberglass fabricator,  and a 
facilitator  who arranged meetings between 
remote controlled submarine makers and 
potential buyers.  The three men  pleaded 
guilty  in  US District  Court in  Tampa, Florida, 
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in  a  conspiracy  that goes back  to 1997. “The 
remote-controlled vessels — up to 40 feet 
long  — are smaller  than the manned SPSS, 
which  are up to 70  feet  long,”  said Joseph 
Ruddy,  an  assistant  US attorney.  “The 
remote-controlled vessels can  carry  up to 
1,800 kilograms of cocaine and cost  about 
$500,000 to make,  according  to court 
documents.  They  have a  range of about  1,000 
miles without  refueling,  but  they  can  be 
refueled at sea.” 51 
UNITED STATES NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS 
IN LITTORAL OPERATIONS: LESSONS 
LEARNED 
Since 2000, there have been  three attacks on 
US Navy  ships. On  January  3, 2000,  there 
was a  failed attacked by  al-Qaeda using a  boat 
full of explosives against the Navy  destroyer 
USS The Sullivans, while in  port  at  Aden, 
Yemen.  On October  12,  2000, there was a 
successful  attack on  the destroyer USS Cole 
while it was harbored and refueling  in  port  at 
Aden. Both  attacks used small surface 
vessels.  Analysis of transfer  of sea-based 
smuggling  technology  and applied behavioral 
analysis of sea-based terrorist  actions 
suggests a  link between  the LTEE and the al-
Qaeda attacks in  2000.  Specifically,  the LTTE 
suicide attacks at sea  are also said to have 
inspired other groups, including al-Qaeda. 
Sea Tigers often  boast  that  it  was their  suicide 
attacks on Sri  Lankan vessels, the Abitha  and 
Edithara,  that al-Qaeda  emulated when  it 
attacked the USS Cole. 52
As a result  of the USS Cole bombing, the 
US Navy  began  to reassess its antiterrorism 
and force-protection  policy  and methods, 
both  at  home and abroad.  The Navy  stepped 
up Random  Anti-terrorism  Measures (RAM), 
which  are meant  to complicate the planning 
of a  terrorist  attack by  making  it  difficult to 
discern a  predictable pattern  to security 
posture. 53  The Abdullah  Azzam  Brigades 
claimed responsibility  for  firing at  least  three 
rockets at  a  US amphibious assault  ship while 
two ships,  the Ashland and the USS 
Kearsarge,  were docked at Aqaba, a 
Jordanian port  on  the Red Sea, in  2005.54 
Two of the rockets were Katyushas, highly 
inaccurate, unguided weapons used by 
Lebanon’s Hezbollah  guerrillas to attack 
northern  Israel.  There have been  a  number of 
ships, such  as The Liberty  Sun,  flying  an 
American  flag  while carrying  food aid for 
CARE and the World Food Program  that 
were attacked by  Somali pirates in  2005,  and 
the number is likely to continue to rise. 
RECENT ATTACK OF A NAVY SHIP BY A 
SMALL SUBMARINE
The question  of whether  a  mini-sub (which 
the Sea Tigers had in  their  terrorist 
smuggling  fleet) has been  used to attack a 
navy  ship since 1941  was answered in  the 
af f irmative when  the South  Korean 
government  announced that  a  60-foot  North 
Korean  Yeono class (or  alternative spelling 
“Yono”) submarine fired a  torpedo that  sank 
the South  Korean corvette Cheonan  in  March 
2010.55 South  Korea also declared that North 
Korea had a larger  midget  submarine,  the 
Sang-O, on  patrol in  the area  when  the Yeono 
class mini-submarine attacked the South 
Korean  ship.56  As proof of the attack,  South 
Korea announced that a  civilian  ship hired to 
dredge the area  of the attack  found remains 
of what  South  Korea  classified as a CHT-02D 
torpedo, made in North Korea. 
That  torpedo would have a  big  enough 
warhead, 250  kilograms,  to destroy  the 
corvette.  Vice-Admiral Hwang  Won-dong, 
who led the intelligence analysis unit of the 
investigation team,  reported that after  the 
provocation, the submarine “promptly 
returned to waters north  of the Northern 
Limit  Line (NLL) by  back  tracking  the 
infiltration route.” The vice admiral reported,
We do not know whether  the North 
observed the Cheonan  in  advance to attack 
it. But we believe that North  Korean 
submarines must have undergone prior 
military drills, including firing a torpedo, in 
waters similar  to those in which  the South’s 
frigate was sunk. We detected that a few 
small submarines and a  mother ship 
supporting them  left a  North  Korean naval 
base in the West Sea 2-3 days prior to the 
attack. “No. 1,” a handwritten mark on the 
rear part of the torpedo collected from the 
sinking site, is  consistent with  markings on 
a stray North  Korean torpedo the South 
recovered seven years ago.57 
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Government reports state that the ship’s 
sonar  did not  detect the submarine or  the 
torpedo.58  
DIRECT ACTION AGAINST COMMAND 
AND CONTROL
Unlike the command and control of the Sino-
Soviet  Bloc analyzed in  the Ramsey  and 
Borner model,  current authorities are 
working  to remove DTO leadership. Law 
enforcement  efforts to identify  and arrest 
members involved in  sea-based smuggling 
conspiracies — from  fabricators to leadership 
of DTO through  Operation  Panama  Express 
and specifically  those involved in  LPV,  SPSS, 
and submarine operations — will, over  time, 
have an  impact  on  DTO sea  operations using 
LPV,  SPSS, and submarines. Moreover, if 
key,  difficult-to-replace smuggling fleet 
strategists,  such  as Meyendorff, are arrested, 
it  follows that  until the strategists can  be 
replaced, there  is a  deficit in the ability  of the 
DTO to respond to constant changes and 
advances in  interdiction sources and 
methods. In  the event  that  the DTO engage in 
terrorism, the issues emerge of the impact of 
removal of DTO leadership by  military 
capture or kill methods.
A  critical observation  is what  occurred to 
the Sea Tigers who were confronted by  a 
military  response,  in  large part  due to the 
terrorism  of the land-based operations. 
Specifically, the death  in  April 2009  of 
Colonel Soosai,  a  key  leader  in  the LTEE and 
referred to as the Admiral  of the Sea  Tigers, 
b r o u g h t a n  i m m e d i a t e e n d t o t h e 
independent  Tamil state civil  war  and thus 
the Sea  Tigers’ sea-based smuggling and 
terrorist  operations.  His death preceded that 
of Velupillai Prabhakaran,  the leader  and 
founder  of the LTEE, killed in  fighting  with 
the army  on  May  18,  2009. The deaths of 
Colonel Soosai and Prabhakaran,  the 
remaining command and control structure 
during  military  operations,  and the demise of 
the LTEE raise the issue of the longevity  of 
terrorist  organizations that use sea-based 
terrorism  once the leadership is removed by  a 
military  response that is absolute and final. 
These issues also prompt  a comparison  to the 
demise of about  50 percent of the FARC 
membership and whether  the FARC has the 
leadership capability  to construct  and operate 
a smuggling terrorist fleet. 59  
THE MODIFIED RAMSEY AND 
BORNER MODEL
The Ramsey  and Borner  method of applied 
behavioral analysis for  identifying  indicators 
and formulating  strategic warnings regarding 
the Sino-Soviet Bloc was appropriate at  the 
time, given the geopolitical complexities of 
the waxing  and waning relationships among 
the members of the Sino-Bloc  prior  to the 
collapse of the Soviet  Union. The method 
remains relevant given the similar state of 
relationships among members in  the drug 
trafficking terrorist coalition today. 
In  a  similar  vein, both  DTO and rebel 
groups proclaim  political doctrine that  is 
diametrically  opposed to their  behavior.   In 
the case of the drug traffickers,  the 
pronouncements that  they  are nonpolitical 
and interested only  in profit does not  match 
their  behaviors of controlling  the government 
through  intimidation, bribes, assassination 
and terrorist  acts.  The rebel groups’ 
pronouncements – that  they  are political  and 
not profit-driven and want to change the 
government  through  intimidation, bribes, 
assassination,  and terrorist acts – do not 
match  their  participation  in  drug trafficking. 
Both  groups seek  to dominate specific areas 
of the world to satisfy  their  own wants and 
what  drives the tension  is that  both  groups 
need to control the political  process in  their 
countries by  similar methods. As the drug 
organizations and the terrorist groups strive 
to control the government  and compete 
against each other  for resources,  the 
distinctions between them  blur,  especially 
when there is a coalition.  
The contradiction  between  alleged belief 
and behavior must  be analyzed within the 
geopolitical  context of the region  when 
completing  threat assessment, exercising  risk 
management,  and formulating policy 
decisions.  At times,  there is shifting  on the 
crime-terror  nexus within  and among the 
three different group clusters — drug  terrorist 
coalitions, DTO, and terrorist/rebel groups — 
with  such  speed that  separation  of terrorist 
from  criminal becomes blurred.60  The 
shifting  dynamic within  and among  the 
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different  members of the drug  terrorist 
coalition  complicates the identification of 
indicators and generation  of strategic 
warnings.  The threat  analysis of a  potential 
attack  on the United States is juxtaposed over 
the three competing  groups: drug terrorist 
coalitions, DTO, and terrorist groups. Unlike 
the Ramsey  and Borner  model,  which 
considered one command and control 
structure, the South America  threat 
assessment  must  consider  these three 
separate command and control structures. 
Within this juxtaposed template laid over 
the Ramsey  and Borner  model is the 
possibility  that for-profit terrorist groups, 
such  as Hezbollah  operations in  South 
America, may  advance from  a  profit-
generating smuggling  mission to carrying out 
a  political mission,  either directly  or  in  a 
scenario similar  to Abdullah  Azzam  Brigades’ 
rocket  attack. Alternatively,  the possibility 
that  the  FARC may  advance to sea-based 
smuggling for  profit  must  be calculated. 
Furthermore,  the possibility  that  a  drug 
trafficking  organization  may  decide to engage 
in  terrorist  attacks against a  Coast Guard 
vessel  or  land-based police  force must be 
considered. As a  means of organizing the 
above waxing  and waning  factors,  as well  as 
organizations’ proclaimed political doctrine 
that is diametrically  opposed to their 
behavior,  the authors offer  the HCR-20,  a 
forensic  behavioral science method of threat 
assessment that  divides hostile intentions 
and behaviors into historical, clinical, and 
risk management components. 61  
The historical  component  is the collection 
of the behaviors that  have occurred in  the 
past  and are fixed.  For  example, al-Qaeda, 
Hezbollah  (through  the Abdullah  Azzam 
B r i g a d e s ) ,  a n d t h e S e a  T i g e r s a l l 
demonstrated a  history  of sea-based 
terrorism. The Sea  Tigers proclaimed their 
intentions to kill  Sri Lankans and other 
nationals and did so during sea-based 
terrorist  acts. Thus, these organizations had a 
history  of terrorism, reported they  believed in 
committing  terrorist  acts,  and therefore only 
needed the opportunity  and means to commit 
the terrorist  acts.  With  respect to the South 
American  DTO, there has been no stated goal 
of killing Americans or  their  allies using sea-
based terrorist  operations. However, using  a 
behavioral  science threat perspective 
historically, the behaviors of DTO in  North 
Central  and South America  have repeatedly 
demonstrated acts using  military  and 
terrorist strategies and tactics. 
The clinical  section of the threat 
assessment includes the contradiction 
between  alleged belief and behavior  or 
intentions. In  the case of al-Qaeda  and 
Hezbollah  and Abdullah  Azzam  Brigades, 
there is no discrepancy  between  intentions 
and behaviors inasmuch  as both  claimed 
their  intentions to kill  Americans.  The clinical 
assessment addresses what  would need to 
change for  South American DTO or  the FARC 
to engage in  sea-based terrorist attacks. 
Given  that the DTO and the FARC have 
engaged in land-based terrorism  — the 
former  in  North  and Central  America  and the 
latter  in South  America  — the issue for  threat 
analysis is identifying  which  factors caused a 
change in  the belief that  sea-based terrorist 
acts would be in  the best  interest  of the 
organization.   
Applying threat assessment methods to 
DTO,  narco-terrorists, and terrorist 
organizations using  a behavioral  science 
assessment of hostile actions calls for  a  third 
component, known as risk management, 
which  considers the availability  of tools for 
behaving  in a  manner  consistent with  a 
group’s belief system.  For  example, 
equipping go-fast  boats with  barbs on  the 
bow  would not  be consistent  with  a 
smuggling  terrorist  group’s stated beliefs that 
it  is only  intending  to engage in  smuggling 
operations.  Thus, although  a DTO,  such  as 
the Colombian  Norte del  Valle,  may  report 
that  it  has no intention to engage in  sea-
based terrorism,  its history  refutes that 
assertion, and the collection  of tools such  as 
outfitting  or  equipping  smuggling  craft with 
terrorist  capabilities also refutes that 
assertion, therefore raising  the strategic 
threat warning.
The following  threat  matrix  draws upon 
the authors’ collection of information  about 
sea-based smuggling  crews,  captains, 
communication  patterns, avoidance tactics, 
technology, and strategic  planners.  The 
matrix  also includes the structural advances 
in  vessels and boats and whether  the 
advances were similar  or  different  from  those 
used by  military  or terrorist  organizations 
with  sea-based capabilities. To address the 
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risk management  component  of the HCR-20 
and in  keeping  with the Ramsey  and Borner 
Model,  a  threat matrix  is presented below 
that  includes the information  about  sea-
based smuggling operations without  terrorist 
intentions or  preparations and terrorist  sea 
operations that  had specific terrorist 
intentions and preparations. In  a  manner 
similar  to the Ramsey  and Borner  Model, 
different types of sea-based hostile actions 
that  can  take place and the different types of 
hostile behaviors that raise the potential  for 
hostile action are offered.
Indicators 1 2 3 4
Section A: Leadership and Crew
Loose—no command and control structure
All crew agree to smuggling drugs—no political affiliation X
Loose—no command and control structure
All crew agree to smuggle drugs; political affiliation among crew X X
Tight command and control structure
All crew agree to smuggling drugs; no political affiliation X
Tight command and control structure; all crew agree to smuggling; political affiliation with command staff X X
Section B: Financing of Construction
Drug trafficking organization X
Coalition of drug traffickers who commissioned the boat X
Terrorist organization X X
Coalition of drug traffickers and terrorists X X
Section C: Weapons 
Release of controlled weapons and equipment to crew—grenade launchers x
Release of controlled weapons and equipment to crew—assault weapons X
Limited automatic weapons on board—one firearm to drug commissar X
Crew military trained X X
Captain military trained X X
Section D: submarine vessel construction
Vessel outfitted—armor plating X X X
Vessel outfitted—deck gun X X X
Vessel outfitted—explosives X X X
Diver lock out X X
Mine laying ability X X
Stealth avoidance only X X
Section E: Course of vessel submarine, torpedo, low profile 
Military installations X X
Military ships in harbor X
Fixed target of civilian opportunity—oil rigs X
Fixed target of civilian opportunity—oil carrying vessels, etc.  (time of shipping on same course) X
Course avoids military installations X X
Course avoids civilian targets X X
Section F: Submarine, low profile arrangement for crew’s return
Arrangement made X X
No arrangement made X
Section G: Threats 
Threats and intimidation to crew if captured; family will suffer X X
No threats or intimidation to crew if captured X
Section H Money paid to crew 
Money paid to crew, around $3,000 X
No money paid to crew or crew; had to account for money spent; receipts X
Table 2: Threat Indicators
Types of Actions
1. Terrorist premeditated surprise attack mission to attack military or civilian targets
2. Escalation at point of interdiction/ability to attack if interdicted
3. Drug trafficking smuggling run—no means to attack
4. Terrorist trafficking smuggling run—no intent to attack but will attack to defend shipment
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The Ramsey  and Borner  Model offered the 
indicators and type of hostile intentions to 
intelligence analysts to assess the weight  of 
each  indicator  against  each  type of 
smuggling, terrorist,  or  coalition group and 
the type of threat  they  pose.  The authors 
endorse a similar  approach  in  completing  an 
analysis from  diverse groups — Coast Guard, 
O f f i c e o f N a v a l I n t e l l i g e n c e ,  D r u g 
Enforcement  Agency  and Central Intelligence 
Agency.62 The analysis from  each  group must 
determine the weight  given  to each  indicator 
in  the table above,  based on  knowledge of 
DTO,  narcoterrorists,  or  terrorist groups 
using the sea-based smuggling method.  
SUMMARY
When the mass of the information has been 
collected, the art is to sift the wheat from the 
chaff, and then to lay before the commander a 
short clear statement. 
 
Field Marshal Earl Alexander 
This article has presented a  model of South 
American  drug  traffickers,  drug traffickers’ 
terrorist coalitions,  and narco-terrorist 
groups that  use sea-based smuggling 
methods. The model is based on  the analysis 
of behavior  intentions and strategic  thinking, 
yielding  threat  assessment.  The model 
yielded four  possible attack scenarios.  The 
historical actions of South  American  sea-
based drug  trafficking organizations support 
the conclusion  that the current  strategy  of 
DTO is to exploit  the weaknesses of coastal 
defenses in  Central  America  and Southern 
Europe.  This study  supports the position  that 
the strategy  of South  American traffickers 
developing submarines is to attempt to use 
the submarine technology  to leap ahead of 
sea-based interdiction  methods. The authors 
contend that behavioral  indicators suggest  a 
non-terrorist  strategy  as part  of South 
American DTO sea-based smuggling.  
The developmental  progress within and 
between  LPV  and SPSS indicate clear  intent 
o f S o u t h  A m e r i c a n D T O t o a v o i d 
m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  o f t h e i r  f l e e t ,  w h i l e 
simultaneously  neutralizing  intelligence and 
law  enforcement detection  during smuggling 
operations. The developmental  progress 
within  and between smuggling vessels, when 
compared to the LTTE terrorist navy,  does 
not indicate South  American DTO have any 
intent to carry  offensive weapons.  The study 
of littoral terrorist  warfare indicates that 
attacks on  US Navy  ships have been from 
small open-craft  surface vessels that were 
similar  to small open-surface vessels used by 
the LTTE to attack the Sri Lanka navy. 
There has been  one land-based rocket 
attack  on US Navy  ships while in  a  harbor. 
The 2008 Mumbai attack, employing  small 
open craft  to insert terrorists into the 
country, is similar  to both  LTTE and North 
Korea  terrorist  operations with the 
understanding  that North Korea  has also 
employed mini-submarines to insert  terrorist 
kill teams into South  Korea.  Littoral warfare 
involving submarines attacking  navy  ships 
has been  conducted by  North  Korea  and 
included a  torpedo attack on  a  South  Korean 
ship at  sea. There is no indication  that any 
South  American drug  smuggling organization 
or  drug  terrorist  coalition  has constructed a 
submarine with  the purpose of inserting 
covert operatives or a torpedo system.  
During  the previous five  years,  the United 
States has evaluated specific behaviors of 
South  American  sea-based drug smugglers, 
such  as scuttling  vessels at  sea,  and has 
responded by  passing  the Drug Trafficking 
Interdiction  Assistance Act  of 2008. In 
response to the small open-vessel  attack and 
a  rocket  attack on US Navy  ships in harbors, 
the Navy  responded by  rewriting its Random 
Anti-Terrorism  Measures. Recent successes 
of Operation  Panama  Express support  the 
law  enforcement  approach  inherent  in  the 
Maritime Strategic Doctrine for  dismantling 
South  American  sea-based smuggling 
organizations. Drug  traffickers have built 
submarines on the west  coast  of Colombia 
and Ecuador, which  makes operating  them  in 
the Pacific  far more probable than  the 
Atlantic. Drug  terrorist  coalitions, although 
demonstrating  the technological expertise to 
c o n s t r u c t  a  s u b m a r i n e ,  h a v e n o t 
demonstrated the capability  to launch  a 
submarine from  the east  coast of South 
America  with  a crew  proficient  to navigate 
the Atlantic Ocean on  a  cruise to Africa  or 
Southern Europe. 
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A  significant indicator  will lie in the nature 
of the training,  be it  military  or  civilian, and 
the political and religious beliefs of the 
captain and crew  prescribing to radical jihad. 
Currently,  indications are that the captains 
and crews aboard smuggling  vessels remain 
nonpolitical and are not religious extremists. 
Changes in  the crew  makeup would be a 
significant indicator,  as would vessels with 
defensive or  offensive weapons. Once the 
smuggling  vessels are outfitted with  defensive 
weapons (anything with  more firepower  than 
a  single assault  rifle) among  the entire crew, 
there is significant potential for  a  Type 2 
Action  confrontation  between members 
supporting  the Maritime Strategic Doctrine 
and drug  traffickers at  sea.  Once defensive 
weapons are aboard sea-based smuggling 
vessels,  the drug  traffickers have signaled a 
profound shift  in  strategic thinking,  implying 
a  willingness to defend the smuggling 
shipping  lane with  force,  not unlike the 
defense of the land-based smuggling  lanes in 
Central and North America.
The authors are aware of the danger  of 
being  unprepared when  confronting  an 
adversary  who has made the strategic shift 
from  a  criminal response to one of terrorism. 
The comparison  between terrorist  strategies 
and tactics used by  land-based drug 
traffickers (i.e.,  Mexico) and South  American 
drug  traffickers militarizing  their  vessels and 
boats is a  significant  warning  to policy 
makers.  In  the event  that drug  organizations 
pursue the use of submarines with  the 
capability  to penetrate US territorial waters, a 
reevaluation  of current doctrine and policies 
must  take place prior  to a  confrontation. 
Although  some would argue that  an 
immediate policy  review  will escalate 
tensions,  the authors vehemently  disagree 
and maintain  that  it  is the drug  traffickers 
who would have escalated the situation  at  sea 
– an  environment that  is inherently 
dangerous and unforgiving.  The LTTE 
terrorist  tactics at sea and the DTO land-
based terrorist  tactics in  Central America  are 
precisely  the type of terrorist  behaviors that 
must  be resolved quickly.  Traditional 
antisubmarine warfare against  drug 
traffickers in  the littoral  zone will  require the 
United States to plan  for  defending civilian 
targets traditionally  off limits during  time of 
war. 
At  least  one South  American  drug 
organization  transferred advanced smuggling 
technology  to Southern  Europe and 
attempted a smuggling operation  using  a 
Type 2  vessel.  Buenaventura vessels cruise 
the Pacific  and rendezvous off the southwest 
coast of Mexico with  smugglers who 
transport  the drugs inland.  The authors’ 
position  is that  the smuggling technology 
most likely  to be transferred to a  terrorist 
organization  is Type 1-C  and/or  Type 1-D. 
The most  likely  conflict  at  sea  will be a  Type 2 
Action.  If terrorist-based rebel groups in 
South  America acquire  vessels or  a  boat,  Type 
1 and Type 4 actions are probable. 
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Integration of Social Determinants of Community Preparedness 
and Resiliency in 21st Century Emergency Management Planning
Paul A. Biedrzycki and Raisa Koltun
ABSTRACT
The United States Department of Homeland 
Security’s  Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) has  recently adopted a 
“whole of community” approach in its 
strategic planning and response to 
catastrophic events. However, most 
traditional emergency preparedness models 
and practices  do  not sufficiently consider 
underlying social conditions  and dynamics 
that are not only predictive of population 
health but also of behaviors  that potentially 
influence  the community resiliency.  This is 
not limited to consideration of public  social 
cohesiveness,  health equity,  economic 
conditions, and political capital. These and 
other “social determinants  of community 
preparedness and res i l iency” must 
thoughtfully be considered in all aspects of 
emergency management planning in the 
coming decades. Deeper understanding of 
community social and economic dynamics 
will allow  for better coordination with  other 
emerging federal agency initiatives  and 
policies.  This  entails  refocusing on language, 
culture,  socio-economic,  geographic,  and 
community status  to  attain true “whole of 
community” engagement.
INTRODUCTION  
T h e r e c e n t r e l e a s e b y  t h e O b a m a 
Administration  of Presidential Policy 
Directive 8  (PPD 8), also referred to as the 
National Preparedness Directive,  highlights a 
key  imperative that speaks strongly  and 
encourages the adoption and practice of a 
more comprehensive as well as community-
oriented focus toward strengthening  national 
emergency  preparedness and resiliency.1 
Furthermore,  the recent  release of the Whole 
Community Approach to  Emergency 
Management: Principles, Themes,  and 
Pathways  for Action by  the Federal 
Emergency  Management  Agency  (FEMA) 
underscores federal commitment  in 
promoting  the inclusion  and engagement of 
d iverse s takeholders in  the overal l 
community  preparedness and planning 
process,  recognizing  the role of inherent and 
unique community-based social dynamics, 
networks,  and informal leadership that can 
be leveraged to strengthen  community 
resiliency.2
Both  of these initiatives provide the 
opportunity  and conceptual framework to 
establish  a  more community-focused 
approach  to emergency  management by 
willingly  inviting to the table a  wide array  of 
key  stakeholders,  including  citizens as 
legitimate and equitable partners and assets 
in  the process. In  essence, both  PPD 8  and 
FEMA’s whole of community  philosophy 
represent an  emerging  trend and  new 
modality  for  the emergency  management 
discipline in  incorporating  socioeconomic 
conditions and more meaningful  community 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a t t h e  p l a n n i n g a n d 
preparedness core.  As such, it  will also 
demand a  fundamentally  new  emphasis on 
re-establishing  or  improving  community 
relationships and most  importantly,  an 
authentic and genuine trust  between 
government and citizenry. 
This essay  will  outline this new  modality 
in  two interrelated parts – the concept  of 
examining  various social determinants of 
preparedness and community  resiliency  and 
the importance of fostering  better community 
inclusion  and trust.  Three case studies are 
presented to exemplify  the need for  this shift 
in  approach.  The purpose of this essay  is to 
advance these concepts and advocate 
i n c l u s i o n  i n t o m o d e r n  e m e r g e n c y 
management  practice.  This can only  enhance 
preparation  and nation-wide resiliency  in  the 
twenty-first  century  given  the breadth and 
scope of natural  and man-made threats to the 
country  and global community  as evident  by 
recent  historical events such  as Hurricane 
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Katrina,  the British Petroleum  Gulf Oil Spill, 
and the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic. 
WHAT ARE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF 
COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND 
RESILIENCY? 
S o c i a l  d e t e r m i n a n t s o f e m e r g e n c y 
preparedness and resiliency  can  best  be 
thought of in  the context  of those dynamics 
or  factors that  influence the vulnerability  of a 
community  as it  responds to and recovers 
from  an emergency.  Such  factors are unique 
and vary  greatly  between communities but 
can  be categorized into several  domains. This 
variation  in  community  social dynamics is 
not randomly  distributed and is largely  due to 
inequities in the ownership and distribution 
of resources,  wealth, and opportunity.  These 
in  and of themselves can  account for  many 
disparities in  outcomes between  communities 
that  are often  seen and indeed magnified in 
the aftermath  of a  catastrophic  event  such  as 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
Identifying  social determinants of 
emergency  preparedness and resiliency  then 
can  be viewed as a  function of the socio-
economics of a  community  (e.g.,  mean 
income,  percent  savings, education  levels, 
unemployment  rates); environmental 
infrastructure (e.g., housing availability, 
cr ime rates , subopt imal geographic 
locations); and other  intangible but 
nevertheless important community  attributes 
( e . g . ,  d e g r e e o f s o c i a l  c o h e s i o n , 
predominance of family/neighborhood 
s t r u c t u r e ,  a n d l e v e l  o f c o m m u n i t y 
engagement). Communities with  high  levels 
of poverty  become the most vulnerable to the 
impact  of disasters in  terms of lacking 
adequate preparedness and being  at highest 
risk  for adverse consequences.  This is 
primarily  due to government  and related 
system  failures in  addressing  appropriate and 
timely  response and recovery  necessary  to 
seed and foster  a  culture of resiliency  within 
this population.
Currently,  underlying  social and economic 
considerations relevant  and unique to a  given 
community  are generally  not fully  integrated 
within  traditional emergency  management 
p l a n n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s o r  a p p r o a c h e s . 
Consideration  of such data such  as 
unemployment rates,  high  school graduation 
rates,  social  capital, and crime statistics do 
not readily  find their  way  into discussions 
involving the emergency  management 
paradigm  of preparedness, mitigation, 
response, and recovery.  Indeed,  emergency 
planning  is often conducted as “one size fits 
all”  and only  very  recently  – in  the  aftermath 
of Katrina – has attention  been  cast on  the 
functional and cultural dimensions of 
communities. Even  then, the discourse has 
been  limited to issues of mobility  or  achieving 
basic cultural  competency  around ethnic 
group communication  and outreach.  Much  of 
this approach  may  be enabled and driven by 
resource availability; however,  it  is our 
contention  that a deeper  understanding  of 
the above social determinants is lacking in 
emergency  management training,  discipline, 
practice, and strategies.
Instead, we suggest that communities 
need to be thought of as unique organisms 
representing  a  network replete with  informal 
leadership,  communication conduits,  and a 
sense of identity  and purpose that  is dynamic, 
constantly  evolving,  and based on economic, 
social and political shifts in  its sands.  As 
such, disparities in income,  health, and 
education along with  varying  levels of social 
cohesion  and civic  engagement are part  of a 
landscape that  both  shapes and anticipates 
human  behaviors including  those around 
emergency  preparedness and level of 
resiliency  toward catastrophic events. The 
silo of emergency  management as a 
government-centric  and uni-dimensional 
planning  model  that  currently  meets the 
needs of only  a  subset of the population  is no 
longer viable  nor  is it  appropriate to meet  the 
needs of twenty-first  century  disaster 
preparedness around diverse threats. Neither 
is it  a  prescription for  successful  achievement 
of community  resiliency  as called for  in  PPD 
8  or  as a  fundamental outcome of the “whole 
of community”  tenet being  promoted by 
FEMA  as the lead federa l d isas ter 
preparedness agency. 
THE “WHOLE OF COMMUNITY” AND 
IMPORTANCE OF INCLUSION AND TRUST 
Understanding the underlying  social 
determinants of a  particular  community  is 
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paramount to the successful engagement  of 
its members and subsequent  shared 
ownership and participation in a  range of 
issues from  public works to public  health. 
However, engagement  and inclusion  of 
community  is often reduced to simple 
invitations to participate in  pro forma 
processes already  developed by  government 
entities and typically  directed through 
reactionary  administrative policy.  Emergency 
management  agencies at  federal,  state,  and 
local levels are therefore expected, as a 
matter  of good practice, to engage the 
community  in  ways that are  not  only 
ineffective but lack formal evaluation 
mechanisms to gauge success.  These 
agencies, faced with  the unenviable task  of 
planning for  the unexpected and low 
probability  event, seldom  generate sufficient 
community  interest  and momentum  to create 
realistic  plans. The outcome of such 
endeavors is plans that  do not reflect 
community  input  in  a  way  that  maximizes 
citizenry  buy-in  or  clarifies roles and 
responsibilities. Engaging the “whole of 
community”  in a  comprehensive, genuine, 
and authentic  way,  while complex,  can pay 
dividends in  achieving  community  resiliency. 
Furthermore,  it is only  through  meaningful 
inclusion  of the broader  community  and 
development of mutual  trust that  an  accurate 
understanding  and integration  of underlying 
social determinants can occur. 
Engaging the community  entails more 
than  an invitation to the discussion. Inclusion 
m u s t  a c k n o w l e d g e a n d e m p h a s i z e 
community  knowledge and other assets, as 
well  as enact  a  truly  collaborative process 
between  all stakeholders. This requires early 
and sincere outreach,  reflective listening, 
demonstrating  patience in  relationship-
building, acknowledging  deficits, practicing 
transparency  in process,  sharing the true 
rationale  behind policy,  and equitable 
evaluation  of progress toward mutually 
agreeable goals.
Government  emergency  management 
agencies must learn  to let  go of the need to 
control  and micromanage community 
preparedness activities and instead find ways 
to incentivize citizen participation  to ensure a 
creative flow  of ideas during  problem  solving 
as well  as enable community  ownership of 
solutions.  Too often government entities, 
albeit well  intentioned, are subconsciously 
prescriptive in  approach and mentality  in 
what  is a  supposedly  objective assessment 
a n d a n a l y s i s o f p e r c e i v e d g a p s i n 
preparedness planning  or  capabilities. This 
can  become obvious to key  members of a 
community  and quickly  derail  trust  and 
create suspicion  in  terms of underlying 
motives. Collaboration  with  the community 
should entail government  at the periphery 
and not  the center  and must include the ebb 
and flow  of input  in  a  timely  and constructive 
manner  so that trust,  attentiveness to 
mutually  agreed upon  outcomes and a  win-
win environment is created and maintained.  
Adopting the above attitude and approach 
toward improved community  inclusion  by 
government emergency  management 
agencies will  not only  result  in  enhanced 
trust, but also a  better  calibrated response to 
c a t a s t r o p h i c  e v e n t s t h r o u g h b e t t e r 
anticipation  of community  needs as well  as 
availability  and deployment  of community 
assets when  needed. An  added benefit  is the 
impact  on  resiliency  and the ability  of the 
community  as a  whole to mitigate the 
consequences of such  events through  more 
strategic coordination  and collaboration 
across the whole of community  sectors, 
disciplines and citizenry. 
WHY IT IS ESSENTIAL TO CONSIDER 
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNITY  
PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCY 
Three examples of historically  important 
events of national  scope and prominence can 
serve to highlight the advantages of 
considering community  social determinants 
and inclusion  in  the planning  phase of 
emergency  preparedness.  In  each  instance,  a 
failure to adequately  consider this level  of 
community  dynamic and effects on  the long-
term  impact  of the disaster  resulted in  a  less 
than optimal response that  included 
significant adverse health, economic,  and 
social consequences and failure to build or 
strengthen community resiliency. 
Example No. 1: Hurricane Katrina
Considered by  many  to be one of the greatest 
failures of post  9/11  national preparedness 
efforts (especially  in  the context of being an 
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“anticipated emergency  event”),  the 2005 
landfall  of Hurricane Katrina  continues to 
plague New  Orleans and the surrounding 
region  not  only  with  remnants of physical 
impact  but by  citizen  emotional scarring. 
Revisiting  the Katrina experience by  the 
media, academics, first responders, and the 
general public has done little to dispel 
distrust  and cynicism  regarding the real or 
perceived pitfalls in  local,  state,  and federal 
government  emergency  planning  and 
response. In particular,  stories of “individuals 
left  behind,”  “neighborhoods ignored,”  and 
“populations excluded,”suggest a  planning 
and response model out  of touch  with 
community  rhythm  and cadence at  a  very 
fundamental level.  In addition  to the 
expected political  finger pointing  across both 
sides of the partisan  aisle in  an  effort to 
diffuse blame, emergency  management 
preparedness planning  post-Katrina has not 
been  sufficiently  recalibrated to meaningfully 
i n c l u d e a n d a c c o m m o d a t e s p e c i a l 
populations, meet  community  functional 
needs, and improve cultural  attenuation to 
foster a level of self-sufficiency and resiliency.  
New  Orleans even before Katrina  was a 
poverty-stricken  city, plagued by  social 
factors that put  certain  neighborhoods at 
much  higher risk  than others for  hurricane 
damage.  Residents from  higher  poverty 
neighborhoods were less likely  to rapidly  or 
easily  evacuate prior  to the hurricane coming 
ashore.3  Although  the media placed blame 
on  these communities through  the lens of a 
lack  of individual  responsibility, in  reality, 
deficits in  planning necessary  infrastructure 
and resources to evacuate resulted in the 
most severe damage to these communities. 
This was most  evident in  news reports that 
depicted deteriorating  medical  surge and 
support  as well  as concerns regarding  public 
safety  during and after  evacuation  was 
declared by government authorities.
In  essence,  Hurricane Katrina  uncovered 
many  stark social ills that  have existed for 
decades in  New  Orleans but became both 
acutely  evident and exacerbated as the 
emergency  unfolded. However,  meaningful 
and authentic  engagement  of the community 
and advanced consideration  and integration 
of various social  determinants could have 
resulted in  a  very  different  historical  account 
of the event. It  is our  belief that  taking  time 
for  emergency  managers to fully  understand 
these  social  factors will make all the 
difference in  the success of future local 
preparedness activities and recognized 
improvements in community  trust  and 
resiliency.
Example No. 2: British Petroleum 
Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
The British  Petroleum  (BP) Deepwater 
Horizon oil  rig  disaster  in  2010 had 
immediate implications for  the surrounding 
environment  including deposition  of millions 
of gallons of crude oil  on  the shorelines and 
beaches of several  states stretching  from 
Louisiana  to Florida.  While media  and first 
responder  attention  appropriately  focused on 
control  of the spill  at  the rig  and related 
underwater  infrastructure, longer-term 
response efforts quickly  shifted to mitigating 
e c o s y s t e m  i m p a c t  a n d r e s i d u a l 
environmental contamination. However, 
issues have since emerged farther inland and 
among  shoreline resident  populations that 
speak loudly  to the unanticipated social  and 
economic disruption that  is an  equally 
important repercussion  of the spill.  These 
types and categories of impacts are seldom 
considered upfront  in  the typical emergency 
planning  model or  mindset.  The response is 
often  calibrated to the more immediate, 
eas i ly  understandable and tangib le 
consequences of a disaster. 
Indeed, offshore disasters such  as the BP 
oil  rig explosion in  the Gulf can  have 
significant and devastating  effects far  on-
shore.  An  article in  the New  England Journal 
of Medicine  highlighting  long-term  health 
effects of the spill points toward a  number  of 
social phenomenon  that  are directly 
attributable to the incident  months later.4 
These demonstrable psychosocial issues 
relate to chronic unemployment  by 
individuals involved in the once robust  Gulf 
fishing industry. Persons caught  in  a 
prolonged economic downturn in  this 
regional  economic mainstay  have reported 
stress related gastrointestinal illness, 
unexplained back and leg  pain, and difficulty 
sleeping. The fact  that  many  of these workers 
quit  high  school and have few  specific skills 
outside of the fishing  industry  should not be 
ignored. A  better understanding of economic 
impact  of such  events must include 
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consideration  of workforce demographics 
and alternative employment placement 
programs to ease such transitions.
Equally  significant were the authors’ 
findings regarding  an  increase in  community 
domestic violence cases and reports.  While 
not suggesting  that  the number  of abusers 
had actually  increased, the hypothesis that 
extended unemployment  placed abusers in 
the home environment was theorized.  The 
question  remains as to how  we can  better 
predict,  plan,  and prepare for  such 
consequences within  communities that  are 
directly  involved or peripheral to these types 
of disasters or  emergency  events. Achieving 
community  resiliency  as part  of a  national 
preparedness objective has a clear  nexus with 
social determinants such  as high  school 
graduation  and unemployment  rates along 
with public health and safety trends. 
Example No. 3: 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
The H1N1  pandemic in  2009  offers a  number 
of insights into the importance of considering 
u p s t r e a m  s o c i a l d e t e r m i n a n t s a n d 
community  dynamics in  emergency 
preparedness planning  and resiliency.  The 
spread of novel disease within a  population  is 
of particular  concern  to public  health  officials 
w h o a r e i m m e d i a t e l y  f a c e d w i t h 
characterizing  the magnitude of disease 
spread,  severity  of illness, and efficacy  of 
available medical  countermeasures as well as 
non-pharmaceutical interventions such as 
social distancing  and isolat ion and 
quarantine.  
As school closure became the social 
d i s t a n c i n g  m e a s u r e m o s t  r e a d i l y 
implemented by  local public  health  agencies 
early  in the first  phase of the pandemic, it 
became equally  clear  that  the public were less 
eager  to embrace such  a maneuver  due to the 
economic consequence that appeared to 
outweigh  risk of infection  from  a  flu  strain 
that  appeared not  much  different  from 
seasonal epidemics. Loss of income, inability 
to place  displaced children in  alternative 
congregated chi ldcare sett ings,  and 
consideration  of breakfast and lunch  needs 
for  many  low-income public  students quickly 
raised issues by  parents and policymakers 
alike as to whether  such  social distancing 
measures were warranted. In  Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin,  public  health  officials ordered 
closure of twenty-one public  and private 
schools within two weeks prior  to rescinding 
the directive and abandoning  the policy 
based on political and community  economic 
considerations. This represented a  light  bulb 
moment for  public  health  emergency 
planners and others who were married to 
standard pandemic plans that  were not 
calibrated against  severity  of illness and 
unequivocally  endorsed such  measures for 
protection  and preservation of the public’s 
health.
In  addition, it  became apparent in 
Wisconsin  and by  the State Division  of Public 
Health during  the second wave of the 
pandemic that  a  disproportionate number of 
h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n s d u e t o i n f l u e n z a 
complications were occurring  among 
minority  populations as compared to non-
Hispanic white cohorts. 5  In the City  of 
Milwaukee, this disparity  in  hospitalizations 
was seven  times higher in African-American 
populations. A  number  of factors were 
hypothesized as contributing  to this 
phenomenon  including: higher  prevalence of 
chronic disease in  minority  populations 
contributing  to severity  of influenza 
complications; access to and availability  of 
early  healthcare intervention  in  the 
community; continued reflection  of low 
influenza vaccination  rates within  some 
minority  populations;  and inadequate 
educational outreach and awareness building 
in  terms achieving cultural competency  in 
message content,  format,  and method of 
delivery.
A  closer examination  of social influences 
within  populations,  especially  around 
economic  status and healthcare behavior, 
may  have provided valuable insight  on more 
measured and targeted interventions and 
prevention strategies. However, it  is often 
easier  and more convenient for government 
agencies to develop strategies that  are 
uniformly  standardized across a  large 
geographic region  to maximize deployment 
and allocation of resources with  little effort or 
thought to critically  evaluate outcomes at  the 
individual community  level during  the 
response. 
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CONCLUSION: REDEFINING “THE 
WAY FORWARD”
These three examples offer  several lessons on 
the need to identify  and consider  integration 
of social determinants within  future 
emergency  preparedness efforts in  order  to 
improve response and achieve community 
resiliency. First,  many  ill-effects of disasters 
can  be linked to inadequate planning – 
specifically  in  regards to incorporating 
existing economic,  social,  and health  impacts 
that  define a  community’s daily  reality  into 
the preparedness equation.  Second,  through 
the use of proper  community  inclusion  and 
trust building  throughout  every  facet  of the 
emergency  planning model (preparedness, 
mitigation,  response,  and recovery), many 
post-emergency  consequences could be better 
predicted and responded to in a  manner  that 
strengthens community  self-sufficiency  and 
encourages resiliency.  Translating  both  of 
these important  components into modern 
emergency  management  practice will achieve 
a  robust  and successful model of national 
preparedness and resiliency  – the ultimate 
goal of PPD8 and philosophical tenet  of the 
FEMA  “Whole of Community”  strategic 
approach. 
There are certainly  examples in other 
disaster  response analyses where emergency 
management agencies have successfully 
engaged community  organizations in  the 
planning process. Often  these included 
community  health  promoters,  community 
activists,  organizers,  and others who have 
built  community  trust, are trained to 
understand community  dynamics,  and are 
best  situated to implement an  effective 
response through their  already  established 
social networks. Further  research  and 
evaluation  is needed to demonstrate the 
effectiveness and outcomes of these 
partnerships,  as well as best  practices for 
implementation. 
Unique communities require unique 
solutions to what  can be complex  planning 
m o d e l s f o r w a r d e d b y  e m e r g e n c y 
management  agencies. Therefore,  a  less 
prescriptive approach  by  government 
agencies and more guiding  and consulting 
roles need to be adopted to integrate  creative 
solutions and problem  solving  by  the 
community.  This will strengthen  trust 
between the community  and government 
agencies as well  as attract atypical 
stakeholders to the discussion  forum. 
Sustaining  this level of constructive dialogue 
becomes paramount and stimulates further 
evolution  of discussion including  a more 
diverse array  of effective solutions around 
planning, response, and recovery.
I t  i s incumbent  upon  emergency 
management and homeland security 
professionals to not  only  incentivize  and 
improve active  involvement of non-
traditional  stakeholders in  the planning 
process but  to also consider  and incorporate 
social determinants as previously  suggested. 
Federal  workgroups assigned the task  of 
c r e a t i n g  a n d l e v e r a g i n g  “ W h o l e o f 
Community”  must reflect  the diversity  of 
communities in  such  forums and pursue 
outcomes based on  creating  an  environment 
of empathy  and trust.  This requires 
authenticity  in  leadership by  federal 
authorities as well  as state and local 
emergency  management agencies to partner 
with  communities to discern  relevant  social 
determinants that are the key  to moving 
f o r w a r d i n  s u c c e s s f u l e m e r g e n c y 
preparedness and community  resiliency  in 
the twenty-first century. 
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Waiting For Homeland Security Theory
Christopher Bellavita
Nothing is harder, yet nothing is more necessary, than to speak of certain things whose existence is 
neither demonstrable nor probable. The very fact that serious and conscientious men treat them as 
existing things brings them a step closer to existence and to the possibility of being born.
–  Herman Hesse, attributed to "Albertus Secundus"1
ACT 1
A country road.  
A wooden table.  
A small whiteboard.
Gloaming.
SCENE 1 - THERE IS NOTHING TO BE DONE
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical 
analysis nor to be susceptible of it.
— Karl Popper 
CHARLES: Everyone should be their own homeland security theorist.2 
GAILE: Why in heaven's name would you wish that?  
BARCLAY: It would be pure chaos.
JACQUES: We already  have chaos.  At  least  intellectual chaos. Homeland security  has no 
theoretical center of gravity, no overall strategy for developing its theoretical foundations.
GAILE: (agreeing) It's a mishmash of loosely connected ideas, missions, and activities.
JACQUES: Observing  intellectual activity  in  homeland security  is like watching young  children 
playing soccer, running in packs to follow the ball. We can do better.
BARCLAY: (abstractly) I recall  reading something that  called homeland security  an anemic 
policy  enterprise.3 So many  people try  to do so many  things under  the same umbrella.  There is 
no central purpose to homeland security. One person called it an inconsistent hash. 4
CHARLES: (reflectively) Why  do we even  care whether  this activity  we credulously  call 
homeland security  has its own theoretical framework? What  would theory  do for  us as 
academics or for our students or practitioners?
JACQUES: (earnestly)  I've been  in this field since 9/11, and I believe we've just  begun to build a 
discipline.  I don't  want to have wasted the past decade on  something  that  just dissolves. And it 
will,  if we don't  bring  conceptual precision  to our  work. If homeland security  is ever  to be 
academically  respectable,  it  has to offer  more than  rhetoric and anecdotes.  As thinkers who care 
about  this field and who are  invested in  it, we have a  responsibility  to provide rigorous 
conceptual foundations for what we teach.
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BARCLAY: (approvingly) Yes.  Before we can develop a  homeland security  research  agenda, we 
need to ground the knowledge we create.  Theory  – whether derived deductively  or  inductively  – 
can help us do that.
CHARLES: I do not disagree with what you are saying.
GAILE: (annoyed)  Does that  mean  you  agree  with  us? Because if you  do,  the idea  of encouraging 
everyone to be their own theorist is silly. It's like letting anyone be a dentist.
CHARLES: (sharply) Allow  me some credit,  please. I've thought  at length  about this; my  thesis 
is not meant  merely  to be provocative.  And your  dentist  analogy  is fallacious.  Homeland security 
is many things, but nothing having to do with teeth.
GAILE: (gruffly) You know what I mean. What you propose....
CHARLES: (insistently)  No.  I do not know  what  you  mean, and that's a  central part  of the 
difficulty  trying to develop homeland security  theory.  I did not come to my  position  casually. A 
few  years ago I started thinking  about  this, wondering how  to bring  conceptual  order  to the 
homeland security  mess.  And I'm  not  talking  about what  practitioners do day  to day, although 
that  may  also be messy.  I'm  talking about  what  we do – in  the classrooms and in  our  research  – 
when  we talk  and write about homeland security.  I thought  we needed to start  with  theory,  and I 
worked to create one.
BARCLAY: (crisply) One? One theory of homeland security?
CHARLES: Yes, I thought  I'd  start with  grand theory. 5 I wanted something that  organized all 
homeland security  ideas.  I wanted an overarching perspective I could use to structure the way  I 
teach homeland security.
BARCLAY: How did that go?
CHARLES: (flatly) Not very well.
GAILE: I'm  not a  fan of grand theories. I question  a  need for  unique homeland security  theories, 
whether they  are grand theories,  mid range or  micro theories.6  We can  bring order  to our 
inquiry  of homeland security  problems, 7 by  using the theoretical frameworks provided by  the 
professions that make up homeland security  – law  enforcement, emergency  management,  the 
military, public health, and so on.8
BARCLAY: (musingly)  I'm  not convinced we can  do without unique homeland security  theories. 
However,  I prefer  mid-range theories myself.  I believe those could be created around the 
constituent elements of homeland security  – like  border  security, transportation,  intelligence, 
preparedness, or  critical infrastructure.  I believe if we understand the major pieces of homeland 
security  correctly, the entire theory-building  endeavor  will  take care of itself. The whole  will 
become apparent by aggregating the parts.
CHARLES: I have to disagree. I think you are confusing....
GAILE: (interrupting) I will  side with  at  least the spirit  of Professor  Barclay’s remarks here. 
Homeland security  is much  too big  an  activity  to presume any  of us know  enough  to create a 
universal  theory. We might  end up with  unique mid-range theories or  we may  use existing 
theoretical  perspectives, but we bring  rigor  to our  scholarship by  focusing on the conceptual 
building blocks of the discipline. 
JACQUES: (slowly)  I'm  not suggesting  any  of us are  smart enough  to theorize about  all of 
homeland security, but  I think we should try.  Or  at least  that's what  I've  been  doing.  We can 
always fall  back  on  mid-range theories if our  grand design  project does not  work out. But  we 
should at least try.
CHARLES: I disagree with  the three of you. My  experience and thinking  lead me to conclude we 
cannot have a  grand theory  of homeland security  or,  for  that  matter, mid-range theories that  will 
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do anyone much  good.  Perhaps there will be a  publication or  two from  the effort, but  I don't 
think it's going to make much difference to the field.
BARCLAY: But you said you started out wanting a grand theory.
CHARLES: (quietly) An unexpected event happened on my way there.
BARCLAY: What?
CHARLES: I got lost in semantics.
[Charles brushes dust from the table.]
SCENE 2 – SHREDS AND PATCHES
Here is the world, sound as a nut, perfect, not the smallest piece of chaos left, never a stitch nor an 
end, not a mark of haste, or botching, or second thought; but the theory of the world is a thing of shreds 
and patches. 
– Ralph Waldo Emerson
CHARLES: The more I researched, the more I realized I did not  understand very  well what 
theory  means. It  means lots of things. So if I wanted a  grand theory  of homeland security,  what 
exactly would that look like?
GAILE: (dismissively) I'm not an advocate of semantic inquiry. 
CHARLES: You’re saying you don’t care what words mean?
GAILE: I’m  saying if we went  around trying  to define everything precisely, we'd never get 
anything done.
JACQUES: (helpfully) That’s why  people in our  world value quantification.  There is not a  lot of 
discussion about the meaning of a number.
CHARLES: (acerbically) Right.  Like statistics?  Let’s talk  a  few  moments about 
heteroscedasticity or Markov's inequality. 
BARCLAY: We’re wandering  from  the point here.  Professor  Gaile is correct. Part of our 
obligation  as scholars is to decide to use a  word – like theory  – in  a  particular  way. As long as we 
specify  our  assumptions and identify  the decisions we made to operationalize the language we 
use, we’re okay. It is what scientists do.
CHARLES: (intransigently)  If you apply  that  logic  to the meaning  of theory,  you can  find 
authors agreeing  to use the word to signify  almost  anything  – from  individual hunch  to a  system 
of ideas that  purport to explain  or predict some phenomenon. 9 I don't  find such  a  broad range of 
meaning helpful.
GAILE: (harshly)  I don't  mean to belittle your  cognitive angst, but the meaning of theory  is very 
clear  to me.  I acknowledge there are many  ways to interpret  what  the word could mean, but  for 
most people a  theory  is a  collection  of ideas that  are integrated in  a  cohesive way.  Some theories 
describe  a  phenomenon, like homeland security. Some theories seek to explain something. 
There are, of course, predictive theories – one might call that the gold standard of theory. 10
JACQUES: (benignly) It  certainly  is the goal of the  physical sciences,  the hard sciences, if you 
will. The true test of a theory’s validity is its ability to predict. 11
CHARLES: I cannot  agree with  that, for  several reasons. First, much  of what  happens within 
homeland security has more to do with the social than the physical sciences. Second….
GAILE: Let me finish, please. In  addition to descriptive,  explanatory  and predictive, there also 
are normative theories, collections of ideas that say what ought to be done. 
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[Silence; each person thinking about what ought to happen next.]
BARCLAY: (warmly) Quiz time: Give me a homeland security example of each kind of theory.
GAILE: I’ll  start. I maintain  TSA’s twenty  layers of security,  or  whatever the number is,  is an 
example of descriptive theory.12 It  identifies the steps taken  to ensure the safety  of aircraft and 
passengers. In this example, descriptive theory says what something is. 13 
JACQUES: (cheerfully)  Fathali Moghaddam  created a  six-element  theory  he believes explains 
the social and psychological processes that  lead someone to commit  terrorist  acts.14 This theory 
provides information about why something happens, for what reasons. 15  
CHARLES: You  could make the argument  Moghaddam’s model  describes how  – that  is,  the 
mechanisms – not  why – people get  radicalized.  I think  it’s easier  to disrupt  radicalization 
mechanisms than to disrupt motives.
GAILE: (continuing the quiz) You  could use almost  any  homeland security  policy  to illustrate a 
predictive theory.
BARCLAY: (uncertain) I don’t follow your argument.
GAILE: One can  look  at  public  policy  as a prediction based on  an  articulated logic, or  at  least 
one hopes as much.  Practically  all policies take an  “if…then”  form: if you  do what  it says to do in 
a  policy,  then  you  will achieve its desired outcomes.  For  instance, the 2007  HSPD 21  on  public 
health  and medical preparedness includes a  policy  statement  that  says planning  for  catastrophic 
health needs will improve information flow and response during an event.16
BARCLAY: You  are interpreting  “prediction”  too loosely  for  me in that  example. Do you  have 
another, perhaps more traditional example of a predictive theory?
GAILE: Certainly. Take Wilson  and Kelling’s broken  window  theory  from  criminology: 
preventing  small  problems,  like urban  vandalism, helps a  community  prevent  more serious 
crime. 17  You  can  see it  follows the same “if…then”  pattern. Predictive theory  describes how 
something happens, the cause-effect linkages.
BARCLAY: (persistently) What about a homeland security example of predictive theory?
GAILE: This is the point I made earlier;  reducing  crime – like  gang violence – is a  homeland 
security  issue. We don’t  need any  special  homeland security  theory  for  that.  We have perfectly 
respectable theories we can employ.
JACQUES: (agreeably) I believe NIMS is an  example of a  predictive theory  in  homeland 
security.18 If public  safety  practitioners plan  and behave as described in  NIMS doctrine, then 
response to an  event  will be efficient and effective, or  at  least  more so than it would be without 
the structure and procedures NIMS provides. 
GAILE: Perhaps, but I’m  not sure how  you  would test  that.  I think you  could make a  stronger 
case that NIMS is a normative theory. The federal  government  told states and cities they  should 
adopt NIMS. Or they don’t get grant money.  
JACQUES: Maybe NIMS – as theory – is descriptive, explanatory, predictive, and normative.
CHARLES: (contentedly) Thank  you  for  demonstrating the point  I’ve been  trying  to make: once 
you  start  thinking  about  the meaning  of “theory” and the language surrounding  it, the more 
Augean becomes our academic task.
[All nod thoughtfully, pretending to understand what Augean means]
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SCENE 3 - TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT REALITY
A theory must be tempered with reality. 
- Jawaharlal Nehru 
GAILE: Our  disquisition  reminds me what  E. F. Schumacher’s said about theory: “It’s amazing 
how  much  theory  we can  do without  when work  actually  begins.” 19 I spent twenty  years as a 
public safety  practitioner. I was very  good at  what  I did,  and I don’t recall  one time when 
explicitly using theory made me more effective.
CHARLES: (circumspectly) Without  belittling your  faith  in  pragmatism,  Gaile, doing  what  is 
practical is only one kind of truth.  
GAILE: I realize that.
CHARLES: Searching  for  truth  is a  big  part of our  job.  I'm  probably  going to end up being 
pragmatic: I believe encouraging  everyone to be their  own  theorist  is the ultimate pragmatism. 
But  before I surrender  to your conventional  practitioner  truth,  I think we owe it  to the academic 
part of homeland security to search for a different kind of truth.
BARCLAY: What do you have in mind?
JACQUES: (helpfully)  We could start  with  objective truth,  those things that  cannot  be wished 
away. That may be my all-time favorite definition of truth.
CHARLES: I remember something like that  being  presented as the definition of reality,  not 
truth.20 
JACQUES: (vexed) Reality is the ultimate truth, my friend.
CHARLES: Good bumper  sticker,  Jacques. But  I do not  think it is helpful  in  this discussion.  I 
think objective truth  refers to language that  corresponds to what is being  described – the facts, 
the material reality.21 What is homeland security’s reality? What is the ontological nature of this 
phenomenon we propose to theorize about?
GAILE: (wearily) I do not  think I can  tolerate one more “What is homeland security”  academic 
circle jerk. 22
BARCLAY: "Ontology?" How are you using that word?
CHARLES: (hesitantly) I'm  probably  using  it  incorrectly,  at  least to a  philosopher. But  I mean 
ontology  to refer  to the essential  nature,  the being,  of the phenomenon  under  examination. 
When we use the term  homeland security,  what  – literally  – does it  refer  to? Are we talking 
about  organizations,  activities,  behaviors, missions, strategies,  all of the above,  something 
different? What is this thing we are discussing, as if we understand its ontological nature?
GAILE: (smiling) Ah, the last refuge of the academic: define your terms.
CHARLES: You  can  joke if you'd like,  but  it's more than a  mindless academic exercise.  As I 
reflect  on  the history  of homeland security  it  is clear  to me the term  came first.  The definition 
followed. And the definition  keeps changing because the ontological reality  supporting 
homeland security  is much  more subjective than  it  is objective. The distinction  between those 
two realities is frequently ignored, to our detriment. 
JACQUES: We don’t all  ignore it.  In  my  classes I use something  called the Ontological  Box  to 
talk about homeland security reality.23 
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[Jacques takes a marking pen and draws on the pitted whiteboard.]
JACQUES: (exuberantly) I present  the source of homeland security  reality  as one dimension, 
ranging  from  objective to subjective.  I describe the persistence of that  reality  as a  second 
dimension, ranging from  very  stable to continuously  changing. For  my  analytical convenience,  I 
can  then define homeland security  as four  ideal types:24 a  rational reality,25 a  structural reality, 26 
a group reality,27…
BARCLAY: (supportively) Coherence truth?28
JACQUES: Yes, I think  groups cohere around a  shared understanding  of what reality  is. 
[Returns  to  his  chart.]  And finally,  homeland security  as an individual’s reality. 29  This 
ontological  framework  has sparked energetic discussion.  At  least  in  the classroom. I do 
something  similar  in  class with  the epistemology  of homeland security  – what  counts as data, 
and methods of inquiring into homeland security.30 Let me draw it.
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GAILE: (interrupting impatiently) I get  all  that, but  I think  you're making  this “what is 
homeland security”  business way  more difficult  than it  needs to be. I will accept  there may  be 
numerous fringe definitions of homeland security,  but  I think most people in  the community  use 
it  to mean  activities intended to prevent bad things from  happening  – whenever  that's possible, 
and when something disastrous does happen,  to work on  response and recovery.  It's not  that 
hard to understand what homeland security means.
CHARLES: (exactingly) You  said "most people in  the community" use homeland security  the 
way  you  just  described.  I think that  is key. I've looked at  this "community" you  allude to and it 
turns out there are at least half a dozen different communities.
BARCLAY: What kind of communities?
CHARLES:  Language communities. I subscribe to the view  that you  understand the meaning  of 
a  word by  observing  how  it  is used.31  I’ve encountered more than half a  dozen language 
communities that use the term homeland security in a distinct way.32
JACQUES: (gently)  Professor Gaile’s definition  captures the sense of the official  one,  the one 
from  the Department  of Homeland Security  and from  the Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review report.33 
CHARLES: I don't  know  what  you mean  by  "official." [Charles pauses] Let  me say  that a 
different way. I don't believe the way government uses the word has any privileged status.
GAILE: (perplexed) Goodness.  It’s got  to count for  something. There wouldn't be any  homeland 
security if there were no Department of Homeland Security.
BARCLAY: I think states and cities, especially  those who have experienced terrorist  attacks and 
disasters, might disagree.
GAILE: (yielding) Yes, yes, of course. But you know what I mean.
CHARLES: Again,  this is exactly  what we are talking  about.  If we want  to develop a  theory  of 
homeland security  we have to be clear  what  we mean  by  theory  and what  we mean by  homeland 
security. If we can't  be precise about  that, we at  least have to describe the range of 
understanding available to us.
BELLAVITA, WAITING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THEORY  7
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8  ARTICLE 16 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
[Jaques wipes clean the whiteboard.]
BARCLAY: (amenably) OK,  let’s try  to do that.  To summarize your  position,  Professor Charles, 
as I understand it,  theory  can  mean  anything  from  a  vague hunch  to a  well-specified and 
systematic collection of demonstrable principles and hypotheses. 
CHARLES: Yes.
BARCLAY: And homeland security  can  mean  almost anything from  preventing terrorism, to a 
concentration on all hazards, to... to what else?
CHARLES: To national security,  to managing  slow  moving  catastrophes, and to the fear  that 
government uses homeland security to justify limiting civil liberties.
GAILE: (exasperated) Oh please....
CHARLES: You  may  not  agree with  it,  but  it  is one of the language communities in  homeland 
security.
GAILE: (forcibly) Let  me summarize my  position. To develop a  theory  of homeland security  you 
first  decide what theory  means.  You  make a  decision  about what  most  reasonable people in your 
profession mean by  theory  and use that  understanding.  You  include a  footnote to explain  you 
understand there are lots of definitions of theory, but  you  pick  one credible and defensible 
definition of theory to move the process along.
JACQUES: I agree,  provisionally. And you  can do the same thing  for  deciding  what  homeland 
security means. Just make sure that it is credible and defensible.
GAILE: (assenting) I will concede there are competing  definitions of homeland security.  Even  if 
some of them  strain  the absurd. However, if our  theory-building  project  is to be productive, we 
need to simply  decide what  we mean  by  homeland security.  So I am  going with  the definition 
that appears in the official documents.
CHARLES: Fortunately, we do not  have to agree. I understand your  position  and I disagree with 
it.
BARCLAY: Why?
CHARLES: As I said, I think the position surrenders too quickly to pragmatism.
JACQUES: It’s not idealistic enough for you?
CHARLES: If you are referring to Plato’s image in Raphael's School of Athens.... 34
JACQUES: I am.
CHARLES: I suppose I am  being  idealistic  in  that  sense.  But if academics can't  seek  as pure a 
truth as possible, who can?35
Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are 
wanted in life. Plant nothing else. And root out everything else. You can only form the minds of 
reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle on 
which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to 
Facts, sir! – Charles Dickens (Hard Times)
If facts conflict with a theory, either the theory must be changed or the facts. – Benedict Spinoza
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ACT 2
 A country road.  




SCENE 1 - SELLING THE TRUTH TO REALITY
I can’t stand theory because it is imposed by the intellectual. And the intellectual is, by definition, not 
a creative person. The intellectual is a person who talks about the creative process, but often doesn’t 
understand it. 
– Mary Pratt
GAILE: (defensively)  Not  that  my  view  needs defending, but don't  forget  our  students in  all  of 
this. They  come to our  programs because they  want  to be practical women  and men, involved in 
the daily  world of politics,  organizations, budgets, and getting  real work done.  They  want  to 
make a positive difference in society. 
JACQUES: I agree completely.  Some of us may  have the luxury  of being  in  a  fully  funded 
department. But  the rest of us are in  a  market. People come to our  programs because we 
increase their  chances of getting  a  job  once they  graduate.  We are not  going  to draw  many 
customers by  offering  an  exegesis about the ontology  of homeland security. Students want  the 
knowledge and skills they need to prevent terrorism and to respond to disasters.
BARCLAY: We are wandering again from our theory discussion.
GAILE: (insistently)  No we’re not.  We have an  obligation  to our students and to our  emerging 
profession to be practical. Yes, we need to demonstrate that  we have a theoretical  foundation  for 
what  we teach  and research. We also need to show  what  we teach  has practical consequences in 
the real world, that our ideas help make the nation more secure.
CHARLES: (compliantly) You and I are in complete agreement here, Gaile.
GAILE: I doubt that.
JACQUES: I second that doubt.
CHARLES: (disappointedly) Hear  me out. I’m  all for where you  want  to end up.  I simply  believe 
what I have to offer is a much more practical and theoretical perspective than you provide.
BARCLAY: "A  practical theoretical perspective?" Aren’t  you  being  inconsistent  and 
contradictory?
CHARLES: (conciliatorily) If that's what  you’re hearing,  then  the error rests in  my  inability  to 
articulate my  position  clearly  enough.  I think  you  get  to pragmatism  – that is,  to what works – 
through idealism.
GAILE: Then what do you mean by idealism?
CHARLES: Platonic ideal  stuff; it’s about the search  for  pure forms.  That's why  I'm  approaching 
the theory  discussion  first from  a  philosophical position.  I do think  philosophy  can  be very 
practical.
GAILE: (shrugging)  You are being  pedantically  reductionist. Like Descartes,  you  appear  to want 
everything broken down to the level of what each syllable means.36 
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CHARLES: (softly) I would rather  say  that a  different  way. I believe  I’m  being  more holistic than 
reductionist. 37 I want  to start theory  building  from  the level  of each  individual who wants to 
participate in this process. I want  each  person  to be treated as an  end unto himself or  herself, 
and I want  to see what theories emerge from  a  community  of people who think  and behave that 
way.  
[Charles looks around unsuccessfully for something to sit on.]
BARCLAY: I would like to return  to your assertion: you  get  to the practical in  homeland security 
through the ideal. What do you mean by that?
CHARLES: (keenly)  Earlier  in  our  conversation,  Professor  Gaile made claims about  what  theory 
means and what  homeland security  means.  I will assume the assertions resulted from  a 
thoughtful review of the literature on both topics.
GAILE: Yes, from  the literature and from  my  practical experience. I've spent years thinking 
about these issues and I came to my conclusions deliberately.
CHARLES: You  have the knowledge and skills that allow  you  to do that.  We all do. At  least  all of 
us at this table. 
JACQUES:  So you want to turn everyone into PhDs?
CHARLES: (pleased) An  intriguing  idea.  But  there are  few  enough  jobs as it  is.  I'm  not sure we 
need to spawn many more of us. Replacement reproduction should be enough.
BARCLAY: Back to the topic please.
CHARLES: (adamantly) We don't  need to create more PhDs. We do need to teach  our  students 
the skills they  need to be their  own  theorists in  a  homeland security  world imbued – for  as long 
as any  of us can  see  – with  ambiguity  and uncertainty.  That's partially  behind my  desire to have 
anyone interested in homeland security be their own theorists.
BARCLAY: To be consistent here, how are you using theory?
CHARLES: (intently) It does not  actually  matter.  I am  willing  to accept everything from  hunch 
to inviolate law.  The output  from  a particular  theorist  is not  as important  to me as the process 
used to develop a  theory  – whether  derived inductively, deductively,  dialectically, abductively, 
through  detour, multiple realities, open  systems – it  does not  matter  to me.38 The “let everyone 
be a  theorist”  approach  works if people are willing  to share  their  ideas – and to the degree they 
can, their reasons – openly. That is the process that does matter to me.
BARCLAY: (querulously) You’re merely restating what scientists are supposed to do.
CHARLES: No.  I’m  trying  to say  theorizing about  homeland security  is too important to be 
restricted to the academic patriciate. The activity should be open to all. 39
SCENE 2 – NOTHING IS MORE PRACTICAL
Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more 
likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives…. The only principle that does not 
inhibit progress is: anything goes. 
– Paul Feyerabend
JACQUES: (haltingly) You place a lot of faith in critical thinking.
CHARLES: Yes. It is my single vice.
GAILE: And by  critical thinking  you  mean  looking at the assumptions underpinning  the ideas 
generated by your creative free-for-all?
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CHARLES: (impatiently)  Of course.  Assumptions and assertions. Our  maxim  should be "What 
is your claim about homeland security and why should anyone believe you?"40
 BARCLAY: So you  envision  a  world where everyone in  homeland security  walks around uttering 
theories?
CHARLES: That world is already here. Except maybe for the muttering part. 
BARCLAY: (prickly) I said “uttering.”
CHARLES:  (dismissively) Whatever. Theorists are all  around us.  Show  me a homeland security 
practitioner who's any good at their work, and I will show you a good theorist.
GAILE: (examining) What about practitioners who aren't very good? Bad theorists?
CHARLES: (considering) I would like to think  more about that  question, but you  probably  could 
say  that.  If someone is ineffective  at their  work, that  person’s theory  about  how  to get something 
done is likely incorrect.  
GAILE: (absorbed in a memory)  There is nothing like failure to make you  question  your 
operating theories.  
JACQUES: I have a basic problem with your “show me a good practitioner” argument.
CHARLES: In  a  moment, please.  Let me add one more piece. This surprised me: In  my 
experience, good practitioners are  almost  always unable to describe their  effectiveness from  a 
theoretical perspective. They are effective, but they cannot explain why.
BARCLAY: (aridly)  As Chris Argyris demonstrated, when  they  do offer  a  description  it 
frequently differs from what they actually do.41
CHARLES: True. Since our  classroom  task  is fundamentally  about  teaching  people how  to learn, 
rather than what to learn... 
JACQUES: (surprised) Pardon me?
CHARLES: … teaching  critical  thinking  is key  to what we do. If you're  a  good critical thinker  you 
should be able to construct  your  own theories about homeland security,  and subject those claims 
to the same critical analysis used to create  the claim. This is where other  people enter  the 
process.  Presumably, if there were flaws in  your  theory  you  would have found them. Talking 
with  others is a  way  to test your  ideas,  to check for  errors,  as it  were. Done correctly,  especially 
with people who disagree with you, what I suggest holds the potential to transform ideas. 42
[A pause for silence. No one wants to speak next.]
BARCLAY: Professor  Jacques,  you  said you did not  agree that  good practitioners are good 
theorists?
JACQUES: (restlessly) Some practitioners may  be good theorists, but  I don't  think  that helps us 
much  in constructing  and teaching homeland security  theories.  The idea  that  everyone should 
be their  own  theorist  might work if the everyone you're talking  about  is an accomplished 
professional. It's not going  to work if you're teaching  a  room  full of inexperienced undergraduate 
students.
CHARLES: Now it's my turn to disagree with you.
JACQUES: (irritably)  And my  turn  to ask you  to allow  me to finish. I also think you’re incorrect 
believing we should not  be teaching  students what to learn. You  obviously  have not  spent  much 
time with undergraduates.
CHARLES: (implacably) You  are making  claims about inexperienced undergraduates.  I think 
you should provide some evidence to support your assertions.
JACQUES: How  about  more than  a  decade teaching  homeland security  to undergraduates.  Is 
that evidence enough for you?
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GAILE: (mildly) That's my  experience also. Students need foundational knowledge before they 
can act or theorize effectively. We teach foundations. 
BARCLAY: (peremptorily) We are far  from  what  we started talking about: can  there be a  theory 
of homeland security?
GAILE: (emending) A grand theory.
BARCLAY: Yes,  can  there be a  grand theory? Charles used to think so,  but  has now  abandoned 
that search. Gaile says probably not. Jacques says…what?
JACQUES: My  view  is there can  be a  grand theory  of homeland security.  In  fact I would like to 
propose one.
GAILE: (insistently) Before you do that,  I’d like to slightly  modify  Professor  Barclay’s summary. 
There may  be a  grand theory  out there somewhere. But  in  my  view  we can make more progress 
as a  discipline by  focusing  on  mid-range theories, on  theories that  try  to describe or  explain  a 
more manageable subset  of homeland security: like preparedness,  domestic intelligence, ethics, 
transportation  security  – the list  of topics is almost  without  end.  And, I will add again, the case 
has not been  argued to my  satisfaction  that  we need unique homeland security  theories to make 
progress. Existing academic disciplines and professions have a lot to offer us. 43  
CHARLES: (confidently)  Please note  how  we are getting slightly  closer  to my  position  that  we 
should encourage everyone to be their  own  theorists.  We have expanded membership in our 
clerisy  from  homeland security  academics,  to now  include academics in  ancillary  disciplines, 
and maybe even  practitioners. If you  can  only  see your  way  to dismantle your  irredentist  wall a 
bit more….
GAILE: That’s silly.  And not  just because you  are trying  to get  away  with  using  “clerisy”  and 
“irredentist.” 
BARCLAY: (to no one) Was that another dentist reference?
GAILE: (to Charles) You  are  ignoring  that  it  takes a  certain amount of training  and knowledge 
to theorize effectively.  Academics are especially  good at  theory  building, especially  academics 
who have been homeland security practitioners.
JACQUES: Like you, Gaile.
GAILE: Yes, and like you, Jacques.
SCENE 3 – CONTRIVED FOOTHOLDS 
Knowledge is not a series of self consistent theories that converges toward an ideal view; it is rather 
an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps even incommensurable) alternatives, 
each single theory, each fairytale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater 
articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of our 
consciousness. 
– Paul Feyerabend
BARCLAY: (reflectively) Here is where I think  we are in  the discussion. We have two, perhaps 
three positions represented on  the issue of developing  homeland security  theory. The left 
position....
CHARLES: What do you mean by left?
BARCLAY: Well,  what  you’re saying  sounds left-libertarian  to me: individuals should create 
their  own rules. As opposed to the more right-leaning  conservative position of adhering  to 
traditional rules about making theory.
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CHARLES: (fractiously) I don't see libertarian being the same thing as left.
BARCLAY: But for the purpose of this conversation?
CHARLES: I think my  position  is more anarchistic – in  a good way  – than  left  or  libertarian.  But 
please don’t let my truth get in the way of your analysis.
BARCLAY: (disregarding) As I was saying,  the  left position  is to question  everything: the 
meaning  of theory,  of homeland security,  of inquiry,  of what  counts as data,  and so on.  Everyone 
creates their  own  theory  and shares those ideas with  everyone else, modifying the theories as 
needed. Rather than having one dominant  theory  about  homeland security,  one looks for  as 
many ideas as possible and subjects them to the crucible of critical analysis. 44
CHARLES: (acceding)  That  is an accurate representation  of the substance of my  argument.  I 
would add that  ideas – we can  call them  theories – would be evaluated continuously  both 
through  critical analysis and – because our  field of study  aims to be practical – the real world 
test. Eventually, conclusions we reach need to be verifiable, repeatable, and falsifiable.
JACQUES: (quietly) That's simply the requirements of basic science.45
BARCLAY:  Here's what I think of as the position on the right.  It  is a  pragmatic view  that says 
we, as scholars,  need to operationalize terms like theory  and homeland security.  Bite the bullet 
and announce what  we mean  by  those terms and why,  then  develop and test  theories from  that 
foundation.  Realize there are alternative meanings for  many  of the core terms,  but select 
meaning  from  what most  informed and knowledgeable people would say  are reasonable 
understandings of those words.
GAILE: (approvingly) Although I continue to question  the need for unique homeland security 
theory, I agree with  your  summary.  I think  that approach  gives us a  much  firmer,  more 
manageable basis to use or  create  theories that advance our understanding  of homeland 
security.
JACQUES: What  Professor  Barclay  characterized as the position  on the right  is also how  regular 
science proceeds: define terms, state and test hypotheses, report results. 46
CHARLES: (dispassionately) I think  what Barclay’s synthesis has done is illustrate how  one 
arrives at  a  coherence theory  of truth: work  with  people who share your  basic assumptions about 
theory  and homeland security.  I am  also seeking  coherence truth.  I simply  want to allow  more 
people to participate in the conversation. 
[Three people pause. They look at each other through the darkness.]
GAILE: (implacably) Barclay, you said there are possibly three positions? 
BARCLAY: Yes, I thought  if there is a  far  left and extreme right, there should be a  middle 
position.  (forgetfully)  But whatever  it  was apparently  slipped my  mind. Would anyone care to 
state it?
JACQUES: (reservedly) I think I might  represent that position. I believe it's possible to have a 
grand theory  of homeland security, and I think  I have one.  But  to get  there, I have to make 
several assumptions about the terms I use and what  counts for  me as evidence to support  the 
theory.
CHARLES: How is that a third position?
JACQUES: (pensively) I'm  not  certain. When  scientists want  to understand something they 
cannot see, they  create a  model  of what they  believe the phenomenon  is.  They  test  and modify 
that  model as necessary. In  that sense, I think I “see”  how  all of homeland security  works. I 
believe the model  I have to present  combines rigor  with  flexibility,  and precision  with 
interpretation. I offer  it  as a  grand theory  of homeland security. I'm  not sure if that's a  left 
position, a center position, or a right position. 
BARCLAY:  Why don't you tell us your model and let us decide? 
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There is a theory which states that if ever for any reason anyone discovers what exactly the Universe is 
for and why it is here it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and 
inexplicable. There is another that states that this has already happened. – Douglas Adam
ACT 3
A country road.  
A wooden table.  
A small whiteboard.
Toward dawn.
SCENE 1 – PRODUCING HOMELAND SECURITY
A theory has only the alternative of being right or wrong.  A model has a third possibility: it may be 
right, but irrelevant.
 – Manfred Eigen
JACQUES: Like many  research  projects, I start  with  a  question I want to answer: What did it 
take to produce the homeland security enterprise? I formulated the question  so I would not 
have to define what I meant by homeland security or enterprise.47  
GAILE: How did you do that?
JACQUES: In  my  opinion anyone who cares about the subject already  has a  preferred definition 
of “homeland security”  and “enterprise.”  So rather  than  trying  to get everyone to agree with  the 
definition  I like,  I contend this theory  will work for  any  definition  of homeland security  and any 
definition of the homeland security enterprise.
CHARLES: (inviting) How are you using "theory" in your formulation?
JACQUES: I'm  not sure yet. My  ideas are partly  drawn from  established frameworks, and partly 
from  intuition. But I think the mash-up I end with  works at  the levels of descriptive, 
explanatory, predictive, and normative theory.
GAILE: (judiciously) It  sounds to me as if you  will  be explaining.  If you  start by  asking  what  it 
took  to produce the homeland security  enterprise, you're seeking  an  explanation.  You  want  to 
know the mechanisms that created what we presently have.
JACQUES: My  hunch  is if we can  answer  what I am  calling  the "production" question, we can 
understand what forces brought us to where we are now  in the homeland security  enterprise.  If 
we understand those forces, we should be able to use that  knowledge to move the enterprise 
toward a certain direction.
CHARLES: (attentively) I would like  to note how  your formulation  depends on  the Newtonian 
metaphors of force and direction.  There are alternatives to that approach. But  I will withhold a 
bit until I hear you out.
GAILE: (sententiously) Your  force metaphor  reminds me of an  aphorism: the pessimist  curses 
the wind, the optimist hopes it will change, and the realist adjusts his sails. 48 
JACQUES: I like that.  It  captures what  I'm  trying  to say. If we can  understand what  it  took  to 
produce the homeland security  enterprise, we can  adjust our  sails to take the enterprise where 
we want it to go. And by “we,” I mean theorists and reflective practitioners. 49
BARCLAY: (redirecting) Do you have an answer to your production question?
BELLAVITA, WAITING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THEORY  14
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8  ARTICLE 16 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
JACQUES: Yes.  My  answer  is complicated, but let  me state it  and then  try  to unpack  it. Here’s 
what  I conclude: It  took an event significant enough to activate the issue attention  cycle in 
homeland security.  Once it  was activated,  the cycle continued to complete the pattern.  Said 
another way,  the homeland security  enterprise is the second order consequence of the issue 
attention  cycle.  Multiple cycles, actually.  The activation and unfolding  of those cycles produced 
the homeland security enterprise we have today.
BARCLAY: I do not understand anything you just said.
GAILE: (helpfully) I think I do. The issue attention cycle is an  idea  Jacques has applied to 
homeland security. 50 The cycle describes what happens after  a  major event.  There's a  public 
clamor to do something immediately; people eventually  realize how  difficult it  will be to fix  the 
problem; then they subsequently lose interest. The cycle restarts with the next event.
JACQUES: That’s the basic idea,  but I see it slightly  differently.  [Jacques  draws on the 
whiteboard] I envision seven  stages in  the cycle: pre-event,  the actual event,  alarm, demand, 
awareness of difficulty, changing priorities, and then finally the post-event period.51
BARCLAY: Can you give an example of the cycle?
JACQUES: (affably)  There are plenty  of examples,  from  the 9/11  attacks onward.  But let  me say 
more about why I think this is a grand theory. 52
BARCLAY: Please do.
JACQUES: I think  everyone at  this table would agree a significant part of the homeland security 
enterprise is complex, regardless how you conceptualize the enterprise. 
CHARLES: What do you mean by….
JACQUES: I mean  complex  in  the technical  sense, not  the common  language meaning  of that 
word. 53
CHARLES: You anticipate my question.
JACQUES: My mind may not work as quickly as yours, Professor Charles, but it does work.
BELLAVITA, WAITING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THEORY  15
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8  ARTICLE 16 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
CHARLES: (bowing) My apologies.
JACQUES: (continuing)  Not  every  aspect  of homeland security  is complex. But  I believe we 
would all agree the homeland security  enterprise consists of countless agencies, people,  levels of 
government,  the private sector, nongovernmental  organizations,  citizens, and even  other 
countries.54
GAILE:  Agreed. Homeland security is much more than the Department of Homeland Security. 
JACQUES: (avidly)  Imagine if you will multiple issue attention  cycles operating simultaneously 
but asynchronously  within  the homeland security  enterprise. And if you  picture the enterprise 
populated with  numerous agents, interacting  with  each  other  within multiple and variably 
constrained rule-based systems, you see an image of exceptional complexity.
BARCLAY: I'm not following any of that.
CHARLES: (construing)  Professor  Jacques has shifted from  a  Newtonian  paradigm  to a 
Darwinian  one. Even  though Jacques talks about  forces and directions, I hear  descriptions of an 
ecosystem: many life forms seeking a niche in the homeland security environment.55
GAILE: (disputing)  I'm  hearing  something less organic.  It's as if the homeland security 
enterprise consisted of lots of hydrogen  and oxygen  atoms,  combining  together  under  various 
atmospheric conditions to produce a single cloud, a weather system, or a hurricane.
JACQUES: (delightedly) Both  metaphors come close.  I'm  saying  the homeland security 
enterprise is the continuously  emerging product of a  complex  adaptive system. 56 It's a  system 
that  is energized by  activity  surrounding  an  initiating  event  – typically  a  mega  event people view 
as threatening the security  and maybe even  the existence of the United States.  The system 
sustains its energy  by  trying  to solve or  contain  the problems triggered by  the event, and by 
responding to the opportunities revealed by the event.57
[They pause.  Early light touches the horizon.]
SCENE 2 – TRUTH THAT IS LIVED, NOT TAUGHT
He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a rudder and 
compass and never knows where he may cast. 
– Leonardo da Vinci
CHARLES: Will you entertain questions about your grand homeland security theory?
JACQUES: (cautiously) Of course.
CHARLES: If we agree one function  of theory  is to describe a  phenomenon, would you  say  your 
issue cycle theory describes homeland security?
JACQUES: (deliberately)  For  the purposes of building and testing  theory,  yes.  I think it  is 
possible to use the framework I offer  to identify  homeland security  problems that  resist  solution, 
generate questions about those problems,  create hypotheses about  solutions,  and then  test those 
hypotheses. So yes, one can build a research agenda around the framework I offer.
BARCLAY: (respectfully) You’re answering a  different  question.  I think  you've moved directly 
into theory’s problem  solving  potential.  Professor  Charles asked about its power  as a  descriptive 
framework.
JACQUES: I think  you  could use the framework  to describe the history  of homeland security. 
That  would demonstrate  the theory’s descriptive power. One could start  with homeland security 
version  1.0 – the September  11, 2001  attacks. It  then  evolved to version  2.0  – Katrina  and the 
discovery  of all  hazards.  Version  3.0 arrived with  H1N1  and the widespread acceptance of public 
health professionals into the enterprise. In  Version 4.0,  the newly  elected Obama 
BELLAVITA, WAITING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THEORY  16
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8  ARTICLE 16 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Administration  absorbed homeland security  into national security.  Version  5.0  arrived with  the 
Great Recession  and is marked by  the awareness of fiscal  limits, by  programmatic  retrenchment, 
and by  a  diminished threat of terrorism. 58 At the most  macro level, it  is possible to describe how 
significant events trigger change in  homeland security.  But  to me that  is not especially 
interesting or useful.
CHARLES: (nodding) I agree with you: it’s not particularly  interesting  or  useful.  But at  the risk 
of turning this into the homeland security  equivalent of the Glass Bead Game, 59 allow  me the 
second question you have already anticipated. Talk about the explanatory power of your theory.
JACQUES: (circumspectly) I think the framework can  be used to explain  why  Hurricane Katrina 
shifted attention  in  the homeland security  enterprise toward all hazards and away  from 
terrorism.60 The issue-attention  pattern  triggered by  Katrina  in 2005  dampened interest  in  a 
domestic terrorist threat  that  had declined substantially  since 2001.  The failed attempt by  the 
underwear  bomber  in  2009  sped the implementation  of body  scanners.61 The meltdown of the 
US financial  markets related directly,  in  my  view, to the reduction in Urban  Area  Security 
Initiative grants. 62 I believe one could build a  long  list of examples explaining  how  the enterprise 
has evolved. But I think ultimately we care about explaining so we can make predictions.
GAILE: Yes. I think we agree that’s the ultimate value of a practical homeland security theory.63
[One person yawns. One stretches. One spots a morning star.]
JACQUES: (discomfited)  Prediction is where I run  into problems. As I said earlier, some but not 
all,  parts of the homeland security  enterprise are complex.  I don’t think  it’s possible to predict 
with  any  precision the outputs of a  complex  adaptive system.  Metaphorically, it is similar  to the 
difficulties quantum  physics encounters.  One can  describe the range of probable outcomes for 
an  event, but  one cannot  predict  a  specific  outcome. 64 I want to argue that  prediction  is possible 
for  some aspects of the enterprise,  but not for  other parts.  To support that  part  of my  theory, 
and to show  where prediction  in  homeland security  is possible and where it  is not, I need to 
present a supporting framework.65
JACQUES: This is the cynefin framework.  
CHARLES: I know that.
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JACQUES: It  helps me make sense of the homeland security  environment in a  way  that 
contributes to explanation, prediction  and normative guidance.  I believe different  stages of the 
homeland security issue attention cycle activate different aspects of the cynefin framework. 
BARCLAY: How are you spelling that word? I've never heard of it.
JACQUES: C-y-n-e-f-i-n, pronounced "Ku-nev-in." 
BARCLAY: What does it mean?
CHARLES: (interrupting)  It’s a  Welsh  word that  roughly  translates into the place of your 
multiple realities; it describes the relationship among people, experience, and contexts.66  
BARCLAY: I'm still not clear what the word means.
CHARLES: (yielding) Neither am I. But I find the framework occasionally useful.
JACQUES: I think  it  is a  good description of the world I'm  trying  to portray. Homeland security 
is a place of multiple realities. 
GAILE:  I've read about the term, but I'm not convinced I know what it means.
JACQUES: I've heard Snowden – who coined the term – lecture about it. 67  
CHARLES: There is a YouTube video that describes it.68 
JACQUES: (apologetically) I’m  going  to be pedantic  again,  but  I want  to outline my 
understanding  of cynefin.  We start  first  with  a  system,  defined as any  network that coheres 
around something – like an issue or mission – and agents who operate within the system.
BARCLAY: Agents?
JACQUES: I mean  people,  organizations,  policies, doctrines,  rules – anything  around which  a 
system  can  form. Systems can be ordered, complex or  chaotic.  Ordered systems are further 
divided into simple and complicated. Let me draw it for you.
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SCENE 3 – PATTERNS WITHOUT VALUES
Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have neither 
understood the theory nor the problem it was intended to solve. 
– Karl Popper
BARCLAY: How are all these boxes useful?
CHARLES: (helpfully insistent)  If I may.  First  of all,  they  are not boxes.  They  represent 
phenomenological spaces.  The point  is to ask what  an  issue would look like from  each 
perspective. Some answers work better than others.
JACQUES: One’s phenomenological choice has consequences for  how  one understands the 
source of order. The order of simple systems comes from known cause-and-effect relationships. 
CHARLES: As an example, consider  one of the Department of Homeland Security  payroll 
systems: submit your timesheet and out comes a paycheck. That is a simple system.69 
JACQUES: Another  simple system  could be the procedures you  follow  going  through airport 
security: show  your  boarding pass,  show  your  identification, put  your  belongings on  the 
conveyer  belt,  take your shoes and belt off,  remove your computer, empty  your  pockets, stand 
inside the body  scanner,  raise your hands in  the universal gesture of surrender,  move forward 
when  you  are instructed,  and so on. Simple systems are governed by  rules,  like standard 
operating  procedures.  They  are  derived from  empirical demonstrations that  the outcomes one 
wants can be obtained by following explicit procedures. 
CHARLES: (injecting) The order  in  a  complicated system, if I may  continue, comes through 
research. You  don't  start  out knowing  what  to do in  a  particular  situation  – such as how  to 
process the massive amount of data suspicious activity reports generate70 – but you can learn. 
JACQUES: Determining  how  to identify  and protect  the critical  nodes in  a  multi-state power 
grid is another  example of a  complicated homeland security  problem. Eventually,  research  can 
lead to solutions that become standard operating procedures.   
CHARLES: In a complicated system, order is knowable and sustainable.
JACQUES: Both  simple and complicated systems are governed by  known or knowable cause and 
effect relationships. That’s where their order comes from.
GAILE: (losing interest) I do not see how this is related to building a homeland security theory.
JACQUES: Sorry, I can get too far  into the weeds.  What  I'm  trying  to do is describe the 
phenomenological space that is homeland security,  using  the cynefin framework  to illustrate 
ways of making sense of that space.
BARCLAY: (incuriously) I'm put off by the word space. It's jargon I'm not comfortable with.
GAILE: I don't have a  problem  with  space.  It's just another  way  to describe the homeland 
security enterprise.
CHARLES: Whether you  call it  the homeland security  space or  the enterprise, I don’t  want us to 
miss the significant point here: we four  are making  up what we mean  by  words like enterprise 
and space through our conversation. We are acting as if these words point to something real.
GAILE: (amending) Socially constructing reality?71
CHARLES: Yes, I believe so. Our conversation  provides another  example of how  coherence truth 
works. Some parts of homeland security  may  be governed by  objective truth,  others by 
pragmatic truth.  But  in my  view, the more we talk  about this nebulous theory-building  project 
among  ourselves, and the more we identify  and resolve our  differences, the closer  we get  to 
coherence truth about homeland security theory.
BARCLAY: (reengaging) Meaning?
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GAILE: It’s what Richard Rorty said: Truth is what your colleagues let you get away with.72
CHARLES: I suspect  if there is ever  to be a dominant  theory  of homeland security, it  will be 
based more on coherence truth  than pragmatic or  objective truth. I predict  that  one of the many 
language communities in  homeland security  will  come to some agreement  about  what 
constitutes an  accepted theory.  I say  more power  to whomever  is able to accomplish that.  At 
least  that will  provide something  tangible for  other  language communities to engage.  We can 
then  get  a  healthy  dialectic  going  over  the substance of homeland security  theory,  and move past 
the how-to make-a theory discussion. 73
JACQUES: (dismissing, gently) Maybe,  but let me continue talking about  cynefin. I described 
the simple and the complicated systems. I think  homeland security,  writ  large, has a  fairly  good 
understanding  of simple and complicated problems. Simple problems are handled by  standard 
operating procedures, and complicated problems are addressed through research.74 
CHARLES: (magnanimously) I like where you're going  with  this. Most  of the simple and 
complicated problems in  homeland security  are solved or  are being adequately  managed 
through research.
JACQUES: I think  I just  said that.  I have not  done the empirical work to support  those claims. 
But  with some exceptions I believe that is the case. So my  grand theory  takes into consideration 
that  many  of homeland security’s technical  and administrative problems are fairly  well specified, 
and as a result approachable through mid-range theories.
BARCLAY: Such as?
JACQUES: (carefully) Again, I have not done the empirical  work yet,  but  I suspect  issues like 
border  entry  procedures,  finding  handguns in  carry-on  luggage, monitoring  the movement of 
maritime shipping  containers fit this category. FEMA instructions for conducting  planning  and 
exercises may be another example.  
CHARLES:  Your examples are no-brainers from a theoretical perspective.
JACQUES: Conceptually,  perhaps.  But working  out  the details,  say, of detecting  a radiological 
signal in a port that has hundreds of thousands of containers can be daunting.
BARCLAY: (impatiently) What about the complex and chaotic parts of the cynefin framework?
JACQUES: Those domains describe activity  where order  emerges.  Cause and effect  relationships 
can be known, but almost always it's after the fact, after an event has happened.  
[Gaile picks small stones from the ground and arches them toward the horizon.]
JACQUES: In  my  reading  of homeland security's history, the changes,  the  big  changes,  have 
always been around events that are not going to happen the same way again.
BARCLAY: You are talking about black swans?
JACQUES: (studiedly)  I don’t  think I would call  them  black swans.75 Hurricane Katrina certainly 
was predictable  and predicted.  So too was using  an  airplane as a  terrorist weapon,  and the 
likelihood of a  pandemic.  But  recall  my  central  thesis: the homeland security  enterprise was 
produced by  events that  initiated and sustained multiple issue attention  cycles.  I think one could 
agree that  events surrounding  complex and chaotic activity  are largely  responsible for  the 
general  shape and direction  of the enterprise. Activities in  the simple  and complicated domains 
sustain that shape and direction. They  may  tinker  with  the shape at the margins, but they  do not 
significantly alter it. Especially not in comparison to significant events.
GAILE: Perhaps the lack  of significant difference between  the Bush Administration’s Homeland 
Security  Presidential Directive 8  and the Obama  Administration’s Presidential Preparedness 
Directorate 8 illustrates your “tinkering with the shape” idea?76
JACQUES: It might be. But I don't know enough about either to have an opinion.
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BARCLAY: (disquieted) I don't  understand yet  how  you  are distinguishing between  complex and 
chaotic in your formulation.
JACQUES: In  a  chaotic system,  there is no discernible cause and effect pattern.  Agents are 
independent and largely unconstrained.  
CHARLES: There is a  chilling  scene in the Jules and Gedeon  Naudet  video about September 
11th.  It  is the moment firefighters become aware the building is coming  down  around them. 77 
That is chaos. Everything surprises. No one rules. Except maybe the laws of physics. 
JACQUES:  In a  complex  system, as I think we discussed earlier,  order  emerges retrospectively. 
We can  discover  cause effect relationships,  but we only  know  them  after  the fact; and the 
relationships never recur.  
GAILE: That’s similar  to Churchill’s conclusion about history: the study  of things that  never 
happen the same way twice.
JACQUES: A  complex  system  constrains the freedom  agents have to act, but  not as much  as 
simple or  complicated systems. Agents can  modify  a  complex  system  through interacting  with 
each other and with the system. 78
GAILE: An  example would be how  public  health  and other  agencies learned to distribute 
vaccines during the 2009  H1N1  pandemic.79 Or  how  the Deepwater  Horizon  event moved first 
from  the chaos of the explosion, to the complexity  of the response, to the complicated task  of 
stopping the leak, to the – comparatively speaking – simple job of clean up.80  
JACQUES: Yes, good examples. But before this gets even more complicated...
BARCLAY: (smiling) Or complex?
JACQUES: Right.  I don’t  want to lose sight  of the forest.  Before this explanation  gets into even 
more details, let me restate my  theoretical  claim. I start  with  the question: What  did it  take to 
produce the homeland security  enterprise? I argue it took  the activation  and unfolding of the 
homeland security  issue attention  cycle. I present a  tentative description  of the stages of that 
cycle. 
BARCLAY: (reassured) OK, I follow all that.
JACQUES: Now, please allow me one more drawing.  
[Jacques erases the board and begins to write.]
JACQUES: I maintain  each  stage in the issue attention  cycle tends to evoke particular 
phenomenological characteristics.  Each  stage provides opportunities to make sense of a 
situation  in  a  different  way.81 I use the four  elements of the cynefin  framework  as a  convenient 
way to highlight – with an X – those opportunities.
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SCENE 4 – ESCAPING FROM OLD IDEAS
All the limitative Theorems of metamathematics and the theory of computation suggest that once the 
ability to represent your own structure has reached a certain critical point, that is the kiss of death: it 
guarantees you can never represent yourself totally.  Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, Church’s 
Undecidability Theorem, Turing’s Halting Problem, Turski’s Truth Theorem will always have the 
[flavor] of some ancient fairy tale which warns you that “To seek self-knowledge is to embark on a 
journey…which will always be incomplete, cannot be charted on a map, will never halt, cannot be 
described.” 
– Douglas Hofstadter
GAILE: I don’t want to be too much of a Philistine, but tell us the "so what" from all this?
JACQUES: (hesitantly) I'm  still working  on  that, but  I think  one could fill in  the chart  for  a 
variety  of decisions that  have to be made during the cycle: decisions about communication, 
strategy,  planning, technology,  leadership,  and so on. For  instance, there are certain leadership 
styles that are appropriate for some stages of the cycle and inappropriate for others.82 
GAILE: So it should be possible to use your cycle theory to generate testable hypotheses?
JACQUES: (confidently) Yes,  let me use leadership as an  example.  During  a  catastrophe – let’s 
say,  like Deepwater  Horizon  – I would expect to see leaders who used behaviors suitable for 
chaotic events to be more effective than leaders who followed standard operating procedures.83 
BARCLAY: And leaders would tend to be ineffective  if they  used complexity  strategies in 
situations where following routine procedures is the appropriate behavior?
JACQUES: Yes.   As an  example,  responding  to a wildland fire using  something  other than the 
Incident Command System  would be a  mistake,  and would be contrary  to the strategy 
appropriate for a routine – at least in this context – disaster. 
CHARLES: (obdurately) Your  framework,  while vaguely  interesting, does seem  to be a  rehash  – 
sorry, maybe not  the best word – of something leadership and organizational theorists already 
understand quite well: different situations require different behaviors.
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JACQUES: (protectively) I think I am  providing  more than  a  restatement of contingency 
theory.84 I think  I have an  accurate descriptive theory  of what  it  took  to produce the homeland 
security  enterprise.  I also believe it  explains how  the enterprise evolves: multiple stakeholders 
interacting within systems created by overlapping and multiple issue attention cycles.  
[Jacques half-heartedly erases the board]
JACQUES: The enterprise includes simple and complicated dimensions. Occasionally  – and 
significantly  – chaos happens. But I think  the most  interesting  and uncontrollable parts of the 
enterprise reside within  complexity. My  grand theory  suggests combining issue attention  with 
the cynefin  framework  produces heuristic  advice for  appropriate action in  the homeland security 
enterprise. I think it is especially valuable as a guide to acting within complexity.
CHARLES: Okay, I follow.  But  heuristic  advice  is insufficient.  By  your  earlier  argument,  one 
does not  predict the outcomes of a  complex  system. And recall our  agreement that  prediction is 
the true measure of useful theory.
JACQUES: (discouraged) That  is where I run  into difficulty.  My  admittedly  idealistic  hope is to 
be able to use the theory  to make predictions about  something significant in  homeland security. 
I can  handle prediction  in  the simple and complicated domains.  But  if the catalytic core of 
homeland security’s trajectory  resides within  the complex  domain,  prediction  – at  least 
significant prediction – will not  be possible. If it  is possible,  then the homeland security 
enterprise is not a complex adaptive system – at least as I understand that term. 
CHARLES: (encouraging)  Maybe we have not  yet  discovered how  to predict  complex events?85 
Perhaps the best we can do, as Gaile said, is to adjust our sails.
BARCLAY: (abruptly) I am  trying not  to be dense,  but  what  does "adjust our  sails" mean in 
homeland security?
JACQUES: (slowly)  To me it  means paying  attention  – for  the problems you  care about – to 
where you  are in  the issue attention  cycle, knowing your phenomenological options,  and then 
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acting  according to what  Mary  Parker  Follet  called “the law  of the situation.” 86 The theory  I’m 
proposing helps leaders parse the situation they are in so they can be more effective.
BARCLAY: We have found another  use of theory, at least  descriptive theory: to act  as a  roadmap 
for strategic leadership.
CHARLES: (aseptically) As much as I might  enjoy  speculating about your  grand theory, I have 
two other  problems with  it.  First, your  insistence on  a  significant initiating  event  rules out  slowly 
moving  catastrophes, such  as climate change, a deteriorating national  education  system, and 
similar social trends.87 Secondly, what would it take to falsify your idea?
JACQUES: Why do you want to falsify it?
GAILE:  (elaborating) If a  claim  can’t  be falsified then  it  is not  scientific. It  would be what Hume 
called a relation of ideas, something true simply by definition.88 Karl Popper made this point.89 
CHARLES: Your  model describes how  you  claim  to see homeland security. Popper  would argue 
you  probably  already  had the ideas in  your  head before you  applied them  to homeland security. 
He believed we imagine first, then  test  our  ideas – our  models – through  experimentation. The 
task of science is to try  to falsify  ideas, not  to prove them.  Through  that  process our  models get 
better  and we know  more.90 If your  theory  cannot be disproven, even  hypothetically,  then  it  adds 
nothing of substance to our  store of knowledge.91  As intricate a  formulation  as you've 
constructed, what would it take to falsify your views?
JACQUES: (distracted) I would like to think more about  that,  but  my  immediate reaction  is it 
would be easy  to falsify. Show  me a  leader  who's good in  a  crisis because he follows how-to-be-a-
leader rules,92 and I'll say there's something wrong with my framework.
CHARLES: But  I hope your  framework, your model, your  grand theory  – whatever  you’re calling 
it – is not simply another way to say something about leadership that’s already well known.
JACQUES: (bruised) Thank you.
CHARLES: (ignores comment)  You  claim  to have a  way  to explain  what  it took to produce the 
homeland security  enterprise. You  say  it  took events to initiate and sustain  a  pattern  of behavior 
you're  calling  the homeland security  issue attention cycle.  Even  hypothetically,  what  would it 
take to demonstrate you are wrong? How could you falsify the claim?
JACQUES: (defensively  exasperated)  Listen,  it  took me long  enough  to make this up.  I'm  not 
ready  to try  to falsify  it yet.  I'm  still  trying  to understand what  it means, what  hypotheses I can 
derive from  it,  and how  I can test  those hypotheses. I'm  not  yet ready  to think  about  proving 
myself wrong. I want to see where my  approach  leads first.  I am  more interested in  seeing  where 
the idea goes, in pursuing it, than in convincing you it’s right.
GAILE: I believe I can think of a way  to falsify  it. Let's say  there is an event  that happens in 
United States similar  to the 2011  Fukushima event – say  at  California’s Diablo Canyon or San 
Onofre nuclear  plants. There is an  earthquake,  a  tsunami, and a  reactor  meltdown. According  to 
Jacques’ issue cycle theory, the homeland security  enterprise would be substantially  changed as 
the repercussions of that event ripple through the nation.
CHARLES: (dismissively)  That is a  trivial  observation.  It  is little more than  saying,  "If 
something really horrible happens in the United States, things will change."
BARCLAY: (evenly) I don't think you're being fair here.
CHARLES: It’s not  a  matter  of fairness. I don’t believe we need a  moderately  interesting  but 
arcane collection  of ideas to tell  us what  we already  know.  The grand theory  is not  precise 
enough  to give us anything more than  another  set  of words for  describing how  one person  sees 
the world of homeland security.
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GAILE: (pleased) You  are not being  consistent,  Professor Charles. Earlier  you  said you  wanted 
everyone to be their own theorist.  Now  you  have Jacques offering a  theory  and you criticize the 
ideas as restating the obvious. You can't have it both ways.
CHARLES: (amused) Well,  as Emerson  wrote, “A  foolish  consistency  is the hobgoblin  of little 
minds.” I applaud Jacques for  the cycle  theory.  However, I do not  believe I am  being foolishly 
inconsistent in trying to challenge Jacques’ ideas.  Science is less about what one person does, 
and more about the activity  of the entire scientific community. What  we who care about  this 
embryonic  homeland security  discipline do is listen  to each  other, agree,  disagree,  ask  for 
evidence, modify  ideas, disprove ideas,  extend ideas, and so on.  That's how  science makes 
progress. That’s how we will make progress.
BARCLAY: (pressing) Are you agreeing or disagreeing with Professor Jacques?
CHARLES: Neither. I am  demonstrating  what I said earlier. I want every  person who cares 
about  homeland security  to be their  own  theorist. I want  them  to make claims about  why  we 
have the homeland security  enterprise we have,  what  it  took to produce the enterprise, pose any 
research  questions they  have. I want them  to support  their  claims with whatever  evidence they 
can  marshal: use data, rhetoric, analysis. I don't  care. But I do care that  they  share those ideas 
with  others,  in  writing and in  conversation. And that  they  share with  transformational openness: 
asking,  “What do I have to believe in  order  to see the world like Jacques does,  or  Gaile,  or 
Barclay?”  I expect  them  to listen  to me the same way: What  do they  have to believe to see as 
Charles does? As we learn  to speak and listen  to each other, we will  remain  alive to the 
continuously  evolving  theoretical and empirical  cultures of homeland security.  Open  this theory 
building activity to everyone. Not just to the academic hegemony.
[A pause for silence.]
GAILE: (dryly)  I feel like I should be hearing  a  rising  chorus of strings and horns about  now. 
Had we more time, Professor Charles,  I'd ask you  what  evidence you  would accept  to refute your 
last claim, your own normative ideas about how we should create homeland security theory.
CHARLES: (tickled) That would be easy.  Have the academic priesthood use their  special 
training to come up with  breakthrough  ideas or  solutions to homeland security’s wicked 
problems.93 If they  can  do that while others who are less skilled cannot,  I would be willing  to 
rethink my claim about encouraging everyone to be a homeland security theorist.
GAILE: I agree we should focus on  solving  the thorny  problems.  That’s why  I question whether 
we even  need homeland security  theories.  There is not  enough  uniqueness in  what  we do to 
warrant  a  novel academic approach.  I think  homeland security  as a  profession  is analogous to 
health. 94  The health  profession includes innumerable disciplines,  problems,  bodies of 
knowledge, and inquiry  methods; together  they  combine to form  a  meta-discipline called health. 
Maybe it’s the same with  homeland security.  There is no grand theory  of health.  Homeland 
security also can do well without one. 
CHARLES: I’m  not willing  to rule out  a  grand theory.  But  I’m  more enthusiastic  about 
discovering as many interesting homeland security theories as people can create.
GAILE: As I’ve said,  the professional  disciplines that constitute homeland security  – law 
enforcement, the military,  intelligence, emergency  management,  public health, fire services – 
give us enough  ideas to work  with. The same thing  is true for  traditional academic disciplines –
like public  policy,  public administration, economics, sociology, biology, geography, 
mathematics,  computer  science,  and so on.  They  offer  a  wealth  of useful theories to people who 
want to improve security.  We don’t  need new  theories.  We do need to get  better  at  using  the 
ones we already have.   
JACQUES: And I believe it's worth  building on the 500-year  tradition  of Western  science.  Let’s 
apply  to homeland security  the tools and logics that  brought us the philosophical  and material 
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progress we enjoy  today.  The grand theory  I propose is certainly  not perfect,  but I believe it  can 
help take us to the next stage in the development of our profession.
[A very long silence.]
BARCLAY: Well, it looks like we have reached a stopping point.  Shall we go?
CHARLES: Yes, let’s go.
GAILE: Yes, let’s.
JACQUES: Yes.
[They do not move.]
That is the way leaves fall around a tree in autumn, a tree unaware of the rain running down its 
sides, of the sun or the frost, and of life gradually retreating inward. The tree does not die. It waits. – 
Herman Hesse
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Sociology (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1964), 299. Robert Merton described middle range theories 
[what I am calling mid-range] as “theories that lie between the minor [what I am calling micro theories] 
but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance in day-to-day research and the all-inclusive 
systematic efforts to develop unified theory [what I am calling grand theories] that will explain all the 
observed uniformities of social behaviour, organization and social change.” Collins Dictionary of 
Sociology (London: Collins, 2006), s.v. "Theories of the Middle Range," http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?
qurl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.credoreference.com/entry/collinssoc/theories_of_the_middle_range. 
7 For a comprehensive perspective on what Congress considers to be homeland security problems, see the 
collection of Congressional Research Service documents, titled Congressional Research Service Reports 
on Homeland Security, maintained by the Federation of American scientists at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/homesec/index.html. For a less ambitious list see Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland 
Security: In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful?” Homeland Security Affairs 7, Article 1 (February 
2011), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=7.1.1
8 In an unpublished 2005 paper titled “Appendix to ‘Homeland Security Disciplines and the Cycle of 
Preparedness’,” William V. Pelfrey identified the following disciplines, activities, and professions as 
having some nexus with homeland security: law enforcement, emergency medical services, fire service, 
hazardous waste operations and emergency response, emergency dispatch communications, health 
services, emergency management, governmental administrators, public health, public works, business 
continuity, cyber-security and information technology, infrastructure protection, educational institutions 
and organizations, homeland security [state, federal and local], private security, loss prevention, major 
event security, Red Cross, volunteer and non-governmental organizations providing public assistance, 
public information, media management, public places and major facilities, financial institutions, 
prosecutors, risk management, skilled trades, transportation services, public/private utilities, and 
military. For a discussion of the theoretical frameworks many of those disciplines offer, see Bellavita, 
“Changing Homeland Security: In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful?” 3-4.
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9 Here are some definitions of theory, representative of the wide range of the word’s meaning: 
“A theory is any systematic and coherent collection of ideas that relate to a specific subject….  There is no 
requirement that the collection be demonstrated, and it can even be false…. String Theory in physics is 
highly speculative, but it’s still a theory….” Steven Dutch, “What Is a Theory?” http://www.uwgb.edu/
dutchs/PSEUDOSC/WhatTheory.HTM. 
“A theory is a symbolic construction…. A theory is a way of making sense of a disturbing situation so as to 
allow us most effectively to bring to bear our repertoire of habits, and even more important, to modify 
habits or discard them altogether, replacing them by new ones as the situation demands.… [Theory] will 
appear as the device for interpreting, criticizing, and unifying established laws, modifying them to fit data 
unanticipated in their formulation, and guiding the enterprise of discovering new and more powerful 
generalizations. To engage in theorizing means not just to learn by experience but to take thought about 
what is there to be learned.” Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry; Methodology for Behavioral Science, 
295-296.
Theory “[in a] loose or general sense: A hypothesis proposed as an explanation; hence, a mere hypothesis, 
speculation, conjecture; an idea or set of ideas about something; an individual view or notion.” Oxford 
English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/200431?
rskey=Uxn8tb&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid 
Theory falls “between the ‘minor working hypotheses’ of everyday life and the ‘all-inclusive’ grand 
theories.” Barney G. Glaser, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research 
Observations (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1967), 32-33.
A theory is “a general understanding of how humans gain knowledge of the world around them, and an 
understanding of what makes the work descended from the Scientific Revolution different from the other 
kinds of investigation in the world…. [Theory is] a scientific strategy for investigating the world.” Peter 
Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Science and Its 
Conceptual Foundations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 5, 7.
“A theory is a general principle supported by a substantial body of scientific evidence which explains 
observed facts.  As a probable explanation for observations, a theory offers an intellectual framework for 
future discussion, investigation and refinement.”  Jennifer Bothamley, ed., Dictionary of Theories 
(London; Detroit: Gale Research International, 1993), 523.
“A theory is any systematic and coherent collection of ideas that relate to a specific subject…. All 
hypotheses are theories, but all theories are not hypotheses….” Dutch, “What is a Theory,” http://
www.uwgb.edu/dutchs/PSEUDOSC/WhatTheory.HTM 
Theory is “[a] scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of 
facts or phenomena; a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by observation or experiment, 
and is propounded or accepted as accounting for the known facts; a statement of what are held to be the 
general laws, principles, or causes of something known or observed.” Oxford English Dictionary, http://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/200431?rskey=Uxn8tb&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid. 
“The words hypothesis, law, and theory refer to different kinds of statements… that scientists make about 
natural phenomena. A hypothesis is a proposition that attempts to explain a set of facts in a unified way.… 
A scientific law is a hypothesis that is assumed to be universally true.… A theory is a set of statements, 
including laws and hypotheses, that explains a group of observations or phenomena in terms of those laws 
and hypotheses. A theory thus accounts for a wider variety of events than the law does.” The American 
Heritage Science Dictionary (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2005), 313.
“[In] modern science the term ‘theory’, or ‘scientific theory’ is generally understood to refer to a proposed 
explanation of empirical phenomena, made in a way consistent with [the] scientific method. Such theories  
are preferably described in such a way that any scientist in the field is in a position to understand and 
either provide empirical support ("verify") or empirically contradict (‘falsify’) it. In this modern scientific 
context the distinction between theory and practice corresponds roughly to the distinction between 
theoretical science and technology or applied science.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory. “Consider 
the following usages of the word ‘theory’ [:] the Ptolemaic Theory of the solar system, the Phlogiston 
Theory of combustion, the Theory of Relativity, Grand Unified Theories of physics, the Theory of 
Continental Drift, Stress Theory, Number Theory, Music Theory, the Theory of Evolution.” Dutch, “What 
Is a Theory?” http://www.uwgb.edu/dutchs/PSEUDOSC/WhatTheory.HTM.
10 Christopher Bellavita, ed., How Public Organizations Work: Learning from Experience (New York: 
Praeger. 1990), xvi; Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 298-302; Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, 6.
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11 This is a position articulated by William Whewell (1794-1866). “The hypotheses which we accept ought 
to explain phenomena which we have observed. But they ought to do more than this; our hypotheses 
ought to foretell phenomena which have not yet been observed; ... because if the rule prevails, it includes 
all cases; and will determine them all, if we can only calculate its real consequences. Hence it will predict 
the results of new combinations, as well as explain the appearances, which have occurred in old ones. And 
that it does this with certainty and correctness, is one mode in which the hypothesis is to be verified as 
right and useful.” — William Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Vol. 2 (1847), 62-63. [Cited 
at http://www.todayinsci.com/QuotationsCategories/P_Cat/Prediction-Quotations.htm.] Whewell is 
credited with, among other things, inventing the word “scientist,” at the behest of the poet Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge.  See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whewell/ and http://www.oed.com.libproxy.nps.edu/
view/Entry/172698?redirectedFrom=scientist#eid. 
From John von Neumann, “What is important is the gradual development of a theory, based on a careful 
analysis of the ... facts. ... Its first applications are necessarily to elementary problems where the result has 
never been in doubt and no theory is actually required. At this early stage the application serves to 
corroborate the theory. The next stage develops when the theory is applied to somewhat more 
complicated situations in which it may already lead to a certain extent beyond the obvious and familiar. 
Here theory and application corroborate each other mutually. Beyond lies the field of real success: 
genuine prediction by theory. It is well known that all mathematized sciences have gone through these 
successive stages of evolution. — John von Neumann  “Formulation of the Economic Problem” in Theory 
of Games and Economic Behavior (1964), 8. Reprinted in John Von Neumann, F. Bródy and Tibor Vámos 
eds., The Neumann Compendium (2000), 416. 
12 See “Layers of Security” at http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/index.shtm. For an example of 
contrary descriptive theory on the 20 layers of security, see “Unfolding TSA Layered Security” at http://
aviationknowledge.wikidot.com/aviation:unfolding-tsa-layered-security. For a claim that there are 
twenty-one, not twenty security layers, see John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and 
Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security (Oxford University Press, 2011), 
138. Mueller and Stewart include “international partnerships;” the TSA “Layers of Security” website does 
not (when last accessed on April 10, 2012).
13 For a summary of Kuhn’s position on what is called in this paper descriptive theory, see “Evolution of 
Descriptive Theory” at http://www2.uiah.fi/projekti/metodi/124.htm.
14 Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 
60, no. 2 (February/March 2005): 161–169. 
15 “An explanation “answers the question ‘Why did the explanadum-phenomenon occur?’ by showing that 
the phenomenon resulted from certain particular circumstances….” Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 278, note 5, citing Carl G. 
Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: 
Free Press, 1965), 337.
16  Homeland  Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 21: “ Public Health and Medical 
Preparedness” (October 18, 2007), 3, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-21.htmHSPD21.  
17 George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” The 
Atlantic (March 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/
4465/?single_page=true. 
18 The National Incident Management System (NIMS); see www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/
NIMSFAQs.pdf
19 Attributed.
20 “Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away.” Philip K. Dick, “How to Build a 
Universe That Doesn’t Fall Apart Two Days Later” (1978), http://deoxy.org/pkd_how2build.htm. 
BELLAVITA, WAITING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THEORY  30
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8  ARTICLE 16 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
21 For an extended description of objective (or correspondence) truth see David, Marian, "The 
Correspondence Theory of Truth," Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2009 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/truth-correspondence/#3.   
22 I am using the phrase to mean “A metaphor for any group activity performed for personal gratification.”  
http://www.wordnik.com/words/circle%20jerk
23 This framework is adapted from Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life (London: Heinemann, 1979), 
21-37.
24 Max Weber defined ideal types as “[a theoretical construct] formed by the one-sided accentuation of 
one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one sidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct 
cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.  … It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting 
concept with which the real situation or action is compared ….”  Dictionary of Visual Discourse: A 
Dialectical Lexicon of Terms (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), s.v. "IDEAL TYPE," http://
www.credoreference.com/entry/ashgtvd/ideal_type. 
25 For an example of homeland security as a rational reality (as defined in the text), see Richard J. 
Hartnett, et. al., “Augmenting the DGPS Broadcast with Emergency Information,” Homeland Security 
Affairs, Best Papers from the IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (January 2011). 
http://www.hsaj.org/?article=supplement3.5
26 For an example of the structural reality of homeland security, see Samuel Clovis, “Federalism, 
Homeland Security and National Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of Public Policy,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 2006), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.3.4 
27 For examples of homeland security from a group perspective, see Fathali Moghaddam and James 
Breckenridge, “Homeland Security and Support for Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Omniculturalism 
Policies among Americans,” Homeland Security Affairs 6, no. 3 (September 2010), http://
www.hsaj.org/?article=6.3.7, and Lulu Rodriguez and Suman Lee, “Factors Affecting the Amplification or 
Attenuation of Public Worry and Dread about Bioterrorist Attacks,” Homeland Security Affairs 6, no. 1 
(January 2010), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=6.1.7
28 James O. Young, "The Coherence Theory of Truth," Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/truth-coherence/.
29 For an example of homeland security from an individual perspective, see Tom Ridge and Larry Bloom, 
The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege...And How We Can Be Safe Again (Thomas Dunne Books, 
2009); and Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the 
Future of American Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
30 One of the characters in the text abruptly terminates the discussion of what counts as data when 
constructing homeland security theory. If the conversation were to continue, the characters would talk 
about deciding whether to use every day events, theories, concepts, metaphors, or paradigms to determine 
what counts as homeland security data. (Bellavita, How Public Organizations Work, xvi.) This would lead 
to a longer discussion about the appropriate modes of homeland security inquiry; a conversation that 
would touch on induction, deduction, abduction, multiple realities, dialectic inquiry, unbounded systems, 
obliquity, detour and access. (C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic Concepts of 
Systems and Organization (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Ian I. Mitroff, The Unbounded Mind: 
Breaking the Chains of Traditional Business Thinking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); 
Francois Jullien, Detour and Access: Strategies of Meaning in China and Greece, trans. Sophie Hawkes 
(MIT Press, 2004); and Igor Douven, "Abduction," Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/; John 
Kay, Obliquity: Why Our Goals Are Best Achieved Indirectly (Penguin Press, 2011). The framework for 
the epistemological pyramid was suggested to me by Larry Kirkhart.
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31 “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined 
thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, eds., 4th ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 43.
32 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?” Homeland Security 
Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2008) http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1  Shawn Reese, Defining Homeland 
Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations, R42462 (Congressional Research Service, April 3, 
2012).
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (2010), 11-17. 
34  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_School_of_Athens.  See also, Raphael's Fresco of the School of 
Athens http://youtu.be/uOrG6jfBzEU, especially from the 1:30 to the 3:40 mark.
35 “Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of 
discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate 
to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.  It would be impossible to 
survey all there is to say about truth in any coherent way.” Michael Glanzberg, "Truth," Edward N. Zalta, 
ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2009/entries/truth/. For more on this practically endless topic, see also F. Fernandez-Armesto, Truth 
(Random House Pod, 2010); Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide (Oxford University Press, 2007); and 
Harry G. Frankfurt, On Truth, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 2006).
36 René Descartes, A Discourse on the Method, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford University Press, 2008), 17.
37 Piet J.M. Verschuren, “Holism versus Reductionism in Modern Social Science Research,” Quality and 
Quantity 35, no. 4 (2001): 389-405.
38 A character again tries to bring up modes of inquiry, but neglects to provide details about what the 
ideas mean. See note #30.
39 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, Fourth ed. (2010),Verso.
40 Peter Facione, “Critical Thinking: What It Is and Why It Counts” (2011), www.insightassessment.com/
pdf_files/what&why2006.pdf; Tim van Gelder, “Teaching Critical Thinking: Some Lessons from 
Cognitive Science” College Teaching 53, no. 1 (2005): 41-46; Linda Kiltz, “Developing Critical Thinking 
Skills in Homeland Security and Emergency Management Courses,” Journal of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management 6, no. 1 (2009); Matthew L. Collins and Stacy L. Peerbolte, “An Exploratory 
Research Design Further Demonstrating the Need for the Integration of Critical Thinking Skill Curricula 
in Homeland Security and Emergency Management Higher Education Academic Programs,” Journal of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management 8, no. 2 (2011).
41 Chris Argyris, “Teaching Smart People How To Learn,” Harvard Business Review (May-June 1991): 
148-158.
42 Orion F. White, Jr., and Cynthia J. McSwain. 1983. “Transformational Theory and Organizational 
Analysis,” in Beyond Method: Strategies for Social Research, ed. Gareth Morgan (Sage Publications, Inc., 
1983), 292-305.
43  For a carefully discussed extension of this position, see R. McDermott, “Methodology for Homeland 
Security,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (July 2010). http://
www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Default.aspx?t=346. 
44 “Everywhere science is enriched by unscientific methods and unscientific results, while procedures 
which have often been regarded as essential parts of science are quietly suspended or circumvented… The 
separation of science and non-science is not only artificial but also detrimental to the advancement of 
knowledge. If we want to understand nature, if we want to master our physical surroundings, then we 
must use all ideas, all methods, and not just a small selection of them.” Feyerabend, Against Method, 
305-306
BELLAVITA, WAITING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THEORY  32
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8  ARTICLE 16 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
45 Peter Godfrey-Smith “If we want to understand how science works… the first thing we need to do is 
work out what exactly we are trying to explain. Where does science begin and end? What kind of activity 
counts as 'science'? Unfortunately this is not something we can settle in advance. There is a lot of 
disagreement about what counts as science….” Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, 2. 
Kaplan agrees: “I … forgo a definition [of the scientific method] because I believe there is no one thing to 
be defined.” Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 27.
“...I think science is not about data; it's not about the empirical content, about our vision of the world. It's 
about overcoming our own ideas, and about going beyond common sense continuously. Science is a 
continuous challenge of common sense, and the core of science is not certainty, it's continuous 
uncertainty. I would even say the joy of taking what we think, being aware that in everything we think, 
there are probably still an enormous amount of prejudices and mistakes, and try to learn to look a little bit  
larger, knowing that there is always a larger point of view that we'll expect in the future.” Carlo Rovelli, 
“Science Is Not About Certainty: A Philosophy of Physics,” Edge (2012), http://www.edge.org/
conversation/a-philosophy-of-physics.
The question of what constitutes basic science appears very straightforward to the Oxford English 
Dictionary: “A branch of study which is concerned either with a connected body of demonstrated truths 
or with observed facts systematically classified and more or less colligated by being brought under general 
laws, and which includes trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth within its own domain.” 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition (1989), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/172672. 
46 “How and why do we accept one theory in preference to others? ...We choose the theory which best 
holds its own in competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the 
fittest to survive….  A theory is a tool which we test by applying it, and which we judge as to its fitness by 
the result of its application.” Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2002), 
91.
47 The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review report defines homeland security and the homeland 
security enterprise:  “Homeland security is a concerted national effort to ensure a homeland is safe, 
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way 
of life can thrive.”  “The homeland security ‘enterprise’ refers to the collective efforts and shared 
responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners—
as well as individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical homeland security capabilities. It 
connotes a broad-based community with a common interest in the safety and well-being of America and 
American society.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
Report (2010), 13, 12.
48 Attributed to William Arthur Ward http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/w/
williamart110212.html.  The correct quote is “The pessimist complains about the wind; the optimist 
expects it to change; the realist adjusts the sails.”
49 Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think In Action, 1st ed. (Basic Books, 
1984). 
50 Anthony Downs, “Up and Down With Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’" The Public Interest 28 
(Summer 1972): 38-50; Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: The Issue-Attention Cycle,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 1 (June 2005), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=1.1.1; B. Guy Peters and 
Brian W. Hogwood, “In Search of the Issue-Attention Cycle,” Journal of Politics 47, no. 1 (February 1985): 
238-253. For a visual example, see John Sides, “On Haiti, America’s Short Attention Span Strikes Again,” 
Salon.com (2010), http://www.salon.com/2010/04/30/haiti_short_attention_span/singleton/.
51 This depiction of the cycle modifies the cycle’s presentation in the Anthony Downs article, cited in note 
50. Pre-event refers to the period and activities before an event. Event refers to the major event that 
triggers the next phase of the cycle. Alarm signifies national or other significant stakeholder attention to 
the event. Demand means the insistence by officials and the public that the causes and consequences of 
the event be addressed. Awareness of difficulty indicates the growing knowledge that causes and 
consequences will not quickly be remedied. Changing priorities describes the shift of attention to different 
problems. Post-event refers to the transformation of the issue to a new pre-event status.  
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52 See Note 5 for the working definition of grand theory.
53  “[It] is useful to distinguish between the notions 'complex' and 'complicated'. If the system–despite the 
fact that it may consist of a huge number of components–can be given a complete description in terms of 
its individual constituents, such a system is merely complicated. Things like jumbo jets or computers are 
complicated. In a complex system, on the other hand, the interaction among constituents of the system, 
and the interaction between the system and its environment, are of such a nature that the system as a 
whole cannot be fully understood simply by analyzing its components. Moreover, these relationships are 
not fixed, but shift and change, often as a result of self organization. This can result in novel features, 
usually referred to in terms of emergent properties. The brain, natural language and social systems are 
complex.” Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems, 1st ed. 
(Routledge, 1998), viii.
54 For a comprehensive list of the agencies and people who constitute the homeland security enterprise, 
see DHS, “Appendix A: Roles And Responsibilities Across The Homeland Security Enterprise.”   
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (2010), A1-A8.
55 Robert F. Ulanowicz, A Third Window: Natural Life Beyond Newton and Darwin (West 
Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2009); Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor, eds. 
Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2008); Rafe Sagarin, Learning From the Octopus: How Secrets from Nature Can Help Us Fight 
Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters, and Disease (Basic Books, 2012).
56 A complex adaptive system is “a system in which large networks of components with no central control 
and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information 
processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution."  Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), 13. See also John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptive 
Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life (Princeton University Press, 2007). 
57 For a detailed analysis of how the homeland security enterprise intelligence system is sustained, see 
Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State, 1st 
ed. (Little, Brown and Company, 2011).
58 D. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics, 2nd ed. (CQ Press, 2007); 
Janet Napolitano, “Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano’s 2nd Annual Address on the State 
of America’s Homeland Security: Homeland Security and Economic Security” presented at the National 
Press Club, January 30, 2012, Washington, DC, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/napolitano-state-
of-america-homeland-security.shtm; Paul C. Light, “The Homeland Security Hash” Wilson Quarterly 31, 
no. 2 (2007): 36-44. Presenting homeland security’s first decade as a series of version was suggested to 
me by Ted Lewis.
59 “What is the 'Glass Bead Game'?… Hesse speaks of ‘a game of thoughts called the Glass Bead Game’…: ‘I 
hear music and see men of the past and future. I see wise men and poets and scholars and artists 
harmoniously building the hundred–gated cathedral of Mind.’… The Glass Bead Game is an act of mental 
synthesis through which the spiritual values of all ages are perceived as simultaneously present and vitally  
alive.... [The] game is… a symbol of the human imagination.…"  Hermann Hesse, The Glass Bead Game: 
(Magister Ludi), 1st ed. (New York: Picador USA, 2002), viii-ix.  
60 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), 31-39, 44.  
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61 “A key motivation for the rapid deployment of full-body scanners was the foiled Christmas Day plot in 
which a terrorist hid plastic explosives in his underwear….” Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and 
Money, 149.
“AIT [Advanced Imaging Technology] devices, long under consideration by the TSA under the Bush 
administration gained rapid acceptance by TSA after the failed underwear bombing attempt on Christmas 
Day 2009 of a US-bound airliner.” Mickey McCarter, “TSA Rolls Out More Advanced Screening Tech, 
Trusted Traveler Pilot Program,” HS Today, October 7, 2001, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-
news-analysis/single-article/tsa-rolls-out-more-advanced-screening-tech-trusted-traveler-pilot-program/
aab613d483e888b4f085f4a69312be97.html.  “December 25, 2009: Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab attempts 
to detonate an explosive device concealed in his underwear on board Northwest flight 253. TSA works 
with DHS, foreign partners, and air carriers to swiftly implement enhanced aviation security 
measures.” [Emphasis added], “TSA Evolution Timeline” (n.d.), www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/
TSA_evolution_timeline.pdf
62 “Thirty-one cities across the country won’t receive anti-terror funding because of cuts to the 
Department of Homeland Security’s FY 2011 budget.” Janet Wilmoth, “DHS Cuts UASI Grants for 31 
Cities,” Fire Chief, May 20, 2011, http://firechief.com/hazmat/disaster-management/dhs-cuts-uasi-
grants-20110520/.  “The reductions were enacted by the Department of Defense and Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011 (Public Law 112-10), enacted by President Barack Obama on April 
15 as a budget compromise for the remainder of the fiscal year.” Mickey McCarter, “Diminished DHS 
Grants Draw Praise For Targeting Highest Risks,” HS Today, May 20, 2011, http://www.hstoday.us/
briefings/grants-funding/single-article/diminished-dhs-grants-draw-praise-for-targeting-highest-risks/
f5b1bc10848dd58d7df85fc832b6c0b7.html. 
63 See Milton Friedman’s “The Methodology of Positivist Economics,” in Milton Friedman, Essays in 
Positive Economics (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1964). The task of theory is “to 
provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences 
of any change in circumstances. Its performance is to be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity 
with experience of the predictions it yields…. Such a theory is, in general, a complex intermixture of two 
elements. In part, it is a ‘language’ designed to promote ‘systematic and organized methods of reasoning.’ 
In part, it is a body of substantive hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of complex reality…. 
[The] only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.” 
4-6.
64 Niels Bohr wrote, "Anyone not shocked by quantum mechanics has not yet understood it." Here is a 
textual (as distinct from mathematical) representation of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (that 
explains the limits of accuracy): “The simultaneous measurement of two conjugate variables (such as the 
momentum and position or the energy and time for a moving particle) entails a limitation on the precision  
(standard deviation) of each measurement. Namely: the more precise the measurement of position, the 
more imprecise the measurement of momentum, and vice versa. [Emphasis added] In the most extreme 
case, absolute precision of one variable would entail absolute imprecision regarding the other.”   It is 
taken from Heisenberg's Zeitschrift für Physik, 43 (1927), 172-198, translated into English by John 
Archibald Wheeler and Hubert Zurek, in Quantum Theory and Measurement, Wheeler and Zurek, eds. 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), 62-84.  See http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08a.htm 
for additional details. For a brief audio explanation by Heisenberg of part of the principle, listen to 
“Heisenberg Recalls His Early Thoughts on the Uncertainty Principle,” http://www.aip.org/history/
heisenberg/uncertain.au.
Wayne Porter argues (in a private conversation, February 2012) the Uncertainty Principle is especially 
relevant when considering contemporary plans and strategies. He claims many national plans are 
developed more from a baseline of what the current position is rather than the direction of momentum.  
He and his co-author describe some implications of this view in Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby, A 
National Strategic Narrative (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/nationalstrategicnarrative.pdf. 
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65 “A core challenge in diagnosing why some [social-ecological systems] are sustainable… is the 
identification and analysis of relationships among multiple levels of these complex systems at different 
spatial and temporal scales. Understanding a complex whole requires knowledge about specific variables 
and how their component parts are related. Thus, we must learn how to dissect and harness complexity, 
rather than eliminate it from such systems. This process is complicated, however, because entirely 
different frameworks, theories, and models are used by different disciplines to analyze their parts of the 
complex multilevel whole. A common, classificatory framework is needed to facilitate multidisciplinary 
efforts toward a better understanding of complex [systems].… A framework is… useful in providing a 
common set of potentially relevant variables and their subcomponents to use in the design of data 
collection instruments, the conduct of fieldwork, and the analysis of findings about… complex [systems]." 
Elinor Ostrom, “A General Framework for Analyzing the Sustainability of Social-ecological Systems,” 
Science 325, no. 5939 (2009): 420.
For the distinction Ostrom makes among framework, theory, and model, see Elinor Ostrom, “Institutional  
Rational Choice,” in Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd Edition, ed. Paul A Sabatier, Chapter 2 (Westview 
Press, 2007), 25-26
66 D. Snowden and M Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard Business Review 
(November 2007): 70.
67 For additional information about the Cynefin framework, see David Snowdon, “Origins of Cynefin,” 
Cognitive Edge, http://cognitive-edge.com/library/more/articles/the-origins-of-cynefin1/. See also the 
entry for Cynefin at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cynefin
68 An eight minute video overview of the Cynefin framework can be found at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=N7oz366X0-8
69 I learned that the US Department of Agriculture’s National Finance Center (NFC) manages many, if not, 
most of the payroll systems used by the DHS. DHS is not the only agency that uses the Department of 
Agriculture; the NFC website boasts that its “customer base is comprised of more than 140 Federal 
organizations, representing all three branches of the Government.” https://www.nfc.usda.gov/
About_NFC/About_NFC_home.html.  My guess is the NFC has figured out how to make a complicated 
process comparatively simple, and has shared their success with other agencies. But I’m just guessing.
70 For a description of the Suspicious Activity Reporting System, see “The Nationwide SAR Initiative” at 
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/.  For a discussion of the problems created by the data generated, see G.W. Schulz 
and Andrew Becker, “Finding Meaning in Suspicious Activity Reports,” NPR, September 7, 2011, http://
www.npr.org/2011/09/07/140237086/finding-meaning-in-suspicious-activity-reports.  
For a brief introduction to the more generic “big data problem,” see “DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano: 
The ‘Big Data’ Problem,” Homeland Security News March 2011), http://
www.homelandsecuritynews.info/2011/03/dhs-secretary-janet-napolitano-the-big-data-problem/. 
“Many of you probably deal with a version of [the Big Data Problem] in your own work: your research 
brings in reams of data, but what is essential is the ability to glean insight, and discern patterns and 
trends from a mass of information.  It is about discerning meaning and information from millions – 
billions – of data points. And when it comes to our security, this is one of our nation’s most pressing 
science and engineering challenges. I mentioned the two million airline passengers we process every day. 
Now add the more than 50,000 cargo containers that come every day through hundreds of air, land, and 
sea ports. At the same time, DHS is part of the nation’s Intelligence Community, which receives more 
terabytes of data each day than the entire text holdings of the Library of Congress. [emphasis added] 
The National Counterterrorism Center’s 24-hour Operations Center receives 8,000 to 10,000 pieces of 
counterterrorist information every day. We receive data about all of this, and it is clearly too much to 
suggest that the simplistic “connect the dots” analogy accurately represents what an analyst must do. Very 
quickly, you can see that “Big Data” – more so than the lack of data – becomes the most pressing problem. 
At the same time, the threats implicated by the data are not static.”
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71 In the context of the conversation, socially constructing reality refers to the communication process 
humans use to develop a shared subjective reality; over time, subjective reality can become reified and 
take on the attributes of objective reality – meaning people tend to forget what part of “reality” they made 
up.  There is much more to the concept than this; see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social 
Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Anchor, 1967). An overview of the 
ideas can be found at http://www.sociosite.net/topics/texts/berger_luckman.php.  
72 Rorty’s quote is cited in W. Desmond, Art, Origins, Otherness: Between Philosophy and Art (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 280.
73 For one attempt to do this, see Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional 
Considerations.
74 For illustrations of simple and complicated homeland security problems, see Christopher Bellavita, 
“Changing Homeland Security: Shape Patterns, Not Programs,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 
(October 2006), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.3.5. From a different conceptual framework, simple and 
complicated problems can be categorized as “tame” problems.  See H. Rittel and M. Webber, “Dilemmas 
in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155–169.
75 “[A] Black Swan… is an event with the following three attributes. First, it… lies outside the realm of 
regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it 
carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct 
explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it [retrospectively] explainable and predictable.” 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 1st ed. (Random House, 
2007), xvii-xviii.
76 George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8/HSPD-8 (Washington, DC, 2003), http://
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html. Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 8/ PPD-8: 
National Preparedness (Washington, DC, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/
gc_1215444247124.shtm. Christopher Bellavita. 2011. “The National Preparedness Goal Occupies Wall 
Street,” Homeland Security Watch. October 4, 2011, http://www.hlswatch.com/2011/10/04/the-
national-preparedness-goal-occupies-wall-street/.
77 Gedeon Naudet, James Hanlon, and Jules Naudet, 9/11 (Paramount, 2010). The specific scene 
described in the narrative can be viewed (around the 46 minute mark) at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=RjzQTETv6-w. 
78 “A complex system is a lightly constrained system, in which agents (anything which acts) co-evolve with  
the system itself; the system constrains the agents, but the agents constantly modify the system by the 
nature of their interaction with it.  Managing complex system … involves a process of navigation where 
the map by its nature is incomplete and the topology is constantly changing.”  David Snowden, 
“Complexity, Precision and Meaning,” Cognitive Edge (2008), http://cognitive-edge.com/blog/entry/
3759/complexity-precision-and-meaning/. See also The Cynefin Framework, http://www.youtube.com/
In?v=N7oz366X0-8. 
79 Lisa Schnirring, “H1N1 Lessons Learned Vaccination Campaign Weathered Rough Road, Paid 
Dividends,” CIDRAP, April 30, 2010. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/
news/apr3010campaign.html. Tom Russo, “Pandemic Vaccine Distribution Policy for the Twenty-First 
Century” Homeland Security Affairs 8, Article 4 (February 2012), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=8.1.4.
80 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The 
Gulf Oil Disaster in the Future of Offshore Drilling (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 2011); 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Incident Specific Preparedness Review (Washington, DC: British 
Petroleum, 2010). Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report.
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81 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 75.  Snowden claims people tend to 
interpret situations based on their personal preference for action. People who are socialized in 
bureaucracies tend to see problems as “a failure of process.” “Deep experts” see problems as a result of 
failure to provide enough time or resources to do analysis. People who are "natural complexity workers" 
tend to seek ideas and opinions from a wide variety of sources. And "of course the fascists love a crisis 
because then they can be given absolute command of everybody who has to do what they're told."  When 
people are confronted with a significant decision, they “are in a disordered space, assessing the situation 
according to their preference for action." The Cynefin Framework, http://www.youtube.com/In?
v=N7oz366X0-8 
82 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making”; Robert Kegan and Lisa Laskow 
Lahey, Immunity to Change: How to Overcome It and Unlock the Potential in Yourself and Your 
Organization, 1st ed. (Harvard Business School Press, 2009); Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn, and 
Joseph M. Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness: A Model to Build 
Government Connectivity,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 4, 
no. 2 (2006): 128–134.
83 Appendix II.1 “Characteristics And Qualifications Of An Effective Crisis Leader,” in Deep Water: The 
Gulf Oil Disaster in the Future of Offshore Drilling, 57-61.
84 Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1989), 
149-172; 194-198.
85 “One of the most powerful tools arising from complex systems research is a set of computational 
techniques that allow a much wider range of models to be explored.… [Scientific]… validity… must be 
earned by carefully considering the ability of the new models to help us understand and predict [emphasis 
added] the questions that we hold most dear.” (5) “Recognizing and understanding causality is one of the 
big challenges for agents within, and modelers of, complex systems.… Predictive agents… need to have an 
understanding of the causal implications of their actions.… Modeling how agents simplify complexity so 
that they can predict an act is an important topic.” [emphasis added] (237), in Miller and Page, Complex 
Adaptive Systems.
86 The law of the situation – a proto-complexity strategy – was suggested early in the 20th century by Mary 
Parker Follett: “From one point of view, one might call the essence of scientific management the attempt 
to find the law of the situation. With scientific management the managers are as much under orders as the 
workers, for both obey the law of the situation. Our job is not how to get people to obey orders, but how to 
devise methods by which we can best discover the order integral to a particular situation.”  Mary Parker 
Follett, Mary Parker, “The Giving of Orders,” in Scientific Foundations of Business Administration 
(Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1926); reprinted in Classic Readings in Organizational Behavior, 
J. Steven Ott, ed. (Pacific Grove, Calif: Brooks/Cole, 1989), 259. 
More than 75 years later, another author extended Follett’s point: "There is a quality even meaner than 
outright ugliness or disorder, and this meaner quality is the dishonest mask of pretend order, achieved by 
ignoring or surpassing the real order that is struggling to exist and to be served." Jane Jacobs, The Death 
and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 2002), 21.
87 The December 2011 Strategic National Risk Assessment excluded similar threats from its initial 
assessment: "Only events that have a distinct beginning and end and those with an explicit nexus to 
homeland security missions were included. This approach excluded:  Chronic societal concerns, such as 
immigration and border violations, and those that are generally not related to homeland security national 
preparedness, such as cancer or car accidents; and, Political, economic, environmental, and societal 
trends that may contribute to a changing risk environment but are not explicitly homeland security 
national-level events (e.g., demographic shifts, economic trends). These trends will be important to 
include in future iterations of a national risk assessment, however." The Strategic National Risk 
Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach Toward a Secure and Resilient 
Nation (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 2.
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88 “Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well-known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of 
those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most 
simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and security; what resource are we then possessed of? By what 
invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate for 
intellectual view?” David Hume, “A Treatise of Human Nature,” in Great Books of the Western World. 
Vol. 35 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 471. “The necessary connexion betwixt causes and 
effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the 
transition arising from the accustomed union. These are, therefore, the same.” David Hume, “A Treatise 
of Human Nature,” Sect. XIV of The Idea Of Necessary Connexion, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/
4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm#2H_4_0035. 
89 “But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by 
experience. These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be 
taken as a criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be 
capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form 
shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible  
for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
18 (emphasis in original).
90 “The most common misunderstanding about science is that scientists seek and find truth. They don't–
they make and test models.… Building models is very different from proclaiming truths. It's a never-
ending process of discovery and refinement, not a war to win or destination to reach. Uncertainty is 
intrinsic to the process of finding out what you don't know, not a weakness to avoid.” Neil Gershenfeld, 
“Truth Is a Model,” in This Will Make You Smarter: New Scientific Concepts to Improve Your Thinking, 
ed. John Brockman (Harper Perennial, 2012), 72-73.
91 “In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable: and in so far as it is not 
falsifiable, it does not speak about reality.” Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 316 (emphasis in 
original)
92 One government report suggests people can be trained to lead during a crisis: “Many Government 
Agencies and private corporations ‘grow’ leaders from within. They also often bring in proven leaders 
from outside to provide new leadership and direction for the organization; however, the skills of 
organization and the ability to manage and lead are only baseline competencies when a crisis arises. The 
outcome of a crisis or the success of a response to the crisis is directly related to effective crisis leadership. 
Some leaders are naturally suited for such a role, but often are not the ones who find themselves 
confronting a crisis or are not the ones placed in the position of leadership when the crisis occurs. Leaders 
involved in crisis management may find themselves on national television, with little or no media training 
or experience for their leadership position. Crisis managers are required to make critical and binding 
decisions without the benefit of lengthy study or peer-reviewed advice. The crisis dictates the pace, tempo, 
and duration that drives the decision making process. Leaders not trained and prepared to function 
effectively in a crisis can create an image of incompetence, chaos, or disorganization, even if the incident 
is being managed competently and effectively. In most cases, the leader in a crisis is the “face” of the 
organization he or she represents; in some cases it may be virtually the only time the public is aware of the 
organization. The reputation of that organization will largely be determined by the performance of the 
crisis leader.” Appendix II.1 “Characteristics And Qualifications Of An Effective Crisis Leader,” 57 
[emphasis added] in Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster in the Future of Offshore Drilling. 
93 A starting list of problems to work on can be found at Congressional Research Service Reports on 
Homeland Security, maintained by the Federation of American scientists at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
homesec/index.html.  Also, Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: Shape Patterns, Not Programs,” 9; 
Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful?” 1.
94 This comparison was brought to my attention by Jason Nairn. Jason P. Nairn, “State and Local 
Homeland Security Officials: Who Are They and What Do They Do?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, September 2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691550.pdf.
Perceptual Framing of Homeland Security
Linda Kiltz and James D. Ramsay
ABSTRACT  
This article analyzes the  phenomenon of 
homeland security through the development 
of four conceptual lenses that were created 
out of the  existing literatures  in criminal 
justice,  public administration, organization 
behavior,  risk  management, international 
relations,  and the overlap between them. 
Using terrorism as  a proxy for the homeland 
security enterprise, these conceptual lenses 
include: (1) homeland security as  a criminal 
justice problem  which views terrorism  as  a 
crime; (2)  homeland security as  a 
international relations problem which  views 
terrorism as  a war; (3)  homeland security 
as an organization design problem  which 
views terrorism  as a  network  of sub-state 
transnational actors; and (4) homeland 
security as a collaborative nexus which 
views terrorism  as  a complex mixture of 
s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  e c o n o m i c ,  a n d 
environmental issues; that is,  lens  4 
represents  an overlap of lenses 1-3. Each 
conceptual lens consists  of theories, 
practices,  values, beliefs,  and assumptions 
that serve to  shape how  homeland security is 
conceptualized. We recognize that homeland 
security is a broad field applied science that 
incorporates natural, technological,  and 
manmade hazards  and threats.   Perhaps  to 
best exemplify the complex and evolving 
nature of the  homeland security enterprise, 
terrorism can be an effective proxy for how 
homeland security  might be conceptualized 
and how  a theoretical foundation might be 
structured.  These  conceptual lenses  highlight 
how  perceptual filters  can significantly alter 
how  individuals  and organizat ions 
understand and explain phenomena or 
events. 
INTRODUCTION
We see the world, not as it is, but as we are—
or, as we are conditioned to see it.
 - Steven R. Covey in The 7 Habits of Highly 
Effective People
Surprise occurs the moment we realize our 
view of the world no longer matches reality. 
 - Wayne Burkan in Wide Angle Vision
“Would you tell me, please, which way I 
ought to go from here?”  “That depends a 
good deal on where you want to get to,” said 
the Cat.   “I don’t much care where,” said 
Alice.  “Then it doesn’t matter which way you 
go,” said the Cat. “So long as I get 
SOMEWHERE,” Alice added as an 
explanation.  “Oh, you’re sure to do that,” 
said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”
 - From Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland, by Lewis Carroll
At  8:46  a.m.  on September  11, 2001, 
American  Airlines flight  11  crashed into the 
North  Tower of the World Trade Center  in 
New  York  City.  Initial reports by  the media 
stated that an  airplane had crashed into one 
of the towers in  what  to many  appeared to be 
an  accident of some kind.1  This belief was 
supported by  eyewitness accounts that 
described the airplane to news reporters as a 
small commuter  plane or  “a  smaller plane.” 2 
Sean  Murtagh,  a  CNN producer, stated 
minutes after  the attack,  “I just  witnessed a 
plane that appeared to be cruising  at slightly 
lower-than-normal  altitude over  New  York 
City, and it  appears to have crashed into – I 
don't  know  which tower  it  is – but  it  hit 
directly  in the middle of one of the World 
Trade Center towers.”3  When  Murtagh was 
asked about  the type of aircraft  he reported it 
was a  “two engine jet,  maybe a 737…a large 
passenger  commercial jet.” 4 In attempting to 
explain  what was happening  from  an accident 
narrative, the CNN reporter  asked Murtagh  if 
the plane had difficulty  flying  in which he 
responded, “Yes, it  did. It  was teetering back 
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and forth, wingtip to wingtip,  and it  looks like 
it  crashed into,  probably, twenty  stories from 
the top of the World Trade Center.” 5 
President  Bush  also reported that  he thought 
the initial crash  was an  accident: “I was 
sitting outside the classroom  waiting  to go in, 
and I saw  an airplane hit  the tower – the TV 
was obviously  on, and I use to fly  myself,  and 
I said, "There's one terrible pilot." And I said, 
"It must have been a horrible accident."6  
The idea  that this event  could have been  a 
terrorist  attack was not  evident  in  the initial 
news reports of the 9/11  attacks,  even  though 
in  1993  Ramzi Yousef,  a  nephew  of Khalid 
Sheik Mohammad (the mastermind behind 
the 9/11  attacks) and six  co-conspirators had 
detonated a  1,500  pound bomb in the 
underground parking  garage of the World 
Trade Center  that  killed six people and 
injured more than  1,000.7  The goal of this 
attack  was to devastate the foundation  of the 
north  tower  in  such  a  way  that  it  would 
collapse onto its twin, thus causing  the 
collapse of both. 8 As a  nation  we initially  did 
not perceive that  we were under attack by  al 
Qaeda  although  this organization  was 
responsible  for carrying  out  a  number  of 
highly  destructive suicide bombing  attacks 
against  the United States before 9/11 
including the 1998 attacks against  the 
American  embassies in  Nairobi,  Kenya, and 
Dar  es Salaam, Tanzania, and the attack on 
the USS Cole off the coast  of Yemen on 
October 12, 2000. This perception  rapidly 
changed,  however,  when United Airlines 
Flight  175  struck  the South  Tower  of the 
World Trade Center  at 9:03  a.m.  on 
September 11, 2001.  
Immediately  after  the second airplane 
crashed into the WTC,  reporters on  ABC,  Fox, 
and NBC news began  talking  about  a 
deliberate attack. Charles Gibson of Good 
Morning America stated, “It looks like a 
concerted effort to attack  the World Trade 
Center  in  New  York… A  concerted attack  is 
underway.” 9 One of the first  witnesses of the 
event  interviewed by  CNN reported,  “I 
believe it was intentional.  It  was flown 
deliberately  into the building… There was 
nothing wrong  with  the airplane.”10 President 
Bush  reported that when he was told that  a 
second plane had hit  the World Trade Center, 
“I knew  that when  I got  all the facts that we 
were under  attack, there would be hell  to pay 
for  attacking America.” 11  By  evening on 
September  11, 2001  the shock and surprise 
turned to anger  as Americans realized that 
America was under attack.
On that  day,  nineteen  men affiliated with 
al  Qaeda, an  Islamic  terrorist  organization, 
hijacked a  total of four  passenger  jets. 12 Two 
of these planes crashed into the World Trade 
Center,  one airplane crashed into the 
Pentagon  in  Arlington  County,  Virginia 
killing  184  people, and the last  aircraft 
crashed into a field near  the town  of 
Shanksville in rural Somerset  County, 
Pennsylvania  as passengers and members of 
the flight  crew  attempted to retake control of 
their  plane from  the hijackers.  Excluding  the 
nineteen  hijackers,  a  confirmed 2,973  people 
died and thousands were injured as a  result 
of these attacks. 13  
Since the 2001  attacks,  the term  homeland 
security  has been used regularly  in  the media 
and in our  daily  lexicon. Our “war  on 
terrorism” has had a  significant  impact  on US 
domestic and foreign policies and on  the lives 
of people throughout  the world. Fear of 
future terrorist attacks has spawned the 
development and creation of massive 
governmental  programs,  agencies, and 
policies aimed at protecting  our homeland. 
For  example,  at  the federal level,  a  massive 
reorganization  merged twenty-two distinct 
federal agencies into the Department  of 
Homeland Security; this was the largest 
restructuring  of the federal  bureaucracy  in 
fifty  years.14 It  is clear  that  homeland security 
has been  a prominent  public policy  focus 
since September 11, 2001  in  part because 
overwhelming  government  response was 
needed to protect the United States from 
future terrorist  attacks,  and because political 
and public expectations made it so. 
DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY
Though  the term  homeland security  is 
used in  our common  language on  a  regular 
basis, a  review  of the literature shows that 
there is no consensus on the meaning of 
homeland security.  A  frequently  cited 
definition  of homeland security  is from  the 
2002  National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  The federal  government defined 
homeland security  as “a  concerted national 
effort  to prevent  terrorist  attacks within  the 
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United States, reduce America’s vulnerability 
to terrorism,  and minimizing  the damage and 
recover  from  attacks that do occur.” 15  This 
definition  has been  expanded under 
President  Barak Obama  to include other 
hazards after  the catastrophic events of 
H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a . T h e O b a m a 
administration's current  strategy  focuses on 
terrorism  as the foremost of many  threats, 
defining  homeland security  as "a  concerted 
national effort  to ensure a  homeland that  is 
safe, secure,  and resilient  against  terrorism 
and other  hazards, where American  interests, 
aspirations, and way  of life can thrive."16 The 
most current  federal  definition of homeland 
security  reflects much  of what the nation  has 
learned about  homeland security  policy, 
strategy,  and tactics over  the last decade.  It 
arises from  the February  2010 Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review  (QHSR) which 
refers to homeland security  as an  enterprise, 
or  an  inherently  collaborative and joint  effort 
of federal,  state,  local, tribal, private sector, 
and nongovernmental  partners with  a 
common interest in the well being  and public 
safety of America. The QHSR states: 
H o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y  d e s c r i b e s t h e 
intersection  of  evolving threats and hazards 
with  traditional  governmental and civic 
responsibilities for  civil  defense, emergency 
response, law enforcement, customs, 
border control, and immigration. In 
combining these responsibilities under one 
overarching concept, homeland security 
breaks down  longstanding  stovepipes of 
activity that have been and could still be 
exploited by  those seeking to harm 
America.17 
The conceptual lenses in  this article were 
developed because there  is no coherent 
theory  to date that  explains the phenomenon 
of homeland security  and are built  on the 
assumption that  the primary  focus of 
homeland security  is on  the threat of 
terrorism  versus natural  hazards.18  One 
method that can  be used to begin  to build a 
theory  of homeland security  is to adapt  and 
blend applicable  theories from  a  number  of 
academic  disciplines that  have relevance to 
homeland security issues and challenges.  
The terrorist  attacks on  the World Trade 
Center  in 1993  and in  2001  and our 
government’s response have been  explained 
in  part by  theories from  the fields of political 
s c i e n c e ,  c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e , p u b l i c 
administration, sociology,  and others. 
However,  each  of these discipline-specific 
theories and their  corresponding paradigms 
offer  but  a  piece of the picture in 
understanding  homeland security  policy  and 
the threat  of terrorism  as a  social and 
political phenomenon.  The purpose of this 
article is to gain  a  better  understanding  of 
homeland security  by  looking at  this 
phenomenon  through multiple conceptual 
lenses or paradigms.  
Paradigms are “a  set  of assumptions, 
concepts,  values and pract ices that 
constitutes a way  of viewing reality  for  the 
community  that  shares them,” especially  in 
an  academic discipline.19 A  paradigm  shapes 
how  we see the world and helps to explain  the 
world to us.  Paradigms are like internal maps 
that  we carry  with us in  our brains, often 
subconsciously,  in  the form  of images, 
assumptions,  stories, theories, and principles, 
that  condition how  we perceive the world, 
make judgments, and solve problems.20 Our 
paradigms are formed not  only  by  our early 
experiences as children within our  families 
and communities,  but  also through  our 
educational experiences and training.  More 
importantly,  paradigms heavily  influence 
how  we see current  events as well  as whether 
we will  be aware of new  problems,  how  we 
perceive and understand new  phenomenon, 
and how we choose to solve problems.  
For  example, immediately  following the 
events of 9/11,  homeland security  was largely 
viewed as a  series of efforts designed to 
counter  terrorism.  For  example,  President 
Bush  declared that  “homeland security 
encompasses those activities that are focused 
on  combating terrorism… Such activities 
include efforts to detect,  deter,  protect 
against and,  if needed,  respond to terrorist 
attacks.” 21 Given  the above statement,  what 
first  comes to mind when  you  read the term 
deter? What  is meant by  the concept  of 
deterrence as it relates to terrorism? A  law 
enforcement officer  or  a  scholar  in 
criminology  would mostly  likely  have very 
different  definitions and theories of 
deterrence than  someone who works in  the 
military  or  a scholar  in  international  relations 
or risk management.  
For  criminologists, deterrence occurs 
when  someone refrains from  committing a 
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crime because he fears the certainty, 
swiftness,  and severity  of legal punishment.22 
Deterrence from  an international relations 
perspective, on  the other hand, refers to a 
policy  aimed at dissuading  an  adversary 
(usually  a  nation state) from  using  military 
force to achieve its foreign  policy  objectives 
through  the threat  of military  retaliation. 23 A 
risk management  perspective of deterrence 
might  include the effects of failed control 
procedures, including  the relative inability  to 
safeguard assets or  to ensure accurate 
reporting.  If we take the term  deterrence 
from  criminology, we would assume that  we 
are going  to deter  terrorism  by  passing new 
legislation  raising  the penalties for  specific 
criminal  acts that  may  be defined as 
terrorism. However, if we use the theories of 
deterrence from  an international relations 
perspective, we would assume either  covert 
intelligence operations or  military  action 
would be used against terrorist  threats. Both 
of these uses of deterrence pose unique policy 
solutions that  may  not be effective against 
some forms of terrorism  we are likely  to face 
in the future.
BUILDING A THEORY OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY USING 
MULTIPLE FRAME ANALYSIS
In  order  to understand the challenges in 
developing homeland security  theory, it  is 
critical to incorporate the complex  and 
dynamic  nature of the homeland security 
enterprise.  However,  rather than  trying  to 
understand each  of the many  challenging 
issues characterizing homeland security  at 
the same time, it is logical to simplify  the task 
by  concentrating on  a  single challenge. For 
this article, we choose the challenge of 
terrorism. In turn,  three perspectives,  or 
conceptual  lenses,  are identified from  the 
l i t e r a t u r e t h a t c a n e a c h  b e u s e d 
independently,  or  in  combination, to 
understand the problem  of terrorism. The 
lenses derive from  the criminology  and 
criminal  justice literature, the international 
re lat ions l i terature, and the publ ic 
administration  and polit ical science 
literature. Each conceptual lens in  multiple 
frame analysis consists of theories, practices, 
values,  beliefs, and assumptions that  serve to 
shape how  the threat of terrorism  is 
perceived as a  problem, and how  the problem 
should be resolved in  the form  of homeland 
security  policy  and programs. These 
conceptual  lenses highlight  how  perceptual 
filters can  significantly  alter  how  individuals 
and organizations understand and explain 
phenomena  or events. The first  lens, criminal 
justice, views terrorism  (the proxy  for 
homeland security) as a  criminal justice 
problem. The second lens views terrorism  as 
an  international relations issue.  The third 
lens views terrorism  as an  organization 
design  problem.  In  addition, a fourth  lens is 
described.  The overlap of the previous three 
lenses suggests that the homeland security 
enterprise might also be understood as a 
collaborative nexus of each  of the other 
viewpoints.  This article  will  describe the 
characteristics and assumptions of each  of 
these conceptual lenses based on  a 
comprehensive literature review  and their 
subsequent  application to homeland security 
as described in  the 2002  National Strategy 
for Homeland Security.  In  addition, this 
article will  demonstrate that  although  each 
lens has a  distinct contribution  to what 
homeland security  is,  each  of the lenses work 
together  on many  issues and challenges of 
homeland security  as a  collaborative nexus of 
methods and strategies.  Hence where the 
three lenses overlap offers a  distinct 
contribution to what homeland security  is as 
well.
The article  is organized as follows.  Part 
One describes the characteristics of the first 
lens,  homeland security  as a  criminal  justice 
problem, viewing terrorism  as a  crime. Part 
Two describes the second lens, homeland 
security  as an  international relations 
problem, viewing  terrorism  as war. Part 
Three describes the third lens, homeland 
security  as an  organization  design  problem 
that  views terrorism  as a  network. The 
characteristics of each  lens are based on 
those items most frequently  represented in 
the literature. However,  there is no one 
paradigm  or  clear  consensus in  the academic 
disciplines on  how  the entirety  of homeland 
security  is understood, and therefore what 
homeland security  policies might be most 
effective against the threat of terrorism.  
Scholars and practitioners in  criminal 
justice,  international relations,  and public 
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administration  bring different  educational 
backgrounds,  experiences,  values,  and beliefs 
to their  study  of historical events and new 
phenomena. Thus,  these individuals may  see 
completely  different  things when  they  look  at 
the same events. 24 (See figure 1.) Joel  Barker 
wrote,  “What may  be perfectly  clear  and 
visible to one person  is invisible to another 
because of differing  paradigms.” 25  As a 
caution, the  authors note that viewing  the 
world through  a  given  conceptual lens is like 
looking  at  a  distant object  through  a  straw; 
while it  allows a  person to focus on one 
specific aspect of an  issue,  the nature  of the 
perspective tends to oversimplify  complex 
issues by  blocking  out the larger  view. 
Similarly, it  may  also block the viewer’s 
ability  to look  at  the event from  an  alternative 
vantage point. Ultimately, given  the complex 
and dynamic nature of the homeland security 
enterprise,  if we are to understand it  we must 
find a  way  to consider homeland security 
issues and challenges, like terrorism,  from 
multiple perspectives.  Additionally,  we have 
to have the ability  to put  our  own  (perhaps 
preferred) perspective aside so we can 
understand homeland security  from  a  variety 
of points of view.  Thus,  to form  a  theoretical 
foundation  of homeland security, we will use 
multiple perspectives,  or lenses, to consider 
the challenge of terrorism. Each  conceptual 
lens will  be  described distinct theories, 
definitions, meanings, and strategies. (See 
Figure 1.)
Figure 1: Multiple Frame Analysis
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LENS I: HOMELAND SECURITY AS A 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROBLEM – 
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A CRIME  
By  looking at  terrorism  as crime and through 
a  criminal justice lens, key  characteristics of 
homeland security  and terrorism  are 
highlighted. First, the criminal  justice lens 
perceives terrorism  as a crime that  is 
politically  motivated.  Theodore Honderich 
defines political violence as: 
[The] use of force against persons or things; 
a use of force prohibited by law, directed to 
a change in  the policies, system, territory of 
jurisdiction, or personnel  of a government 
or governments, and hence also directed to 
changes in the lives  of individuals within 
societies.26  
Unlike other offenders investigated by  the 
FBI,  those identified as terrorists have 
committed or  are suspected of having 
committed crimes for political reasons. 
However  despite  the motivation, acts of 
terrorism  can  include crimes such  as murder, 
kidnapping, arson,  and destruction of 
property  which  are acts designated to be 
illegal by state and national criminal codes. 
Second, terrorism  is defined as an  act  of 
violence whose purpose is to coerce or 
intimidate a  government  or  population  to 
obtain  political  or  social benefits.27  For 
example the federal statutes on terrorism 
define international  and domestic terrorism 
as:
Activities that involve violent acts or acts 
dangerous to human life that are a violation 
of the criminal  laws of the U.S. or of any 
state, and appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce a  civilian population; to influence 
the policy  of  a government by  intimidation 
or  coercion; or attempt to affect the 
c o n d u c t o f  g o v e r n m e n t b y m a s s 
destruction, assassination or kidnapping.28 
What  distinguishes acts of terrorism  from 
common crimes is that  the act  is motivated 
by  political,  ideological,  and religious intent 
in  order  to create a  mood of fear  and that  the 
victims are always innocent.  
Third, terrorism  is distinct  from  ordinary 
domestic crime in  a  number of ways. 
Criminals are characterized as opportunistic, 
impulsive, self-centered,  and undisciplined.29 
For  most  criminals,  crime is a  way  for 
obtaining  goods and violence is employed as 
a  means to obtain  money  or material goods 
for  the criminal’s own  self-interest. 
Terrorists, by  contrast,  normally  plan  their 
operations and their  violent  acts are intended 
to have consequences (political or  social)  and 
make a  symbolic statement  about  a  political 
cause.30 In  addition,  terrorists are motivated 
by  ideology,  while criminals are generally  not 
committed to any  specific  ideology.  Finally, 
most criminals avoid committing  crimes in 
public and are oriented toward escape. 
Terrorists, however, use political  violence to 
gain public attention  for  their  cause; they 
train  and prepare for  their  missions, and are 
attack oriented.31
Fourth,  counter  terrorism  strategies to 
prevent and deter terrorism  can  be found in 
part in  crime prevention  and deterrence 
theories. A  primary  purpose of criminal law  is 
to deter  or  to dissuade a  person from 
committing  a  crime because he/she fears 
b e i n g  p u n i s h e d t h r o u g h  f i n e s o r 
incarceration.  Deterrence theory  from  the 
perspective of criminologists assumes that 
individuals are rational  actors who choose to 
obey  or  violate the law  by  a  rational 
calculation  of the risk of pain  from 
incarceration,  social  stigma,  or  death  penalty 
versus the potential pleasure and economic 
gain derived from  a  criminal act. 32 Homeland 
security  policy  since 9/11  has included 
activities focused on  deterring terrorism  by 
passing  legislation  (i.e.,  PATRIOT Act) that 
created new  terrorism  related crimes, such  as 
acts of violence against  mass transportation 
systems, and made penalties more severe for 
those convicted of such crimes.33 The primary 
weakness of using  legal sanctions as a 
deterrent  to terrorism  is that  the actual or 
perceived threat  of formally  applied 
punishment  by  the state has not  been  proven 
to provide a  significant marginal  deterrent 
effect  as it  does with  criminals. 34  And,  in 
addition,  the challenge presented by 
asymmetric transnational actors is that they 
are difficult  to prosecute by  US law.  This 
point  is made more significant given  the 
inability  to form  coherent international 
bodies, policies,  and laws that have 
reasonable potential  to be enforced so as to 
be able to deter  anything. Take for example 
the problem  Somali pirates pose to the 
international shipping community. 
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Law  enforcement  agencies often  employ 
crime prevention strategies to complement 
deterrence strategies. Among  the most visible 
crime prevention  measures are those that 
include various forms of target  hardening  and 
increasing  the physical security  of potential 
targets of crime. Target hardening  includes 
the installation  of locks,  bars for  windows, 
intruder  alarms, fences, and other  devices 
that  make crime more difficult to carry  out. 
Other  situational  crime prevention strategies 
include physical,  electronic, and procedural 
measures that serve to deter  criminals from 
attacking,  detecting them  if they  do attack, 
delaying them  so they  can  be apprehended, 
and denying them  access to certain  targets.35 
These types of measures were clearly  seen 
after  9/11  at  airports, government buildings, 
and port  facilities where new  fences, 
barricades,  scanners, and surveillance 
systems were adopted.  
Lastly, the criminal  justice  lens identifies 
homeland security  as a  criminal justice 
problem  that  should be handled by  local, 
state,  national,  and international law 
enforcement  agencies.  Law  enforcement 
agencies are concerned with  preventing  and 
deterring crime, gathering  evidence, 
determining  the guilt  of the individuals 
responsible for a particular  act,  and 
apprehending and bringing the perpetrators 
to trial.  The criminal  justice approach  offers a 
broad range of counterterrorist  strategies to 
deter, prevent,  and respond to terrorism  that 
is quite different  from  an  international 
re lat ions and organizat ional  design 
perspective. Because acts of terrorism  are 
inherently  criminal behaviors under  the laws 
of the nation  and states,  local  and state law 
enforcement  agencies play  a  major  role in 
counter  terrorism. In  many  state and local 
homeland security  plans, law  enforcement 
agencies are assigned tasks that  include 
g a t h e r i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d s h a r i n g 
information  through  joint  terrorism  task 
forces,  protecting  key  infrastructure and 
assets, doing  surveillance and preventive 
patrols,  responding to bomb threats and 
o t h e r  d i s a s t e r s , a n d c o n d u c t i n g 
investigations. 36
The contemporary  criminal justice system 
in  the United States has played a  key  role in 
homeland security  when  terrorism  has been 
perceived as a  crime, because all parts of the 
criminal  justice system  are activated when  an 
individual or  group commits an  act of 
terrorism  within  the United States and they 
are caught, prosecuted,  and found guilty  of 
the crimes.  The criminal justice system 
consists of three main  components: law 
enforcement agencies charged with 
investigating crimes and apprehending 
suspects; the court  system  where a 
determination  is made whether  a  suspect  is 
guilty  as charged; and the correctional  system 
charged with  treating  and rehabilitating 
offenders and with incapacitating them.
In the criminal  justice lens,  local,  state, 
and federal law  enforcement  agencies play  a 
critical role in  homeland security. At  the 
national  level,  the Federal Bureau  of 
Investigation (FBI) has been  designated the 
lead federal agency  in  investigating  terrorist 
groups in  the United States and acts of 
terrorism  directed at  Americans overseas. 
The FBI received this authority  through  a 
series of presidential directives and 
legislation  including  President Reagan’s 
national security  decision  directive 30,37  the 
O m n i b u s D i p l o m a t i c  S e c u r i t y  a n d 
Antiterrorism  Act  of 1986, 38  and President 
Clinton’s Presidential Decision  Directive 39.39 
Although  the FBI has had this role for  over 
twenty  years, throughout  most  of the 1990s 
counterterrorism  was not  seen as the priority 
in  this organization.  Before 9/11, the highest 
priority  goal for the FBI was the reduction  of 
violent  crime,  including  organized crime and 
drug  and gang related violence.40  However 
since the terrorist  attacks on 9/11,  the highest 
priority  for  the department has been  to 
protect Americans by  preventing acts of 
terrorism.41  
The International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) argue that  all “terrorism  is 
local”  and that regardless of the global and 
international connections,  any  actual 
terrorism  attack is going to occur  at the local 
level and it  will  be local first  responders who 
will initially  deal with  the attack. 42 As first 
responders to a  terrorist  attack, local  police 
officers will  be responsible for  assessing  the 
crime scene for  hazards,  calling for and 
providing medical assistance, identifying 
victims and witnesses,  securing  the crime 
scene and physical  evidence, and notifying 
supervisors and investigators who will be 
handling the case.43  In  addition to 
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responding to and investigating terrorist 
attacks after they  occur,  local police are 
required to be more proactive in  preventing 
and detecting acts of terrorism  through 
intelligence gathering and analysis and by 
completing threat  and vulnerabi l i ty 
assessments in  their  jurisdictions. 44 From  the 
criminal  justice perspective, terrorism  is 
considered a  criminal matter  to be handled 
by  local,  state,  and national  law  enforcement 
agencies. Law  enforcement  is concerned with 
gathering  evidence,  determining  the guilt of 
the individuals responsible for  a  particular 
act,  and apprehending  and bringing  the 
perpetrators to trial. 
Criminal  justice is not only  viewed in  the 
United States as a  system, but  also as a 
process that  takes offenders through  a  series 
of decision  points beginning  with  the 
investigation of a crime and arrest of 
suspects, to adjudication  where guilt  or 
innocence is determined in a  trial,  and 
concluding  with  correctional treatment  and 
release. 45  While the actual  process is more 
complex than this and can  vary  based on if 
the crimes are classified as misdemeanors or 
felonies,  what is critical about  this process is 
that  it  is bound by  specific constitutional 
procedures and protections.  The formal 
justice process implies that criminal 
defendants charged with  a  serious crime are 
entitled to a  full  range of rights under  the law 
including the right  to refuse to answer 
questions when placed in police custody,  the 
right  to a  speedy  and public  trial by  an 
impartial  jury,  and the right  to have trial 
procedures subject to review  by  a  higher 
authority,  to name a  few. This lens identifies 
homeland security  as a  criminal justice 
problem  that is best  resolved by  utilizing the 
institutions and processes of the criminal 
justice system (see Table 1 for a summary).  
Table 1:  Characteristics of Lens I – Terrorism as a Criminal Justice Problem
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LENS II: HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROBLEM 
–TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A WAR
This lens conceptualizes terrorism  as a  form 
o f w a r f a r e a n d i s g r o u n d e d i n a n 
international relations foundation,  thus 
presenting  key  characteristics that  are 
distinct  from  the other  lenses. First, 
homeland security  is linked to national 
security  in  protecting  the United States and 
its interests at  home and abroad.  In  the wake 
of the terrorist  attacks on  September  11, 
2001, the United States required a  guiding 
vision  to outline our  national strategy  to 
combat the terrorist threat  at home and 
abroad. Under  President George W. Bush five 
new  strategies were published,46 relating to 
specific aspects of homeland security  and 
combating  terrorism, in  addition  to an 
updated National Security Strategy . 
Although  there are many  definitions of 
national security,  the US armed forces 
defines national security as a:
…collective term encompassing  both 
national  defense and foreign relations of 
the United States. Specifically, the 
condition provided by: 1) a military or 
defense advantage over  any  foreign nation 
or group of nations; 2) a favorable foreign 
relations  position; or  3) a defense posture 
capable of successfully resisting  hostile or 
destructive action from within  or without, 
overt or covert.47  
While national  security  is typically 
considered the purview  of the military 
referring to the aggregate of foreign  and 
domestic security  issues facing  America, 
homeland security  might best be considered a 
civilian  function.  In  policy  and practice, the 
homeland security  enterprise includes the 
combined domestic efforts of federal,  state, 
local,  and private organizations focused on, at 
a  minimum,  preventing, deterring,  and 
responding to acts of terrorism  within  the 
homeland as well  as efforts to harden  and 
protect critical  infrastructure,  efforts to 
improve emergency  planning, response and 
recovery,  intel l igence gathering  and 
disseminating, and policy  development  that 
supports all these efforts.  
The 2002  National Security Strategy 
p r o v i d e s a  b r o a d f r a m e w o r k f o r 
strengthening US security  in  the future. It 
also identifies the national  security  goals of 
the United States, and describes the foreign 
policy  and military  capabilities necessary  to 
achieve those goals.  These goals included 
combating  terrorism  around the world by 
d isrupt ing and destroying  of these 
organizations,  strengthening  homeland 
security, and fostering  cooperation  with  allies 
and international organizations to combat 
terror. 48  
This link between  homeland security  and 
national security  is also highlighted in 
President  Obama’s National Security 
Strategy, 2010 (NSS). One of the significant 
differences between  the 2002  and 2010 
national security  strategies was President 
Obama’s decision to merge the concepts of 
national security  and homeland security 
more closely  as well as to abandon the 
doctrine of pre-emption. Obama  argued that 
the 2010  NSS complemented “our  efforts to 
integrate homeland security  with  national 
security, including  seamless coordination 
among  Federal, state  and local governments 
to prevent, protect against,  and respond to 
threats and natural disasters.” 49 Among  the 
major objectives of the 2010 NSS are to 
prevent terrorist  attacks on  and in  the United 
States through  the use of intelligence, law 
enforcement, and homeland security 
capabilities, and to disrupt, dismantle, and 
defeat  al  Qaeda  and its terrorist affiliates in 
Afghanistan,  Pakistan,  and around the 
world.50  The concept  of defeating  global 
terrorist  networks and insurgencies is 
supported by  military  and international 
relations theories that  view  terrorism  as a 
form  of asymmetrical warfare, which  is the 
next component of the international relations 
lens. 
Second, seen  through this lens, terrorism 
is perceived as a  strategy  of asymmetrical 
warfare that  is directed at people, particularly 
civilians and noncombatants, in  violation  of 
the laws of war.51  This perception  is clearly 
articulated by  President  Bush  in  the National 
Security Strategy of 2002, in  which  he states, 
“The United States is fighting a  war  against 
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terrorists of global reach. The enemy  is not a 
single political regime or person or  religion  or 
ideology. The enemy  is terrorism  — 
premeditated, politically  motivated violence 
against innocents.” 52  Terrorism  from  this 
perspective is an  act  of violence the purpose 
of which  is it  to coerce or  intimidate a 
government  or population  in  order  to obtain 
primarily  political goals but  the violence is 
perpetrated using  asymmetric methods and 
strategies.  
Presumably,  most  transnational  terrorist 
organizations realize they  are much  smaller 
and weaker  than  national armies and cannot 
fight  and win  the more powerful  side under 
conventional  rules of war. 53 This indeed is the 
heart  of the asymmetry  between  traditional 
military  power  and modern  terrorist 
organizations such  as al Qaeda  or  Hamas. 
Thus, the weaker  terrorist organization  uses 
unconventional  methods of fighting, such as 
the use of car  bombs and suicide bombers 
against  civilian targets, assassination  of 
political leaders,  attacks against  information 
systems and critical infrastructure, and 
environmental destruction.54 The attacks by 
al  Qaeda  on  September 11, 2001  revealed how 
unconventional  (asymmetric)  strategies can 
be effectively  used to inflict  mass casualties, 
and have tremendous political,  social and 
psychological effects. 
A  third element  of this lens is that 
terrorism  is a  form  of psychological  warfare 
that  targets civilians as a  means of instilling 
fear  in  a  population. Wheeler  writes, 
“terrorism,  a  psychological technique relying 
on  the effects of surprise and shock to 
unnerve or  to coerce,  aims at an  opponent’s 
eventual demoralization  and surrender  on 
the issue in  dispute.” 55 By  brutal acts against 
civilians, terrorists seek  to sow  fear  in  a 
population as a  whole  in  the hope that  this 
will destabilize the society  and alienate 
people from support of their government. 56
Fourth,  this lens recognizes that  terrorism 
is perpetrated by  individuals, domestic  and 
transnational groups,  and agents of nation-
states. Of particular concern  is state 
sponsored terrorism  and its impact on  the 
world system.57  International relations 
scholars have written extensively  about  how 
terrorism  can  be used as a  tool of foreign 
policy  by  nation  states as a  means of 
balancing  power in  the world system, of 
destabilizing  hostile regimes, and of avoiding 
direct military  confrontation with  a  more 
powerful nation  state.58 A  weaker  nation  state 
and transnational organizations will use 
terrorism  as a  foreign  policy  strategy  over 
conventional  warfare because conventional 
warfare will  simply  be too costly  in  terms of 
personnel and resources.  This was clearly 
seen during  the Cold War  where the former 
Soviet  Union was involved with  a  wide range 
of terrorist  movements throughout  the world 
that  attempted to destabilize and embarrass 
the United States and our  allies. 59  The 
behavior  of the former  Soviet  Union,  Iran, 
and other nation-states as state sponsors of 
terrorism,  as well  as the behavior  of 
transnational terrorist  organizations, can  be 
explained in  part by  a  wide range of 
international relations theories60
Within a  month  of the 9/11  attacks the 
United States launched a  large-scale military 
operation  in  Afghanistan  to overthrow  the 
Taliban regime harboring  al Qaeda,  to find 
Osama bin  Laden,  and to defeat terrorist 
elements in the country.  President  Bush 
warned that the United States would not  just 
respond after being  attacked in  the future, 
but would exercise  the right  to self defense by 
acting  preemptively  against terrorist 
organizations to prevent them  from  doing 
harm  against  our  nation.61  The doctrine of 
preemption – of attacking  an  enemy  based on 
legitimate evidence that  an  attack is 
imminent – replaced deterrence as a  key 
principle of US foreign  policy  under  the Bush, 
Reagan, and Clinton administrations.  
The doctrine of deterrence has been  a  key 
principle of US foreign  policy  since the 1950s. 
In its most general form,  deterrence is 
defined as the power to persuade one’s 
opponents that  the costs and/or  risks of a 
given  course of action  outweigh  its benefits.62 
Thus, an adversary  can  be deterred by  the 
threatened use of military  force,  as well  as by 
other  types of threats/rewards that  can 
include economic  or  trade sanctions or  the 
promise of economic aid.  To be a  credible 
deterrent  against  possible threats,  the United 
States must not only  maintain a  stable 
deterrent  posture by  having  a readiness to 
use military  force when  needed, but  also 
must  be able to convince an  adversary  that 
we have the will  and power  to punish  an 
adversary  severely. 63  Many  scholars have 
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noted that in  the 1980s and 1990s,  US foreign 
policy  failed to deter  terrorist  attacks because 
we failed to communicate to groups such  as al 
Qaeda that  the United States was willing  and 
able to inflict  significant damage on  their 
organizations in the event  of an  attack.64 In 
fact  prior  to 9/11, the United States had 
consistently  failed to retaliate in  any 
meaningful manner  against terrorist attacks 
by  Islamic radicals such  as those against  the 
World Trade Center  in  1993, the US 
embassies in East  Africa  in  1998,  and the USS 
Cole in Yemen  in  2000.  A  primary  weakness 
of deterrence theories in  international 
relations is that  many  are directed against 
nation  states, not individuals or  transnational 
terrorist  organizations, which  are today 
primarily sub state actors. 
In  the realm  of international relations, 
globalization  has had a  significant impact on 
actors in  the world system. Globalization is a 
dynamic process that  has involved the 
integration  of economic markets, nation-
states,  and technologies,  and has made the 
transnational movement of money,  goods, 
p e o p l e ,  a n d i d e a s m u c h  e a s i e r  t o 
accomplish.65 As a  result,  extensive webs of 
interdependence have been  created that have 
had negative and positive impacts on  the 
world system.  Among  the negative aspects is 
the anti-globalization  backlash  that  has 
arisen in some regions of the world.  A 
number  of scholars have argued that  the 
increased threat of transnational terrorism  in 
the post  Cold War  era can  be explained in 
part by  organizations and communities 
fighting against  globalization  and the spread 
of American  political,  economic, and cultural 
influence. 66 For  example, Samuel Huntington 
in  The Clash of Civilizations,  argued that the 
spread of western  influence militarily, 
economically,  politically, socially, and 
culturally  has created intense resentment 
among  Muslims and this will  result  in  future 
conflicts. 67  Further,  Benjamin  Barber  also 
argues that terrorism  is a  reaction to the 
international forces of globalization  because 
it  threatens traditional community  structures 
based on  kinship,  religion,  or  ethnicity. 68 
According  to economist  Joseph  Stiglitz,  anti 
globalization attitudes in  developing 
c o u n t r i e s a r e d u e t o t h e f a c t  t h a t 
globalization has made some of these 
countries worse off than  before,  including 
those in  the Muslim  world.69 In  the  Muslim 
world,  globalization  has not  only  been  seen  as 
a  force that  is undermining traditional values, 
but also as a  source of economic  exploitation 
by  the West,  particularly  the United States.70 
To kindle the anger  and frustration of the 
population and recruit  members to their 
ranks, radical elements within these societies, 
such  as Hamas or al  Qaeda,  make claims that 
wealthy  nations are exploiting  them  to gain 
more power  and wealth  at the expense of 
weaker  nation  states and communities.  Thus, 
terrorist  violence by  groups and individuals 
may  be the result  of feelings of intense anger, 
a g g r e s s i o n  a n d f r u s t r a t i o n  d u e t o 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n d i t i o n s s u c h  a s 
globalization, deprivation or oppression. 71  
Finally,  the international relations lens 
views terrorism  as a  form  of warfare that  is 
an  international relations problem  that 
should be handled by  national intelligence 
agencies, the State Department, the National 
Security  Council, and the United States 
military.  Wherein  homeland security  issues 
are involved,  these agencies are focused on 
the national  security  of the United States and 
are concerned with  preventing, deterring, 
and responding  to international  terrorism 
through  a broad range of offensive and 
defensive counterterrorism strategies. 
Terrorism  experts of ten  organize 
counter terror i s t  opt ions into three 
classifications that  include: (1) diplomacy, 
financial controls,  military  force, intelligence, 
and covert  actions; (2) legal, repressive,  and 
conciliatory  responses to terrorism; and (3) 
targeted and untargeted prevention (i.e., 
target hardening).72  Counterterrorism 
options can vary  from  the use of military 
force and intelligence operations to 
diplomacy  and social reforms.  Military  forces 
are deployed in covert  operations using 
special operations forces, in  suppression 
campaigns using  military  strikes to destroy  or 
d i s r u p t  t e r r o r i s t  p e r s o n n e l a n d 
infrastructure,  and in  preemptive attacks to 
prevent terrorist  attacks in  the future. For 
example,  the United States responded to 
terrorist  acts of aggression  with  military 
operations in  Afghanistan in  response to 
9/11/01  as well as in  Libya  after the Berlin 
Disco bombing in 1986. 73  
Nonmilitary, repressive options include 
nonviolent  covert  operations such  as 
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disinformation  campaigns,  intelligence 
gathering  and analysis,  economic sanctions, 
and enhanced physical  security  of possible 
targets or  target  hardening. Conciliatory 
counterterrorism  options do not  involve the 
use of force or  other  repressive methods and 
can  include diplomacy  to negotiate 
acceptable resolutions to a  conflict,  and social 
reforms to address the root causes of 
terrorism.74   Legal responses to terrorism 
include actions, such  as economic or  trade 
sanctions instituted by  international 
organizations such  as the United Nations and 
World Court.  
Each  of these options has been used by 
various administrations to prevent, deter, 
and respond to terrorism, but  some of these 
options can  pose significant  ethical  and legal 
di lemmas for  pol icy  makers.75  The 
importance of preemption  and deterrence in 
preventing  terrorist  attacks by  transnational 
terrorist  organizations and nation  states is 
central  to the development  of these responses 
when  viewed through  the international 
relations lens. 76  Regarding  terrorism  and 
counter-terrorism,  this lens views homeland 
security  as an  international  relations problem 
that  is best  addressed by  utilizing  the 
institutions and processes of the US national 
security  apparatus (See Table  2  for 
Summary.)
Table 2:  Characteristics of Lens II – Terrorism as War
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LENS III: HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN PROBLEM – 
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A NETWORK 
OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
In  Lens III – Homeland Security  as an 
Organizational Design  Problem/Terrorism  as 
Network – a number  of characteristics are 
highlighted.  This lens views homeland 
security  from  an  organizational  design  and 
public administration  perspective.  First,  this 
lens focuses on  the importance of the design 
a n d s t r u c t u r e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t 
organizations tasked with  homeland security 
and counter-terrorism. The argument  is that 
rational, hierarchical,  bureaucratic designs 
and practices are likely  to face significant 
challenges in deterring, preventing, and 
responding to terrorism  attacks in  the future 
because they  are not well  suited for  operating 
in  complex,  unstable environments. Yet  in 
the wake of 9/11, passage of the Homeland 
Security  Act  of 2002  created one of the 
largest bureaucratic  organizations in 
Washington,  DC. The Department  of 
Homeland Security  (DHS) was created to 
centralize the resources and expertise of 
twenty-two diverse federal agencies into a 
supra-bureaucracy  ostensibly  in  order  to 
achieve greater  coordination  in  homeland 
security  within  federal agencies and with 
state and local  government  and the private 
sector. 
How  best  to accomplish  homeland 
security  is one of most complex  problems 
that  must be addressed by  our  elected leaders 
and government  organizations at  the local, 
state, and federal levels.  The coordinated 
execution  of agreed upon  programs and 
p o l i c i e s i n  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y  i s 
fundamentally  the responsibility  of not  only 
DHS, but also for  a  vast  network  of 
g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c i e s , n o n p r o f i t 
organizations,  and private enterprises 
working  in  a  concerted effort to prevent, 
deter, and respond to terrorist  attacks within 
the United States.  Though  a  network  of 
organizations is involved in  these homeland 
security  efforts,  the primary  structure of 
government  organizations is a  hierarchical 
model with  bureaucratic organizational 
structures.77 Bureaucratic  structures are often 
described as having  a  clear  hierarchy  in 
which  there is supervision  of lower  offices by 
higher  ones,  a  clear  chain  of command and 
authority, established rules, policies and 
procedures (red tape), a  division  of work, and 
clear  lines of communication  which  is best 
suited for  stable and predictable work 
environments. 78  However,  organizations 
dedicated to homeland security  often  operate 
in  environments that  are dynamic, complex, 
and uncertain,  thus requiring  an  organic 
n e t w o r k  s t r u c t u r e t h a t  i s h i g h l y 
decentralized, flexible, and adaptable.79  The 
large-scale failure of the federal government 
in  responding to Hurricane Katrina  in  2005 
clearly  highlighted the coordination 
challenges faced by  traditionally  bureaucratic 
organizations.  
A  number  of public administration 
scholars argue that  network governance 
structures are the most  effective in 
responding to increasingly  complex  social 
and political problems that span across 
organizations and levels of government.80 
Network models of organizations and 
governance are significantly  different than 
hierarchical  models.81 First,  while hierarchies 
have a  single authority  structure created 
under a  chain of command,  networks have a 
divided authority  structure.  Second,  in  a 
hierarchical  structure activities are guided by 
clear  goals and well-defined problems, while 
in  a  network there are various and changing 
definitions of problems and goals.  Third, a 
network is a  highly  organic structure that is 
decentralized and may  integrate multiple 
levels of government  and a  variety  of private 
and nonprofit  organizations in  order  to 
deliver  a  service or  meet  policy  goals.  One of 
the greatest strengths of a  network structure 
is its ability  to bring together  a  group of 
experts and resources to solve  problems in a 
rapidly  changing  and shifting environment. 
These capabilities are critical in preventing, 
deterring, and responding  to the vast array  of 
threats to the homeland. Homeland security 
is a  shared responsibility  with Congress, state 
and local  governments,  the private sector, 
nonprofit organizations,  and the American 
people.  To effectively  integrate and 
coordinate these diverse stakeholders into 
homeland secur i ty  e f forts ,  network 
governance structures (i.e.,  fusion  centers, 
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interagency  policy  centers,  multinational  law 
enforcement, and data  sharing  Memos of 
Understanding, etc.)  will  need to be created 
and maintained at multiple levels.  
The next  element  of this lens focuses on 
the organizational culture, mission, and 
strategies of the agencies involved in 
homeland security. How  terrorism, as well  as 
other threats,  is defined and conceptualized 
is determined largely  by  the lead agencies 
involved in  homeland security,  particularly 
the Department of Homeland Security, 
Department  of Justice,  Department  of 
Defense, and the organizations associated 
with  national intelligence and national 
security. As a  result,  counterterrorism 
policies and programs will  take on  the 
character  of these organizations. For 
example,  the FBI has historically  taken a 
traditional law  enforcement  approach  to 
counter  terrorism  whereby  agents respond to 
crimes after  they  have occurred to gather 
evidence and build  a  case for  prosecution 
(this was clearly  seen  in  their  handling  of the 
1993  World Trade Center  bombing).  But 
following  9/11  and the subsequent  passage of 
the PATRIOT Act, the FBI has attempted to 
become more proactive. 
Strategy  is often  driven  by  policy, which  is 
in  turn  driven  by  world events. Strategic 
responses to policy  can  often  develop 
particular  organizational culture and 
structure. Chandler  defines strategy  as “the 
determination of the basic  goals and 
objectives of an  enterprise,  and adoption  of 
the courses of action  and the allocation  of 
resources necessary  for  carrying  out these 
goals.” 82  In  the public sector,  an  agency’s 
strategy  can  be articulated in  its enabling 
legislation  that  defines its purposes and by  its 
strategic  plans, mission  statements, policies, 
and adopted goals. For  example the 
Homeland Security  Act  of 2002  states the 
mission  of the Department  of Homeland 
Security is to: 
Prevent terrorist attacks within  the United 
States; reduce the vulnerability  of the 
United States to terrorism; minimize the 
damage, and assist in the recovery, from 
terrorist attacks  that do occur within  the 
United States; and carry  out all  functions of 
entities transferred to the Department, 
including  acting as a  focal  point regarding 
n a t u r a l  a n d m a n m a d e c r i s e s a n d 
emergency planning.83  
After  9/11, the FBI also changed its 
mission  priorities and identified prevention 
of terrorist  attacks as its number one priority. 
Both  these examples illustrate how  an 
organization  can  change its structure to 
accommodate a  shift in policy,  and strategy  – 
in  this case, a  greater  emphasis on  counter-
terrorism. Some have argued that  this focus 
on  terrorism  by  DHS left the agency 
unprepared for  large-scale natural disasters 
such  as Hurricane Katrina.84  The growing 
number  of natural  disasters combined with 
the increasing number of murders and drug 
related violence on  the US-Mexican  border, 
and the increasing  threats to our  cyber 
infrastructure led to a  significant  change in 
the mission  of the Department  of Homeland 
Security.   Under  President  Obama,  DHS has 
five homeland security  missions: (1) 
preventing  terrorism  and enhancing  security; 
(2)  securing and managing  borders; (3) 
enforcing  and administering immigration 
laws; (4) safeguarding  securing cyberspace; 
and (5)  ensuring resilience to disasters.85 
Strategy  formulation  and changes typically 
b e g i n  w i t h  a n  a s s e s s m e n t  o f t h e 
opportunities and threats in  the external 
environment  and is an  on-going  process for 
government organizations such as DHS.  
Organizational culture is very  important  to 
organizations and culture change is a  critical 
component of organizational  transformation. 
Organizational culture is defined as “the set 
of values,  guiding  beliefs,  understandings and 
ways of thinking  that is shared by  members 
of an organization  and taught  to new 
members as correct.” 86 Edgar  Schein  argued, 
“Culture matters because it is a  powerful, 
latent, and often  unconscious set of forces 
that determine both our  individual and 
collective behavior, ways of perceiving, 
thought patterns,  and values.” 87  In turn, 
cultural  elements determine strategy, goals, 
and modes of operating. For  example, 
because law  enforcement agencies, such  as 
the FBI,  perceive terrorism  as a crime,  their 
counterterrorism  strategies must be 
underpinned by  the guiding  principle of the 
rule of law  and implemented through  the 
criminal justice approach.  
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Understanding  organizational cultures 
helps to explain  some of the inter-
organizational and intra-organizational 
conflicts that  occur  in  implementing  policies 
and programs in homeland security.  A 
conflict highlighted in the 9/11  Commission 
Report  was between  the FBI and CIA  in 
sharing  intelligence information  on  suspected 
terrorists. An example of this conflict can be 
illustrated in  part  by  the drastically  different 
organizational  cultures and strategies of the 
intelligence community  and the law 
enforcement community.
The culture of intell igence-driven 
organizations differs from  those of pure law 
enforcement  organizations. 88 While  (foreign) 
intelligence organizations are interested in 
long-term  infiltration,  active and passive 
monitoring, and deterrence,89  the law 
enforcement  bias is to arrest  and prosecute. 
Also, the primary  goals of an  intelligence 
organization  include principle elements in 
the intelligence cycle such as: (1) determining 
what intelligence should be collected to 
advance national interests; (2) systematically 
collecting  that  raw  intelligence; (3)  applying 
analytical  tools to the raw  information in  the 
development of informed judgments; and (4) 
sharing  that finished intelligence with 
national level  policymakers and other 
officials with  a demonstrated need to know. 
“Tradecraft”  or  the how, where,  and why 
intelligence gathering  takes place,  is of 
utmost importance.90 Recruitment  of sources 
and penetration  of groups operating  in  the 
United States is highly  valued by  intelligence 
organizations.  Finally,  there are fewer  legal 
restrictions on overseas CIA  operations than 
FBI investigations at home or abroad. 
By  contrast, the primary  goal  of law 
enforcement  is to respond to criminal 
activities, and to deter future crimes.  In 
general,  this goal is achieved by  rigorous 
investigation of criminal activities and close 
cooperation  with  prosecutors. Discrete, 
individual criminal cases are the driving 
factor  in  law  enforcement  organizations, 
while broader  trends and relationships 
among  social  variables – such as political, 
economic, and military  factors – drive 
intelligence organizations.91  When  law 
enforcement entities operate within the 
United States, civil liberties and the rights of 
US citizens are of paramount concern. As a 
result,  the FBI is governed by  a  complex 
range of investigative guidelines and polices, 
and statutes and constitutional  limits when 
intelligence is being gathered in  the United 
States against  foreign  agents or  US citizens.92 
T h i s l e n s n o t  o n l y  f o c u s e s o n  t h e 
organizations involved in  homeland security 
but also on the organizational  structure of 
terrorist groups.
Threats to homeland security  come from 
terrorist  organizations or  movements often  in 
the form  of loosely  linked networks of varied 
groups. These groups can  range from  highly 
organized and trained operatives (e.g.,  Ramzi 
Yousef)  to groups of potential actors who lack 
training or  stable organizational  structures 
(e.g., Black September).  Today’s terrorist 
networks are different than past  terrorist 
organizations in  their  design, technology, and 
tactics and pose unique challenges.93  
Terrorism  research often  includes studies 
on  how  terrorist organizations are structured 
and how  these structures have changed and 
adapted to their  environment. In  the past,  the 
tendency  was to assume that  terrorists 
belonged to identifiable organizations with 
relatively  clear  command and control 
structures (pyramid organization) and a 
defined chain  of command,  as well as a 
defined set  of political,  social, and economic 
o b j e c t i v e s . 94  R e c e n t l y ,  t e r r o r i s t 
organizational  structures have evolved into 
more loosely  linked network structures to 
survive in  a  constantly  changing  threat 
environment  with  a  distributed control  and 
command structure (if one exists at  all).  As 
law  enforcement,  intelligence,  and military 
operations have successfully  found and 
c a p t u r e d o p e r a t i v e s i n  t e r r o r i s t 
organizations,  these groups have had to find 
new  ways to evade authority,  to become more 
adaptable and resilient,  and to ensure their 
organization  would survive if the main 
leaders were captured or killed.95  
Arquilla  and Ronfeldt,  in  their  study  of 
terrorist  organizations, define a  network as “a 
set  of diverse,  dispersed nodes that  share a 
set  of ideas and interests and are arrayed to 
act in  a  fully  intermitted networked 
manner.96  Arquilla  and Ronfeldt argue that 
these networks have little or  no hierarchy  or 
official authority.97 Also decision-making and 
operations are decentralized; thus tactical 
operations can  be initiated and carried out 
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locally  without central leadership.98  The 
n e t w o r k o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f t e n h a s a 
decentralized cell structure consisting  of a 
small group of people and a  team  leader.  The 
leader  is usually  the person  with  the most 
experience; he or  she is responsible for 
ensuring  the tasks of the cell are  carried out 
and for  communicating  and coordinating 
with  other  cells. Since 9/11, al Qaeda  has 
made numerous transformations and has 
morphed into a  multidimensional network  of 
networks. The challenge in  homeland 
security  is in  designing  governance structures 
and networks that are effective  and efficient 
at  preventing, deterring, and responding  to 
terrorist  attacks and other  natural and 
manmade hazards.  (See Table 3  for  a 
summary of this lens.)
Table 3:  Characteristics of Lens III – Terrorism as a Network
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LENS IV – HOMELAND SECURITY AS A 
COLLABORATIVE NEXUS OF NETWORKS, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS – 
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A COMPLEX 
MIXTURE OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS99
The previous discussion indicates that 
homeland security  may  appear  to function 
differently  depending on  one’s viewpoint. It 
fol lows that  homeland security  can 
legitimately  be “in the eye of the beholder;” 
that  is,  homeland security  means different 
things to different  people. Further,  the 
previous discussion  indicates that the 
policies,  strategies, and even  the tactics 
employed in  the ongoing  struggle against 
transnational, asymmetric terrorism  would 
be different when  conceived and executed 
through  one lens as opposed to another. 
Referring again to Figure 1, it  becomes 
apparent  then  that perhaps it  makes sense to 
investigate what  the overlap in the three 
lenses may  mean; that  is,  that the overlap 
itself is a  separate lens with  which  to view 
homeland security  strategies, organization, 
operations,  or  tactics.  We will explore the 
emergent construct  of environmental security 
as an exemplar of this lens.
Consistent  with a multi-lens theory  of 
homeland security,  we have described the 
term  “homeland security”  as a  construct that 
tends to be dynamic  (e.g.,  its meaning 
changes over  time),  and is value-laden (e.g.,  it 
can mean different  things to different 
constituents).  Understanding  that what  is 
and what is not homeland security  is also 
context  dependent,  enables it to be addressed 
in  a  wide spectrum  of levels of analysis 
(ranging  from  individual  to global/
transnational)  and policy. In  order  to 
properly  frame the importance of global 
climate and public  health  in  a  security 
paradigm,  there are several major  forms or 
frameworks of conceiving security  that are 
pertinent  to consider.  These include the 
concepts of transnational,  international,  and 
national  security; homeland security; 
environmental security; and human security.  
In  2010, Pakistan  experienced its worst 
flooding  in  a century,  and Russia  was plagued 
with  record heat and widespread wildfires 
that  choked the region with  smoke and killed 
hundreds. Both  of these events were related, 
and were potentially  tied to climate change, 
which  may  have contributed to an  unusual 
alteration  in the high  altitude jet  stream. This 
unusual phenomenon brought both  the 
devastating heat  to Russia  and helped push 
large amounts of moisture-laden  air  into 
Pakistan,  where almost  20  percent  of the 
country  was flooded.  In  addition, both  the 
record flooding  in the American Midwest, 
and second most  deadly  tornado season 
(killing almost 500 people)  occurred in  2011. 
All  of these events may  eventually  be tied in 
part to global  warming-related weather 
pattern/climate changes,  but regardless of 
the causality  of these specific  events, these 
are but  a  few  of the types of extreme climactic 
events that  are predicted by  climate change 
models. What  the field of environmental 
security  is primarily  concerned about is the 
relationship between global and regional 
climates and how  that  influences cascading 
failures in human and ecological systems. 
Global  warming  and the resultant  changes 
to climate around the world are among the 
biggest  challenges humanity  faces.  As such, 
policy  makers and security  strategists should 
not consider  global warming  a distant  or 
abstract problem.   Rather climate change/
global warming  represent  a  challenge that all 
nations need to participate in  solving.  And 
taken  together  with  various other related 
challenges including  peak oil (and related 
energy  resource pressures),  growing  water 
and food shortages, and population  growth, 
transnational  crime and asymmetric 
insurgencies,  combine to become a  more 
significant human  security  concern.100  As 
discussed below, governments and militaries 
around the world, including  the United States 
Pentagon, have begun to recognize this 
concern.  For  example,  hunger  is already  a 
rising global  problem,  reducing decades-long 
improvements. This has been caused in  part 
by  rising  food and fuel prices, which  will vary 
but worsen overall with  reduced oil and gas 
supplies caused by  “peak oil”  production 
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drops.  Rising  hunger  has respectively  been 
the result of crop failures and water shortages 
from  climate change, and rising  demand from 
both  population  growth  and rising  demand 
for  high-quality, high-input  foods like  meat 
(the latter  related to rising  wealth  in 
countries like India,  Brazil and China). Many 
food,  water,  and oil-stressed poorer  nations 
have reached political  and social tipping 
points that  culminate in  mass migrations or 
social  and political unrest which  can 
eventually  lead to their  governments failing 
(e.g.,  failed states and large scale regional 
disruptions such  as the Arab Spring 
uprisings).   
As a  part of the larger  domain  of 
homeland security,  the main goals of 
environmental  security  (ES) include 
stabilizing natural  systems that  ultimately 
impact national  security,  including  those 
systems affected by  global warming.  Hence 
the concept  is that  sustainable natural 
systems lead to sustainable security.  Hunger, 
water  and fuels shortages, and disease each 
adds to the misery  felt by  society  and to 
political instability.  Subsequently,  political 
instability  tends to motivate radical acts, 
terrorism, wars,  and other  political  violence 
and economic  distress as we have recently 
witnessed in  the conflicts in  northern Africa 
and the Middle East. Therefore, ES 
challenges traditional security  concepts by  its 
focus on mitigation  strategies such  as (1) 
building  sustainable economic  systems and 
reducing population  growth rates as much  as 
possible; (2) eliminating/reducing  poverty 
and enhancing  education,  which  would help 
stabilize population  growth  and build a 
healthier  and an  employable population  base; 
(3) stabilizing and restoring  Earth’s critical 
environmental systems, such as forests, soil, 
oceans and fisheries,  and fresh  water  supplies 
that  will  support  future economic activity  and 
growth; (4) reducing  greenhouse gas 
emissions, to reverse the rising  atmospheric 
levels from  their  current,  and future, 
unsustainable levels; and (5) achieving 
sustainable energy  policies,  including 
improved energy  efficiency  (better  use of 
energy  consumed)  and alternative energy 
sources (such  as solar,  wind,  geothermal,  bio-
fuels, etc.)  to replace the fossil fuel shortages 
already looming.  
By  its nature,  environmental  security 
challenges certain  traditional notions of 
national security  and homeland security.  ES 
must  include many  non-traditional security 
players – including agencies such  as the 
Environment  Protection  Agency  (EPA),  the 
N a t i o n a l A e r o n a u t i c s a n d S p a c e 
Administration  (NASA), and independent 
and government  scientists doing research  on 
climate change-related issues, technologies, 
etc. Even  some states, such  as California, 
have independently  enacted climate security-
related legislation  to reduce GHG  emissions 
through  regulation  and tax  incentives. 101  In 
light of the intersection  of global climate 
change and the resulting  impact on  the 
political economies and governments around 
the world,  we might  define environmental 
security as:
An  interdisciplinary  study  of the affects  of 
extreme environmental  or climatic events 
which  can  act locally  or  trans-nationally to 
destabilize countries or  regions of  the world 
resulting in  either  geopolitical instability, 
resource conflicts  or vulnerabilities  in 
critical  infrastructure, or some combination 
of these. 
The discussion  above clearly  points out 
how  environmental security  exemplifies the 
overlap of the international  relations, 
criminal justice, and networks lenses. 
Recently  the 2010  QDR recognized for  the 
first  time the national  security  implications of 
climate change and energy  dependence by 
stating: 
The rising demand for resources, rapid 
urbanization  of littoral  regions, the effects 
of climate change, the emergence of new 
strains of disease, and profound cultural 
and demographic tensions in several 
regions are just some of the trends whose 
complex interplay may spark or  exacerbate 
future conflicts.102  
As an example of the QDR’s concerns, 
consider  the challenges peak oil represents to 
US homeland security. Persistent  access to 
affordable fossil fuels like oil is not  only  core 
to the ongoing  health  of the US economy, but 
its success depends on  effective international 
p o l i c y  n e t w o r k s , t r a n s n a t i o n a l  l a w 
enforcement structures, and international 
relations.  For instance,  energy  use/inputs in 
the form  of oil and gas-related products (e.g., 
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nitrogen fertilizers,  fuel for  farming), 
machine production,  and transportation  of 
food to distant markets have become central 
to modern  agriculture productivity  and food 
distribution.  The rising  price of oil is thought 
to be caused,  at  least  in  part, by  a 
combination  of the inevitable depletion  of oil 
and gas reserves (supply)  and rising  global 
use of fossil fuels and transportation 
(demand).  Since food production  in  the 
developed world is incredibly  oil  intensive,  as 
the price of oil increases, the price of food 
follows.  Clearly  a  political concern  in  the 
United States,  rising food prices are 
particularly  traumatic for those in  less 
developed countries.  Consequently,  as food 
becomes increasingly  expensive,  mass 
migrations of populations seeking  better 
opportunities can  be expected. Such 
migrations become major  stressors to the 
economies and governments of both 
receiving  nations and to the nations who are 
losing the skills and talents of their populace.
Table 4:  Characteristics of Lens IV – Terrorism as a Collaborative Nexus
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to begin  the 
effort  to build a theoretical  foundation  for 
homeland security  by  creating  a  framework 
based on four  distinct  conceptual lenses 
developed from  the academic literature in the 
fields of criminology, international relations, 
organization  studies,  risk management,  and 
public  administration. These conceptual 
lenses include (1) homeland security  as a 
criminal justice  problem, with  terrorism 
viewed as crime; (2) homeland security  as a 
international relations problem,  with 
terrorism  viewed as war; (3) homeland 
Security  as an  organization  design  problem, 
with  terrorism  viewed as a  network of 
transnational,  sub-state actors; and (4) 
homeland security  as a  collaborative nexus of 
the law  enforcement,  diplomatic, and 
network lenses that  culminates in  the notion 
of environmental  security.  Each  conceptual 
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lens consists of theories,  practices, values, 
beliefs, and assumptions that can  serve to 
shape how  critical  events are perceived,  and 
as such,  how  these events are understood and 
the problems addressed in the form  of 
homeland security  programs and policies. 
The fields of criminology, organization 
t h e o r y ,  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d 
international relations each bring unique 
theoretical perspectives that contribute 
significantly  to our  understanding  of 
homeland security, but  none of the lenses 
individually  provides an  adequate picture of 
the challenges of homeland security  theory  or 
policies needed to address modern  threats 
and hazards.  
Homeland security  is a  complex  problem 
that spans many  academic  disciplines, 
professions,  and organizational  boundaries. 
It encompasses both  foreign  and domestic 
policy  issues,  and involves government 
organizations at  all levels,  as well  as 
businesses,  nonprofit  organizations, and 
citizens.  In fact, homeland security  is so 
complex  that  multiple perspectives are 
needed to analyze the phenomenon  because 
one perspective simply  misses too much, or 
fails to see critical pieces of the problem  that 
need to be addressed. Thus, further  research 
should be encouraged that  is interdisciplinary 
and seeks to break down  some of the 
disciplinary  barriers within  the field of 
homeland security.  This requires a  focus on 
processes and incentives that will bring 
scholars and policymakers with  these 
different perspectives together.  
It is clear  that conceptual lenses heavily 
influence whether we will be aware of new 
problems,  how  we give meaning  to what  we 
observe, and how  we perceive or  understand 
new  phenomenon. Unexpected changes are 
often  difficult to perceive, let  alone address 
because they  simply  are not  captured within 
our  mental maps or  conceptual lenses that we 
use to make sense of the world. To ensure we 
are not  surprised by  another  9/11, it is critical 
that  we continue to broaden  our conceptual 
lenses as it relates to homeland security.  
In  the rapidly  changing  environment of 
the information  age, problems are constantly 
morphing  into new  forms,  thus the life cycle 
of any  particular  solution  is likely  to be very 
short. Thus, an  important  challenge for 
scholars and government  leaders is to lead 
the process of continuing to analyze our 
existing conceptual lenses as they  relate to 
homeland security,  as well  as to lead the 
process of constructing  new  conceptual 
lenses.  A  useful next  step would be to apply 
the lenses to a  number  of terrorist  attacks 
and conduct  a  multiple case study. Multiple 
frame analysis can  be used to analyze critical 
cases such  as the attacks on  the World Trade 
Center  in  1993  and 2001. A  comparative 
analysis of these two events can  be conducted 
to see how  our  conceptual  lenses and 
perceptions have changed over  time. In 
addition,  further  research  is needed on  the 
lenses used in  multiple frame analysis in 
order  to more clearly  define the theories, 
concepts,  definitions,  and principles in  each. 
Also, additional  lenses can  be added to the 
framework  such as those that  look at 
homeland security  from  an  emergency 
management,  public health,  or  r isk 
management  perspective and applied to other 
cases. Also, further  research is needed to 
understand how  these conceptual lenses are 
formed and shared,  and changed within 
government  organizations,  as well as among 
elected officials. The use of multiple lenses in 
analyzing complex  phenomenon  such  as 
homeland security  is important because 
when  used alone, one perspective or  lens can 
miss key  elements and captures only  a  small 
part of the phenomenon  we are observing. 
Using  multiple perspectives allows us to 
develop explanations that  help us understand 
specific aspects of homeland security  as well 
as identify  alternative paradigms that  serve to 
help transform  our  theories, traditions, rules, 
and standards of practice.  
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A n i n n o v a t i v e d e s i g n f o r s h a r i n g 
information and intelligence is found in the 
form  of network fusion, which encourages 
collaboration across multiple disciplines by 
leveraging technology to  connect the 
unconnected at classified and unclassified 
levels. As terrorists move to  new  methods  of 
attack, law  enforcement and first responders 
must use comprehensive and timely 
information and intelligence to  both 
anticipate  potential threats  and to  ensure a 
high measure of adaptability  in responses. 
This article  defines  network fusion along 
with other architectures for homeland 
security connectivity; explores  the current 
information and intelligence sharing 
challenges; examines how  network fusion 
can enhance fusion centers  as  well as  assist 
emergency responders; and makes several 
recommendations for implementing network 
fusion. Network  fusion provides  an 
opportunity to  bring many unique 
perspectives  together for smarter,  faster and 
cheaper intelligence sharing.
INTRODUCTION
In April of 2004, a surreal meeting took 
place in a small restaurant in Monterey, 
California between a Minneapolis  FBI agent 
and a New  York  City fire  chief. The FBI 
agent described his experience of the days 
leading up to  9/11 and wanting to  obtain a 
search warrant for Zacarias  Moussaoui 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.  He became so  frustrated with the 
system, which did not more aggressively 
pursue a search warrant and lacked any 
urgency for sharing information, that,  at 
one point,  he  blurted out to  his  supervisors 
that he  was “just trying to stop someone 
from  taking a plane and crashing it into  the 
World Trade  Center.” Little did he know  how 
prophetic his statement would turn out to be. 
The 9/11  Commission  Report described the 
month before the attacks as  a “system 
blinking red” with warnings.  Then I told an 
equally distressing story of never being told 
on September 11 about police helicopters’ 
observations  that the top fifteen floors of the 
North Tower,  which I was in,  were “glowing 
red”  with fire  and that the corner of the 
building was starting to buckle.  These 
historical eyewitness  accounts  illustrate  that 
the systems for intelligence and information 
sharing were “blinking red” for 9/11. While 
t h e r e h a v e b e e n i m p r o v e m e n t s i n 
distributing information, some wonder if 
information sharing and collaborative 
systems are still blinking red in today’s 
networked world.1
Many  in  the intelligence and first-
responder  communities would like to believe 
that  commissions, studies,  new  policies,  and 
executive orders have solved the United 
States’ information  and intelligence sharing 
problems.  Yet  “the same enduring  realities 
that  prevented adaptation  before 9/11  have 
stymied adaptation  even  in  the aftermath  of 
tragedy.”2 The problem  is that organizations, 
by  their  command and control  design, are not 
structured for  collaboration. The struggle 
that  ensues is how  to achieve connectivity  for 
sharing information,  within  a  system 
inhibited by  organizations determined to 
pursue disconnectedness as a means for 
power and control. 3  
The disconnect that exists between 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s c r e a t e s i n f o r m a t i o n 
a s y m m e t r i e s ,  w h i c h  p r o d u c e t w o 
consequences.  The first  is the inability  to 
prevent an attack from  occurring.   Without 
information, organizations are helpless to 
stop terrorism.  The second focuses on  an 
organization’s powerlessness to adequately 
mitigate and respond to terrorist  incidents, 
when  there is a  lack  of understanding  of the 
threat  environment.  Terrorism  will continue 
to challenge society  because it cannot  be 
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totally  prevented,  which  necessitates the 
expansion  of our present  information sharing 
and intelligence system  to contain  policies for 
resilience.  
A  new  design for  organizations to share 
information  and intelligence may  be found in 
the form  of network fusion,  which connects 
not only  the law  enforcement and intelligence 
communities for  prevention and protection 
purposes, but also other  key  components of 
the emergency  responder  community  – such 
as fire departments and health  care systems – 
for  mitigation, response,  and recovery  efforts. 
Together  all  organizations can  benefit  from 
and contribute to the critical  mission areas of 
homeland security  through  the power  of 
networks.
Finding new  approaches for  collaboration 
may  be less a  matter  of innovation  and more 
a  matter  of discovering  what  is already  done 
by  organizations. Stephen Cohen and William 
Eimicke from  Columbia  University  observe 
that  organizations are becoming increasingly 
connected through  inter-organizational 
networks. 4  They  argue that  government is 
m o v i n g a w a y  f r o m  t h e t r a d i t i o n a l 
hierarchical  model that  dominated the 
twentieth  century  and toward a  more fluid 
continuum  of organizational collaboration.5 
This trend means that  organizations now  are 
more likely  to be connected horizontally  and 
look outward toward other  organizations for 
necessary  functions. The ultimate goal of 
networked government organizations is the 
production of public value greater  than  any 
one organization could accomplish alone. 6
The fusing  of information  for  intelligence 
sharing is the goal for  some centrally 
controlled systems; however, sharing 
information  is more likely  to occur  when 
organizations are arranged as members of an 
integrated network, which  transcends 
traditional organizational boundaries for  a 
faster  and smarter understanding of the 
threat  environment. This article defines 
network fusion  along with  other architectures 
for  homeland security  connectivity; explores 
the current information  and intelligence 
sharing  challenges; examines how  network 
fusion, as well as competitive forces,  will 
strategically  shape fusion  centers; and makes 
several recommendations for  implementing 
network fusion.
DEFINING NETWORK FUSION
Network fusion  is an  information sharing 
s y s t e m  t h a t  f u s e s i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d 
intelligence from  multiple sources to allow 
decision  makers to better  adapt  to a changing 
threat  environment. It  leverages technology 
to improve awareness and collaboration 
across different disciplines by  connecting 
voice,  video, and data  communications at 
classified and unclassified levels. Networks 
bridge gaps,  strengthen  relationships,  and 
allow  for  innovation,  speed, and flexibility  in 
exchanging  critical information. 7 Through  the 
use of collaborative technology, network 
fusion  is a framework for  linking  multiple 
systems for  pushing  and pulling information 
and intelligence.  It  provides a  platform  for 
connecting  disparate organizations and their 
unique viewpoints.
In  a  networked world, fusion  centers, 
created for  the sharing of information  and 
intelligence, as well as other  critical 
information  nodes, will  have to change their 
shape from  a  strictly  hierarchical, linear, or 
unidirectional hub-and-spoke network  to that 
of a  network platform  that can connect  and 
fuse information  from  many  different  sources 
rather  than  only  those co-located with  them. 
Christopher  Bellavita,  who teaches at  the 
Naval Postgraduate School, contends that 
fusion  centers are examples of an  emergent 
approach  to homeland security. They  were 
first  started post  9/11  at  the state level, to 
bring people together  for  better  information 
sharing.  However,  “fusion”  means more than 
simply  putting people from  different agencies 
in  the same room; it requires the fusing  of 
information,  which  represents continuing 
evolution of fusion centers. 8
The future of fusion  centers will  depend 
on  their  ability  to collaborate  with other 
organizations for  prevention and response as 
well  as their  capacity  for  information to be 
pushed and pulled in  real time through 
networking. Successful network fusion has 
three distinct advantages:
• Faster  to communicate directly  with 
decision  makers and those closest  to the 
 information; 
• Smarter  to understand the threat 
e n v i r o n m e n t  t h r o u g h  m u l t i p l e 
perspectives;
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• Cheaper  to collaborate virtually  rather 
than co-locate.
Network  fusion  exploits technology  to 
quickly  connect various organizations that 
participate in  homeland security  to exchange 
critical information, insights into potential 
attacks, and real-time situational awareness 
reports. Its effectiveness lies in  the speed 
with  which  it connects decision  makers who 
are close to the information  with  others 
throughout  the network. Secure video 
conferencing eliminates travel  time, which 
speeds up the network  of information 
exchange. “Fast  information  is better  than 
slow,”  which  is the core philosophy  of major 
corporate  information  companies, like 
Google. 9  Failure to consider  the speed of 
network fusion  as part of the intelligence and 
information  process will  greatly  retard the 
ability  to prevent  and respond to terrorist 
threats and disasters.
John  Arquilla, associate professor  at the 
Naval Postgraduate  School,  maintains that 
the fight  against  terrorism  “depends to some 
extent on  technological  innovation, but 
mainly  on a  willingness to innovate 
organizationally  and doctrinally,  perhaps 
especially  by  building  new  mechanisms for 
inter-agency  and multi-jurisdictional 
cooperation.” 10 The Markle Foundation  Task 
Force supports this conclusion by  further 
arguing  that  traditional  information  sharing 
prior  to September 11  contributed to a lack  of 
terrorism  prevention  and preparedness and 
recommends “network architecture” as a 
corrective measure.11
As terrorists move to employ  new  methods 
of attack,  law  enforcement and first 
responders must use comprehensive and 
timely  intelligence to anticipate potential 
threats and to ensure a  high  measure of 
adaptability  in  their  responses.  System 
adaptability  occurs when  multiple  insights or 
a  diversity  of viewpoints “enables people to 
see different things when  they  view  the same 
event.” 12  The fusing of insights from  the 
intelligence community  – law  enforcement, 
the fire  service, health  care organizations, 
transportation  systems, environmental 
protection  agencies,  and other organizations 
– provides an  opportunity  to bring  many 
unique perspectives together  for  smarter 
overall analysis.
While  senior  decision  makers in  these 
aforementioned organizations normally  do 
not sit  in  fusion  centers, or  occupy  seats in 
emergency  operations centers, such decision 
makers would add valuable experience, 
analysis,  and intuition  to the interpretation  of 
reports if they  were part  of the information-
fusing process.  By  connecting  to a sundry  of 
perspectives,  network fusion  leverages the 
knowledge of senior  executives to form  a 
smarter  understanding  of the threat 
environment. 
EXISTING NETWORKS
It is not enough to create faster  and smarter 
ways of enhancing information sharing; such 
methods also must  have sustainable price 
tags.  The cost  of physical co-location  is 
$200,000  per  year, per  person.13 If a  position 
is to be covered twenty-four  hours a  day, 
seven  days a  week, the economic impact is 
one million  dollars per year.  Add to this 
several different  operations centers,  and the 
cost  is staggering and unsustainable. In 
addit ion, having  scores of agencies 
represented in one location  imposes space 
constraints. It is impossible for  every  agency 
to have a  seat  at  the table in  a  fusion center; 
the size of the facility  would be enormous and 
cost  for  personnel  would be prohibitive.  The 
solution  is one of network fusion,  which 
utilizes new  and existing networks to extend 
the reach  of fusion  centers to emergency 
responders.
The development of network  fusion  for 
faster,  smarter,  and cheaper  information 
sharing  and collaboration  will require a 
sociotechnical  approach  that  makes use of 
hard and soft systems. Technical or  hard 
systems draw  on  technology  to assist  in 
connecting  security  partners to information 
and intelligence.  For  agencies working  with 
the Department  of Homeland Security 
(DHS),  information  is exchanged through  e-
mail,  Web posts, phone calls,  and video 
conferences. Unclassified methods for 
information  exchange use the Homeland 
Security  Information  Network (HSIN) 
platform, while classified information  moves 
primarily  over the Homeland Security  Data 
Network (HSDN).  Working with  the 
Department of Homeland Security, first 
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responders can  utilize the  technology  of hard 
systems for  vo ice ,  v ideo,  and data 
communications to exchange classified and 
unclassified intelligence in  a  timely  manner 
over secure systems.
New  York  City  has created an  unclassified 
community-of-interest  Web portal  on  HSIN 
called the New  York  Situational Awareness 
Program  (NYSAP).  More than forty-five 
agencies participate in  this collaborative 
environment  for organizations to post  and 
receive information  and share real-time 
situational  awareness.  When the East  Coast 
was hit  by  Hurricane Irene in  2011,  critical 
information  on flooding,  downed trees,  and 
people in  need of assistance was shared 
among  agencies using  NYSAP,  which enabled 
New  York City  to take immediate steps to 
respond and recover  from  this natural 
disaster. Work is also under  way  to create 
better  collaborative tools to illustrate 
information in graphic form.
Social or  soft  systems are often  overlooked 
when  developing  networks. These are the 
functional skills and qualifications needed for 
collaboration  when  dealing  with  classified 
information.  Major  organizations that  are at 
risk from  terrorism  and acting  as critical 
network nodes,  or are connected to fusion 
centers and the Joint Terrorism  Task  Force, 
need personnel to receive information  within 
the security  domains of top secret,  secret, and 
sensitive but  unclassified. DHS has made a 
commitment  to work  with  first  responders in 
providing clearances and training  as part of a 
s y s t e m  f o r  i n t e l l i g e n c e b a s e d o n 
organizational need, risk, and capability.
Types of Networks
HIERARCHICAL 
Linear pushing of information
CO-LOCATED LIAISONS 
Multiple agencies are co-located 
HUB-AND-SPOKE
Pushing information from a central node
NETWORK FUSION
Using technology to connect and 
collaboration
Table 1: Four types of information and intelligent sharing systems.
HIERARCHICAL LINEAR SYSTEMS
Linear  information  networks are illustrated 
by  information moving from  first  the federal 
to state level,  then  to local  and tribal entities, 
and then  to individual agencies based on  a 
priority  list. This type of network should be 
evaluated for  a  single point  of failure and for 
bias when the system  is stressed. Too often 
the flow  of information through  many 
successive levels is slow.  There are also 
occasions when organizations tend to hold 
information  to flex  their  power. Asking first 
responders to respond to terrorist  incidents 
without  current  information and intelligence 
is like asking  a  pilot  to fly  without 
instruments or  weather  reports. A  lack of 
information  places first  responders at a  huge 
disadvantage when  performing lifesaving 
rescues at extreme events.
However,  there are narrowly  defined 
incidents in  which  only  a  small group of 
people is supplied with  information.  Navy 
Seal Team  Six  and limited government 
officials were the only  people who knew 
about  the raid on  Osama Bin  Laden’s 
compound. In  this case,  a  hierarchical,  linear 
system  was used to ensure security.  But  to 
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locate Bin  Laden, it  took  a  large network. 
Leaders should not be limited to one type of 
network. Rather,  they  should consider  “how 
well  [a network’s]  structure is adapted to the 
activities the organization  carries out and the 
environment in which it carries it out.”14
HUB-AND-SPOKE SYSTEMS
The DHS has plans for  seventy-seven fusion 
centers around the United States. One center 
is designated for  each  state, with  a  number  of 
metropolitan  areas having  their  own  regional 
centers. These centers are designed as hub-
and-spoke networks,  where each  fusion 
center  acts as a  hub and connects to various 
security  partners as though  the spokes of a 
wheel. Information flows primarily  out  of the 
hub and connects directly  to spoke agencies. 
Hub-and-spoke networks are effective in 
spreading information to the overall  network 
by  pushing  information  from  a  centralized 
location.
The potential  drawback  of these networks 
is their  inability  to handle the bidirectional 
exchange of information  in  a  timely  manner. 
Similar  to an  airport  terminal,  such  networks 
have limited capacity  during peak traffic 
times. 15 The convergence of information  may 
cause the network to slow  down during 
c r i t i c a l  m o m e n t s a n d b e c o m e s o 
overwhelmed that information  does not  get 
exchanged in  a  timely  manner. To avoid such 
congestion,  this type of system  only  pushes 
information  to agencies,  with little room  for 
tailoring  the information  to the end user.  It 
also may  not recognize the need to 
disseminate information  to others than  law 
enforcement  agencies.  The real danger  is for 
a  hub-and-spoke network  to become a 
modernized informational stovepipe,  where 
information  originates from  a  place of limited 
perspective and is pushed only  when the 
originating  agency  deems it  necessary  to do 
so.
Another  example of a  hub-and-spoke 
network is the video surveillance systems that 
have proliferated around many  cities. Cities 
such  as Los Angeles,  London, and Beijing 
currently  provide thousands of camera feeds 
into fire, police, and city  emergency 
operations centers.  Video feeds are selected 
by  these operation  centers to assist in 
acquiring  better  situational  awareness. 
However, the weakness of this type of 
network is seen  when information cannot be 
pulled or  is not  provided by  the controlling 
agency.
CO-LOCATED LIAISON SYSTEM
With  grant  money  from  DHS and working 
with  the private sector, the New  York City 
Police Department  (NYPD) has as many  as 
2,000 cameras feeding  into their  Lower 
Manhattan Security  Initiative (LMSI). These 
cameras can  provide critical  images to 
criminal investigators and could assist 
decision  makers if multiple terrorist attacks 
(such  as those seen  in Mumbai) were to 
occur.
Requests by  the Office of Emergency 
M a n a g e m e n t  ( O E M ) a n d t h e F i r e 
Department of New  York (FDNY) to receive 
live-feed video from  LMSI to their  emergency 
operations centers were repeatedly  turned 
down by  the NYPD. Alternatively,  OEM and 
FDNY were invited to send a  liaison  to LMSI. 
However,  this does not  provide direct viewing 
of live video by  senior  decision  makers. 
Instead,  information  has to be relayed by  a 
lower-ranking liaison, by  voice only.  A  liaison 
system  often fails to get  the right  information 
to the right people at the right time. 
Yet,  many  local and federal government 
programs see a  liaison  system  of co-location 
as the only  collaborative structure available 
for  information  exchange.   While there is 
value in  face-to-face collaboration  and 
analysis,  at  times these co-located liaison 
systems consist of individuals or  groups who 
act  in  parallel  and do not  generate unique 
ideas to increase collective value. If groups 
are not designed with  shared responsibility 
and accountability,  the liaison  system  can 
underperform. 16
NETWORK FUSION
The struggle for  information  sharing  in  a 
networked world is to provide not  just a  seat 
at  the table, but to have real-time information 
provided directly  to decision  makers. It does 
not matter  who controls the raw  data  but how 
organizations and individuals can connect  to 
extract the information  needed to make 
PFEIFER, NETWORK FUSION  5
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 17 (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
critical decisions, “because all of us are better 
than  any  one of us at  understanding what  the 
data is saying.”17
The lack of a  robust multichannel system 
for  information and intelligence sharing 
points to a system  that  is still  “blinking red.” 
To avoid such  limitation,  collectors and 
consumers of intelligence and information 
should enhance their  current systems of co-
locating  people by  having a  network fusion 
mechanism  for  pull ing and pushing 
information. However,  as agencies adopt a 
network approach  to information  and 





The Homeland Security  Act  of 2002  and the 
Int e l l ig e nc e Re f o rm  and Te rro r is m 
Prevention  Act  of 2004  were written  in 
response to a  need for  improved information 
and intelligence sharing.  These acts were 
later  strengthened by  the issuance of a 2005 
presidential  memorandum  establishing 
guidelines and requirements for  a  new 
information-sharing environment. 18  Even 
with  such initiatives,  the United States 
Government  Accountability  Office (GAO) 
concluded: “the nation sti l l  lacks a 
government wide policy  and processes 
needed to build an  integrated terrorism-
related,  information-sharing  road map, but 
small-scale sharing initiatives are under 
way.” 19 The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (2007),  the National Response 
F r a m e w o r k ( 2 0 0 8 )  a n d N a t i o n a l 
Preparedness  Goals  (2011) continue to 
highlight  the importance of creating  a  culture 
o f preparedness and d isseminat ing 
information  to enable first responders to 
better  manage incidents and minimize 
damage.20  A dynamic and unpredictable 
threat  environment  requires leaders to 
constantly  evaluate their  organizational 
structure for better ways to collaborate. 
Sharing of information  and intelligence 
among  different  agencies through  networks 
creates a  system-wide understanding of the 
threat  environment. If information  sharing 
fails, the ability  of some agencies to make 
sense of the threat environment  also fails. 
Lacking  the relevant information  to form  a 
system-wide analysis of a threat  environment 
could mean  that individual  agencies make 
separate decisions that, although appropriate 
for  that  agency,  may  conflict  with  the system-
wide goal  and thus prove adverse to that 
agency  as well  as to other  units within  the 
system. 21 The fusion center  model strives to 
provide a  comprehensive picture of the threat 
environment to lessen  potential system 
failure; yet  organizations tend to self organize 
and share intelligence in  functional areas of 
prevention and protection,  ignoring  the need 
for  intelligence for  mitigation,  response,  and 
recovery.  Sharing intelligence for  only 
prevention will surely  lead to the next 
surprise attack if a  plot cannot  be disrupted. 
However,  using  intelligence to also mitigate 
and respond to potential  attacks will lessen 
the consequences and avoid the element  of 
surprise.  Since there is no such  thing  as a 
perfect  defense against terrorism, homeland 
security  agencies must prepare for  a  range of 
potential terrorist attacks and work  together 
to diminish the effects of uncertainty.
In  Bak’s  Sand Pile and a  similar  article in 
Homeland Security  Affairs, Ted Lewis 
describes complex  adaptive systems as being 
self-organizing: as these systems become 
more efficient and connected they  reach a 
state of self-organized criticality  (SOC) or  the 
point  where they  collapse unexpectedly.22 
Based on  this argument,  fusion  centers that 
have self-organized into law  enforcement-
only  centers with  limited central  hubs for 
information  may  be hitting  the point  of 
criticality.  What  was once a well-intentioned 
idea  for  sharing intelligence has mutated,  for 
some, into tightly  connected criminal 
investigation  fiefdoms that exclude those 
outside of law  enforcement.  On a  more 
positive note, lecturer Paul Cilliers argues 
that  the edge of criticality  is the point  at 
which  systems can  change with  the least 
amount of effort.23  The challenge for 
adaptation  is to bridge information  gaps and 
overcome organizational biases. 
INFORMATION GAPS AND HOLES
Examining how  networks function  provides 
clues for  identifying  gaps and reengineering 
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intelligence sharing  in  terms of network 
fusion. The key  building blocks of networks 
are the connections between  organizations, 
which  are referred to as ties.  Social network 
research  literature focuses on  ties and 
bridging gaps between  organizations. 
Opportunities for  information  sharing  are 
dependent  on  the formation  of these ties as a 
fundamental first  step for  creating  a  network 
model.
Having a  multiplicity  of ties between 
organizations will  increase the chances for 
finding new  information. According  to 
Ronald Burt,  professor  at Chicago University, 
these ties span structural  holes or  gaps when 
there are two or  more nodes that do not 
communicate available information.24  The 
structural hole argument  describes the 
negotiation  of connections that bridge gaps to 
join  otherwise disconnected people and 
information  systems.25 Two design principles 
are involved for  an  optimized network  to 
create efficiency  and effectiveness. 26 The first 
principle is to connect  different non-
redundant nodes to maximize diversity  of 
information. The second principle is to use 
these contacts as a  portal  to others in  a 
cluster.  Instead of maintaining  relations with 
all  contacts, an  optimized network delegates 
the maintenance of clusters to the primary 
contacts.27  In  this way, one organization  is 
able to connect  with  many  organizations. 
Fusion  is about connecting  to individuals and 
organizational  clusters to take full  advantage 
of available information.
When the small  plane of the Yankees 
pitcher  Cory  Lidel  crashed into a  Manhattan 
high-rise in  October  2006, first  responders 
needed critical information  in  order to 
respond appropriately. They  needed to know 
if this plane crash  had any  nexus to terrorism, 
if it  was an  isolated accident or  one in  a  series 
of attacks, and if the specific building  was 
prone to fire or  collapse. Homeland Security 
officials in  Washington  also needed to have 
situational  awareness about  the incident and 
the extent  of the fire.  During this incident 
there  were structural holes between  the 
National Operations Center  and New  York 
City’s first  responders. The formal system  for 
information  exchange was slow  to react 
because of these holes in  the network as well 
as inadequate technology. However,  an 
informal and hastily  formed information-
sharing  network bridged those gaps to 
quickly  provide critical information  from  the 
scene.  This incident  illustrates the value of 
having  many  ties and the need to formally 
bridge holes between organizations.
M o r t o n  H a n s e n ,  p r o f e s s o r  o f 
entrepreneurship,  argues that  social research 
has concentrated too much  on  the ability  of 
ties to access novel information  and not 
enough  on the transfer of complex  forms of 
knowledge.28  He claims that  complex 
k n o w l e d g e i s b e s t t r a n s f e r r e d b y 
strengthening ties among different  groups. 
The lack of interagency  cooperation between 
organizations responding  to 9/11  seems to 
support  the hypothesis that  weak ties 
inhibited these agencies from  exchanging 
information. Understanding why  weak ties 
may  not  always span  across groups during 
complex  incidents is critical to building 
networks for information fusion.
ORGANIZATIONAL BIASES
The 9/11 Commission Report warns that  the 
biggest  impediment  to an  all-source analysis 
of intelligence needed to connect  the dots of a 
terrorist  plot is the human  or  systemic 
resistance to information  sharing. 29  This 
develops as the tendency  to look  inward 
toward members of the same organization 
and avoid looking  outward to other  groups, 
thus creating organizational bias.30  People 
are naturally  prone to gravitate towards and 
give more information to members of their 
own  organization and less information  to 
outsiders.  
As the stress and complexity  of a  crisis 
increase, people tend to focus on aspects 
judged most important to themselves and 
their  agency.31  Daniel  Kahneman  describes 
this as a  case of “what you  see is all  there 
is”  (WYSIATI). 32 Often  organizations fail  to 
allow  for  other  possibilities, by  turning 
inward.  They  create a  positive in-group bias 
in  favor  of those who are part  of the same 
group and a  negative out-group bias against 
those who are part  of an  alternate group.33 
The events of 9/11  illustrated that the CIA 
and FBI,  as well  as first  responders,  did not 
realize how  little information  they  had nor 
did they  understand how  the information 
they had could have assisted other agencies.
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When people suffer  from  organizational 
bias,  they  frequently  feel little obligation  to 
exchange valuable information  with  those 
outside their  group, since responsibility  for 
acting  is diffused across the in-group.  This 
phenomenon  excludes the out-group from 
receiving  information  that  may  be vital to its 
operation. The intelligence community 
traditionally  views first responders as the 
outsiders; this organizational bias must  be 
overcome when  creating  an intelligence 
network model. In  a  networked world, it  is 
critical to strengthen  ties and connections to 
law  enforcement and first  responders by 
developing trust  and eliminating  biases for 
information  sharing and collaboration. 
Overcoming  organizational bias increases the 
flow  of information, which  contributes to 
overall  prevention  and preparedness by 
anticipating  potential attacks and building 
resilient systems to reduce negative effects.
MITIGATION NEGLECT
Another  form  of bias is mitigation neglect – 
or  neglecting to share relevant  information 
with  those who must respond to and mitigate 
the effects of an  event.  To optimize homeland 
security  efforts, law  enforcement  agencies 
and first  responders must comprehend 
threats, assess vulnerabilities,  and determine 
the impact  of possible  terrorist  incidents. 
They  also must  be willing  to set aside the 
convent ional mindset  that  be l ieves 
inte l l igence is only  for  prevention. 
Information  sharing  through  a  network 
model can strengthen prevention  and 
m i t i g a t i o n e f f o r t s b y  i n c r e a s i n g 
understanding  of the threat  and working 
collaboratively  to detect  and lessen  the 
consequences of an attack.
One tactic  of terrorists is to conduct a 
sequenced attack, using  a  small  explosion  or 
fire to lure first responders and/or  passersby 
to the scene of an  incident,  only  to cause 
maximum  injury  and fatality  with  a 
secondary  explosive device.  In  2002  in Bali, 
Indonesia, a  backpack explosive was used 
inside a nightclub to drive occupants outside, 
where a  more powerful vehicle-borne 
improved explosive device (VBIED) was 
detonated and killed 202  people. While  the 
intelligence community  works hard to 
prevent such  events from  occurring, it  has 
neglected the need for first  responders to 
have intelligence to understand the potential 
threat environment.
On December  11, 2010,  a  car  fire was used 
in a  busy  shopping  area  in  Stockholm, 
Sweden,  to attract  first  responders to a  car 
where an  improvised explosive device was to 
be set  off remotely.  Fortunately,  this attack 
on  first  responders failed.  However,  it  took 
more than six  weeks for  the FDNY to learn  of 
the VBIED car  fire in Stockholm  that  put 
firefighters at  risk. This delay  in  information 
and intelligence sharing  to first  responders is 
an  indication  of mitigation  neglect  by  those 
who are responsible for  sharing intelligence. 
Mitigation, or  the lessening  of effects before, 
during, and after  an  event,  validates first 




Intelligence is the process by  which raw  data 
is collected and transformed into usable 
information, and then disseminated to end 
users at  the strategic,  operational,  and 
tactical levels. 34  Mark Lowenthal describes 
the intelligence process of collecting 
information  as meaningless unless analysts 
can  turn information  into reports and briefs, 
which  are usable by  consumers, thus creating 
value. 35  Creating true value for  all  consumers 
of intelligence requires a  strategy  that  goes 
beyond just  creating reports and incorporates 
network fusion.
Harvard Business School professor 
Michael Porter  argues there are  five 
competitive forces that  shape strategy  for 
business.  These forces consist  of the power  of 
suppliers,  consumers, rivals,  new  entries,  and 
substitutes.36  Understanding  how  the five 
forces shape strategy  provides companies 
with  a  competitive advantage for  profitability. 
I n  t h e g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e g o a l f o r 
understanding  these forces is to generate 
greater  public value.  By  applying Porter’s 
competitive forces to intelligence sharing, we 
gain insight  into how  we might strategically 
structure fusion  centers and use network 
fusion  to create a  stronger  system  for 
homeland security. 
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SUPPLIERS AND CONSUMERS
Suppliers and consumers have the power  to 
influence what is being reported about 
terrorist  plots, trends, critical  infrastructure 
vulnerabilities,  and the possible modality  of 
attack.  This information,  in  turn, will  affect 
decisions made at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels. Too often  suppliers of 
intel l igence use their  unintentional 
organizational  bias and affiliation  with  law 
enforcement  to tailor  intelligence for 
prevention,  which  leaves the first responder 
community  at  a  major disadvantage for 
reducing the consequences and the risk of 
responding  to terrorist  incidents.  Non-
traditional consumers of intelligence – those 
outside of law  enforcement  – are now 
requesting  different  forms of intelligence. 
Together,  suppliers and consumers set new 
strategic requirements for intelligence. 
Here are some examples o f how 
information  and intelligence for  all hazards 
are influenced by  suppliers and consumers to 
create public value.
• Policy  makers use strategic intelligence 
to decide how  best to equip first 
responders and systematically  position 
r e s o u r c e s .  A n  e x a m p l e o f s u c h 
intelligence is the strategic response to a 
terrorist  threat  involving  toxic industrial 
chemicals.  In  India  and Iraq, terrorists 
have used chlorine gas in  previous 
attacks. Understanding  this threat on  a 
strategic  level and knowing  the proximity 
o f industr ia l chemical p lants to 
Manhattan, the FDNY purchased two 
140-foot fireboats, specially  designed to 
protect their  crews from  chemical, 
biological,  radiological,  and nuclear 
(CBRN)  exposure while applying large 
volumes of water  to displace a  toxic 
chemical cloud. These fireboats act  as 
interagency  command platforms and are 
positioned to protect  the New  York–New 
Jersey  Harbor  region from  CBRN attacks 
and maritime threats.
• Operational intelligence is used for 
planning  and training  against  dynamic 
scenarios for  preparedness.  The aim  of 
intelligence for  operations is to increase 
public safety  by  mitigating  the effects of 
attacks. The advantage of multiple 
disciplines is to develop scenarios to help 
decision  makers deal  with  uncertainty  by 
considering alternate courses of action. 37 
These scenarios are not predictions of the 
future; rather, they  are vehicles that  assist 
people in  learning  about  alternative 
tactics.38  Scenario building  assists 
homeland security  in  identifying the blind 
spots in  its planning  process and 
developing adaptability  to deal with 
uncertainty.  One example of this 
advantage of information  sharing 
involves the analysis of the plot  to blow 
up the Buckeye Pipeline supplying  fuel to 
JFK Airport  in  New  York  City. Working 
closely  with  multiple agencies in  an 
intelligence briefing,  the FDNY  provided 
law  enforcement with  an  alternate 
location  for an  attack, which  had not been 
considered and was far  more damaging  to 
New  York City  airports.  Maps, geospatial 
photographs, and a  description of the 
pipeline were given  to security  partners, 
ind icat ing the p laces o f greater 
vulnerability. A  competitive advantage 
over  the terrorists was derived from  the 
network interaction  of first responders 
with  intelligence experts to create 
d y n a m i c s c e n a r i o s t h a t i d e n t i f y 
vulnerabilities in  addition to the 
investigation.
• Tactical Intelligence  is the timely  and 
accurate exchange of information  during 
an  incident. The power of network  fusion 
was seen  on January  15, 2009, when  US 
Airways Flight 1549  made an  emergency 
landing in  the icy  waters of the  Hudson 
River  in  New  York.  By  pulling  the list  of 
passengers and crew  from  the control 
tower  at LaGuardia,  and tracking  and 
cross-referencing  it  to the Emergency 
Medical  System  network  of people taken 
off the plane,  the FDNY  was the first  to 
know  that all  people on  this flight were 
safe and immediately  posted this on  the 
HSIN portal, which  connected to the 
emergency  management  cluster. This 
information  was pulled by  many  security 
partners including  the DHS National 
Operations Center,  and was given  to the 
secretary  of intelligence and analysis to 
brief the Secretary  of DHS and the 
situation room  of the White House. 
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Through  a  fusion  of data  points, 
information was shared in  real time 
across a  network  of homeland security 
partners.
RIVALRIES 
The federal government  has invested a  great 
deal of money  in  creating  liaison models for 
sharing  information  and intelligence. In 
1980, the Joint  Terrorism  Task Force (JTTF) 
was formed at the New  York  Office of the FBI 
with  NYPD. Over  the years this joint  venture 
has proved its worth  in  unraveling  terrorist 
plots and prosecuting  cases.  It represents the 
blending  of law  enforcement  agencies for 
counterterrorism  purposes.  Similarly, High 
Intensity  Drug Trafficking  Area (HIDTA) task 
force was created to share information. The 
DHS fusion  centers were designed to expand 
information  sharing  among  unconnected law 
enforcement  and non-traditional consumers 
of intelligence like the fire and health 
services. However,  many  of those overseeing 
funding are starting to wonder  if fusion 
centers duplicate the function  of the law 
enforcement model of JTTF. 
For  fusion  centers to have a  competitive 
advantage, they  will  need to develop a 
distinct  core competency  and improve their 
ability  to share information  faster, smarter, 
and cheaper.  To achieve these goals, public 
sectors must  strategically  position  their 
organization  to perform  different  activities 
from  rivals or  perform  similar  activities in 
different ways.39  The competitive advantage 
of fusion  centers lies in  their capacity  to 
connect to a  diverse group of agencies to 
share intelligence and information not only 
for  prevention  and protection,  but  also for 
mitigation,  response,  and recovery. Without 
such  competitive advantage, fusion centers 
could become extinct with  future budget  cuts, 
by  not  being  unique enough  to have 
substantial value. Network fusion  is the 
distinctive core competency  of fusion  centers, 
which  allows them  to connect  to multiple 
disciplines in  response to all threats and 
hazards.  The advantage is in  the ability  to 
exchange critical information  with  a  variety 
of senior  executives in real time by  not 
requiring  them  to be co-located. Through 
network  fusion  classified information is 
carried over  HSDN and is utilized not  only 
criminal investigations but  also for  all 
hazards.  
NEW ENTRANTS AND SUBSTITUTES
It is broadly  known  that  New  York  City  is 
considered a  prime terrorist  target  because of 
its iconic and economic status.  Yet, there are 
no plans for  a  NYC fusion  center. Analysis 
reveals several reasons for  this lack.  First  is 
the rivalry  that  a  fusion center  would create 
between  the Joint  Terrorism  Task Force and 
High  Intensity  Drug Trafficking Area  task 
force. Second is the new  entrance into 
intelligence by  the robust  intelligence and 
counterterrorism  bureaus of the NYPD, 
which  boast of more than  one thousand 
NYPD officers assigned to this work, 
including officers in  several international 
cities. 
The third and most  revealing  reason  is the 
emergence of network  fusion  as a  substitute 
for  a  fusion  center  in  New  York City. Through 
the connectivity  of HSDN the same type of 
classified intelligence that is shared with 
fusion  centers is exchanged directly  with 
NYPD. The police department is able to 
connect to DHS Intelligence and Analysis,  the 
National Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC), 
and bridge to the FBI and other  sources of 
intelligence. FDNY also was provided with 
HSDN to connect  to similar  types of 
intelligence. In  New  York City,  the police and 
fire departments that suffered great losses on 
9/11  and will  respond to the next  terrorist 
event, can  now  share classified information 
with  each  other  as well as the DHS, FBI, 
United States Coast  Guard, state fusion 
center  in  Albany,  NY, and centers and 
agencies in  surrounding states as well.   James 
Surowiecki  describes this aggregated 
knowledge as the “wisdom  of crowds,”  which 
is characterized by  diversity  of opinion  from 
independent  and decentralized sources. 40 
Network fusion  provides an  alternative 
means for  sharing intelligence with  multiple 
agencies responsible  for  protecting and 
responding to terrorism in New York City. 
The emergence of network fusion  could 
have a  similar  effect on  co-located models for 
intelligence (e.g.,  fusion centers) as 
Wikipedia  had on  encyclopedias.  After  244 
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years,  the printed copy  of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica was replaced by  a  digital  format.41 
Wikipedia,  with  its ability  to leverage the 
“wisdom  of crowds”  and Internet  availability, 
proved to be equally  accurate, faster, cheaper, 
and more widely  used than  the traditional 
encyclopedia.  Fusion  centers have the 
opportunity  to embrace the concept of 
diversity  through  network  fusion and make it 
their  distinctive core competency,  thus 
avoiding irrelevancy. 
PARADIGM SHIFT TO NETWORK 
FUSION
Network fusion is the  next evolution  in 
information  and intelligence sharing.  The 
objective of this approach  is to blend 
technology  with  social interaction  to 
understand threats and mitigate their  effects. 
S u c h  e m e r g e n t s y s t e m s c o n n e c t 
organizations to each other; this alters their 
behavior  in  response to the behavior  of other 
organizations in the network.42  The network 
effect  expands the capacity  of organizations 
to interact  with  each  other  and to recognize 
threats. Collective collaboration represents 
the  establishment of trust and personal 
relationships among clusters of police, fire, 
health,  and others to exchange information. 
To create such  a  shift  to a network  structure, 
leaders must prod organizations to develop a 
new  purpose, reengineer  operations, build 
broad support,  and restructure responsibility 
and accountability across organizations.43  
PURPOSE
Information and intelligence sharing  is 
defined in  the National Preparedness Goals 
as “the ability  to exchange intelligence, 
information, data,  or knowledge among 
Federal,  state,  local or private-sector  entities 
as appropriate.” 44 The more connection there 
is,  the greater  the chance for  discovering 
novel  and critical pieces of information. 
Unfortunately, this document  l imits 
intelligence and information  sharing  as core 
goals of prevention and protection  only. A 
new  purpose should include a  network fusion 
approach  that exchanges information for 
collective collaboration  across all  five mission 
areas:45
• Prevention: Information/intelligence 
supports efforts to avoid, prevent,  or  stop 
terrorist  attacks by  connecting  to 
different  sources to discover  novel 
elements of threats.
• Protection: Information/intelligence 
enhances homeland security  effects 
against man-made or  natural disasters by 
increasing awareness of vulnerabilities.
• Mitigation: Information/intelligence 
widens the understanding  of the threat 
environment,  which  enables people to act 
in  time to lessen  the effects of a  possible 
event.
• Response: Information/intelligence 
increases situational  awareness to 
support  an adaptive response to save life 
and property  in  a  dynamic  event. It  also 
shapes preparedness efforts of training, 
equipping, and exercising.
• Recovery: Information/intelligence will 
shorten  the time needed to restore a 
community to normal.
The purpose of sharing  within  a  network 
framework is to facilitate the exchange of 
useful,  relevant, and timely  information 
among  the entities that  need it,  ensuring  that 
the right  information will get  to key  decision 
makers in  a  timely  manner.  Instead of 
waiting for  information to be pushed, 
network fusion  also allows for  information  to 
be pulled and returned back  to the network in 
the form  of enhanced intelligence. As 
government  agencies move toward a 
sociotechnical network  approach for 
counterterrorism  and crisis management,  the 
effectiveness of such  an  approach will depend 
on  how  well  they  develop technology  and 
collaborative channels of communication 
with their security partners.  
REENGINEERING FOR NETWORK 
FUSION
In  a  networked world information moves 
quickly  across a  multichannel network  that is 
engineered to connect  individuals and groups 
to create a  broad understanding of the threat 
e n v i r o n m e n t . W i t h o u t  i n f o r m a t i o n , 
organizations cannot  fully  use their  skills to 
mitigate the threat  or the consequences of 
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terrorism. Fusion centers will  only  tap a 
small potential of information  sharing  by  co-
locating  partners, unless they  also connect to 
other partners through  network fusion. New 
York City’s experience with  network fusion 
illustrates how  key  city  agencies can  connect 
with  each  other  as well  as to the Department 
of Homeland Security, state fusion centers, 
the FBI,  and others in  the intelligence 
community. 
Reengineering  for  network fusion  requires 
a  sociotechnical approach  that  uses 
i n n o v a t i v e t e c h n o l o g y  t o f a c i l i t a t e 
collaboration  among  those tasked with the 
function of protecting  life and property.  The 
following  are some concrete steps that 
leaders can take to develop a  system  for 
network  fusion  and greater  information 
sharing.
Leverage Technology: To participate in 
network fusion  at a  classified level,  DHS will 
need to construct  a  secure room  or  Sensitive 
Compartmented Information  Facility  (SCIF) 
that is equipped with  HSDN, secure 
computer,  secure video conferencing,  secure 
telephone (terminal) equipment  (STE),  safe, 
printer, and shredder.  The room  and the 
equipment  will provide a  secure means to 
receive classified material and briefings.  
Identify Personnel: It is critical that 
organizations identify  those in  leadership 
positions who will benefit  from  classified 
reports and briefs.  Organizations that 
participate in  network  fusion must also 
commit  a team  that will  work  together  to 
analyze and produce intelligence products, 
thus adding value to the intelligence 
community.
Connect to  Intelligence and Information: 
Having  the equipment  and personnel to 
receive classified information is useless, 
unless the equipment  connects to usable 
intelligence and members have the tools to 
accomplish  their  work.  Network fusion 
creates a  web-like feature for  fusion  centers, 
which  connects organizations to secure 
intelligence sites.  To receive access to secure 
websites, agencies become an adjunct  to their 
state or  regional fusion  center.  In 2012, the 
New  York City  Fire Department became an 
adjunct  to the New  York State Intelligence 
Center  (the NYSIC is New  York’s Fusion 
Center)  and took  full  advantage of resources 
without  having  to travel to Albany.  The 
NYSIC and New  York  City  agencies are now 
partners. In  addition,  DHS created a  Fire 
Service folder  on  HSDN for  secure 
documents to be dropped or  as a place to 
request Fire Service input and analysis.
C o l l a b o r a t e w i t h O t h e r s : A s a 
sociotechnical  network, it  is expected that 
members will  interact  with  one another.  By 
looking  at intelligence from  different 
perspectives,  new  pieces of information  can 
be exchanged via  email. However, one of the 
most valuable means of collaboration  is the 
use of secure video teleconferencing  (S-VTC). 
DHS can  provide a  bridge for  a  weekly  (or 
when  needed) brief among New  York  City 
police and fire departments, the FBI, NYSIC, 
New  Jersey  Fusion  Center,  and other security 
partners. Since there is no time lost  in  travel, 
senior  executives are more likely  to attend a 
short  fifteen- to twenty-minute brief.  Video 
conferencing not only  produces a  common 
operating  picture,  it  also builds relationships 
and trust among security partners.
Support and Coach: Forming  a  network 
fusion  team  for  intelligence sharing requires 
an  additional  element that  is often 
overlooked.  Richard Hackman,  who 
researched collaborative intelligence at 
Harvard University,  stresses the need for 
DHS support in  terms of education  and 
expert  coaching. 46 DHS supports the need for 
members of an  analytical  team  to receive 
analyst  training  to increase their  skills.  DHS 
has also provided each  fusion  center  and 
those that are a  part  of network fusion  with 
an  intelligence and analysis analyst to assist 
in  the information  sharing process. Other 
expert  coaching  is also a  good idea  for 
creating  a  strong  analytical  team.  At  NYPD, 
highly  regarded intelligence experts head the 
Intelligence Bureau  and provide professional 
guidance.  At FDNY, intelligence experts 
attached to the Terrorism  Task Forces and 
Operations Center  supply  coaching  to foster  a 
higher-level competency.
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Network Fusion is a sociotechnical information sharing system designed to 
encourage collaboration across multiple disciplines by utilizing technology to connect 
voice, video, and data communications at classified and unclassified levels.
 Leverage Technology
With DHS, construct a secure room or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF) equipped with Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), computer, S-VTC, 
STE, safe, printer and shredder.
 Identify Personnel
Identify personnel who would receive classified information and train selected 
members to be part of an analytical team.
 Connect to Intelligence and Information
Link to Fusion Centers, as an adjunct agency, for access to intelligence and abide by 
the rules and requirement for handling classified information.
 Collaborate with Others
Partner with other agencies for exchanging information.
 Support and Coach
Receive DHS support, acquire clearances, educate analysts and provide expert 
coaching for understanding intelligence context.
Table 2: Implementing Network Fusion for Practitioners 
ACQUIRING LEGITIMACY AND SUPPORT
Designing networked intelligence not only 
requires operational capacity  to connect 
networks,  but  also political support  found by 
proving  substantial value for  national 
security.47 Following  the 1993  bombing  of the 
World Trade Center,  FDNY  Fire Marshal 
Ronald Bucca  (who had a  security  clearance 
due to his participation  in  Army  Reserve 
Military  Intelligence), tried to represent the 
fire department  on the Joint  Terrorism  Task 
Force but was denied.  Based on  his access to 
military  intelligence he feared that terrorists 
would again target the World Trade Center. 
This fear  became a  reality  on  September  11, 
2001. Fire Marshal Bucca  was killed as he 
took  part  in  the rescue operation, but  his 
vision  for  FDNY to be part of the intelligence 
sharing  community  was realized.  Today,  two 
fire marshals are assigned full-time to the 
JTTF and high-ranking  fire chiefs are given 
clearances to attend classified intelligence 
briefings. 
The efficacy  of horizontal integration  of 
intelligence has been  proven  in  real-life 
situations.  In 2003,  there was a credible 
threat  against the George Washington  Bridge, 
which  connects New  York and New  Jersey.  A 
multiagency  brief was held concerning  the 
threat  and law  enforcement  devised a  plan  to 
protect  the bridge. The fire service,  a  weak tie 
to law  enforcement, brought  a  perspective of 
consequence mitigation  to the discussion and 
asked about the vulnerabilities of the 
structure. The Port Authority  of New  York 
and New  Jersey  sought  out  its engineers to 
brief the FDNY  fire chief,  who inquired about 
progressive bridge collapse. Once the answer 
to this serendipitous question  was known, it 
led to an  exchange of information,  which  in 
turn  led to the creation  of new  preventive 
guidelines, the revision  of preparedness 
plans, the relocation  of special resources for 
mitigation,  the  issuance of new  response 
protocols, and the purchase of new 
equipment.
This horizontal network  approach  enabled 
organizations to extend their  expertise and 
presence into areas not  traditionally 
associated with the intelligence community, 
thus filling a  hole in  security  plans. Including 
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mitigation  and response expanded the 
aperture of intelligence that previously 
focused on prevention and protection. 
Information  sharing  does not  stop with  a 
single threat. New  York  City’s Department of 
Transportation  (DOT),  aware of this threat 
against the bridges,  conducted a  study  with 
the US Army  Corps of Engineers and private 
consultants to understand the vulnerability  of 
its major  bridges. The study  produced 
thousands of pages of information  and was 
shared with  a  network of emergency 
responders including  law  enforcement. 
Unfortunately,  connecting  to volumes of 
technical  engineering  reports was useless to 
emergency responders. 
The FDNY asked DOT to support  the 
development of a  First Responder’s  Bridge 
Guide .  This was a secure document 
developed for  high-ranking  incident 
commanders to assist  in  their  making  critical 
decisions on  the stability  of the bridges. 
Incident commanders were now  armed with 
the knowledge of what would cause a  bridge 
to collapse. This information  could be moved 
wirelessly  across an  encrypted network to the 
decision  makers in  real time. The result  of 
this project demonstrates the power  of multi-
agency  support for  reengineering information 
structures to connect  different  perspectives 
about  the same threat and collaborate to 
produce a  fusion-supported decision  making 
document for first responders. 
In  2006,  the DHS chief intelligence 
officer, Charles Allen,  testified in  front of 
Congress: “to prevent  and counter  potential 
terrorist  attacks and other threats to the 
homeland,  first  responders and frontline law 
enforcement  officers must  be armed with  the 
information  that  will  enable them  first  to 
recognize and then  defeat  the threat.” 48 This 
tes t imony  publ ic ly  recognized f i rs t 
responders as a  legitimate part  of the 
intelligence networks,  which will enable them 
to better  fulfill their  role in  homeland 
security. 
THE FIRE SERVICE AND NETWORK 
FUSION
On the West  Coast,  California’s Terrorism 
Early  Warning  Group,  which  was the 
predecessor to fusion  centers,  invited the Los 
Angeles County  Fire Department to place 
battalion  chiefs as members of this team. In 
Washington, DC,  the Metropolitan  Police 
Department  refused to attend a  security 
briefing  at  the Capitol unless a  fire chief from 
DC Fire Department  was invited to attend. 
These efforts by  a  few  forward looking 
individuals paved the way  to recognizing the 
fire service as a security partner.
Under the direction  of Charles Allen,  the 
Office  of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 
started working  directly  with  the FDNY to 
form  an  information  and intelligence-sharing 
environment  for  the fire service.49 By  aligning 
the FDNY with DHS efforts to improve 
i n f o r m a t i o n  f l o w , t h e F i r e S e r v i c e 
Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) was created, 
which  provided a template for  DHS to share 
i n f o r m a t i o n a m o n g  m a j o r  c i t y  f i r e 
departments. 50 This initiative adheres to the 
mandate articulated in  the Intelligence and 
Terrorism  Reform  Act  and the presidential 
directives to create an information-sharing 
environment across the country.51
In  April  2010,  the DHS integrated the fire 
service into fusion centers and added an 
annex  for  the fire service into the baseline 
capabilities for Major  Urban and State Fusion 
Centers.52  The purpose was to establish  a 
direct  information  conduit between the 
United States Department of Homeland 
Security  and the fire service. Through  the 
sharing  of pre-incident  intelligence and real-
time incident  updates,  information  support 
for  both  the first  responders and DHS is 
enhanced.
In  2011, I&A,  with  Caryn  Wagner’s 
leadership,  provided FDNY  with  HSDN for 
greater  intelligence sharing,  which  was the 
foundation  for network  fusion. In  addition, 
the FDNY furthered the legitimacy  of the fire 
service within  the Department  of Homeland 
Security  by  setting  a  series of intelligence 
requirements. Fearful  that  terrorists might 
continue to use fire as a  tactic, the FDNY set 
detailed requirements for  the intelligence 
community  to search  for  possible chatter  on 
this topic. Discovery  of such  information 
would indicate advancements in  the use of 
fire as a weapon. 
In  2012, a  memorandum  of understanding 
for  network fusion  was signed between  FDNY 
and the New  York  State Intelligence Center 
(NYSIC) making FDNY an  adjunct  member  of 
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New  York State’s fusion  center. Legitimacy  is 
now  attained by  connecting  to a  platform  for 
exchanging  classified and unclassified 
information  in  real time with  senior  officials 
to prevent,  mitigate, and respond to a  range 
of threats.  The benefit of network fusion  is 
that  information  is not  only  pushed through 
briefings,  but  now  can  be pulled for  a  greater 
understanding  of the threat  environment. 
Connecting  to additional fusion  centers and 
other first responder  groups within those 
fusion  centers attains further  benefits of 
network fusion.
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez argues that when 
faced with  new  combinations of technologies 
for  terrorism,  homeland security  must take a 
d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h t o s e c u r i t y .  H e 
recommends bringing  small groups together 
for  a  specific purpose, which  forms “ad-
hocratic”  organizations. 53 Just such  an  ad hoc 
committee was assembled with  FDNY  in 
response to a  detailed article in  the ninth 
issue of Inspire Magazine  (2012) that 
describes how  to use improvised incendiary 
devices to set wildland fires. Taking 
a d v a n t a g e o f n e t w o r k f u s i o n , D H S 
Intelligence and Analysis asked FDNY,  New 
York State’s fusion  center, and others to 
collaborate in  writing  an  awareness 
document of a  potential  terrorist  tactic that 
uses “fire  as a weapon.”  Collaborative 
analysis discovered that  such  tactics might 
also be used against  large populations in 
high-rise buildings.  The fusing  of information 
and network collaboration of ad hoc 
committees illustrates the fire service’s 
contribution to the intelligence process and 
the adaptability  of an  emergent intelligence 
network for understanding  the threat 
environment.
RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The emergence of networks prompts 
organizations to redefine their  core 
responsibilities, from  managing  only  their 
own  people and programs to coordinating 
resources and information  with  other 
agencies for producing  public value. 54  The 
focus now  is on  the mission  outcome of 
public safety  and not  simply  on  an  agency’s 
outputs. Integrating  the concept of network 
fusion  for  information  and intelligence 
sharing into organizations requires a 
management  system  capable of dealing  with 
“multiple locations, several different cultures, 
often  different  and incompatible information 
technology  systems, and sometimes 
deliberate withholding  of important 
information  when  partners perceive they  are 
in  competition  with  one another,  or  simply  to 
protect  bureaucratic  turf.” 55  The goal of 
network fusion is to connect  agencies as a 
force multiplier  for  gathering, analyzing, and 
disseminating  information  into the core 
mission of homeland security.
Homeland security’s use of network  fusion 
represents a balance between  anticipation 
and resiliency. A  strategy  of anticipation is 
the creation  of ties among  first responders, 
law  enforcement,  and the intelligence 
community  to better  understand the threat 
environment  for  prevention  and protection 
before an  event occurs. A  strategy  of 
resilience is the strengthening  of those ties 
for  mitigation, effective consequences 
management, and quicker  recovery  if attacks 
were to take place.
The FDNY has pushed to enhance 
information and intelligence sharing 
c a p a b i l i t i e s b y  f o r m i n g  n e t w o r k s , 
strengthening ties,  and using technologies to 
educate and train its members and to work 
with  other agencies.  The results of these 
efforts were evident  on May  1, 2010,  when a 
vendor  alerted police to a  possible vehicle fire 
in New  York’s Times Square. As police 
directed them  to the car, the firefighters 
noticed, “something  did not look right.” 56 The 
owner  of the SUV  was nowhere to be found; 
there was white smoke rather  than  black; a 
handheld thermal camera showed no sign of 
fire; and an odor  of fireworks emanated from 
the rear  of the vehicle. Firefighters asked 
police to run the license plates. When the 
plates came back  unregistered, the fire 
lieutenants concluded that the fire could be a 
car  bomb. The police and fire officers 
overcame their  organizational biases and 
collaborated with  each  other,  which  led to a 
decision  to evacuate  people from  the area. 
This decentralized approach worked because 
it  allowed organizations to deal with 
uncertainty  by  having  multiple agents (street 
vendors,  firefighters,  and police officers) fuse 
information  to find the best  solution.57 Later 
reports determined that  the SUV  had the 
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potential of being  a  powerful terrorist bomb 
with  lethal consequences. Organizations and 
individuals were accountable to one another 
to share information and collaborate.
POLICY FOR NETWORK FUSION
Network fusion  is composed of flexible and 
innovative systems capable of adapting to the 
complexity  of today’s threat environment. 
Organizations that  can  rapidly  exchange 
intelligence and critical information will 
operate more effectively  than  less prepared 
organizations at  complex  incidents. 58 Failure 
to develop network  fusion will leave first 
responders and fusion  centers to combat 
terrorism  with  l imited information. 
Overcoming organizational bias and 
consequence mitigation  neglect  will foster a 
synergistic network that  combines the 
knowledge of law  enforcement  and the 
intelligence community  with  first  responder 
organizations to form  a  robust  information 
and intelligence-sharing  platform.  Network 
fusion  does not replace fusion  centers, but 
e n h a n c e s t h e i r  c a p a b i l i t y  t o s h a r e 
information  and intelligence.  The stirring 
images of 9/11  and a  system  still blinking red 
with  stovepipes that  failed to share 
information  illustrate the need for  better 
information  and intelligence sharing  among 
agencies before and during a crisis.
Network fusion is an  emergent  process 
that  connects the unconnected by  bridging 
gaps in  information  and intelligence sharing. 
The challenge is to get those who control 
information  to see that hoarding  information 
is not  a  way  of attaining power; sharing 
information  with  the unconnected attains 
that  power  in  a  networked world.  Network 
fusion  extended to other  at-risk  cities and 
organizations will enhance homeland security 
and fusion centers’ efforts by  making them 
faster, smarter, and more cost-effective in 
exchanging information  and intelligence. 
Network fusion is faster  because information 
and intelligence can be exchanged directly 
with  many; smarter  because there is a  pull 
and push  of different  perspectives; and more 
cost-effective because DHS does not  have to 
pay  for  representatives to be co-located.  The 
question  we must  face today  is whether we 
have taken  sufficient  steps to ensure a  policy 
of network fusion to repair  an  information 
sharing system that was “blinking red.”
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Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges
Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens
ABSTRACT 
Public-private partnerships are a major 
issue of discussion in businesses  and 
government agencies  concerned with 
homeland security. However, this  issue has 
received a much less thorough treatment in 
scholarly literature on homeland security. 
This article begins  to fill a gap in homeland 
security scholarship by identifying the 
e s s e n t i a l r o l e t h a t p u b l i c - p r i v a t e 
partnerships  are now  taking in homeland 
security and by examining opportunities 
and challenges for this  transformative shift 
in the f ie ld. The  art ic le begins by 
contextualizing our argument within recent 
scholarship,  and tracing the development of 
public-private partnerships  in homeland 
security. The article then examines  the 
growing role  of public-private sector 
partnerships in homeland security. The 
article  concludes  by discussing ongoing 
challenges  that will need to be considered 
a n d a d d r e s s e d f o r p u b l i c - p r i v a t e 
partnerships  to be successful over the long 
term.
INTRODUCTION
“…I want to just say this about the private 
sector. In my mind, the government is incapable 
of responding to its maximum ability without 
private sector support…” 1 
–Hon. Tom Ridge, Former Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security
April 20,  2010  had been  an  otherwise typical 
day. At 9:49  p.m.,  however,  the first  of 
several blasts shattered the night  air  over  the 
Gulf of Mexico,  ultimately  killing  eleven 
workers and crippling  the Deepwater  Horizon 
oil rig.2  The explosion and subsequent oil 
spi l l eventual ly  became the largest 
environmental catastrophe in  US history.3 
Over  the following  months,  hundreds of 
government  and private sector  actors 
convened around the Gulf of Mexico, 
summoning  an  unprecedented amount  of 
equipment  and technical  expertise to stop the 
oil flow  from  the Gulf’s floor.  British 
Petroleum  (BP), the National Oceanic  and 
Atmospheric Administration, the US Coast 
G u a r d ,  s t a t e g o v e r n m e n t s , l o c a l 
governments, and hundreds of businesses 
and public sector  agencies collaborated in 
response to the disaster.4  British  Petroleum 
and local  officials launched initiatives 
enlisting  local  fishermen  to assist  in 
waterborne cleanup efforts.5  The federal 
government  used privately  manufactured oil 
dispersants in  recovery  operations.6 
Throughout  this process, the public  and 
private sector  worked closely  together  to 
restore a sense of normalcy in the Gulf.
The Deepwater  Horizon  incident provides 
a  large-scale illustration  of an  actively 
growing  trend in emergency  management 
and homeland security.7  Public-private 
partnerships are a  major  issue of discussion 
in businesses and government agencies. 
However,  this issue has received a  much less 
thorough treatment  in scholarly  literature on 
homeland security. This is surprising, as 
public-private partnerships are perhaps the 
most dynamic and important  subjects for 
homeland security practitioners today. 
Public-private partnerships have been 
defined as collaboration  between  a  public 
sector  (government) entity  and a  private 
sector  (for-profit)  entity  to achieve a specific 
goal or  set of objectives.8 This collaboration 
results in  government-business relationships 
that  include service contracts, supply  chains, 
ad hoc partnerships,  channel partnerships, 
information  dissemination  partnerships,  and 
civic  switchboard partnerships. 9  These 
partnerships have been  discussed in  narrow 
ways in  the scholarly  literature in  related 
disciplines (such  as public administration 
broadly  understood) and some of the various 
subfields of homeland security  (such  as 
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e m e r g e n c y  m a n a g e m e n t o r  c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure protection). 10  For  example, 
Yossi Sheff i suggests public-private 
partnerships are  important  for  supply  chain 
security  under threat of international 
terrorism, a  theme that David J.  Closs and 
Edmund F. McGarrell  repeat. 11  Others 
underscore that  private sector  participation  is 
integral in  critical infrastructure protection 
and homeland security. 12  Discussion of the 
private sector’s role within  other subfields, 
such  as inte l l igence ,  cybersecuri ty , 
transportation  security,  public health,  and 
hazard mit igat ion  shows increasing 
understanding  of businesses’ impact  on 
homeland security. 13 
Overall, however,  the scholarly  literature 
has not  yet  caught up to the practitioner 
understanding  of public-private partnerships’ 
prominence in  homeland security. 14  This 
article begins to fill  a  gap in  homeland 
security  scholarship by  identifying  the 
essential role that  public-private partnerships 
are now  taking in  homeland security,  and by 
examining  the impl icat ions o f th is 
transformative shift  in  the field.  As we will 
see, public-private partnerships hold great 
promise,  but  also face significant obstacles 
that  will  need to be overcome. The article 
begins by  tracing the development of public-
private partnerships in  homeland security.  It 
then examines multiple subfields of 
homeland security  and highlights the 
growing  role of public-private sector 
partnerships in  homeland security.  The 
article concludes by  discussing ongoing 
challenges that  will need to be considered 
a n d a d d r e s s e d f o r  p u b l i c - p r i v a t e 
partnerships to be successful over  the long 
term.
THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
HOMELAND SECURITY
Government and businesses’ roles in 
homeland security  can be traced back to 
America’s founding. For  example,  in  the 
Federalist Papers,  James Madison was 
careful to underscore the importance of the 
federal  government  in  “times of war  and 
danger,”  whi le not  diminishing  the 
importance of the states in  periods of “peace 
and security.” 15  In  1803, following  a 
devastating  fire in  Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire,  Congress authorized the 
suspension  of federal bond payments for 
merchants affected by  the disaster. 16 For the 
first  time, the US government  provided 
emergency  relief for  a  community.  Thus 
began  an  escalation of federal-level 
involvement  that  continues today, requiring 
close working relationships among  the 
federal,  state, and local levels of government, 
non-governmental organizations, and the 
private sector. 
Public-private partnerships evolved in  the 
nineteenth  century,  as various disasters 
prompted a  re-calibration  of government’s 
role  in emergencies.  The Great Chicago Fire 
of 1871  burned a  four  square mile area  in  the 
southwestern  part of the city,  leaving  one 
third of the city’s population  homeless.17 
While  difficult to fathom  today,  the federal 
government’s role was limited in  recovery 
efforts. No appreciable amount  of financial 
assistance flowed from  Washington, DC  to 
Chicago in  the fire’s aftermath.18 Instead, the 
majority  of recovery  financing  came from  a 
combination  of local and state  governments, 
as well as charities and businesses.19 The fire 
fac i l i ta ted a sh i f t  in  governmenta l 
involvement in  emergency  management. 
Subsequent twentieth-century  disasters, 
including the 1906  San  Francisco Earthquake 
and the 1927  Great  Mississippi  Flood, 
ratcheted up government  support for 
response and recovery  efforts.20  Increasing 
amounts of funding  changed hands between 
the public  and private sectors to support 
post-disaster reconstruction.
From  World War  II through  the end of the 
Cold War,  public-private partnerships 
remained an essential  element  in  national 
defense. Citizens were trained by  the federal 
government  to watch  for  enemy  aircraft, 
assist  in  preparation  for  nuclear  attacks, and 
direct air  raid drills in  public  spaces. 21 At  the 
same time,  US manufacturing capacity 
adapted to emerging  needs. Firms recycled 
and repurposed commercial  products (e.g. 
rubber,  steel,  wood)  to support the materiel 
needs of the armed forces. The private sector 
modified production  to fill new  demands. The 
Ford Motor  Company, for  example,  built  an 
entire complex  to construct  military 
aircraft. 22  Government  and private sector 
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functions in  national security  evolved to meet 
wartime priorities.
Public-private sector  partnerships 
continued to develop in  the late twentieth 
and early  twenty-first  century.  The Federal 
Emergency  Management  Agency  (FEMA) 
was created during  the Carter  administration 
to consolidate  disaster  management 
functions previously  scattered across the 
federal  government. 23 Over  time, businesses 
began  taking a  more expansive role in 
defense and security,  from  building  out 
information  technology  (IT) infrastructure,  to 
production of specialized equipment in  law 
enforcement, to contracting out job functions 
in government offices.24 
The September  11, 2001  terrorist attacks, 
Hurricane Katrina, and the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill all  highlight  the prominence 
of public-private partnerships in  what is 
today  called homeland security.  In  all  three of 
these disasters,  the private sector  worked 
closely  with  local,  state, federal, and non-
profit  entities to respond to community 
needs.  For  example, following the 9/11 
attacks, Verizon  assumed a  pivotal role in 
quickly  rebuilding  network infrastructure to 
re-open  the New  York Stock  Exchange 
(NYSE). 25  In  the aftermath  of Hurricane 
Katrina,  FEMA, in  cooperation  with the State 
of Louisiana,  distributed $2.3  billion  in 
public assistance funding to residents 
affected by  the  storm. 26  But Wal-Mart  was 
instrumental in  providing relief supplies – 
blankets,  plastic tarpaulins, batteries, 
flashlights, water, and non-perishable food – 
to Gulf residents immediately  following 
Katrina’s impact. 27 Similarly,  the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster  required close coordination 
among  government, non-profit,  and private 
sector  entities.28  The American Red Cross 
sheltered and cared for  displaced Gulf 
residents, while the private sector  hired local 
fishermen  to assist  in cleanup efforts and 
worked with  government  agencies to stop the 
oil leak.  29 It  is clear  from  these examples that 
businesses,  alongside numerous government 
and non-governmental entities, now  play  an 
increasingly  integrated role in  homeland 
security.
In  the following  sections,  we examine 
different initiatives and facets of homeland 
security,  highlighting  the role of public-
private partnerships in  each.  Given  the 
current expansive scope of public-private 
partnerships in  homeland security  as a 
whole,  we limit  our  discussion to select 
federal-level public-private partnerships, 
which  have enjoyed varying  levels of success. 
However,  it  is important  to note that 
homeland security  includes efforts at the 
state and local levels,  including fusion 
c e n t e r s , n o n - p r o f i t s ,  c i v i c g r o u p s , 
professional associations, and individual 
citizens.  As an  “umbrella”  concept, homeland 
security  also touches on various subfields 
apart  from  those we discuss below, including 
immigration  services, public  health, and 
intelligence.30 A  comprehensive treatment of 
public-private partnerships in  every  aspect  of 
homeland security  is beyond the scope of this 
article.  Nevertheless,  the following  discussion 
identifies some of the most  significant  trends 
in homeland security today.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION
With  approximately  85  percent of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure under  private 
sector  control,  alliances between  government 
and business are essential  for  homeland 
security.31  The US Department  of Homeland 
Security  (DHS) creates coordination bodies 
to facilitate information  exchange,  planning, 
and situational awareness between  the public 
a n d p r i v a t e s e c t o r s .  T h e O f f i c e o f 
Infrastructure Protection  (OIP) within  DHS 
works on  threat  and vulnerability  analyses, 
national and local-level coordination  with 
businesses and government agencies, and 
risk mitigation.32  The OIP is responsible for 
coordinating information  exchange and 
collaboration  among  six  sectors: chemical; 
commercial facilities; critical  manufacturing; 
dams; emergency  services; and nuclear 
reactors, materials,  and waste.33  Given that 
private sector companies operate most  of the 
facilities in these six sectors, public-private 
sector  partnerships are indispensable to the 
OIP mission. The Critical  Infrastructure 
Partnership Advisory  Council (CIPAC),  a 
strategic body, complements the OIP.
The CIPAC is the  basic organizational 
framework in  which  government and private 
sector  representatives exchange information 
and coordinate critical infrastructure 
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protection  activities at  the federal  level. The 
CIPAC membership  roster  reads as a 
veritable “who’s who” of government  agencies 
and industry  leaders nationwide.  Firms in the 
CIPAC  include such  companies as BASF 
Corporation, the Trump Organization, 
Verizon,  the Boeing Company, Google, and 
the US Oil and Gas Association.  Government 
entities in the CIPAC  include the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 
Department of Commerce, and Department 
of Justice.34 
The CIPAC demonstrates substantial 
cooperation  between  public and private 
entities at  the federal level related to critical 
infrastructure protection  in  homeland 
securi ty . The existence of mult ip le 
coordination  groups,  as well as the presence 
of leading US businesses within  them, 
underscores that public-private partnerships 
are integral to achieving  homeland security 
object ives in cr i t ica l  infrastructure 
protection. 
Despite the clear  need that  the CIPAC is 
designed to address,  however,  there are 
legitimate criticisms that can  be leveled 
against this group. For  example, some firms 
may  sense that  they  are expected to share a 
significant  amount  of information  with 
government ,  but do not get  t imely 
information  back  from  government.  One 
could also claim  the CIPAC is overly 
government-centric,  and does not give due 
consideration  to business concerns. 
Moreover,  firms may  feel  pressured to 
participate in  order  to avoid regulations that 
will force them  to alter  their business 
strategies.35  Without diminishing the 
relevance of these concerns,  the CIPAC 
nonetheless provides an important example 
of how  public-private partnerships are 
enhancing critical infrastructure protection.
CYBERSECURITY 
Information  technology  (IT) firms are 
essential in  achieving national  cybersecurity 
objectives. Well-known  companies routinely 
p a r t n e r  w i t h  g o v e r n m e n t t o s h a r e 
information  and collaboratively  address IT 
c h a l l e n g e s w i t h h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
implications. For  example,  the National 
Cyber Security  Alliance (NCSA) is an 
organization  that raises awareness about 
cybersecurity  issues and empowers computer 
users to protect themselves against  electronic 
threats.36  Public-private partnerships are 
critical to the NCSA  mission.37  The NCSA 
board includes representatives from 
numerous national  firms, including  AT&T 
Services, Inc., Cisco Systems, Lockheed 
Martin,  Microsoft,  Google, Facebook,  Bank of 
America,  SAIC, and Visa.38  Demonstrating 
linkages between the NCSA  and federal 
government, the White House and DHS 
promoted the most  visible NCSA  initiative, 
known as National Cyber  Security  Awareness 
Month (NCSAM),  in  2010.39 The NCSA  is an 
excel lent  example of publ ic-private 
partnerships at  work in  the cybersecurity 
arena.
A  recent hacking incident further 
highlights the interconnectedness of the 
public and private sectors in  cybersecurity.  In 
June 2011, Google publicly  disclosed that 
individuals in  China  illegally  accessed the 
personal email accounts of several senior  US 
government  officials.40  This was allegedly 
done through use of “phishing,”  a  method of 
fraudulently  obtaining  a  user’s information 
through  fabricated emails asking for 
usernames,  passwords,  and related data. 
Google notified the FBI about  the incident. 
The White House National  Security  Council 
(NSC),  as well as DHS,  followed up with 
Google to assess the incident’s impact.41 
Understanding  this attack’s sources and 
methods provides greater  knowledge of 
cybersecurity  threats to public and private 
sector  organizations. As this incident 
demonstrates , publ ic-pr ivate sector 
partnerships,  as well as information sharing, 
are critical to effective cybersecurity.
PORT SECURITY 
America’s ports are vital hubs of economic 
activity. In  2010  alone, nearly  263,000 
metric  tons of products passed through the 
port  of Houston-Galveston, Texas. 42 During 
the same period, approximately  30  million 
passengers flew  in  and out  of LaGuardia 
airport  in  New  York City.43 With  such  a  high 
volume of goods and persons moving  through 
US ports of entry, port security  is an  urgent 
priority.  Against  this backdrop, the Customs 
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Trade Partnership Against  Terrorism  (C-
TPAT) is a  government-business sector 
initiative that was created to enhance 
worldwide supply  chain  security.44  Over 
6,000  firms are certified through the C-TPAT 
program, meaning  they  enjoy  close working 
relationships with  United States Customs and 
Border  Protection  (CBP), are able to obtain 
government  risk assessments of their  supply 
chain,  and can  attend special government-
sponsored supply  chain  security  training 
sessions.45  Programs like the C-TPAT  are 
useful to homeland security  in  providing  a 
broad administrative framework for  regular 
public-private sector coordination.
On-the-ground security  initiatives also 
impact  this critical area of economic activity. 
The Transportation  Worker Identification 
Credential (TWIC) program  pre-screens 
workers with  unescorted access to sensitive 
areas of America’s ports to ensure they  do not 
pose a  security  threat.46  This arrangement 
enhances supply  chain  security,  and helps 
achieve port security  objectives. As of 2009, 
over  500,000 workers were enrolled in  the 
TWIC program. 47 
Technologies in  use at  America’s ports 
underline the importance of public-private 
sector  partnerships.  Consider  the SAIC 
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection  System 
(VACIS). The VACIS is a  device that emits 
low-level  radiation,  providing  a  rapid view  of 
cargo containers’ contents – not unlike an  X-
ray  machine.48  The VACIS permits 
government  and private sector officials to 
quickly  evaluate if a  given container  poses a 
threat. Similarly, new  luggage and passenger 
screening  machines produced by  L-3  and GE 
Security  bolster  protection  in  US airports.49 
While  the latter  continue to be the subject of 
vigorous public  debate, it  is worth  noting that 
the so-called “full  body  scanners” are a 
private sector  response to a  governmental 
need – a  clear  example of public-private 
partnerships at work in homeland security. 
Another  public-private partnership in  US 
airports is the Screening Partnership 
Program  (SPP).  Under  this initiative, 
screening  companies that  meet  certain 
qualifications carry  out  TSA-like duties at  US 
airports.  Additionally, individual airport 
executives may  petition  TSA  for  private 
sector  employees to work  as screeners in 
their  facilities.50 While the program’s scope is 
l imited – only  s ixteen  airports are 
participating  – the SPP is proving  a  helpful 
alternative to TSA  screening.51 Mark VanLoh, 
Director  of Aviation  for  Kansas City, 
Missouri,  noted in  Congressional testimony 
that  the SPP enhances flexibility  in personnel 
use, allows for  greater  employee cross-
training,  and is more effective in  dealing  with 
non-performing  workers. 52  Like the use of 
new,  privately  manufactured screening 
technologies in airports,  the SPP illustrates 
the increasing presence of public-private 
partnerships in port security.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Emergency  managers are increasingly 
engaged in  all aspects of homeland security, 
including the previously  discussed areas of 
c r i t i c a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o t e c t i o n , 
cybersecurity,  and port  security.53  But  there 
is still a distinct  area within  emergency 
management  that  stands apart from  these 
subfields: immediate,  near-term  response 
and recovery  activities.54  In  such activities, 
FEMA  has widely  embraced the essential role 
of public-private partnerships. 55  Hurricane 
Katrina  and the BP Deepwater  Horizon  oil 
spill illustrate why  FEMA has embraced these 
partnerships. 
Hurricane Katrina provides emergency 
management  scholars and practitioners with 
a  powerful  lesson  in  what  not  to do.  While 
popular  blame for  inadequate response 
initially  fell  upon  FEMA, today  researchers 
acknowledge systemic  failures at all  levels of 
government. 56  Despite these shortcomings, 
the private sector  helped to address various 
government  deficiencies in  response and 
recovery  efforts.57  As the world’s largest 
employer,  Wal-Mart  is proficient  in  logistics; 
that  is,  efficiently  moving and distributing 
large quantities of goods over  a  wide 
geographic area.  In  anticipation  of the 
storm’s impact in  2005, Wal-Mart  deployed 
trucks full of relief supplies to the Gulf 
region.58  Clothing,  diapers, toothbrushes, 
bottled water, ice, and non-perishable food 
items began rolling off Wal-Mart’s fleet  of 
trucks as the storm  passed.59  Government 
leaders took notice.  A  local  official  even 
suggested that  FEMA  use Wal-Mart’s 
response as a  model  for  its own  efforts.60  In 
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the midst  of a  significant  disaster,  Wal-Mart 
filled governmental  gaps in  disaster  recovery 
capabilities. 
Like Katrina,  the 2010  Deepwater Horizon 
oil rig  explosion and spill affected a vast 
geographic area  in  the Gulf of Mexico.  The 
initial  response involved hundreds of local, 
state, and federal  government  actors,  as well 
as representatives from  the non-profit  and 
private sectors.  British  Petroleum, which  was 
a  responsible party  for  the spill,  worked with 
the federal government  and veterans of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill  to assess its impact and 
facilitate cleanup efforts.61 The public  sector 
lacked the necessary  combination  of 
equipment  and technical expertise to shut off 
the flow  of oil from  the Gulf floor.62 Thus BP, 
which  drilled the leaking  undersea  oil  well in 
the first  place, cooperated with  the public 
sector  in  carrying  out  the work  of halting  the 
spill.  Public-private sector  partnerships were 
integral to the overall response and recovery 
effort.
F E M A h a s m a d e p u b l i c - p r i v a t e 
partnerships a  high priority, and leads a 
major national initiative to forge closer  ties 
with  the business community.  The agency’s 
regional  offices,  which  cover  all fifty  states 
and US territories,  house a  private sector 
liaison  officer  charged with  building alliances 
with  firms.63  FEMA  Administrator  Craig 
Fugate underscored the importance of the 
private sector  for  emergency  management  in 
recent public remarks:
The private sector, from Fortune 500 
companies to your local  grocery  store, is an 
essential  member  of  the team…. The faster 
we can help stores  and businesses get back 
on their  feet [after  a] disaster, the more 
effective the rest of the team  can  be in 
focusing our resources on  helping  disaster 
survivors  in areas that don't  yet have access 
to those goods and services. Growing 
strong working relationships between 
emergency  managers and the private sector 
is a  good business decision for everyone – it 
helps us  better serve survivors, rebuild our 
communities and boost local economies.64
These comments illustrate the degree of 
buy-in  within  FEMA  oriented toward 
building  relationships with  businesses. 
Public-private partnerships are beneficial  in 
enhancing  firms’ preparedness for  disaster, 
as well  as connecting  them  with government 
partners in  advance of a large-scale 
emergency.  From  FEMA’s leadership team  to 
personnel in  regional  offices, public-private 
sector  partnerships carry  tremendous 
importance.  This emphasis has real-world 
impacts in disaster response.
BENEFITS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY
Public-private partnerships can  enhance 
hiring,  resource utilization, specialization, 
cross-sector trust,  and technological 
innovation.  They  are often  able to cut across 
traditional bureaucratic divides within 
government.  And they  can enhance public 
protection in  ways not  possible for 
g o v e r n m e n t  o r  b u s i n e s s e s a c t i n g 
independently.  In  this section,  we will discuss 
each  of these advantages, which  suggest 
public-private partnerships will make 
ongoing contributions in homeland security. 
HIRING
The private sector  helps the public sector  fill 
personnel needs more effectively  than  the 
g o v e r n m e n t a c t i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t l y . 
Background checks for  security  clearances – 
a  widespread requirement for  prospective 
employees in the homeland security  arena  – 
are notoriously  sluggish, sometimes taking 
years to complete. 65  This can  create a 
significant time lag  effect  between  an 
applicant  being  offered a position, and 
a c t u a l l y  a s s u m i n g  t h a t p o s i t i o n . 
Compounding the issue,  separate human 
resources-oriented activities are also 
necessary  to bring  a  new  employee into the 
homeland security  workforce.  These 
background investigation  and human 
resources processes frequently  overlap. 
Businesses operating  within  the homeland 
security  space are often  able to bring in  new 
employees faster, and more efficiently, than 
the public sector. 66  This,  in  turn, creates 
value for  the public  sector. This arrangement 
serves firms’ business interests,  as well  as 
governmental personnel needs.
Today,  firms like SAIC, Booz Allen 
Hamilton,  Northrop Grumman, and General 
Dynamics assign  employees to work 
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shoulder-to-shoulder  with government 
counterparts in public  sector  homeland 
security  offices.67  As a  result,  the homeland 
security  workforce benefits from  the hiring 
speed of the private sector. These private 
sector employees perform  traditionally 
government  functions, from  intelligence 
analysis, to emergency  planning,  to 
protecting  critical infrastructure.  Thus, 
businesses can  augment the total homeland 
security  workforce faster  than government 
acting  alone.  This provides a  swift, cost-
effective solution  to the need for  more 
personnel in homeland security positions. 
RESOURCE UTILIZATION 
Firms have a  fixed amount  of human  and 
physical  capital with  which  to achieve 
business objectives. Resource utilization 
refers to these assets being  directed toward a 
specific aim,  and in  so doing, forgoing  other 
opportunities.  By  orienting resources toward 
homeland security  applications, businesses, 
government, and the public can benefit. 
Firms’ sales increase.  Government  gains from 
privately  produced products and services, 
and public  safety  is enhanced.  Private 
companies forge an  advantageous triangular 
relationship among these stakeholders by 
using  their  resources for  homeland security 
purposes. 
A  case from  aviation  security  illustrates 
how  focused resource utilization  can benefit 
businesses,  government,  and the general 
public. In 2008, the Transportation  Security 
Administration (TSA)  announced that  it 
would permit airline passengers to keep 
laptops in bags at  security  checkpoints, 
provided the bags adhere to a  certain  x-ray 
transparency  standard.68  TSA subsequently 
released a  Request  for  Information  (RFI) 
about  bag  requirements: they  should have no 
metal components, such  as zippers,  buttons, 
or  snaps that  could interfere with  the ability 
of an  x-ray  to “see”  the laptop’s components. 
To this end,  Aerovation  – a  luggage producer 
– responded by  designing  a  “checkpoint 
friendly”  laptop bag.69  In  public-private 
partnerships such  as this,  a  firm  re-allocates 
research  and development  resources in  order 
to meet  government  homeland security 
objectives, while at the same time serving its 
business interests.  In  theory,  this would 
increase operational efficiency  and reduce 
wait  times for  airline passengers in  security 
queues. For  this innovation  to be effective, 
however,  TSA  personnel  would need to 
rece ive t ra ining to recognize these 
“checkpoint  friendly”  bags and allow 
passengers to keep their  laptops in the bags. 
This training may  not  have sufficiently 
occurred yet.  But through  these and similar 
efforts to maximize resource utilization, 
public-private partnerships can  work to 
achieve homeland security objectives. 
SPECIALIZATION 
By  participating  in homeland security 
activities,  private sector  actors develop 
specializations in  functional  areas,  enhancing 
public sector  performance. 70 This process,  in 
turn, can permit  government  agencies to 
f o c u s m o r e u p o n  m i s s i o n - e s s e n t i a l 
activities.71  For  example, in  2009,  TSA 
announced the award of an  IT services 
contract to CSC,  a  firm  based in  Falls Church, 
Virginia.72  The $493  million, five-year deal 
i n c l u d e s p r o v i s i o n s f o r d e s i g n i n g , 
maintaining, and upgrading TSA’s IT 
infrastructure over  time. 73  Serving  one 
agency’s IT needs in  such a  comprehensive 
way  means that CSC develops increasing 
familiarity  with  TSA  systems,  software, 
hardware, and requirements. This knowledge 
creates efficiencies over  time. On the one 
hand,  CSC is able to anticipate TSA’s needs in 
a  more effective fashion. On  the other  hand, 
TSA  is freed to devote personnel  and 
resources to other  critical  activities. 
Increasing  specialization  by  CSC increases 
aggregate  effectiveness, serving  both  private 
sector  and public sector  interests in  a 
mutually beneficial manner.
BUILDING TRUST, INCREASING 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Communication  between  the public and 
private sector  can decrease officials’ 
skepticism  and mistrust  of one another.  Over 
time, repeated interaction  and collaboration 
may  actually  build trust  across the 
government-business divide. Whether 
developing plans for  the future, or 
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responding to an emergency,  trust is 
invaluable in  fostering  effective,  mutually 
beneficial  outcomes. 74  So public-private 
partnerships have what  might be called a 
“softer”  benefit  – the construction of 
relationships themselves. It  is challenging  to 
quantify  the value of a  public-private sector 
relationship in  the same way  one might 
appraise a  house or  a  car. But having 
excellent working  relationships in  place 
during  routine operations,  as well  as crises, is 
invaluable.75 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
Public-private partnerships can  also serve as 
catalysts for  new  technological  innovations. 76 
Two growing  DHS initiatives stand out in 
their  promotion  of private sector  innovation 
for  homeland security-related challenges: the 
System  Efficacy  through  Commercialization, 
Utilization,  Relevance and Evaluation 
(SECURE) program,  and its sister  program, 
FutureTECH. 77  The SECURE program 
provides a  pathway  for private  sector 
research  and development (R&D) to occur 
without  DHS financing  the process itself. 
This departs from  the traditional model of 
government-funded R&D,  in  that  DHS 
provides clear  requirements and design 
specifications to prospective vendors via 
public announcement.  Firms, in turn,  design 
technologies using their own  resources, and 
attempt to sell  them  to the government at  a 
competitive price.78  This achieves public 
sector  budgetary  savings,  permits firms to 
focus their  R&D activities in a  more effective 
way, and strives to deploy  solutions in  the 
short-term.
The FutureTECH program  aims to 
enhance existing technologies to meet 
anticipated needs,  taking  a  longer  view  of the 
innovation  process. DHS identifies specific 
focus areas in  which  firms can  continue to 
update and improve homeland security  tools. 
These areas include detection  of homemade 
explosives and waterborne improvised 
explosive devices. 79  By  entering  into a 
Cooperative Research  and Development 
Agreement  (CRADA) with DHS,  firms can 
benefit  from  public sector  subject matter 
experts who help to shape the design  of a 
given  product  to meet precise requirements. 
In  this sense,  CRADA  require close 
coordination  between  a  DHS Science and 
Technology  (S&T) officer  and business 
representatives. 80  Both SECURE and 
FutureTECH can  advance innovation for 
homeland security  by  focusing  private sector 
R&D activities to meet  public  sector  needs. 
Despite the great promise of public-private 
partnerships in  homeland security,  they  also 
have a number  of shortcomings.  The article 
next addresses some of the ways in  which 
public-private partnerships can  fail, and 
outlines areas of governance in  which public-
private partnerships cannot function. 
POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS OF 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Public-private partnerships can  provide 
tremendous advantages for  both  government 
and businesses and can help  the United 
States to meet  its national security  needs. 
There are,  however, instances in  which 
public-private partnerships are inappropriate 
due to the unique mandates of government. 
There have also been  cases in  which  public-
private partnerships fail  to meet expectations 
or  businesses do not  comply  with  government 
recommendations.  These issues demonstrate 
that  while public-private partnerships are an 
important development  in homeland 
security, they  are imperfect, and there are 
certain roles that  must  be retained exclusively 
by the public sector.
THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
There are certain  functions that must remain 
squarely  within  the public sector  domain. The 
decision to hire and fire government 
employees is clearly  a  public  sector 
responsibility  – and must remain  an 
authority  of the public  sector.  To be clear, 
private sector-contractors can  assist public 
sector  entities in  human resources-related 
processes,  providing  operational assistance, 
information, and expertise. But the actual 
decision  to grow  or  shrink the workforce 
affects government  in  a  deeply  rooted way, 
and requires a government employee’s 
signature.  To do otherwise would risk 
undermining  the political  process,  and would 
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create severe conflicts of interest in the very 
contracts that  are approved for  the private 
sector. This would present  an  unacceptable 
and unethical quandary for government.
Procuring  resources,  managing  crises, and 
securing  contracts are clear  public sector 
responsibilities that should not be placed in 
private sector  hands. For  accountability 
reasons, businesses cannot  control public 
sector  budgets.  Firms can  provide advice on 
budgeting decisions for  government,  but they 
cannot actually  approve them. In order  to 
avoid conflicts of interest,  signatures on 
procurement orders must remain  those of 
government  employees.  The public sector 
also relies on  contracts for  provision  of goods 
and services, and government  employees 
must  sign  those contracts.  Outsourcing this 
function effectively  places control of public 
dollars in  private hands,  undermining 
society’s trust  in  government’s stewardship of 
tax revenue.  Similarly,  crises often  call for 
public  safety-related decisions about the 
movement of people and resources. The 
democratic state’s first  duty  is to protect its 
citizens,  and it naturally  follows that these 
types of choices – sending  another  police 
officer,  opening  and closing  evacuation 
shelters – must ultimately  be directed by 
government employees. 
UNMET EXPECTATIONS AND COST 
OVERRUNS 
Without  proper  management, contractual 
public-private partnerships can  fail  for  many 
reasons, including  unmet  expectations and 
cost  overruns. One component of the DHS 
Secure Border  Initiative,  widely  known  as the 
“Virtual Fence,”  provides an  excellent 
example of how  this can happen. This 
initiative was to consist  of a  series of 
surveillance radars,  cameras,  and sensors to 
monitor  the United States-Mexico border. 81 
But  the region’s harsh  terrain  caused the 
equipment  to malfunction, and the different 
technologies that  made up the Virtual Fence 
were challenging to integrate.82 These issues 
would be problematic enough  on  their  own, 
but the project  also ran into cost overruns. 
Estimates for  2005  showed it would cost  $7 
billion  for  the fence to cover  the entire  2,000-
mile US southern border. 83 But  a  pilot  test  of 
Virtual  Fence technology  cost  $1  billion to 
cover  fifty-three miles  of the border – just  2 
percent  of the total project. 84  In  January 
2011, DHS canceled the Virtual Fence project, 
noting  that  it  “‘did not meet  current 
s t a n d a r d s f o r  v i a b i l i t y  a n d c o s t 
effectiveness.’” 85  The Virtual  Fence project 
demonstrates how  contractual partnerships 
between  government and business can fall 
apart.  Unmet expectations,  poor  execution, 
and spiraling  costs doomed the initiative. 
This underscores the importance of effective 
and transparent management  of contracts in 
public-private partnerships.
APPEARANCE VERSUS REALITY OF 
COOPERATION 
In  2008, teams of government scientists 
identified a  cyber  vulnerability  in  the US Bulk 
Power  System  (BPS), drafted a  list of 
remedies to address the vulnerability, 
distributed the list  to electrical companies, 
and provided a  timeline for  implementation. 
Despite these proactive steps, and despite the 
apparent  mutual interest in  addressing these 
vulnerabilities,  in  reality  there was minimal 
private sector compliance with  these 
recommendations.86  This example shows 
differences between  public  and private sector 
approaches to cybersecurity. It  also suggests 
that,  despite the appearance of public-private 
sector cooperation on  cybersecurity 
initiatives, actual cooperation may  be less 
common than one imagines. 87 
D i f f e r i n g  a p p r o a c h e s t o c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure protection  can  also be a  source 
of discord between the public and private 
sectors. Marc de Bruijne and Michel van 
Eeten  point  out  that while government and 
business both  agree on  the importance of 
critical infrastructure protection, this 
consensus can  be remarkably  shallow. 88 
Another  scholar  notes that  any  business 
executive who suddenly  announced he was 
increasing  security  spending  by  25  percent 
for  the good of the nation  would almost 
certainly  be fired.89  Government appeals to 
morals,  patriotism,  or  civic  responsibility 
quickly  lose their  luster  when  they  begin to 
eat  into a  firm’s bottom  line.90  Businesses 
may  publicly  promote their  commitment  to 
security, but behind closed doors, there is an 
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upper  limit  to firms’ security  expenses. 
Beyond that  limit, genuine (rather  than 
rhetorical) investment  in  security  can be 
difficult to come by. 
These examples provide a  cautionary  tale 
for  the public and private sectors. Public-
private partnerships provide great  value for 
both  government and businesses. But  there 
are fundamental limits to what public-private 
partnerships can  do, and they  sometimes fail 
to deliver  as expected. In  the following 
section,  we discuss ongoing  challenges for 
public-private sector  partnerships for 
homeland security.
ONGOING CHALLENGES FOR 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
HOMELAND SECURITY
As the examples in  the previous sections 
d e m o n s t r a t e ,  p u b l i c - p r i v a t e s e c t o r 
partnerships are transforming the entire 
discipline of homeland security,  but  there  are 
potential pitfalls from  such  partnerships as 
well.  This trend toward public-private 
partnerships can  there fore prov ide 
tremendous benefits,  but  it  can  also create 
organizational pathologies, long-term 
challenges,  and many  uncertainties.  Several 
of the challenges discussed below  are already 
emerging,  while others may  arise as public-
private partnerships continue to evolve in 
h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y . S c h o l a r s a n d 
practitioners will need to be mindful of these 
issues as the discipline of homeland security 
matures.
EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 
In public-private partnerships,  traditional 
hierarchy  yields to collaborative  engagement. 
In  addition to more traditional skills in 
overseeing  and directing, managers will 
increasingly  need to connect and coordinate 
the shared activities, resources,  and 
capabilities of a  host of new  organizations 
and individuals.  This arrangement suggests a 
shift  in  management  and organizational 
accountability, raising salient  legal  and 
ethical questions. 
Management and Accountability
Over  time, public-private  partnerships will 
undoubtedly  affect  the skill  sets required for 
public sector  managers. As noted,  supervisors 
will be more valued for  their  ability  to foster 
col laborat ion  among personnel  and 
organizat ions than  for  h ierarchica l 
management  skills.  This transition  toward a 
more coordinated public  sector management 
is known  as “networked governance.” 91 Like 
most organizations broadly  concerned with 
public safety,  homeland security  agencies 
have historically  self-organized in  a 
paramilitary-style, top-down structure. 
Networked governance suggests a  flattening 
of this organizational structure over time. 
In  this sense,  the need for  collaborative 
management  will  ultimately  drive changes in 
hiring  and promotion  practices.  The spoils 
will go to those who can  effectively 
communicate and coordinate the actions of 
many  disparate actors – not to those who can 
simply  command. The coordination-oriented 
manager’s skills,  values,  and outlook  then 
trickle  down into the rest  of the organization, 
eventually  changing it from  within.  This 
adjustment from  a  hierarchical  to a  more 
horizontal organization  would require 
excellent planning  and execution by  both 
public and private sector  leaders to ensure 
continuing  effectiveness.  These potential 
organizational changes also connect  with 
questions of accountability. 
Who is calling  the shots now? With  more 
firms entering  the homeland security  space, 
delicate management questions become 
salient: is it ever  appropriate for  a  private 
sector  employee to direct  a  government civil 
servant to perform  specific  work  functions? 
Under what  circumstances might  this hold 
true? Two members of Congress recently 
voiced reservations about  this idea, 
underlining  that  it is government,  not 
business,  that must  be ultimately  be “in 
charge” of homeland security.92 Is this always 
the case? What  protections can government 
devise to ensure that  it  continues to direct 
homeland security  operations, even with  a 
substantial private sector  presence?  None of 
these questions are easy  to answer.  As the 
field of homeland security  moves forward, 
these issues will  continue to present difficult 
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challenges for  governmental and private 
sector specialists. 
Legal and Ethical Challenges
Government can  expand its presence and 
influence via public-private partnerships in 
homeland security. This carries legal 
implications worth  considering. Jon  D. 
Michaels refers to a  phenomenon  he calls 
“deputizing,”  in  which  the private sector, 
along  with  citizens and other  organizations, 
serve as a  force multiplier  for homeland 
security  purposes. He holds that  this 
arrangement  can  place homeland security 
activities on  ambiguous legal and regulatory 
ground.93   For  example, private security 
officers now  outnumber  police officers three 
to one in  the United States.94  Retaining 
private  security  firms can  be financially 
advantageous for government.  Guarding 
federal  buildings or  large-scale events 
increases long-term  fixed costs for  law 
enforcement  agencies. Retaining  firms to 
temporarily  perform  these duties saves time 
and money. It  permits law  enforcement 
agencies to reallocate resources to other 
priorities.  Despite these benefits,  this type of 
public-private partnership also raises serious 
constitutional questions.
There is a  vigorous debate related to the 
legal  powers of private security  officers.95 
Private security  firms may  or  may  not act as 
government  agents. Depending  upon  context, 
they  may  conduct  limited searches of 
persons. It  is not yet  clear  if these searches 
are uniformly  constrained by  the US 
C o n s t i t u t i o n ’ s f o u r t h  a n d f i f t h 
amendments.96 Similarly,  there are concerns 
about  the chain  of command within  private 
security  companies. To whom  do private 
security  officers ultimately  report, and to 
whom  are they  ultimately  accountable  – a 
government  authority  or  a  business? And 
how  does this distinction  affect  the way  they 
carry  out their  duties? These issues blur  the 
legal boundaries between business and 
government.  The implications here are 
significant. Use of private firms for  law 
enforcement-like functions raises legal  and 
organizational questions that must  be 
balanced against financial advantages.97 
Despite these challenges, proponents of 
public-private partnerships can point  to a 
number  of strategic  advantages.  Government 
can  exert  its influence through businesses in 
a  beneficial  way. Putting  aside discussion  of 
private security  firms, consider  that privately 
produced technologies scan  citizens for 
explosives and contraband in  airports. 
Scholars in  emergency  management,  public 
administration,  operations management,  and 
urban  affairs highlight  the benefits of private 
sector participation in disaster response.98 
Skeptics, however, can be apprehensive 
about  the degree to which  the state intrudes 
o n p r i v a t e l i v e s v i a  p u b l i c - p r i v a t e 
partnerships: surveillance cameras can 
capture one’s every  move in  public; cell 
phone intercepts erase the notion  of private 
information  exchange; and invasive airport 
security  screening is often  interpreted as 
eroding  individual liberties and initiating  a 
slow  shift  toward more widespread draconian 
security  measures. These are valid sources of 
concern  and require clear  responses from 
government and businesses.
The shifting  of organizational and 
technological responsibilities to the private 
sector  also prompts related questions about 
liability.  If private sector  technologies do not 
deliver, what does this mean  from  a  legal 
perspective? For  example, let  us assume a 
sophisticated network  of chemical sensors 
fails to detect  a  toxic agent  in  the 
Washington, DC-area Metro system.  Who 
gets the blame? Absent  indemnification 
agreements, can  government  sue the firm? Is 
it  more appropriate for  citizens’  litigation  to 
be directed toward government  or  the 
business itself? Joint action means sharing 
accountability  for  successes and failures in 
homeland security.  Security,  however, is the 
state’s first  duty.  It  is government,  not 
business,  that must  ultimately  make critical 
decisions and take decisive actions in 
homeland security. How  to reconcile these 
positions? Does public-private sector 
collaboration mean  mutual or  individual 
culpability  for  mistakes? These lines of 
inquiry  require further  investigation. 
Additional liability  questions arise when  the 
public sector  lacks the knowledge to make 
informed judgments and decisions.
The Deepwater Horizon oil  rig  explosion 
and spill show  what  can  happen  when 
government regulation  breaks down.  No 
public sector  agency  had a  complete view  of 
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the problem,  nor  the expertise and 
equipment  needed to solve it. Might the 
privatization  of airport  security  functions 
create a  similar dilemma? For  instance, what 
happens if an  explosive device slips through a 
security  checkpoint, ultimately  downing  a 
commercial airliner? Will  government be able 
to adequately  explain  to the public why  the 
lapse occurred, and how  to remedy  it? 
Contractual consequences under  this 
scenario prove worrisome, as well. If 
government  homeland security  capacity  is 
“hollowed out”  via  outsourcing  to private 
firms,  then  homeland security  can  be held 
hostage to the private sector. 99 Public sector 
agencies must  guard against this possibility 
through  diversifying  contracts,  incentivizing 
competition  among  private sector  actors,  and 
maintaining  a minimum  baseline of expertise 
in core competencies. 
Increasing Need for Transparency
Public-private partnerships also raise 
concerns related to transparency, which 
refers to two distinct,  yet  related concepts. 
The first  is governmental  transparency, 
specifically  agency  reporting  to Congress.  The 
second is agency  and business reporting  to 
t h e g e n e r a l  p u b l i c . B o t h  a r e a s o f 
transparency  pose significant  challenges. 
Legislative oversight  is problematic  for  DHS. 
As of July  2012, over 100 committees or 
subcommittees address matters related to 
departmental  operations.100 Businesses in the 
homeland security  space compound this 
challenge.   For example,  are private sector 
representatives held to the same standards of 
ethics and accountability  as their  public 
sector  counterparts? If Congressional 
oversight of DHS is fractured,  how  effective is 
oversight of firms’ activities? Robust 
monitoring  of public  and private sector 
homeland security  actions is essential. 
Lawmakers will  need to ensure that oversight 
evolves in  parallel with  the trend toward 
public-private partnerships in  homeland 
security.
A  second challenge relates to decreasing 
transparency  in  the privatization of national 
security  functions.101  Among  the many 
volumes on  the evolution of homeland and 
international security  since 9/11, Dana  Priest 
and William  M. Arkin  provide the most 
expansive treatment  of this topic.102  They 
raise several  salient  observations about the 
expansion  of post-9/11  government  contracts. 
Under the Bush  administration, they  argue 
that  Congress was able to substantially  grow 
government  for  national  security  reasons via 
private contracting. 103 At  the same time, they 
note that  Congress tried to create the 
appearance government  was not growing – 
presumably  for  political reasons. 104 There is 
also a  span of control issue; top government 
officials admit  the number of national 
security  programs involving businesses has 
become unmanageable.105 Cozy  relationships 
b e t w e e n  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d b u s i n e s s 
representatives are uncomfortable for  Priest 
and Arkin.  These are best  exemplified in the 
lavish conferences in  which  public and 
private sector  officials mingle over expensive 
drinks, dinner, and entertainment. 106  The 
purpose of these conferences is to build 
business relationships between  the public 
and private sectors.107  To Priest  and Arkin, 
though, they  appear  to erode the sense of 
accountability  and due diligence needed in 
government contracting. They  argue that 
these trends are ultimately  damaging  to 
national security. 
To a  limited extent,  we agree with  Priest 
and Arkin’s thesis.  It is true that  ineffective 
program  management  is fiscally  irresponsible 
and is conducive to misdirection and error. It 
is also important for the public to know  that 
program  oversight is in  place and that 
outcomes are be ing measured in a 
meaningful way.  But the suggestion  that 
there is something sinister  here is unfounded. 
Priest  and Arkin  gloss over  the efficiencies 
that  public-private partnerships can  create. 
As we have argued in  this article,  public-
private  partnerships can  improve hiring, 
resource utilization, specialization  of labor, 
and technological  innovation. In  public-
private partnerships,  firms seek  profits, and 
government  scales in  a  way  that  would be 
impossible if acting  independently.  In  this 
sense,  public-private partnerships enhance 
efficiencies in  ways that government  cannot 
produce on  its own. This is not  foul play; it is 
a  case of rational action  by  both  the public 
and private sectors. 
In  light of these challenges, the public and 
private sectors would be well served by 
s h o w i n g  w h y  g o v e r n m e n t - b u s i n e s s 
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partnerships are  necessary,  and how  their 
existence benefits homeland security.  A 
positive example of such efforts would be the 
work  of Thomas Cellucci, former  chief 
commercialization  officer  at  DHS,  who 
publishes extensively  on  the benefits of 
public-private partnerships for  government, 
businesses,  and taxpayers. 108 For example,  he 
m a k e s t h e c a s e f o r  p u b l i c - p r i v a t e 
partnerships,  particularly  in  the context  of 
the DHS SECURE program:
The products  that are developed through 
[the SECURE program] (even  the ones  that 
were not purchased by DHS) can be offered 
to other  private sector entities, such  as 
airport security, school  and university 
security, and security for professional 
sports and concerts, many  of  whom  support 
the defense of  critical  infrastructure and 
key resources nation-wide. There is then  an 
increase in public safety  and security, all 
while the private sector, public sector  and 
taxpayer benefit from the partnership.109
In  clear language, Cellucci demonstrates 
the benefits of public-private partnerships for 
businesses,  government,  and the public. 
S i m i l a r  g o v e r n m e n t  r e p o r t i n g a n d 
explanation  will  help allay  concerns over the 
necessity of public-private partnerships.
INCENTIVIZING PRIVATE SECTOR 
PARTICIPATION 
Public-private partnerships are easy  when 
both  government and business immediately 
benefit.  In  a  service contract,  for  example, 
government  is able to procure a  needed good 
or  service,  and a  company’s bottom  line 
i n c r e a s e s .  B u t  w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n 
government  needs the private sector  – such 
as in  obtaining  data  on  critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities – but  the private sector  lacks 
incentives to cooperate with  government? 
Working  with  public  sector  officials,  while 
helpful for  homeland security  purposes,  eats 
into firms’ overhead expenses.  Collecting 
data  on  a  business’ vulnerabilities requires 
time, labor, and material costs that  are not 
profit-oriented. There is a  financial 
disincentive for  businesses to assist 
government  in  this case. This problem  can be 
compounded if a  company’s competitor 
decides not to cooperate with  government  in 
the same way. The competitor  can  potentially 
provide services at  a  lower  cost  than the 
company that decides to “play ball.” 110 
Public-private partnerships can  also create 
proprietary  and legal  risks for  companies. 
What  assurances,  for  example,  do firms have 
that  government  will protect proprietary  or 
sensitive information? The WikiLeaks 
scandal  underlines that  classified national 
security  information  can quickly  enter  the 
public  domain,  damaging the national 
interest.111  It  is reasonable to suggest  that 
firms’ confidential  information  could be 
subject to similar  disclosures while in 
government  custody.  Such  leaks can  rapidly 
erode a  business’ competitive  edge. Other 
firms offering  similar  products or  services 
gain valuable business intelligence from  these 
data. Private sector  actors may  find their 
trust in  government undercut  by  information 
leaks.  In extremis,  private sector cooperation 
with  government  on critical infrastructure 
protection  could lead to a  business’ outright 
failure through breaches of confidentiality.112  
Regulatory  questions become salient in 
exchange of sensitive information. Can 
businesses be targeted for  punitive measures 
if they  unwittingly  turn over  damaging 
information  about their  activities? There is a 
potential  moral  dilemma in  businesses 
providing the government  information  on 
facilities and operations.  Countless firms are 
subject  to government  regulation.  In 
cooperating  with  government  for  homeland 
security  purposes, firms potentially  risk 
shining  a  light  on unsavory  or  illegal business 
practices. Government  and businesses may 
need to develop clear  guidelines on 
exchanging  potentially  damaging information 
for homeland security purposes.113 
H o w  t o p r o m o t e p r i v a t e s e c t o r 
engagement under  these challenging 
circumstances? Orszag  argues tax  breaks 
make bad policy; they  can  provide benefits to 
firms that would have invested in  security 
measures anyway, increasing  the firms’ 
budgetary  costs but not  actually  providing 
extra  security. 114 Moreover,  he argues that  tax 
credits do not distinguish between high-risk 
and low-risk  sectors – for  example, chemical 
plants versus shopping malls – when  they 
logically  should. 115 Similarly,  James A.  Lewis 
points out that voluntary  cooperation  from 
f irms in the cybersecurity  arena  is 
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inconsistent with  other  sectors of homeland 
security  that require strict  government 
regulation,  including  banking,  commerce, 
and transportation. 116 Both  of these examples 
show  the difficulty  of balancing regulatory 
tools and market  forces to engage businesses 
in  homeland security  efforts. Scholars,  public 
sector  practitioners, and private sector 
representatives therefore aid homeland 
security  by  seeking  new  ways to encourage 
businesses’ participation.  Developing a menu 
of policy  options to increase firms’ 
involvement  in  homeland security  will  be an 
important priority for the years ahead. 
POLITICS, BUDGETS, AND LONG-TERM 
PLANNING 
Politics,  budgets, and long-term  planning  are 
interconnected in  the  homeland security 
context.  The electoral process can  impact 
homeland security  in significant ways. 
Representatives’ thinking  about  homeland 
security  leads to adjustments in  budgets and 
policies.  While hawkish  elected officials may 
choose to funnel more resources toward 
homeland security, others might elect  to trim 
budgets and focus more narrowly  on  specific 
strategic  priorities. These shifts can  alter,  or 
even  undermine, long-term  planning in 
homeland security.  The ongoing  global 
financial crisis also impacts government and 
businesses’ approaches to homeland security. 
In  this dynamic environment, the public and 
private sectors must effectively  plan for 
future threats and challenges in  homeland 
security.
Politics affect  public-private partnerships. 
For  example,  Connecticut  Senator  Joseph 
Lieberman recently  expressed concern that 
private employees, rather than government 
officials, are making  critical decisions at 
DHS.117 After  TSA  halted an  initiative in  2011 
to expand businesses’ roles in  airport 
security, Florida  Congressman  John  Mica 
vowed to investigate  the decision, noting 
“Nearly  every  positive security  innovation 
since the beginning  of TSA  has come from  the 
contractor  screening  program.” 118  When 
politics challenges businesses in  this way, 
firms can  become increasingly  reluctant  to 
enter  the homeland security  space.  Winning 
government  contracts comes at  significant 
overhead cost; research  and development, 
labor, and negotiation  expenses come out  of 
firms’ bottom  lines. It  makes little  sense for 
firms to invest in  homeland security  if elected 
officials (vis-à-vis bureaucrats, with  whom 
those firms routinely  interact) can abruptly 
restrict  or  halt business. When  companies 
hesitate to enter the homeland security 
arena, this reduces the size of the private 
sector  homeland security  market.  With  less 
competition  in  the game, firms that  stay  at 
the table can charge higher  fees for 
government  contracts. The public sector  is 
left  with  a  diminishing pool  of choices for 
outsourcing,  becoming  increasingly  beholden 
to a  small number  of businesses for products 
and services.  Of course, with  stifled 
competition,  any  cost  increases are passed on 
to taxpayers. Political forces can profoundly 
change government-business partnerships in 
homeland security. 
Global  financial markets influence agency 
budgets. Recently, the worldwide economic 
recession  reduced the number  of private 
contractors performing  tradit ionally 
governmental functions. A  2009  DHS 
initiative began  to examine the appropriate 
balance of government workers and 
contractors within  the department. 119  By 
April 2011, DHS cut  3,200 contractor 
positions, converting them  into 2,400 
government  jobs.120  The DHS 2012  fiscal 
budget  includes provisions to convert  another 
1,881  positions from  the private sector  to the 
public sector.121  Current  trends away  from 
private contracting  are not  limited to DHS.  In 
January  2011,  then-Secretary  of Defense 
Robert  Gates announced an  initiative to 
drastically  thin  the ranks of contractors 
within the Department of Defense, as well: 
[As] I have said before, this department has 
become far  too reliant on contractors to 
perform functions that should either  be 
done by  full-time employees or, in  some 
cases, to staff  activities that could – and 
should – be discontinued…. Overall, we will 
cut the size of the staff support contractor 
cadre by  10 percent  per year for  three years 
and realize nearly $6 billion in  total 
savings.122
Reduced budgets affect public-private 
partnerships in  homeland security,  and will 
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continue to change amidst  efforts to revive 
the world’s economies.
Businesses now  face an uncertain  future. 
Some firms find themselves in  “survival 
mode,”  trimming staff because of operating 
costs. In 2011, icons of American  industry 
with  links to homeland security, including 
G M ( o f f i c i a l  v e h i c l e s ) , C a t e r p i l l a r 
( c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d d e b r i s r e m o v a l 
equipment),  Sprint Nextel (communications), 
and Home Depot  (disaster  recovery  supplies) 
cut thousands of positions. 123  When  firms 
trim  budgets, they  have fewer  resources 
(human  and physical capital) to produce 
products and deliver  services.  This means the 
range of possible business relationships for 
homeland security  narrows. Complicating 
matters, when government  budgets shrink, 
firms can  find it  difficult  to plan  for  the 
future; revenue streams become dynamic, 
and this year’s homeland security  cash  cow 
may  not be there next  year. These 
circumstances create a  vicious circle effect  for 
businesses.  Government  budget  cuts 
eliminate business for  the private sector, 
forcing  firms to scale down. This trimming 
could restrict  the ability  of companies to 
operate in  the homeland security  space.  For 
both  the public and private sectors,  then, 
there is an  aggregate shrinking  effect  in 
homeland security  capacity. This creates 
hardships for  both  sectors.  Government  may 
not be able to guarantee a  consistent level of 
public protection,  while  businesses may  find 
it  difficult  to sustain operations and grow 
effectively. Both  sectors are burdened by  the 
global financial crisis. 
In  light  of these trends, government  and 
businesses must  effectively  plan  for  the 
future  of homeland security. Converting 
private sector  jobs to public sector  positions 
requires focused government  effort . 
Competencies, skills, and knowledge must 
smoothly  transfer  from  business to 
government  hands. Yet  there is little financial 
incentive for  businesses to cooperate in  this 
process. Doing  so contradicts their  self-
interests.  After  all,  firms in  the homeland 
security  space make money  from  government 
contracts.  For  its part,  government may  find 
it  has lost  the capacity  to perform  in  certain 
areas of homeland security. This may  be due 
to over-reliance on the private sector  – the 
“hollowing  out”  of government  mentioned 
above.  Further  complicating  this picture, 
there is a  continual flow  of homeland security 
officials between the public and private 
sectors.  Firms’ employees may  join 
government to gain  excellent benefits, 
promotion potential,  and predictable work 
schedules.  Public sector  employees can 
gravitate  toward the private sector  for 
substantially  higher  salaries and fewer 
bureaucratic  constraints.  Downplaying  or 
ignoring these trends hinders effective long-
term  planning  in  homeland security. 
Business and government  officials should 
carefully  consider  these factors in  their 
respective plans for the future. 
CONCLUSIONS
This article shows that public-private 
partnerships are now  integral to homeland 
security  as a  whole – not just its subfields. 
Government and business cooperation  can 
provide distinct  advantages in  hiring, 
resource utilization,  specialization,  and 
technological innovation. These partnerships 
also have significant  implications for 
management practices,  legal and ethical 
challenges,  transparency, building  private 
sector  participation,  politics,  budgeting, and 
long-term  planning.  Future studies will  need 
to examine other  critical issues that  become 
relevant as public-private partnerships 
continue. 
For  example,  what is the effect  of 
decreasing the number  of private contractors 
working  in  homeland security? This may 
increase cost  savings,  but also degrade 
operational  efficiencies.  In an  era  of 
shrinking  budgets and rising  demands on 
security  officials,  it  may  be that  reducing the 
privatization  of homeland security  also 
diminishes effectiveness.  This may  be fiscally 
healthy, in  other  words, but  damaging from  a 
security  standpoint.  Scholars can  benefit 
from  critically  examining  the effects of 
private  sector  personnel reductions on 
homeland security.
As public-private  partnerships continue to 
grow, there is also a  compelling  need for 
s c h o l a r l y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f e f f e c t i v e 
management and successful  outcomes in 
public-private partnerships. Moreover, 
academics can make valuable contributions 
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in  studying  actions,  initiatives,  and special 
projects that  add value to public-private 
partnerships in  homeland secur i ty . 
Researchers can  work with  industry  leaders 
to enhance tools to share best  practices. For 
example,  an existing DHS website designed 
for  sharing  best practices – Lessons Learned 
Information Sharing  – could provide an 
excellent starting point  for  this cross-sector 
collaboration.124  Scholars are in  an  ideal 
position  to make analytical connections and 
provide a  theoretical  framework  for 
successful  management  of public-private 
partnerships.
From  a  theoretical  perspective,  public-
private partnerships also raise important 
questions.  Our  understanding of homeland 
security  is increasingly  linked with  concepts, 
rather  than  agencies. Flexibility, adaptability, 
and resilience have become hallmarks of 
homeland security  programs at  all levels of 
government.  Incorporating  these concepts 
into agencies’ plans and operations helps to 
produce favorable outcomes. But do public-
private partnerships sufficiently  align  with 
these concepts? Some might argue this is 
clearly  true – contracting represents a 
“flexible”  way  to expand homeland security 
staffing.  However, others could demonstrate 
that  this is hardly  the case; contracting  can 
increase government  dependency  on  the 
private sector,  reducing  organizational 
flexibility.  These questions merit additional 
examination. 
There is an  enduring  need to maintain 
capabilities in  homeland security. From  9/11, 
to Hurricane Katrina, to the 2011  Joplin, 
Missouri  tornado, natural and man-made 
disasters continue to loom  large in  the 
national conscience. The private sector  will 
continue to play  a  major  role in  addressing 
similar  threats in the future. Public sector 
agencies benefit from  working with 
businesses to strengthen  US resilience.  There 
will be an  ongoing need for scholars to 
provide insights as these trends continue to 
develop.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Dr. Nathan E. Busch is an associate  professor 
of government at Christopher Newport 
University (CNU) and co-director of the  CNU 
Center for American Studies, where  he  is lead 
coordinator of CNU’s annual Symposium on 
Homeland Security. He  is author of No End In 
Sight: The Continuing Menace  of Nuclear 
Proliferation (University of Kentucky Press, 
2004), and editor of Combating Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: The Future  of International 
Nonproliferation Policy (University of Georgia 
P r e s s , 2 0 0 9 ) . H e c a n b e  r e a c h e d a t 
nbusch@cnu.edu. 
Austen D. Givens  teaches graduate courses  on 
terrorism and emergency management at Utica 
College  in Utica, NY. He  previously served as 
director of emergency management at 
Christopher Newport University (CNU) in 
Virginia. Austen is a fellow with Virginia 
Commonwealth University’s (VCU) National 
Homeland Security Project, holds a master’s 
degree  in Homeland Security and Emergency 
P r e p a r e d n e s s  f r o m V C U , a n d s t u d i e d 
international relations in the  Woodrow Wilson 
Department of Politics at the  University of 
Virginia. He  has worked with the  Department of 
Homeland Security, the  Office  of the Secretary of 
Defense at the  Pentagon, and the  Virginia Fusion 
C e n t e r . H e c a n b e  r e a c h e d a t 
adgivens@utica.edu. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: 
The authors wish to thank Joe Giordano, Shanna 
Van  Slyke, and Greg Walsh for their helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this article.
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  16
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 18  (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 Homeland Security Television, Public-Private Partnerships for Homeland Security, (Washington, DC: August 3, 
2011) online video, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ka6dgMxLrJI. 
2 British Petroleum, Deepwater Horizon: Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010, 29; National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and 
The Future of Offshore Drilling – Report to the President, January 2011, http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf.
3 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Deep Water, 173.
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  17




7 Throughout this article, the term “homeland security” refers to “actions taken at every level (federal, state, local, 
private, and individual citizen) to deter, defend against, or mitigate attacks within the United States, or to respond to 
other major domestic emergencies.” See Dave McIntyre, “What Is Homeland Security? A Short Story,” n.d., accessed 
April 12, 2012, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin/ActionPlan_WhatIsHLS.htm. 
The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) defines emergency management as “the managerial 
function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope 
with disasters.” Our use of the term “homeland security” also includes emergency management.
See International Association of Emergency Managers, Principles of Emergency Management Supplement, 
(September 11, 2007), 4, http://www.iaem.com/publications/documents/PrinciplesofEmergencyManagement.pdf. 
8 Robert A. Beauregard, “Public-Private Partnerships as Historical Chameleons,” in Partnerships in Urban 
Governance: European and American Experience, ed. Jon Pierre (London: MacMillan Press, 1997), 52–70; Pauline 
V. Rosenau, ed., Public-Private Policy Partnerships (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Peter V. Schaeffer & Scott 
Loveridge, “Toward an Understanding of Types of Public-Private Cooperation,” Public Performance & Management 
Review 26, no.2 (2002): 169–189; Bonnie L. Regan, Enhancing Emergency Preparedness and Response: Partnering 
with the Private Business Sector (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009), 14–15.
9 Stephen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers, Governing By Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector, 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), 69–70.
10 Goldsmith and Eggers, Governing By Network; Beauregard, “Public-Private Partnerships as Historical 
Chameleons,” 52–70; Regan, Enhancing Emergency Preparedness and Response, 14–15; Yossi Sheffi, “Supply Chain 
Management Under the Threat of International Terrorism,” International Journal of Logistics Management 12, no. 2 
(2001): 1–11; David J. Closs and Edmund F. McGarrell, “Enhancing Security Throughout the Supply Chain,” Special 
Report Series (IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2004)
11 Sheffi, “Supply Chain Management Under the Threat of International Terrorism,” 1–11; Closs and McGarrell, 
“Enhancing Security Throughout the Supply Chain,” 1–56. 
12 Stephen E. Flynn and Daniel B. Prieto, “Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland 
Security,” Council Special Report No. 13 (Council on Foreign Relations, March 2006); Phillip Auerswald, Lewis 
Branscomb, Todd La Porte, and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, eds., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private 
Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Myriam Cavelty and 
Manuel Suter, “Public-Private Partnerships Are No Silver Bullet: An Expanded Governance Model for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 2, no. 4 (2009): 179–187.
13 Ashton B. Carter, “The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism,” International Security 26, no. 3 
(2001–2002): 5–23; Charles A. Stone and Anne Zissu, “Registered Traveler Program: The Financial Value of 
Registering the Good Guys,” Review of Policy Research 24, no. 5 (2007): 443–462; Crystal Franco, Eric Toner, 
Richard Waldhorn, Thomas Inglesby, and Tara O’Toole, “The National Disaster Medical System: Past, Present, and 
Suggestions for the Future,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 5, no. 4 
(2007): 319–325; Mary C. Comerio, “Public Policy for Reducing Earthquake Risks: A US Perspective,” Building 
Research and Information 32, no. 5 (2005): 403–413. 
14 Government documents, vis-à-vis the homeland security literature, place great emphasis upon the role of the 
private sector in homeland security operations. This reflects a greater understanding of public-private partnerships’ 
importance for homeland security in the practitioner domain than in the scholarly domain, where knowledge is more 
limited. See The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: May 2010); U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: 2008), 18–20; ----, National Incident 
Management System (Washington, DC: 2008), 15-16; ----, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, 
DC: 2009); ----, National Cyber Incident Response Plan [Interim Version] (Washington, DC: September 2010); ----, 
National Disaster Recovery Framework (Washington, DC: September 2011). 
15 James Madison, No. 45: “The Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to State Governments considered for 
the Independent Journal,” in The Federalist Papers (Yale Law School: The Avalon Project, 2008), http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed45.asp.
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  18
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 18  (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
16 Suburban Emergency Management Project, “History of Federal Domestic Disaster Aid Before the Civil War,” July 
24, 2006, http://www.semp.us/publications/biot_reader.php?BiotID=379. 
17 Elizabeth Witham and Steve Bowen, Financing Recovery from Catastrophic Events: Final Report (Washington, 





21 Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, “Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of 
National Preparedness Efforts,” (Washington, DC: FEMA, September 2006), http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/
docs/DHS%20Civil%20Defense-HS%20-%20Short%20History.pdf. 
22 Jenny Nolan, “Willow Run and the Arsenal of Democracy,” The Detroit News, January 28, 1997, http://
apps.detnews.com/apps/history/index.php?id=73&category=locations. 
23 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA History,” August 11, 2010, http://www.fema.gov/about/
history.shtm. 
24 For example, see Apptis, Inc., “About Us,” accessed March 4, 2012, http://www.apptis.com/about/default.aspx; 
Taser, “About Taser,” accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.taser.com/about-taser; Raytheon, “Raytheon Homeland 
Security,” accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/homeland/. 
25 Verizon, “World Trade Center – A Year Later,” accessed January 27, 2012, http://newscenter.verizon.com/kit/
wtc2/. 
26 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Louisiana Katrina/Rita Recovery,” n.d., accessed June 8, 2012, http://
www.fema.gov/pdf/hazard/hurricane/2005katrina/la_progress_report_0810.pdf, 1.
27 Michael Barbaro and Justin Gillis, “Wal-Mart at Forefront of Hurricane Relief,” The Washington Post, September 
6, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090501598.html. 
28 Austen Givens, “Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Is An Ominous Sign for Critical Infrastructure’s Future,” Emergency 
Management, May 27, 2011, http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Deepwater-Horizon-Oil-Spill-Critical-
Infrastructure-052711.html?page=1&. 
29American Red Cross, “Gulf Coast Beach Safety,” June 21, 2010, http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.
1a019a978f421296e81ec89e43181aa0/?vgnextoid=886d19439f749210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD; 
Restorethegulf.gov, “Technical Assistance: Guide to Private/Non-profit programs,” accessed June 6, 2012, http://
www.restorethegulf.gov/node/4621#redcross; Robbie Brown, “Fishermen Sign On to Clean Up Oil,” New York 
Times, April 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/us/01marsh.html. 
30 Dale Jones and Austen Givens, “Public Administration: The Central Discipline in Homeland Security,” in The 
Future of Public Administration, Public Management, and Public Service Around the World: The Minnowbrook 
Perspective, eds. Rosemary O’Leary, David Van Slyke, and Soonhee Kim (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2011), 67–78.
31 “Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/partnerships/editorial_0206.shtm.
32 Ibid.
33 “More About the Office of Infrastructure Protection” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1189775491423.shtm. 
34 “Council Members, Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/files/committees/editorial_0848.shtm.  
35 The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  19
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 18  (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
36 “About the National Cyber Security Alliance,” National Cyber Security Alliance, n.d., accessed January 26, 2012, 
http://www.staysafeonline.org/about-us/about-national-cyber-security-alliance. 
37 Ibid.
38 National Cyber Security Alliance, “Board Members,” n.d., accessed April 4, 2012, http://www.staysafeonline.org/
about-us/board-members. 
39 “National Cyber Security Awareness Month 2010 Results in Brief” (National Cyber Security Alliance, January 14, 
2011), http://www.staysafeonline.org/sites/default/files/resource_documents/NCSAM%202010%20Short
%20Report011411.docx. 
40 Cecilia Kang and Ellen Nakashima, “Google Says Hackers Based in China Accessed U.S. Officials’ Gmail Accounts,” 
Washington Post, June 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-says-hackers-based-
in-china-accessed-us-officials-gmail-accounts/2011/06/01/AGwgRmGH_story.html. 
41 Ibid.
42 “U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade 2010: RANKING OF U.S. CUSTOMS DISTRICTS BY VOLUME OF 
CARGO” (American Association of Port Authorities, November 23, 2011), http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/Statistics/
U.S.%20WATERBORNE%20FOREIGN%20TRADE%202010%20RANKING%20OF%20U.S.%20CUSTOMS
%20DISTRICTS%20BY%20TRADE%20VOLUME.pdf. 
43 “LaGuardia Airport Facts and Information” (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 2012), http://
www.panynj.gov/airports/lga-facts-info.html. 
44 “C-TPAT Overview” (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, December 13, 2007), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_overview.xml. 
45 Adboulaye Diop and David Hartman, “Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Cost-Benefit Survey” (U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, August 2007), 3,  http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/
ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_cost_survey.ctt/ctpat_cost_survey.pdf; C-TPAT Overview.
46 “Federal Port Security Credential Now Available Nationwide” (Transportation Security Administration, September 
17, 2008), http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2008/0917.shtm. 
47 Testimony of Maurine Fanguy, Program Director, Transportation Security Administration, Before the U.S. House of  
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global 
Counterterrorism, Transportation Security Administration, September 27, 2008, http://www.tsa.gov/press/
speeches/091708_fanguy_twic_depolyment_complete.shtm. 
48 “Borders and Transportation Security” (SAIC, 2012), http://www.saic.com/natsec/homeland-security/border-
security.html. 
49 Joseph Straw, “New Views on Airport Screening,” Security Management (2012), http://
www.securitymanagement.com/article/new-views-airport-screening-004586?page=0%2C1. 
50 House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Screening Partnership: Why 
Is A Job Creating, Public-Private Partnership Meeting Resistance at TSA?, 112th Cong., 1st sess., February 16, 2012.
51 Transportation Security Administration, “Screening Partnership Program,” n.d., accessed June 8, 2012, http://
www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/optout/index.shtm 
52 House Committee on Homeland Security, Screening Partnership, 12.
53 William L. Waugh and Gregory Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management,” 
Public Administration Review 66, no. S1 (2006): 131–140. Comprehensive emergency management means all of a 
community’s hazards are considered in mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities.
54 Naim Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context: Networks in Emergency Response 
Management,” Connections 26, no. 2 (2005): 33–48.
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  20
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 18  (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
55 Elaine Pittman, “What Big-Box Retailers Can Teach Government About Disaster Recovery,” Government 
Technology, November 28, 2011, http://www.govtech.com/policy-management/Big-Box-Retailers-Teach-Disaster-
Recovery.html. 
56 Eric Bonabeau and W. David Stephenson, “Expecting the Unexpected: The Need for a Networked Terrorism and 
Disaster Response Strategy,” Homeland Security Affairs 3, no. 1 (February 2007), http://www.hsaj.org/?
article=3.1.3. 




61 Harold F. Upton, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Gulf of Mexico Fishing Industry (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2011), 8-9, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41640.pdf.
62 Givens, “Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.”
63 “About Industry Liaison Program” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2010), http://www.fema.gov/
privatesector/industry/about.shtm. 
64 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Administrator: Business Community is Critical Partner in 
Disaster Response and Recovery,” November 4, 2011, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=59308. 
Fugate is FEMA’s top official.
65 For example, see Edward T. Pound, “Security Clearance Challenges Defy Easy Fixes,” Government Executive, 
August 14, 2007, http://www.govexec.com/welcome/?zone=welcome&rf=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.govexec.com
%2Fdailyfed%2F0807%2F081407nj1.htm; “Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance 
Process,” Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 22, 2008, http://www.gao.gov/
assets/130/120165.pdf; Letter to U.S. Senators Daniel Akaka and George Voinovich from Brenda Farrell, Director of 
Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 14, 2008, http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08965r.pdf; “Security Clearance Reform: Upgrading the Gateway to the National Security Community,” 
Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ASIS 
International, September 25, 2008, http://www.asisonline.org/councils/documents/govt_secclearance.pdf; 
“Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed 
Clearance Process” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2009), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09488.pdf; Letter (with attachment) to Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists from Dionne 
Hardy, FOIA Officer, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, May 20, 2011, http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/
irtpa-2011.pdf.
66 George Boyne, “Public and Private Management: What’s the Difference?,” Journal of Management Studies 39, no. 
1 (2002): 97–122; Mary K. Feeney and Hal G. Rainey, “Personnel Flexibility and Red Tape in Public and Nonprofit 
Organizations: Distinctions Due to Institutional and Political Accountability,” Journal of Public Administration 
Research & Theory 20 (2010): 801–826.
67 See “Homeland Security,” Booz Allen Hamilton, accessed October 3, 2011, http://www.boozallen.com/consultants/
civilian-government/homeland-security-consulting; “Homeland Security,” SAIC, accessed October 3, 2011, http://
www.saic.com/natsec/homeland-security/; “Homeland Security,” Northrop Grumman, accessed October 3, 2011, 
http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/by_solution/homeland_security/index.html; “Homeland Security,” General 
Dynamics C4 Systems, accessed October 3, 2011, http://www.gdc4s.com/content/detail.cfm?item=a96ae1cb-
eb74-47d6-bffc-bc7ada51469a. 
68 “‘Checkpoint Friendly’ Laptop Bag Procedures,” Transportation Security Administration, August 15, 2008, http://
www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/simplifying_laptop_bag_procedures.shtm. 
69 “Aerovation Products,” Aerovation, n.d., accessed January 26, 2012, http://aerovation.com/; “Laptop Bags: 
Industry Process and Guidelines,” Transportation Security Administration, July 29, 2008, http://www.tsa.gov/press/
happenings/innovative_laptop_bag_designs.shtm. 
70 Goldsmith and Eggers, Governing by Network, 25–39.
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  21
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 18  (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
71 Ibid.
72 “TSA Awards Contract for Information Technology Infrastructure,” Transportation Security Administration, 
September 28, 2009, http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20110131/DEPARTMENTS03/101310303/1050/
PERSONNEL04. 
73 Ibid.
74 Danny Peterson and Richard Besserman, “Analysis of Informal Networking in Emergency Management,” Journal 
of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 7, no. 1 (2010): 1–14; Kathleen M. Kowalski-Trakofler, Charles 
Vaught, Michael R. Brinch Jr., Jacqueline H. Jansky, “A Study of First Moments In Underground Mine Emergency 
Response,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 7, no. 1 (2010): 1–28.
75 The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
76 Goldsmith and Eggers, Governing by Network.
77 Thomas A. Cellucci, ed., Innovative Public-Private Partnerships: Pathway to Effectively Solving Problems (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, July 2010), 17–20, http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/st_innovative_public_private_partnerships_0710_version_2.pdf 
78 Ibid.
79 “FutureTECH,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed January 27, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/files/
programs/gc_1242058794349.shtm. 
80 Thomas A. Cellucci, FutureTECH: Concept of Operations (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d., accessed 
January 27, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st_commercialization_office_futuretech_conops.pdf. 
81 Julia Preston, “Homeland Security Cancels ‘Virtual’ Fence After $1 billion Is Spent,” New York Times, January 14, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/us/politics/15fence.html.
82 Daniel B. Wood, “Janet Napolitano Halts Funding for Virtual Border Fence,” The Christian Science Monitor, March  
17, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0317/Janet-Napolitano-halts-funding-for-virtual-border-fence; 
Robert N. Charette, “Napolitano Cancels the US $1 billion SBINet Virtual Fence Project,” IEEE Spectrum (March 
2011)  http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/napolitano-cancels-the-us-1-billion-sbinet-virtual-fence-project.
83 Preston, “Homeland Security Cancels ‘Virtual’ Fence.”
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Hon. John D. Dingell, “Protecting the Electrical Grid from Cybersecurity Threats,” testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., September 11, 2008, 128.
87 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Business Software Alliance, TechAmerica, Internet Security Alliance (ISA), Center for 
Democracy and Technology, Improving Our Nation’s Cybersecurity through the Public-Private Partnership: A 
White Paper (Center for Democracy and Technology, March 2011), https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/
20110308_cbyersec_paper.pdf. This co-authored white paper supports the assertion that public-private partnerships 
can be strengthened in multiple dimensions.
88 Mark de Bruijine and Michel van Eeten, “Systems That Should Have Failed: Critical Infrastructure Protection in an 
Institutionally Fragmented Environment,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 15, no. 1 (2007): 18. 
89 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security In an Uncertain World (New York, NY: 
Copernicus Books, 2003), 41.  See also de Bruijne and van Eeten, “Systems That Should Have Failed.”
90 de Bruijne and van Eeten, “Systems That Should Have Failed,” 18.
91 Goldsmith and Eggers, Governing by Network.
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  22
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 18  (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
92 Gregg Carlstrom, “Senator: DHS Budget Begins ‘Turnaround’ Away from Contracting,” Federal Times, February 24, 
2010, http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20100224/CONGRESS03/2240304/1055/AGENCY; Stephen Losey, 
“TSA halts expansion of privatized airport screening,” Federal Times, January 31, 2011, http://
www.federaltimes.com/article/20110131/DEPARTMENTS03/101310303/1050/PERSONNEL04.
93 Jon D. Michaels, “Deputizing Homeland Security,” Texas Law Review 88, no. 7 (2010): 1435–1473.
94 Kai Jaeger and Edward P. Stringham, “Private Policing Options for the Poor” (National Center for Policy Analysis, 
December 15, 2011), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba763. 
95 For example, see Cooper J. Strickland, “Regulation Without Agency: A Practical Response to Private Policing in 
United States v. Day,” North Carolina Law Review 89 (2011): 1338–1363.
96 Ibid., 1340.
97 For one of the first of many studies on this subject, see P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized 
Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
98 Ross Prizzia, “Coordinating Disaster Prevention and Management in Hawaii,” Disaster Prevention and 
Management 15, no. 2 (2006): 275–285; Naim Kapucu, “Public-Nonprofit Partnerships For Collective Action in 
Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies,” Public Administration 84, no. 1 (2006): 205–220; Camilla Stivers, “‘So Poor and 
So Black’: Hurricane Katrina, Public Administration, and the Issue of Race,” Public Administration Review 67, no. 1 
(Special Issue, December 2007): 48–56; Geoffrey T. Stewart, Ramesh Kolluru, and Mark Smith, “Leveraging Public-
Private Partnerships to Improve Resilience in Times of Disaster,” International Journal of Physical Distribution and 
Logistics Management 39, no. 5 (2009): 343–364; Susan A. McManus and Kiki Caruson, “Emergency Management: 
Gauging the Extensiveness and Quality of Public and Private-Sector Collaboration at the Local Level,” Urban Affairs 
Review 47, no. 2 (2011): 280–299.
99 For a classic treatment of this phenomenon, see R.A.W. Rhodes, “The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing 
Nature of the Public Service in Britain,” The Political Quarterly 65, no. 2 (1994): 138–151.
100 House Judiciary Committee Hearing on Oversight of the Homeland Security Department, 112th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
July 19, 2012, accessed September 13, 2012, http://www.micevhill.com/attachments/immigration_documents/
hosted_documents/112th_congress/
TranscriptOfHouseJudiciaryCommitteeHearingOnOversightOfTheHomelandSecurityDepartment.pdf; House 
Judiciary Committee Hearing on Homeland Security Oversight (Washington, DC: C-SPAN, July 19, 2012), online 
video, http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/307135-1#.  
101 To date, the most comprehensive and illuminating work on this topic is Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top 







108 For example, see Thomas A. Cellucci, Partnership Program Benefits Taxpayers as well as Public and Private 
Sectors (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, 2008).
109 Thomas A. Cellucci and James W. Grove, Leveraging Public-Private Partnership Models and the Free Market 
System to Increase Speed-of-Execution of High-Impact Solutions Throughout State and Local Governments (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, August 2011), 10.
110 For a similar point, see Stephen Flynn, “The Brittle Superpower,” in Auerswald et al., Seeds of Disaster, 30–31.
111 Scott Shane and Andrew Lehren, “Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy,” New York Times, November 
28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html?pagewanted=all. 
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  23
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 18  (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
112 See Auerswald et al., Seeds of Disaster, for a thorough examination of public-private sector cooperation for critical 
infrastructure protection.
113 Ellen Nakashima, “Cybersecurity Bill Promotes Exchange of Data; Critics Say Measure Could Harm Privacy 
Rights,” Washington Post, November 11, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
cybersecurity-bill-promotes-exchange-of-data-white-house-civil-liberty-groups-fear-measure-could-harm-privacy-
rights/2011/11/30/gIQAD3EPEO_story.html. Recent legislation seeks to limit firms’ liability for sharing data with 
government. This is an example of an incentive for firms to exchange information with the public sector.
114 Peter R. Orszag, “Homeland Security: The Problems With Providing Tax Incentives to Private Firms,” Testimony 
Before the House Committee on Small Business Subcommittee on Rural Enterprise, Agriculture, and Technology, 
108th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 21, 2004. 
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.  See also James A. Lewis, “Aux Armes, Citoyens: Cyber Security and Regulation in the United States,” 
Telecommunications Policy 29 (2005): 821–830.
117 Carlstrom, “Senator: DHS Budget Begins ‘Turnaround’.” 
118 Losey, “TSA halts expansion of privatized airport screening.
119 “Mature and Strengthen the Homeland Security Enterprise,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 14, 
2011, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc_1240838201772.shtm. 
120 “Over Reliance on Contractors,” Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2012, Committee Reports 
(112th Congress), Senate Report 112-074, September 7, 2011, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?
&sid=cp112YCOmu&r_n=sr074.112&dbname=cp112&&sel=TOC_56275&. The 2012 Department of Homeland 
Security Appropriations Bill notes that DHS includes 110,000 private employees, vis-à-vis 221,000 federal employees. 
This effectively means that approximately one third of DHS is privatized. 
121 Ibid.
122 Robert Gates, “A Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 6, 
2011, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1527. 
123 “Big U.S. Companies Announce Massive Job Cuts,” MSNBC, January 26, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
28854051/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/t/big-us-companies-announce-massive-job-cuts/. 




Copyright © 2012 by  the author(s). Homeland Security Affairs is  an  academic 
journal  available free of charge to individuals  and institutions. Because the purpose 
of this publication  is the widest possible dissemination  of knowledge, copies of this 
journal  and the articles contained herein  may be printed or  downloaded and 
redistributed for  personal, research  or educational purposes free of  charge and 
without permission. Any commercial  use of Homeland Security Affairs or  the 
articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of  the 
copyright  holder. The copyright of all  articles  published in Homeland Security 
Affairs  rests with the author(s) of the article. Homeland Security Affairs is the 
online journal of the Naval  Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security (CHDS).
http://www.hsaj.org
BUSCH AND GIVENS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  24
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 18  (OCTOBER 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
